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  Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to provide a new way of reading Henry Miller by drawing 
attention to his unlikely aesthetic and moral intersections with Ezra Pound. It traces 
the lineage of a particular strand of radical modernist expression that is exemplified 
in Pound’s critical essays between 1909 and 1938 and finds its way – incongruously - 
into Henry Miller’s semi-autobiographical novels of the 1930s. In the process, I will 
illuminate hitherto underexplored territory that is shared by two seemingly 
incompatible writers, pointing the way to a better understanding of the aesthetic and 
moral contradictions in Miller’s – and indeed Pound’s – work.    
Crucially, I propose that Miller’s literature is morally engaged rather than amoral or 
unwittingly counter-revolutionary, two common and reductive assumptions. By 
reading him in the context of Pound’s often suspect pronouncements on hierarchy 
and order it is possible to reassess George Orwell’s widely accepted conclusion that 
Miller is simply a ‘passive, unflinching’ recorder of life.1 It is also possible to treat his 
textual violence as an important part of his aesthetic, rather than condemning or 
glossing over it. This thesis will define a set of aesthetics that are common to Pound 
and Miller and involve complex, often paradoxical impulses – most crucially 
between the desire to cultivate a radically inclusive artistic approach and the 
instinctive adherence to a set of absolute tastes and values. 
Taking as my starting point a little known review by Pound of Miller’s Tropic of 
Cancer, I demonstrate that the latter’s often brutal, anti-humanist rhetoric enables 
rather than undermines his larger humanistic project. I show that Miller’s 
idiosyncratic assimilation of high modernist reactionary tropes and ideas were 
integral to his original and influential view of art, ethics and reality. Concomitantly, 
this comparison of two very different writers seeks to generate a new perspective on 
the slippage between retrograde and progressive elements in both their works as 
well as the period in which they were writing.  
                                                             
1 George Orwell, ‘Inside the Whale’ in Collected Essays, ed. by George Packer 
(London: Harvill Secker, 2009), pp. 95-137, p. 128. Originally published in Inside the 
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         Literature review 
My primary reading consists of a selection of Ezra Pound’s essays and manifesto 
writings between 1909 and 1938 and Henry Miller’s Tropic of Cancer and Max and the 
White Phagocytes, two of his semi-autobiographical novels from the 1930s. Of Pound’s 
essays, I will focus on his initially unpublished review of Tropic of Cancer, written in 
1935, on ‘Joyce’ and ‘Ulysses’ - his essays on James Joyce’ value to English literature 
in the 1910s – and Guide to Kulchur, his 1938 treatise on culture, politics and 
economics. Pound’s review of Tropic of Cancer provides the basis for my re-reading of 
Miller’s moral philosophy; the Joyce essays help me to delineate his principal 
aesthetics of the 1910s; and Guide to Kulchur explains his application of these early 
aesthetics to a conspiracy theory that connected impure literary expression to usury, 
liberal democracy and a general decline of values in the Western world.  
My secondary reading can be broken down into six main categories: a small body of 
Miller criticism that reads him in the high modernist tradition; theoretical studies of 
modernism – in particular a selection of books that provide definitions of ‘late’ or 
‘minor’ modernisms which are applicable to Miller; Miller’s essays on art, literature 
and philosophy from the 1940s to the 1960s; a substantial range of work on Pound as 
a literary and economic commentator in the first half of the twentieth century; 1930s 
and 1940s reviews of Miller’s novels that provide points of comparison with 
Pound’s; and literary philosophical and theoretical writings that inform both 
primary subjects.  
There are very few studies of Miller in the context of Anglo-European modernism 
and none at all that focus on the relationship between his and Pound’s writing.  A 
small clutch of texts have dealt with Miller specifically in the context of 
psychoanalysis and Surrealism – Jane Nelson’s Form and Image in the Fiction of Henry 
Miller (1975), Gay Louise Balliet’s Henry Miller and Surrealist Metaphor: Riding the 
Ovarian Trolley (1996), James M. Decker’s Constructing the Self, rejecting modernity 
(2005) and Caroline Blinder’s A Self-Made Surrealist: Ideology and Aesthetics in the Work 
of Henry Miller (2000). These works provide interesting ideas as to Miller’s 
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appropriation and reworking of André Breton’s automatic method and his position 
within that modernist-related methodology. Besides Blinder, whose work has been 
important to my research and whom I shall come on to shortly, these writers do little 
in terms of locating Miller’s prose within the ideological or stylistic context of his 
more celebrated high modernist predecessors and cotemporaries. Nevertheless, they 
have been useful for their commentaries on Miller’s inheritance of Breton’s 
aggressive stance against ‘literature’, an area I explore throughout my comparison of 
Miller with Pound.  
Of the even smaller group of critics who deal specifically with Miller in the context of 
Anglo-European modernism, English academic Sarah Garland is the most relevant to 
my study. Her 2010 essay, ‘The Dearest of Cemeteries’, is the only attempt to make a 
sustained connection between Miller and Pound, identifying their shared interest in 
the apocalyptic and the egomaniacal tone that results from this. I have found her 
approach crucial for its understanding of the correspondence between Pound as co-
writer of the Vorticist manifestos and the autodidactic passages of Cancer. Moreover, 
it has provided me with the foundations for my research into Miller and Pound as 
adopters of eschatological language and theory in the 1930s – pointing the way to 
many of the theorists I cite in Chapter Three, ‘’The Festival of Death’: Eschatology, 
Economics and Fascism’. Treating Miller as a ‘magpie’, a collector of diffuse literary 
ideas, tones and textures, Garland identifies Pound as one of many contributory 
influences on his work.2 This topographical perspective has helped me to form my 
own understanding of Miller’s position in relation to inter-war modernism, allowing 
me to think about Miller as a ‘syncretic’ and ‘parodic’ appropriator of suspect 
prophetic rhetoric.3 This thesis picks up many of the threads from Garland’s essay 
                                                             
2 Sarah Garland, Rhetoric and Excess: Style, Authority, and the Reader in Henry Miller’s 
‘Tropic of Cancer’, Samuel Beckett’s ‘Murphy’, William Burroughs’ ‘Naked Lunch’, and 
Vladimir Nabokov’s ‘Ada or Ardor’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of East 
Anglia, 2005), p. 17. 
3 Sarah Garland, ‘The Dearest of Cemeteries’, European Journal of American Culture, 3rd 
ser., 29 (2010), 197-215, p. 200. 
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and develops them by narrowing the focus from a general study of Miller in the 
context of ‘canonical high modernism’ to a direct comparison with Pound.4 
Garland’s 2005 PhD thesis Rhetoric and Excess: Style, Authority, and the Reader in Henry 
Miller’s Tropic of Cancer, Samuel Beckett’s Murphy, William Burroughs’ Naked Lunch, and 
Vladimir Nabokov’s Ada or Ardor deals more closely with Miller’s narrative style, 
highlighting an aggressive dynamic between writer and reader that I use to connect 
Miller with Pound. Similarly, Katy Masuga’s The Secret Violence of Henry Miller (2011) 
uses Gilles Deleuze’s theory of ‘minor’ literature to present Miller as a covertly 
antagonistic writer whose language and syntax is purposefully excessive and 
frustrating, intended to draw attention to the impossibility of language as a stable 
means of expressing reality. It is relevant to this study because its theoretical 
discussion of Miller’s incendiary construction of sentences helps to inform and 
consolidate my own ideas about his incendiary use of equally unbearable moral 
positions to draw the reader’s attention to the problems inherent in ideology and 
morality.  
Though it does not refer to Pound, Blinder’s thesis Henry Miller’s Sexual Aesthetics: A 
Comparative Analysis of Selected Twentieth-Century Influences on Henry Miller’s Writing 
(1995) and her book A Self-Made Surrealist: Ideology and Aesthetics in the Work of Henry 
Miller have been useful for their focus on morality in Tropic of Cancer, Black Spring 
(1936) and Tropic of Capricorn (1939). Blinder’s translation and close analysis of the 
essay ‘La Morale de Miller’, by French literary theorist Georges Bataille (1946) 
informs my arguments on Miller’s use of violent and ostensibly anti-humanistic 
language to arrive at a position of optimism and tolerance. It also provides a vital 
counterpoint in my comparison of Miller and Pound’s approaches to expenditure, 
both sexual and economic. My own analysis of Bataille plays an important part in the 
thesis - I shall discuss his work in detail later on in this review – and Blinder’s 
criticism has provided me with interesting angles from which to develop my own 
ideas, particularly when it comes to the blurring of boundaries between radical 
avant-gardist aesthetics and the totalising rhetoric of fascism.                                                               
4 Garland, ‘The Dearest of Cemeteries’, p. 200. 
 8 
To the same end, Gilles Mayne’s Eroticism in Georges Bataille and Henry Miller (2001) 
presents Miller as a writer whose subversive project is disingenuous since it seeks to 
replace one set of totalising values with another, more extreme and less accountable. 
My conclusions about Miller’s rebellion against conventional conceptions of 
humanism are tested against Mayne’s comparative analysis of Miller with Bataille as 
well as Indrek Manniste’s more recent study, Henry Miller: The Inhuman Artist (2013). 
While I agree with Mayne about the suspect overtones of Miller’s professedly 
progressive program, and with Manniste about the importance of his self-
presentation as ‘inhuman’, I contend that Miller is more aware of his contradictions 
and absurdities than these scholars allow for. Similarly, I take an interested but 
cautious approach to work that deals enthusiastically with Miller’s sexual and 
spiritual aesthetics – work by Kenneth Rexroth (‘The Reality of Henry Miller’, 1959), 
Charles Glicksberg (The Sexual Revolution in Modern American Literature, 1970), 
Norman Mailer (Genius and Lust, 1976) and Michael Woolf (‘Beyond Ideology: Kate 
Millet and the case for Henry Miller’, 1992) – since I argue that Miller’s project relied 
on a certain irreverence and self-deprecation about his purposes and ideas.   
Besides Tropic of Cancer and Max and the White Phagocytes, I have found evidence of 
Miller’s subversive moral code in his other semi-autobiographical novels of the 1930s 
– Black Spring (1936) and Tropic of Cancer’s prequel, Tropic of Capricorn (1939) – and 
various essays he wrote between the late 1930s and the 1960s. Black Spring and Tropic 
of Capricorn describe Miller’s early life in New York before his self-imposed exile as 
artist in Paris and are mainly useful for the protests they contain against American 
modernity and the restrictions of family and the workplace. For Miller’s explicit 
theories about the artist’s role and the relationship between art and life my main 
source has been the essay ‘Un Être Étoilique’. Written about his lover and literary 
ally Anaïs Nin in 1939, it lays out his recommendations for a sane and healthy 
approach to life, art and moral behaviour. Crucially, it contains his most explicit 
statements on a new form of sympathy that takes count of the complexity of 
pluralistic subjective experience.  ‘An Open Letter to Surrealists Everywhere’ – 
published in 1938 - and Time of the Assasins - his short study of the poet Artaud 
Rimbaud from 1946 – develop these ideas by providing the philosophical grounding 
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for Miller’s beliefs about the primacy of the excessive ‘monstrous’ individual over 
the ‘timid’ collective.5 These beliefs are expanded on in various collections of Miller’s 
correspondence with friends and literary allies – namely A Literate Passion: Letters of 
Anaïs Nin and Henry Miller 1932-1953 (1988), Art and Outrage. A correspondence about 
Henry Miller between A. Perlès and Lawrence Durrell (1959), Hamlet: The Michael Fraenkel 
– Henry Miller Correspondence called HAMLET (1933) and Letters to Emil (1989). The 
last of these, comprising of Miller letters from Paris to his childhood friend Emil 
Schnellock, is particularly useful since he it contains his feelings about Tropic of 
Cancer as it is being written.    
In my attempts to place Miller within the wider historical context of Pound, 
Wyndham Lewis and T.E. Hulme’s modernising project, I have consulted Rod 
Rosenquist’s survey, Modernism, The Market and the Institution of the New (2009). 
Rosenquist provides the template for my understanding of Miller as a ‘late’ 
modernist, both indebted to and reactionary against the radical manifestos of the 
‘men of 1914’.6 He has also helped me understand Miller’s contradictory desires to 
reject and be included within the modernist canon as a distinctively ‘late’ modernist 
characteristic. Modernism-Dada-Postmodernism by Richard Sheppard – another 
overview of modernism cited throughout Garland’s ‘The Dearest of Cemeteries’ – 
gives a good account of the evolution of ideas that took place between W.B Yeats, 
Pound, T.S. Eliot and Joyce’s era of the 1910s and the 1930s when Miller’s Cancer 
appeared. By the same token, Ihab Hassan’s The Literature of Silence and Frank 
Kermode’s The Sense of An Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction (both 1967) are 
referred to in Chapter Three for their analysis of the ways in which apocalyptic ideas 
and rhetoric manifested themselves in work by modernists before and after World 
War Two.     
K.K. Ruthven’s 1990 text Ezra Pound as Literary Critic has provided invaluable 
guidance in my close analysis of Pound’s literary reviews between 1909 and 1938.                                                              
5 Henry Miller, The Time of the Assassins: A Study of Rimbaud by Henry Miller (New 
York: New Directions, 1962 [orig. ed.: 1946]), p. 31. 
6 Rod Rosenquist, Modernism, The Market and the Institution of the New (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 10. 
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Ruthven’s analysis of Pound’s review work benefitted my study by its 
uncomplicated, comprehensive approach and its methodical negotiation of 
inconsistent terrain. He manages to piece together a coherent aesthetic and moral 
theory from Pound’s constantly mutating and contradictory essays, building up a 
picture of Pound as critic and literary ideologue that is convincingly supported by 
primary evidence. Ezra Pound as Literary Critic has also been particularly useful for its 
explanation of Pound’s complicated metamorphosis from literary critic interested in 
championing truthful, ‘concrete’ literary expression to economic theorist who saw 
writing as means of reflecting and realigning economic and social relations.   
Hugh Kenner’s seminal 1972 text The Pound Era makes useful if partisan attempts to 
explain the imagery at the core of Pound’s Imagist and Vorticist aesthetic and 
political proscriptions. While these have helped me in my comparison of Pound and 
Miller’s rhetorical modes, Kenner’s analysis - undertaken in a decade when his 
subject’s pro-fascist wartime activities still rendered him unacceptable to Anglo-
American literary circles - is overly influenced by a desire to restore Pound’s 
reputation. The counter-offensive efforts of critics like Kenner, Marshal McLuhan 
(‘Pound’s Critical Prose’, 1949) and metaphysical philosopher Brian Soper (‘Ezra 
Pound: Some Notes on his Philosophy’, 1950) – steeped in the notion of Pound’s 
desire for understanding and communication - help illuminate the paradox of 
Pound’s insistence on art that records ‘the full gamut of values’ and his increasingly 
fierce intolerance towards people and groups who did not share his particular value 
system.7  
As Kenner, Marshal McLuhan and Soper all note, Pound’s ideas about order and 
values are heavily influenced by his reading of the Ancient Chinese philosopher, 
Confucius. For this reason, I refer to Pound’s 1928 translation of Confucius’ ‘Ta Hsio: 
The Great Digest’, his 1937 essay ‘Immediate Need of Confucius’ and various of his 
‘China Cantos’ throughout the thesis.  Of the academics who have focused specifically on 
this aspect of Pound’s aesthetic and moral approach I have found Ira B. Nadel’s 2003 
essay ‘Constructing the Orient: Pound’s American Vision’ and Feng Lan’s 2005 study                                                              
7 Ezra Pound, ‘Review of Tropic of Cancer’, in Critical Essays on Henry Miller, ed. by 
Ronald Gottesman (New York: G.K. Hall & Co., 1992), pp. 87-90, p. 88. 
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Ezra Pound and Confucius: Remaking Humanism in the Face of Modernity to be most 
pertinent to my reading – Nadel for his understanding of Confucius as a touchstone 
Pound shared with Ralph Waldo Emerson and Walt Whitman and Feng Lan for his 
thoughts on the paradoxes inherent in Confucius and Pound’s arguably humanist 
ideas.  
In my sections on Pound and Wyndham Lewis’ Vorticism I have used William Wees’ 
Vorticism and the English Avant-Garde (1972) to explain the militaristic and masculinist 
atmosphere out of which their ideas emerged. Martin Puckner, a more recent, less 
apologetic commentator on Imagism and Vorticism, is representative of a twenty 
first century critical consensus when he points out the anachronism of what he calls 
‘offensive cliches, racist portraits, patronising characterizations [and] sexist 
obsessions’ in the Vorticist Manifesto.8 Paul Edwards, in his introduction to the 2003 
collection of essays he edits, The Great London Vortex: Modernist Literature and Art, and 
Mark Antliff in his 2010 essay ‘Sculptural Nominalism/Anarchist Vortex: Henri 
Gaudier-Brzeska, Dora Marsden, and Ezra Pound’ have also been useful for their 
explanations of the crossover between visual artistic and literary aesthetics at this 
time. Both present an equally critical but more substantial reading on the anarchistic 
and anti-humanist nature of Pound, Lewis, T.E. Hulme and the Vorticist sculptor 
Henri Gaudier-Brzeska’s work. Moreover, they have helped me crystalize my ideas 
about the contradictorily misogynistic and progressive nature of these artists’ 
instructions for the future. Mary Ann Caws anthology, Manifesto: A Century of Isms 
(2001) and Marjorie Perloff’s The Futurist Moment (1986), which deal with the 
rhetorical devices of the manifesto form have also contributed to my understanding 
of what happens when violence is converted into language; namely, the combination 
of attraction and repulsion through complicity that it evokes in the reader.     
Although my study is not explicitly political, I have made use of various analyses of 
Pound’s politics to shore up my discussion of morality and rhetoric. By this I refer in 
particular to the excessive and potentially fascistic implications of the rebellion                                                              
8 Martin Puckner, ‘The Aftershocks of Blast: Manifestos, Satire and the Rear-Guard of 
Modernism’ in Bad Modernisms by Mao & Walkowitz (London: Duke University 
Press, 2006), p. 78. 
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against reasonable bourgeois and humanistic moral values identified by Bataille in 
‘La Morale de Miller’. William Chace’s Political Identities of Ezra Pound and T.S. Eliot 
(1973), Michael North’s The Political Aesthetics of Yeats, Eliot, and Pound (1991) and 
Alec Marsh’s essay ‘Politics’ (2010) give good close readings of Pound’s work as 
evidence of his ever-changing and elusive political identity. Chace is interesting for 
his thoughts on Pound’s attraction to fascism as a theory that rejects ideology, an 
arena for discourse - whether political or literary - that accepts the sort of self-
contradiction I identify in Pound and Miller. Similarly, North seeks to explain the 
seductive power fascism held over Pound, charting with precision the slow trajectory 
of his journey from crusader for individual freedoms and the toleration of national 
and racial difference to a fierce adherent of what he came to see as ‘the eternal truths’ 
propounded by Mussolini. I attempt to make use of the ground that is cleared by 
these Poundian critics to test Miller’s narrative modes as anti-rational and potentially 
fascistic in their foundational impulses.   
This interest in the anti-rational is also commented on by Leon Surette, whose texts 
The Birth of Modernism: Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot, W.B Yeats, and the Occult (1993) and 
Pound in Purgatory (1999) understand Pound’s descent into economic radicalism, 
anti-Semitism and fascism as the direct result of his attraction to occult ideas that 
were popular amongst early twentieth century modernist writers. Along with Bruce 
Comens (Apocalypse and After: Modern Strategy and Postmodern Tactics in Pound, 
Williams and Zukofsky, 1995) and Roger Griffin (Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of A 
Beginning Under Mussolini and Hitler, 2007) Surette provides much of the background 
for my analysis of Pound and Miller as writers who were seduced – respectively - by 
the language of the archeologist Leo Frobenius and the meta-historian Oswald 
Spengler. Frobenius’ The Voice of Africa (1913) and Spengler’s Decline of the West 
(1918) both contain theories relating to essential cultural virtues that connect 
civilisations across epochs and are central to my analysis of Pound and Miller’s 
eschatological leanings in Chapter Three. Suzanne Marchand’s essay, ‘Leo Frobenius 
and the Revolt against the West’ (1997), gives valuable contextual information about 
Frobenius and also Spengler’s influence on literature in the 1920s and 30s.  
 13 
Chapter Three also explains these ideas in relation to the connections Pound made 
between corrupt economics and aesthetic and cultural impurity. For this purpose I 
have analysed the unorthodox ‘Social Credit’ theories of American economist Major 
C.H. Douglas, theories that Pound promoted as a solution to the problems of usury 
and modern capitalism. Alongside Douglas’ 1935 pamphlet ‘The Use of Money’ and 
Pound’s response to it, Social Credit: An Impact (published in the same year) I have 
relied on Tim Redman’s 1999 essay ‘Pound’s politics and economics’ as a summary guide.  For the links Pound made between Frobenius, Douglas and fascism I have 
examined his full-length studies, the aforementioned Guide to Kulchur, The ABC of 
Economics (1933) and Jefferson And/Or Mussolini (1935). 
A core tenet of my argument is that Pound’s review of Miller’s work correctly 
identifies a consistent and clear moral code undergirding his narrative persona. 
Significant to my formulation of this premise is my analysis of the review work on 
Miller that provides evidence of a counter-argument, which has for decades 
influenced public opinion on Miller – that he was an expressly and inherently amoral 
author. In his 1940 essay about Miller’s Tropic of Cancer, ‘Inside the Whale’, George 
Orwell shows himself to be the most explicit exponent of this viewpoint and he 
undergoes a thorough examination in my study for that reason. Orwell’s central 
proposition – that Miller’s especial talent and significance lies in his detachment from 
the burdens of moral agency – is directly contradicted by Pound’s position on Miller. 
As such, my assertion that Miller’s narrative is moral partly in a Poundian sense 
requires a detailed analysis of the more popularly accepted view of him as a ‘passive 
everyman’ figure.9 
For the same purpose, I include reviews of Miller’s debut novel that agree with 
Orwell’s assessment of him as amoral. Philip Rahv and Edmund Wilson, two 
prominent left-wing literary journalists of the 1930s, 40s and 50s are both useful for 
their understanding of Cancer as an anachronistic homage to less politically urgent 
times, damning Miller with patronisingly faint praise for his lack of interest in the 
moral questions that occupied his contemporaries in the run-up to World War Two.                                                              
9 Orwell, p. 36. 
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Rahv and Wilson provide foils against which to test my ideas about the presence of 
Poundian morality in Miller’s narratives and his fulfillment of Pound’s moral 
criteria.  Equally useful are the various early reviewers who dismiss Miller as 
immoral. By assessing work by conservative critics like Montgomery Belgion, an 
Anglo-French contributor to T. S. Eliot’s periodical Criterion, I am able to throw light 
on the moral debate surrounding Miller, and to demonstrate the crossover between 
his and Pound’s definitions of morality in literature. 
Finally, alongside Bataille – whose ‘La Morale de Miller’, Literature and Evil (1938) 
and economic study The Accursed Share (1949) help me show key difference between 
Miller’s emphasis on excess and Pound’s on control - the principal philosophical 
touchstone for my thesis is Henri Bergson’s 1907 magnum opus, Creative Evolution. 
Through Bergson’s conception of a ‘pluralistic universe’ I elucidate the paradox 
between conservatism and democratic humanism that exists throughout Miller’s 
1930s writings, connecting him to a certain inter-war radically right-wing strand of 
thinking represented by T.E. Hulme.10 Hulme’s writings on Bergson (in particular 
‘The Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds’ (1911?) and ‘A Notebook’, published in 
installments between 1915 and 16) prosaically and rigorously accommodate a belief 
in the multiplicity of subjective reality with totalising ideas about absolute values. 
Crucially, this enables me to discern a similar accommodation of opposing positions 
in Miller’s work and to make sense of his unique aesthetic approach as an 








                                                             
10 William James, ‘A Pluralistic Universe’, in A Pluralistic Universe (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 113. 
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Introduction 
‘Some thought it great, some thought it vile; some thought it mortally dull, others 
wildly exciting. A few copies got out through to the critics; T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound 
were splendidly appreciative.’ Jack Kahane, proprietor of Obelisk Press; publisher of 
Henry Miller’s Tropic of Cancer11 
 
In 1935, a year after it was published, Ezra Pound gave Henry Miller’s Tropic of 
Cancer its first unreservedly complimentary review.12 The Brooklyn expatriate’s 
debut novel, a first person narrative from the perspective of a penniless writer on the 
streets of Paris, arrived on Pound’s doorstep as part of a self-funded and self-
orchestrated publicity campaign. Banned for obscenity in the English speaking world 
and saddled with a small local publisher who was unwilling to face the legal and 
financial ramifications of promoting his book internationally, Miller had taken 
marketing matters into his own hands, personally mailing copies to many of the 
prominent literary figures of the period. From Pound and fellow Anglo-American 
T.S. Eliot through to John Dos Passos and John Steinbeck, anyone he thought might 
further his cause with a favorable write-up was sent a covering letter and first 
edition. According to Jack Kahane, Miller was ‘the most useful collaborator a book 
publisher ever had.’13 While many of these high-profile recipients responded 
enthusiastically to Cancer as an honest confessional text, Pound’s review  - intended 
for publication in T.S. Eliot’s Criterion but only printed recently in Ronald 
Gottesman’s 1992 collection, Critical Essays on Henry Miller - stands alone for its 
declaration of a rare synchronicity of literary vision with its subject and an 
unexpected belief in the novel’s symptomatic importance to the future of English and 
American literature.   
Pound’s admiration for Miller rested primarily on his belief that Cancer was a 
necessary link in the chain of literary evolution begun by James Joyce’s Portrait of an                                                              
11 Jack Kahane, Memoirs of a Booklegger (London: Michael Joseph Ltd, 1939), p. 263. 
12 Henry Miller, Tropic of Cancer (London: Harper Perennial, 2005 [orig. ed.: Paris: 
Obelisk Press, 1934]). Referred to hereafter as Cancer. Further references are given 
after quotations in the text. 
13 Kahane, p. 263. 
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Artist as a Young Man (1916), developed through Joyce’s later work Ulysses (1922), 
and fiction by Pound’s Vorticist ally Wyndham Lewis. In an era defined, Pound 
claims in his review, by ‘a ruck of third rate stuff’ representing and contributing to 
the stagnation of literature as a form of expression, Miller offers ‘deliverance’ to ‘the 
harassed and over-serious critic’ because his work is progressive and veracious 
enough to stand next to Joyce and Lewis’.14 ‘Here we have’ Pound conjectures, the 
only other ‘man-sized’ writer in a field dominated by insignificant mediocre 
practitioners (88). From an early point in his career, then, Miller was assimilated by 
Pound into his elite circle of innovating and modernising Anglo-American literary 
artists. 
In spite of this apparent affinity, a distance has always existed between the two 
writers in critics’ imaginations. One reason is Miller’s reputation for ‘lateness’ when 
it comes to both American expatriate writing and ideologically driven definitions of 
what constitutes Modernism. Because he arrived in Paris in 1930, when American 
artists were leaving the city in their droves and six years after the departure of 
Pound – who was christened ‘the lion of the Latin Quarter’ by Donald Hall at The 
Paris Review - there was a tendency among Miller’s few early reviewers to read Tropic 
of Cancer as a crepuscular homage to a fading era.15 Left-wing American critic 
Edmund Wilson set the tone in 1938 when he described Miller as a documenter of 
the ‘Twilight of the Expatriates’, and it was picked up by Philip Rahv and George 
Orwell in the early forties, both of whom wrote reviews of Cancer in which Miller is 
portrayed as an anachronistic figure, stylistically and ideologically reminiscent of 
writers of the 1920s rather than his thirties contemporaries, but not quite belonging 
to either decade.16   
                                                             
14 ‘Review of Tropic of Cancer’, p. 87. Further references are given after quotations in 
the text. 
15 Donald Hall, ‘Ezra Pound’, in Writers at Work: The Paris Review Interviews, ed. by 
Van Wyck Brooks (London: Secker and Warburg, 1963), p. 35. 
16 Edmund Wilson, ‘Twilight of the Expatriates’ in Critical Essays on Henry Miller, ed. 
by Ronald Gottesman (New York: G.K. Hall & Co., 1992), pp. 91-94, p. 91.  Originally 
published in The New Republic (March, 1938) 
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Another explanation for the underexplored link between Miller and Pound might be 
the reluctance Miller himself expressed about being categorized as part of a collective 
group of artists, and particularly any group defined as ‘modernist’. When asked in a 
1963 interview with the Paris Review whether he had had any ties to Gertrude Stein 
during his time as an expatriate, Miller replied proudly to the contrary, declaring 
that he had ‘never met her, no, knew nobody belonging to her set.’17 He went on to 
voice a sentiment he would repeat at various points throughout his career, that he 
was ‘always against groups and sets and sects and cults and isms and so on’.18 We 
shall come to see that the second of these statements is contradicted by Miller’s 
affiliation with a number of lesser known artists and writers in Paris, but it is clear 
that Miller was careful to cultivate the image of lone author operating from a 
position of independence and minority, and in this way has played his own part in 
securing his absence from canonical lists of the modernist period under discussion. 
This projection is contradicted, however, by his career-long compulsion to make his 
readers aware of the writers, philosophers and artists who influenced his method 
and philosophy. By referencing - in essays, interviews, letters he always intended to 
publish and intertextually in his fiction - the writers he considered his forebears, 
Miller attempted to exert an unusual level of control over critical perspectives on his 
work. With this in mind, it is important that Pound does not feature prominently. 
Miller had no difficulty declaring his ideological and methodological debt to such 
groups as André Breton’s Surrealists, writing that ‘scarcely anything has been as 
stimulating to me as [their] theories and the products’19 or individuals such as Welsh 
anarchist socialist poet John Cowper Powys, described by Miller in the same Paris 
Review interview as ‘my god, my mentor, my idol’, but neglects to pay any public 
homage to Pound.20 Indeed, Pound is excluded from 1952’s The Books In My Life, 
                                                             
17 ‘An Interview with Henry Miller’, in Writers at Work: The Paris Review Interviews, 
ed. by Brooks, pp. 150-159, p. 151.  
18 Ibid., p. 151. 
19 ‘An Open Letter to Surrealists Everywhere’, in The Cosmological Eye (New York: 
New Directions, 1961 [orig. ed.: 1939]), pp.151-196, p.181. Originally published in 
Max and the White Phagocytes (Paris: Obelisk Press, 1938).  
20 ‘Henry Miller’, Writers at Work, p. 156. 
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Miller’s attempt – at the age of sixty - to explain his artistic process in relation to the 
works of literature that have inspired him. In it, Miller gives detailed accounts of his 
sentimental and educational attachments to an extensive and wide-ranging list of 
international writers including the aforementioned Powys and Breton, D.H. 
Lawrence, Blaise Cendrars, Knut Hamsun, Arthur Rimbaud and Rabelais but Pound 
receives no mention whatsoever.  
While Pound is conspicuous by his absence from this publically mapped hinterland, 
Miller expressed some admiration for him behind closed doors. In 1922, eight years 
before immigrating to Paris and starting to write Cancer, he sent a letter to his 
childhood friend Emil Schnellock thanking him for the loan of the early ‘cantos’, 
poems that would become Pound’s magnum opus:  
Say, many thousand thanks to you for introducing me to Ezra Loomis Pound 
… Boy, I can swallow it like Home Brew. And what is more, I can understand 
it, that’s the mystery! Sounds like stuff I say to myself all day long.21  
These two short sentences reveal a great deal about the dialectics within Miller’s 
relationship with Pound’s work. The surprise he registers at being able to 
understand The Cantos demonstrates a preconceived notion of intellectual and 
cultural distance, the overtones of which are evident in his own and critics’ 
reluctance to make and sustain a link between their works. It is also possible to glean 
that Miller’s lower middle class Brooklyn background and his status as a self-
educated, college dropout might have placed him in a position of sensitivity when 
faced with work by the classically educated, prodigiously talented and 
internationally acclaimed Pound.22 Yet, by his ironic exaggeration of his native 
Brooklyn vernacular, Miller also implies a feeling of mysterious familiarity, an                                                              
21 Letters to Emil, ed. by George Wickes (Manchester: Carcanet Press, 1990 [orig. ed.: 
New York: New Directions, 1989]), p. 4, March 10th 1922. 
22 Miller’s insecurities about his background, education and relatively late 
development as a writer are apparent in many of his critical and personal responses 
to works he considered high-brow, and particularly those that are generally included 
in the modernist canon. As will be shown in Chapter Three, ‘’The Festival of Death’: 
Eschatology, Economics and Fascism’, he approaches Oswald Spengler from the 
same ‘lowly Brooklyn boy’ perspective, further enriching the relationship between 
Miller and Pound in their jeremiad poses.  
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unexpected and inexplicably intuitive communication between them that will be 
shown to exist despite these differences and the significant disjunctions between 
their narrative voices and choice of subject matter. 
The sense of an unlikely and incongruous aesthetic correspondence between two 
ostensibly very different artists is rooted in an equally unlikely and incongruous 
notion of shared moral approaches. In the first place, Pound was the only pre-war 
English or American reviewer to recognize a value system of any kind in Miller’s 
writing. Miller was reductively regarded by most of his early critics as an amoral 
artist, symptomatic of the period leading up to the Second World War in his fatalistic 
disengagement from the moral decision-making process. Indeed, George Orwell’s 
1940 essay ‘Inside the Whale’, the first full-length analysis of Miller’s writing in 
English, takes up an important position in this study because of the limiting effect it 
had on contemporary and successive discussions of Miller. By focusing on the 
narrator as ‘a voice from the crowd’, an autobiographical everyman operating from a 
position of total passivity, Orwell wrongly defined Miller as essentially disinterested 
in morality.23 It will be argued that, by failing to distinguish between author and 
narrative persona, and assigning symbolically anti-political, anti-moralistic qualities 
to Miller’s narrator, Orwell set the tone for seventy years of misguided 
interpretations of his work. At this early stage, however, it is important simply to 
recognize that the reading of Cancer offered in ‘Inside the Whale’ is indicative of 
some of the reviews and essays from the thirties and forties that took Miller’s 
narrator to be both a cut and dried, fully accurate representation of the author 
himself and a wholesale rejecter of moral codes.  
Edmund Wilson is important among those who shared Orwell’s perspective. His 
assessment of Cancer as ‘the lowest book of any merit I have ever read’ will be 
discussed later in this chapter for the light it sheds on the moral connections between 
Pound and Miller.24 Like Phillip Rahv, his colleague at left-wing periodical The New 
Republic, who agrees almost verbatim with Orwell when he writes that Miller is 
                                                             
23 Orwell, p. 128.  
24 Wilson, p. 92. 
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‘above all morally passive in his novels … a naturally garrulous American who has 
been through hell’, Wilson is useful for his restrictively historical reading of Cancer.25 
In his review of the novel, ‘The Twilight of Expatriates’, Wilson defines Miller’s 
writing as symptomatically immoral, an accurately sordid reflection of the politically 
and morally redundant atmosphere that pervaded Paris in the 1930s. The text is 
therefore simultaneously criticized and venerated as corrupt and corruptive. Orwell, 
Rahv and Wilson’s active refusals to engage with Cancer beyond simplistic and 
totalizing ideas of his work will be shown later on in this chapter to provide useful 
contextual background against which to discuss Pound’s reading of Miller as 
morally forthright and admirable. 
At root, my identification of a system of morality in Miller’s work is built around 
Pound’s ideas of literary rather than social or political morality, and is grounded in 
Pound’s fundamental conviction that truthfulness in literature is ‘moral’ and 
falseness ‘immoral’. As Pound puts it in his essay ‘The Serious Artist’, ‘good 
literature cannot be immoral’.26 While the principal ethical questions in this study 
therefore relate to a particular code of aesthetics, Pound’s development of an 
obsession with political-economic issues in the 1920s and 30s means that my 
discussion inevitably includes the ways in which politics impose themselves on 
aesthetics. It will be seen that Pound sought a symbiosis between art and the 
economic sphere as he was writing his review of Cancer, generating even more 
surprising correlations with a writer who was expressly indifferent to economic 
theory.  Indeed, as we shall see in Chapter Three, Miller scoffed at Pound’s attempt – 
                                                             
25 Philip Rahv, ‘Henry Miller: Image and Idea’ in Henry Miller: Three Decades of 
Criticism, ed. with an intro. by Edward B. Mitchell (New York: New York University 
Press, 1971), pp. 27-34, p. 31. Originally published in The New Republic (April 21st, 
1941).    
26 Ezra Pound, ‘The Serious Artist’ in The Literary Essays of Ezra Pound, ed. with an 
intro. by T.S. Eliot (London and Boston: Faber & Faber, 1954), pp. 41-57, p. 44. 
Originally published in The New Freewoman (1913).  
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via their mutual acquaintance James Laughlin – to ‘get him to swing the bat for his 
crazy Social Credit theories’.27  
My questions about Pound and Miller’s codes of morality also gravitate around a 
crucial paradox inherent in Pound’s moral theory: in the first place, he recommends 
work that truthfully represents its author’s instinctive values and tastes and resists 
the pressure to conform to collective codes of taste and judgment; in the second, he 
advocates writing that demonstrates its author’s ability to precisely discern and 
represent the indisputable differences between the impressions he or she receives. It 
is a theory, crucially, that relies on a very problematic notion, namely the ability to 
discern indisputable differences between human beings and groups of human beings 
– in appearance and character, but most importantly in terms of their values. This is 
the origin of a slippage in Pound’s writing between a democratic approach to 
subjective experience and a suspect and eventually totalitarian approach to values 
and society. That slippage, we shall see, also lies at the root of Pound and Miller’s 
unlikely artistic alliance. 
Since this study responds to critical readings that regard Miller as ‘amoral’, Miller’s 
moral system must equally be defined in contrast to definitions of its absence. 
‘Amoral’ in Orwell’s review of Cancer means ‘passive to experience’, disengaged 
from the past and the future. As we shall see, Orwell compares Miller to ‘the 
ordinary man’ who ‘far from endeavoring to influence the future … simply lies 
down and lets things happen to him’.28 Implicit in this reading is the assumption that 
‘amoral’ means disengagement from cause and consequence, problems and 
solutions. Indeed, Orwell goes on to claim that: 
[Miller] is neither pushing the world-process forward nor trying to drag it 
back, but on the other hand he is by no means ignoring it … he believes in the 
… impending ruin of Western civilisation much more firmly than the 
                                                             
27 Henry Miller, Durrell-Miller Letters, 1935-1980, ed. by Ian S. MacNiven (New York: 
New Directions, 1988), p. 69, April 5th 1937. 
28 Orwell, p. 105. 
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majority of “revolutionary” writers; only he does not feel called upon to do 
anything about it.29   
According to this definition, ‘moral’ implies active engagement with cause and 
consequence, with problems and solutions and with human experience in order to 
arrive at conclusions about the human condition. Moreover, it means concern for the 
welfare of the individual within society, within history. Using Pound’s definition of 
morality and Orwell’s definition of its absence in Cancer, I argue that Miller’s 
apparent anti-humanism masks an emphatic attempt to understand and improve the 
human condition, to redefine notions of ‘sympathy’, ‘empathy’, ‘compassion’ in a 
way that takes count of the full complexity of human experience.30 Henri Bergson, 
the French philosopher whose theories of a ‘pluralistic’ universe were a major 
influence on Miller and Pound’s philosophical and artistic ally T.E. Hulme, provides 
important insight into this use of anti-humanist language to expound profoundly 
humanist ideas.   
By the same token, Miller’s creation of infernal conditions in Cancer also connects 
him in surprising ways with Pound’s own understanding of values and aesthetics in 
literature, as well as on a wider societal level.  Miller deliberately positioned himself 
within a mode of discourse -widespread among avant-garde writers of the 1930s - 
concerned with ideas relating to death, judgment, heaven and hell. ‘Eschatology’, as 
this school of thought has been termed – by Jacques Derrida, Northrop Frye and, 
most pertinent to this study, Frank Kermode in his essay ‘The Sense of an Ending’ 
(1967) - finds its way into work by Pound, W.B. Yeats, D.H. Lawrence and various 
other literary artists who are now categorized as part of the high modernist                                                              
29 Ibid., p. 131. 
30 Indrek Manniste’s recent study, Henry Miller: The Inhuman Artist (2013), which 
analyses the philosophical – and specifically the Niezschean – roots of Miller’s 
rejection of ‘human’ moral positions, provides some relevant ideas around this issue. 
While my thesis accepts Manniste’s claim that Miller was expressly interested in 
distancing himself from the restrictions imposed by collective human ideas, it looks 
at the latter’s attitude towards the human condition in the more prosaic light shed by 
Ezra Pound and T.E. Hulme’s anti-humanism. Consequently, in contrast to Manniste 
but in line with Sarah Garland (‘The Dearest of Cemeteries’, 2010), I am concerned 
with Miller as a partly parodic, partly earnest appropriator of the anti-humanistic 
trends that pervaded literature and philosophy in the 1910s, 20s and 30s.   
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vanguard. In Chapter Three ‘‘The Festival of Death’ - Eschatology, Economics and 
Fascism’, Kermode’s article will be used to explore and develop this definition of 
eschatology, with reference to related works on apocalyptic thinking at the time.  
In this way, I present a clearer picture of the cultural landscape in which Miller’s 
eschatological interest came about. It will be shown that Pound’s own eschatological 
bent is most clearly manifested in his social, literary and economic essays of the 
1930s, which depict Europe in the aftermath of the First World War as a kind of post-
apocalyptic inferno. The language he uses in these essays will be shown to carry over 
into his review of Cancer. More importantly, it is mirrored in Miller’s novel itself. By 
contrast with Miller, however, Pound’s eschatological vision of pre-Second Word 
War Europe is heavily influenced by his interest in the economic theories mentioned 
earlier, generating vital questions about Pound’s promotion of Cancer. First and 
foremost, how can Pound – who invests himself seriously in a scheme for post-
apocalyptic, economic, and social revolutionary change, find an ally in a writer who 
treated these ideas playfully, even parodically? As part of this, it will be seen that 
Miller straddled fascinatingly but dangerously contradictory positions of urgency 
and irreverence in his appropriation of eschatological tropes, an aspect of his 
approach that is suggested by Caroline Blinder in her thesis Henry Miller’s Sexual 
Aesthetics: A Comparative Analysis of Selected Twentieth-Century Influences on Henry 
Miller’s Writing (1995) and her 2000 study, A Self-Made Surrealist: Ideology and 
Aesthetics in the Work of Henry Miller. More importantly, this area is tackled head-on 
by Sarah Garland in her 2010 essay ‘The Dearest of Cemeteries’.  
Integral to this are the influences of Oswald Spengler on Miller’s writing and of 
Spengler’s collaborator Leo Frobenius on Pound’s. A meta-historian of the 1910s and 
20s who was inspired by nineteenth-century social anthropological theories, 
Spengler’s beliefs in the cyclical nature of cultural progress and dissolution have 
been identified by Northrop Frye as the blueprint for a century of eschatological 
thought. Having enjoyed Spengler as a fledgling writer in New York, Miller 
rediscovered his bestselling tome, The Decline of The West (1918), in 1931 while he was 
struggling to complete Cancer. As a consequence he credits Spengler with having 
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helped shape the book’s ideas, themes and structure. Received via his friend and 
literary ally Michael Fraenkel, with whom he assimilated its apocalyptic 
pronouncements into a collective theory called ‘The Festival of Death’, Spengler’s 
text is talked about by Miller as ‘biggest and best of all’, a work containing ‘great 
music, great literature, great ideas’. 31 As Garland points out in ‘The Dearest of 
Cemeteries’, Miller’s fascination with the principal theme in The Decline of the West, of 
individuals within early twentieth century urban communities as spiritually 
decomposed and defunct, as ‘dead’ while alive, is evident both explicitly in the 
narrator of Cancer’s philosophical musings and implicitly in his street-level 
observations. Since Spengler was profoundly influenced by archeologist Leo 
Frobenius’ theory of ‘cultural morphology’ – which identifies certain cultural virtues 
that unite civilisations across time - and Pound used Frobenius’ ideas to prove many 
of his economic, political and racial hunches, these two German theorists offer 
troubling but useful ways of reading Pound and Miller. 
The Decline of the West also provides a basis for the themes and rhetoric in Miller’s 
‘The Universe of Death’, a chapter from his posthumously published The World of 
Lawrence that first appeared in his 1939 collection The Cosmological Eye, and compares 
the artistic approaches of D.H. Lawrence, James Joyce and Marcel Proust. Miller’s 
position in relation to these major influences on his work is comprehensively covered 
by Sarah Garland in Rhetoric and Excess. It has also been looked at by John Parkin in 
Henry Miller, The Modern Rabelais (1990), Gay Louise Balliet in Henry Miller and the 
Surrealist Metaphor: “riding the ovarian trolley” (1996) and James Decker in Henry 
Miller and Narrative Form (2005). There is, however, a noticeable lack of critical 
material relating to Spenglerian eschatological theories as the catalyst for Miller’s 
appreciation of these prominent figures of the early twentieth century modernist 
period. The role of The Decline of the West in shaping Miller’s ideological perspective 
and the infernal system that Pound recognises both in Cancer and in works by James 
Joyce, will be shown to correlate with apocalyptic elements in Pound’s own literary 
worldview. Paradoxically, it will also be shown that the imaginative and expansive 
                                                             
31 Letters to Emil, p. 74, February 5th 1931. 
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quality of Miller’s Spenglerian vision is one of the key areas in which he differs from 
Pound. 
These thematic and rhetorical correlations will also be seen – crucially – to 
complicate Orwell’s historically specific understanding of amorality in Miller’s work.  
This thesis proposes a re-reading of Orwell’s notion that Miller was ‘amoral’ because 
of his acceptance of and refusal to oppose the ‘fear, tyranny and regimentation’ 
represented by the rise of totalitarian systems of government.32 ‘What is he 
accepting?’ Orwell asks: 
Not an epoch of expansion and liberty, but an epoch of fear, tyranny and 
regimentation. To say that “I accept” in an age like our own is to say that you 
accept concentration camps, rubber truncheons, Hitler, Stalin, bombs, 
aeroplanes, tinned food, machine-guns, putsches, purges, slogans33 
On these terms, moral implies the active resistance of ‘fear, tyranny and 
regimentation’, the individual’s assertion of his or her freedoms in an age of social 
and political oppression.  Accordingly, Chapter Three addresses Miller’s moral 
position in relation to the economic and political circumstances of inter-war Europe. 
If Orwell understands Miller as disengaged from the moral and political process, 
Pound sees Cancer as a moral text partly because it represents the individual’s 
potential for liberation through experience of the economic and social evils generated 
by the ‘Armageddon’ of World War One. In this context, Pound will be seen to have 
jeopardized his mission to divorce aesthetics from the real-politic of his age while 
Miller’s relative success in his own attempt to free art from ideology will be seen to 
constitute a major difference between them.  
Crucially, there are also very serious ways in which Pound misappropriates Miller’s 
use of eschatological rhetoric for increasingly fascistic social and economic ends. This 
naturally complicates the moral question further since Pound sees freedom 
represented in the fascist social and economic policies of Mussolini’s state, one of the 
totalitarian systems of government that Orwell refers to when he talks about ‘fear, 
tyranny and regimentation’. Thus Pound misinterprets Miller’s quest for perceptual                                                              
32 Orwell, p. 104 
33 Ibid., p. 104. 
 26 
liberation or rebirth as a desire for what Bruce Comens, in his study Apocalypse and 
After: Modern Strategy and Postmodern Tactics in Pound, Williams and Zukofsky, calls 
‘literal’ or ‘historical’ apocalyptic change (1995).34 In Chapter Three I argue that 
Miller does in fact make a stand for freedom against oppression, but it is freedom of 
the senses he desires rather than Pound’s social or economic liberty. 
Using Pound’s definition of morality in literature, I highlight elements in Miller that 
prove his clear and identifiable set of ideas about the human condition, about good 
and bad, natural and unnatural ways of behaving. Beneath Pound’s apparently 
straightforward cooption of Miller, I identify an unlikely affinity between them that 
reveals a contradictory conservative impulse at the heart of Miller’s positivist 
theories. Moreover, the ways that Pound misreads Miller also sheds light rather than 
obscurity on the moral thinking behind Miler’s semi-autobiographical and 
confessional project. Ultimately, I aim to demonstrate that Miller cannot be usefully 
read according to Orwell’s reductive conflation of ‘moral’ and moralistic work nor 
through a direct application of Pound’s proscriptive aesthetics. Like Pound, Miller 
was - as Orwell, Phillip Rahv, Lawrence Durrell, Karl Shapiro and Kenneth Rexroth 
all claim - opposed to the use of literature to instruct the reader according to partisan 
codes. Although this certainly renders him an anti-moralist, it is incorrect to call him 
‘amoral’. His moral system might be fraught with a tension between progressive and 
regressive impulses that permeates Pound’s work, but his fundamental message is 
one of profound optimism about the artist’s potential for self-liberation and a 
universalist communion with humanity. 
Finally, the paradox of progressiveness and conservatism also indicates Miller’s 
unique position between versions of modernism in the early twentieth century and 
later modernisms that appeared in the 1940s and 50s. While his positivist principles 
will be shown to corroborate categorisations of him as a late modernist – a precursor 
to the rebellions of Norman Mailer, Jack Kerouac and William Burroughs - Pound’s 
appreciation of his writing provides a starting point from which to understand                                                              
34 Bruce Comens, Apocalypse and After: Modern Strategy and Postmodern Tactics in 
Pound, Williams and Zukofsky (The University of Alabama Press: Tuscaloosa, 
Alabama, 1995), p. 35. 
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Miller as an appropriator of earlier modernist tropes and ideas that contradict his 
wider project in crucial ways. By incorporating brutal, anti-humanist and apocalyptic 
elements in a parodic and autodidactic fashion, Miller will be seen to connect the 
work of Pound and his literary collaborators, Wyndham Lewis and T.E. Hulme, to 
experimental modes of literary expression that came after the Second World War. 
Rod Rosenquist’s Modernism, The Market and the Institution of the New (2009), a survey 
of late modernist aesthetics, is particularly helpful in this area – providing a way of 
understanding Miller as someone who inherited Pound, Joyce and Lewis’ self-
consciousness about their place in history but also bucked against the high style and 
seriousness of these early, iconic modernist figures. If theorists like Art Berman and 
Stan Smith have pointed out that Pound is representative of a ‘modernism become 
self-conscious of itself as a historical event’, then Miller will be seen to be an artist 
whose reverence about history is proved, in fact, by his self–conscious irreverence 
towards it.35   
This further paradox – of anti-literary iconoclasm masking a desire to enter literary 
history - is also identifiable in Pound’ aesthetic. Miller’s self-contradiction on the 
same front echoes what Michael Levensen defines as the vacillation from 
‘provocation to consolidation’ that occurs in early twentieth century modernist 
thinking,36 Indeed, this will be addressed in Chapter Two as part of their common 
debt to the rhetoric of the manifesto form. In line with Pound, Miller’s presentation 
of himself as a provocateur is perennially compromised by his obsessive drive to 
consolidate his position as an established writer through the creation of myths about 
his life. In other words, by deliberately casting himself in the role of iconoclast, he 
himself becomes the icon. The same can be said for his rejection of standard moral 
codes; his desire for moral, existential liberation, which appears to be motivated by 
the desire to seize rather than cede control over the universe he creates. That tension 
                                                             
35 Art Berman, Preface to Modernism (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 
1994), p 64. Quoted in Rod Rosenquist, p. 10. 
36 Michael Levenson, A Genealogy of Modernism - a Study of English Literary Doctrine 
1908-1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 218. Quoted in 
Rosenquist, p. 11. 
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– we shall see - is another crucial area of crossover between Miller’s autobiographical 
impulse and Pound’s centralizing of the artist. 
Chapter One begins with a rudimentary mapping of Pound’s ethical and aesthetic 
approach through detailed analysis of his early review work.  Through a close 
reading of Pound’s review of Miller’s Cancer, as well as relevant writings on those 
authors to whom Pound compared Miller - namely James Joyce, Wyndham Lewis 
and Henry James - Pound’s literary propensity begins to emerge.  Through this, and 
similar examinations of Pound’s many essays on the nature and purpose of 
literature, a topography of his system of values will be drawn up in order to lay 
foundations for the subsequent analysis of Poundian elements in Miller that have so 















1. Pound’s ‘Moral’ Reading of Henry Miller’s Tropic of Cancer 
1.1 Purging the Literary Landscape: Pound’s essays and reviews (1905-1935) 
 ‘As to twentieth century poetry, and the poetry which I expect to see written during 
the next decade or so, it will, I think, move against poppy-cock, it will be harder and 
saner … ‘nearer the bone’. It will be as much like granite as it can be, its force will lie 
in its truth, its interpretative power … I mean it will not try to seem forcible by 
rhetorical din, and luxurious riot. We will have fewer painted adjectives impeding 
the shock and stroke of it. At least for myself, I want it so, austere, direct, free from 
emotional slither.’ Ezra Pound, ‘A Retrospect’ (1918)37 
‘It is of the permanence of nature that honest men … come repeatedly to the same 
answers in ethics, without need of borrowing each others ideas.’ Ezra Pound, ‘Mang 
Tze or the Ethics of Mencius’ (1938)38 
 
Ezra Pound’s literary critical outlook between 1905, the year in which his first essay 
was published, and 1935, when he wrote his review of Henry Miller’s debut novel, 
was largely founded on the conception that a writer should represent subjective 
reality in as concentrated and undiluted a fashion as possible. His literary essays and 
reviews from the period are permeated by a theory of two polarized positions – one 
of artistic purity and of work that is substantial because it presents its subject in its 
authentic shape, the other of artistic contamination, of work that is a weak and 
inauthentic imitation of its subject. The poems of 1930s American Imagist William 
Carlos Williams, for example, represent the first position. They are considered 
valuable by Pound because he believes they successfully realize their author’s 
mission statement to ‘understand something in its natural colors [sic] and shapes.’ 
‘There could’, he says in his essay ‘Dr Williams’ Position’, ‘be no better effort 
underlying any literary process.’39 Likewise, James Joyce is praised repeatedly in                                                              
37 Ezra Pound, ‘A Retrospect’, in Literary Essays, ed.by Eliot,, pp. 3-14, p. 3. ‘A 
Retrospect’ is a 1918 compilation of extracts from various essays Pound published 
during the 1910s. This passage originally appeared in ‘Credo’, published in Poetry 
Review (February, 1912). 
38 Ezra Pound, ‘Mang Tze or the Ethics of Mencius’, in Selected Prose, 1909-1965, ed. 
with an intro. by William Cookson (London: Faber, 1973), pp. 73-98, p. 96. Originally 
published in Criterion XVII (July, 1938).   
39 Ezra Pound, ‘Dr Williams’ Position’, in Literary Essays, ed. by Eliot, pp. 389-398, p. 
390. Originally published in The Dial (November, 1928).  
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Pound’s reviews for his ‘efficiency’, his ability to ‘squeeze the last drop out of a 
situation’.40 
Behind this belief in the purity and authenticity of Williams and Joyce’s work is a 
binary system concerning an author’s relationship with his or her material. In ‘Dr 
Williams’ Position’, Pound presents the poet in a superior relation to what he calls 
‘the post-realists [who] deal with subject matter, human types … so simple that one 
is more entertained by Fabre’s insects’ and ‘the perfumed writers [who] aim … at 
olde lavender but [whose] ultimate aroma lacks freshness.’41  Williams manages, 
Pound implies, to present the unadorned truth of his experience without either 
boring the reader through oversimplified representations and aesthetic barrenness or 
repulsing him or her by contrived attempts at traditional refinement. Williams, in 
other words, gets across the ‘real’ without stripping it of its beauty or embellishing it 
with false effect.42 The positioning of Williams as the antithesis to two villainous 
extremes exemplifies Pound’s belief in a vital and indisputable truth to each person’s 
subjective experience. The world, Pound contends, presents itself in ‘natural colors’ 
to each individual and it is the responsibility of the serious artist to reflect the colors 
he or she perceives with honesty. 
The reference to Joyce’s ‘efficiency’ demonstrates another aspect of Pound’s 
understanding of good, pure artistic creation. If the artist must be able to see and feel 
the world naturally, he or she must also be able to focus accurately on the detail of                                                              
40 Ezra Pound, ‘Ulysses’ in Literary Essays, ed. by Eliot, pp. 403-409, p. 405. Originally 
published in The Dial (June, 1920). 
41 ‘Dr Williams’ Position’, p. 395. 
42 Pound’s objection to the two extremes of post-realism and post-aestheticism was 
also a major factor in his attitude towards visual art as a member of the literary-
artistic Vorticist group (1913-14). The aesthetics Pound helped develop as co-founder 
of Vorticism will be seen later to have provided the basis for much of the common 
ground he shares with Miller. In the context of Pound’s art criticism, however, it is 
notable that the Vorticists were fiercely opposed to contemporary art schools they 
regarded as staidly post-Edwardian. As Philip Rylands puts it in his introduction to 
the 2010 collection of essays, Vorticism- Manifesto for a Modern World, the group stood 
out against ‘the elitist aestheticism of Bloomsbury and … the lower-middle-class 
realism of the Camden Town painters’ (Philip Ryland, ‘Introduction’, in Mark Antliff 
and Vivien Greene (eds.), Vorticism: Manifesto for a Modern World (London: Tate, 
2010), p. 23). 
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his or her material. In order to present the world in ‘its natural colors’, Pound is 
saying, the artist needs to ‘squeeze’ the vital truth from a character, situation, feeling 
or thought, excluding all unnecessary elements from his or her vision. This approach 
is helpfully summed up by Marshall McLuhan – who, along with Hugh Kenner was 
one of the strongest academic proponents of Poundian literary ideas – in his 1949 
essay ‘Pound’s Critical Prose’:  
If there is one theme which emerges everywhere [in Pound’s essays] it is the 
seeking out of those qualities and techniques in a writer which lead to the 
economical rendering of complex actualities.43   
This notion of the worthwhile literary artist as a distiller of experience, a producer of 
a pure and truthful substance from the obscure and incoherent mess of subjective 
reality underpins Pound’s work as a literary critical essayist. It will be seen in 
chapters 1.2 and 2 to have been one of the principal reasons for Pound’s 
interpretation of Miller’s work as aesthetically significant. Miller is described in 
Pound’s review of Cancer as a writer who shares James Joyce’s sensitivity to 
‘tonalities’, a term that implies both the artist’s ability to discern what he or she truly 
feels and the ability to apprehend the subtle differences between the people, objects 
and scenarios he or she depicts. Moreover, Pound’s interest in Miller as a tonal writer 
highlights a crucial paradox at the heart of both their aesthetic projects; namely, the 
understanding that serious, virtuous art arises out of anarchic conditions even if this 
anarchy can only be delineated by applying order to it.  
Discounting Joyce, Williams and a handful of others, Pound’s general view on 
modern literature held that it had been badly damaged by a tendency among 
popular writers – chiefly those ‘perfumed writers’ he mentions in the Williams 
review - to ‘dilute’ the truth of experience. He castigates the average author and poet 
                                                             
43 Marshall McLuhan, ‘Pound’s Critical Prose’, in An Examination of Ezra Pound, ed. 
by Russell, pp.165-171, p. 170.  
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of the 1910s for expressing his or her characters’ thoughts, conversations and actions 
‘abstractly and ornately’ rather than in ‘exact’, ‘direct’ and ‘austere’ fashion.44  
Of these perceived technical faults, ‘Abstraction’ is the central problem. 
Incorporating it into the rhetoric of disease as metaphor that appears throughout his 
review work, Pound uses the idea of abstract expression to build an analogous 
framework for his theory on literature. Indeed, in ‘The Teacher’s Mission’, his 1934 
essay on the future of English letters, he calls this ‘the disease of the last hundred and 
fifty years’, implying a strain of inherently bad literary technique that has corrupted 
the correct and desired approach.45 Abstraction, Pound’s goes on to say in this essay, 
has been the main cause of ‘dilution’ and ‘dispersal’ in literary expression and it is 
vital that its contaminative influence be isolated and removed from the cultural 
bloodstream.46  
It is this sort of belief that leads Hugh Kenner, whose 1971 book The Pound Era charts 
Pound’s influence on early twentieth-century modernism, to describe him as an 
adherent to certain ‘specifications for technical hygiene’.47 Although Kenner refers 
specifically to Pound’s programme as architect of the Imagist movement (1914-17) - 
an area that will be analysed later in this chapter - the description also applies to his 
role as literary critic before and after the existence of that school.  Indeed, throughout 
his essay-writing career Pound assumed a position of sanitary authority in relation to 
contemporary and antecedent writers, believing at every stage that the future of 
English Literature depended upon revolutionary acts of culling and purification.  
In works with didactic, pedagogical titles such as ‘The Serious Artist’ (1913) and 
‘How to Read’ (1931), Pound laid down a strict set of rules for the production and 
appreciation of literature. In this prose, permeated by imagery relating to dirt, 
cleanliness, disease, diagnosis and cure, he takes up the position of self-appointed                                                              
44 ‘Dr Williams’ Position’, p. 392; ‘Rev. G. Crabbe’, in Literary Essays, ed. by Eliot, pp. 
276-279, p. 278. Originally published in The Future (February, 1917); ‘A Retrospect’, p. 
12. 
45 Ezra Pound, ‘The Teacher’s Mission’, in Literary Essays, ed. by Eliot, pp. 58-63, p. 
59. Originally published in The English Journal (October, 1934).  
46 Ibid., p. 60. 
47 Hugh Kenner, The Pound Era (London: Faber & Faber, 1972), p. 185.  
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scourge to the literary establishment, in charge of ‘cleaning up’ what he calls in his 
review of Wyndham Lewis’ Tarr, ‘a great lot of rubbish, cultural, Bohemian, 
romantico-Tennysonish, arty, societish, gutterish’, and of exposing English and 
American fiction as endemically flawed and in desperate need of reform.48 Kenner 
follows his aforementioned comments about ‘technical hygiene’ with a suggestion 
that Pound’s Imagist ‘criteria … were also a screen though which some 
contemporary work could pass’, a metaphor that provides useful ways of thinking 
about his literary and moral position.49 Believing that he was working in literarily 
unproductive, corrupt and corruptive times Pound couched his criticism in 
deliberately radical, revolutionary and totalising terms.  
 This perspective on Pound’s literary theories hints strongly at his later affiliations 
with the Italian fascist movement. The idea of removing certain contaminative 
groups of words and methods to permit the healthy progression of the overall 
language puts the reader clearly in mind of 1930s and 40s fascist theories relating to 
race and civilisation, connotations which are brought sharply into focus by 
philosopher Brian Soper when he defines Pound’s key literary interest in the 1920s as 
‘the study of literary eugenics’50 According to Soper, who directs his criticism away 
from the literary or political context in which Pound is writing and towards the 
framework of metaphysical philosophy, the desire to arrest the decline of literary 
thought and method by cutting out certain undesirable elements is ‘for [Pound] the 
teleology of writing’.51 In Pound’s opinion, Soper suggests, the development of 
literary art by disposing of areas in which it is failing is not only important, it is its 
final cause for existence. The connections between these ideas and Pound’s later 
support for Mussolini will be delineated in detail in my third chapter, ‘’The Festival 
of Death’ - Eschatology, Economics and Fascism’.  Crucially, Pound’s admiration for 
                                                             
48 Ezra Pound, ‘Wyndham Lewis’, in Literary Essays, ed. by Eliot, pp. 423-430, p. 427.  
Originally published in Instigations (1920).  
49 Kenner, p. 185. 
50 Brian Soper, ‘Ezra Pound: Some Notes on his Philosophy’, in An Examination of 
Ezra Pound: A Collection of Essays, ed. by Peter Russell (New Directions, New York, 
1950), pp. 231-247, p. 247.  
51 Ibid., p. 247. 
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Miller also rested heavily on the assumption that he understood and reiterated 
various essential truths about racial and national difference through a courageous 
and uncompromisingly discerning aesthetic method. As we shall see, in his review of 
Cancer Pound takes solace from the notion that ‘Miller’s Americans are very 
American, his orientals, very oriental and his Russians, oh quite so’ (88). By drawing 
clear and indisputable distinctions between groups, he contends, Miller ensures that 
‘the sense of the sphericality of the planet presides.’ (88).    
In a literarily historical context, K.K. Ruthven, whose 1991 study tracks the trajectory 
of Pound’s essay-writing career, makes connections between his campaign for 
efficiency and clarity of expression, his opposition to the overreliance on 
‘unnecessary adjectives’ and the purgatory recommendations of other early 
modernist writers:  
In the drive to make the language more efficient and bring it “close to the thing” 
(SP41) various parts of speech came under attack in the modernist period. 
[Wyndham] Lewis wanted to get rid of prepositions and articles, Gertrude Stein 
of nouns and Pound of the ‘decorative’ frill adjective.52 
In other words, the ‘literary eugenics’ that Soper identifies as Pound’s chief 
motivation also constitute a decidedly high ‘modernistic’ trope, a radical response by 
a number of 1910s and 20s writers to what they regarded as harmful syntactical 
excesses in the works of their contemporaries.53 Ruthven overstates his case in regard 
to Wyndham Lewis, Pound’s chief literary ally of the 1910s: while the prose narrative 
style of Lewis’ novel Tarr does aim at directness by the suppression of prepositions 
and articles, Lewis did not attack ‘parts of speech’ in the same programmatic way as 
Pound. Gertrude Stein, on the other hand, is correctly identified by Ruthven as a 
writer who set out to change the way grammar was used in literature, complaining 
in various essays and lectures of the 1920s and 30s about the overuse of nouns as 
opposed to verbs.54 It is Lewis rather than Stein, however, who is of particular 
interest in relation to Pound in this study since his antagonistic narrative style – built                                                              
52 K.K. Ruthven, Ezra Pound as Literary Critic (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 114. 
53 Soper, p. 247. 
54 Stein gives a detailed explanation of this position in her 1935 lecture ‘Poetry and 
Grammar’, published in Lectures in America (New York: Vintage Books, 1935).   
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out of this eschewal of commonplace parts of speech – makes him a useful subject for 
comparison, both with Pound’s own narrative style, and with Miller’s as interpreted 
by Pound in his review of Cancer. 
Ironically (and maddeningly) Pound is reluctant to explain or offer textual evidence 
of what he means by ‘the disease of abstraction’. The closest he comes to a definition 
of it appears in his 1913 essay ‘A Few Don’ts by an Imagiste’: 
Use no superfluous word, no adjective which does not reveal something. Don’t 
use such an expression as ‘dim lands of peace’. It dulls the image. It mixes 
abstraction with the concrete. It comes from the writer’s not realizing that the 
natural object is always the adequate symbol.55 
The ‘abstract’ word in the example here, taken from Pound’s friend and early mentor 
Ford Madox Heuffer’s poem ‘On the Marsh Road: Winter Nightfall’ (1904), is singled 
out for its failure to correspond productively with the sentence in which it is 
situated. Pound is wary, then, of unnecessary and unrelated adjectives that detract 
from the core meaning and emotional sense created by a sentence. Elsewhere, in his 
commentary on other writers, the word ‘abstraction’ appears most often as a by-
word for the use of language that generalizes or maximizes, that aims to conform to 
or present an idea without paying necessary attention to the minutiae of the picture 
or the voice it is describing. Indeed, in ‘The Teacher’s Mission’, he rallies his readers 
to stigmatize literature and literary criticism that indulges in ‘vague, general 
statements’.56 He follows this with a more specific condemnation of critics who 
generalize, attacking those who ‘use terms so vaguely that the reader thinks he 
agrees with their statements when he doesn’t.’57 
The same principle is implicit in Pound’s approach to writers of poetry and of prose 
fiction. When he talks about Hueffer’s irresponsible use of ‘such terms as “dim lands 
of peace”’, he highlights the dishonest concealment of meaning. The image might 
function well in terms of sound and rhythm, it might even appear to contain the 
                                                             
55 ‘A Retrospect’, p. 5. The cited passage originally appeared in ‘A Few Don’ts by an 
Imagiste’ in Poetry magazine (March, 1913). 
56 ‘The Teacher’s Mission’, p. 61. 
57 Ibid., p. 61 
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possibility of beauty, but its definite meaning is difficult to pin down. In diluting ‘the 
concrete with the abstract’, the writer allows him or herself to be seduced by the 
possibility of shallow, aesthetic effect; losing sight of his or her primary obligation – 
to find the combination of words that expresses a particular experience in an exact 
way. 
Elsewhere, he synonymizes ‘Abstraction’ with words like ‘ornamentation’, 
‘embellishment’ and ‘confections’  - claiming that its root lies in the lazy Victorian 
preference for eighteenth and early nineteenth century Romantic poets rather than 
their more serious and substantial contemporaries. William Wordsworth, whom 
Pound provocatively and amusingly describes as ‘an idiot who occasionally makes 
beautiful (or ornamental) verses’, should never have been venerated over the 
Reverend George Crabbe, a gifted ‘realist’ who depicts the poor in his parish with 
the ‘greatest exactness’ and who ‘refrains from commenting’ at all times.58 The 
recommendation of Crabbe over Wordsworth is indicative of Pound’s literary 
program – he makes it his mission in his essay work to promote the ‘concrete’ and 
the exact over the ‘abstract’, placing significant emphasis on the ‘value of writing 
words that conform precisely with fact … without evasions or circumlocutions’.59  
Most importantly, he cannot abide poets or authors who present material 
misrepresentative of the complex reality they purport to capture and who privilege 
the lyrical effect of their words over direct engagement with their subjects. 
This tracing back of Edwardian literary defects to the skewed values of the 
Victorians was commonplace among Pound’s literary contemporaries and allies. 
Wyndham Lewis, who co-founded the Vorticist artistic movement with Pound (1913-
14), echoes the latter’s contempt for Victorian aesthetics. According to Lewis, mid to 
late nineteenth-century Britain had ‘produced a morass of sugary comfort and 
amiablenesss’ in the arts. Indeed, Victorian writers and artists had  ‘indulged men so                                                              
58 ‘The Rev. G. Crabbe, LLB’, p. 278. This iconoclasm is typical of Pound. He had a 
disposition and knack for audaciously criticising writers he felt were wrongly 
regarded as national institutions. Other treasured English figures he debunked 
include Tennyson, Browning and H.G Wells.  Pound will also be seen to have used 
Wells time and again as an example of the techniques new writers ought to avoid. 
59 Ibid., p. 276. 
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much that they became guys of sentiment.’60 His and Pound’s modernising project, 
Lewis goes on, was part of a widespread ‘brutal’ reaction to the “sentimentalism” 
that had entered British letters as a result of Victorian tastes and attitudes.61 Equally, 
Pound and Lewis’ great friend and ally, the philosopher T.E. Hulme was ‘dedicated’, 
as Philip Rylands puts it, ‘to rejecting the Victorian values that had lingered in 
Edwardian London’.62  Hulme’s interpretations of Henri Bergson’s theories of 
‘creative evolution’, and his subsequent anti-humanist, anti-renaissance art criticism 
will be seen later in this chapter to have had an instrumental role in the development 
of Pound’s aesthetic.   
Pound’s anxiety about writers who devalue their work through aesthetic affectation 
opens up interesting questions about the role of the imagination in the production of 
literature. As will be further examined in Chapter Two, Pound’s desire for a form of 
expression that ‘conforms precisely with fact’ is seemingly contradicted by his 
simultaneous recommendation for the artist’s application of a subjective set of tastes 
and values. The same contradiction – between the desire for penetrative, unflinching 
documentation and personal, aesthetic interpretation – also constitutes a 
fundamental problem at the heart of Miller’s project. As we shall see, although Miller 
obsessively claimed to be moving away from ‘art’ and ‘literature’ and towards what 
he called a ‘human document’, his various essays about the creative process 
emphasize the importance of the individual artist’s aesthetic imaginative world, his 
or her vision. The paradox is enriched by the fact that Pound understood Miller as 
both a documenter of the ‘life as he has seen it’ and a corroborator of what we might 
call Pound’s own idiosyncratic vision.63 
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Returning to Pound’s didactic literary essays, his objection to his contemporaries 
rests on a clear, intransigent vision as to how literature should be written. A writer’s 
chief purpose, he believes, is singular and indisputable - to distill the essence of a 
particular moment, thought, feeling or experience and present it directly and 
meaningfully in words. With very deliberate minimalism, he summarizes the 
principle in his 1929 essay ‘How to Read’, writing that ‘great literature is simply 
language charged with meaning to the utmost possible degree’.64   
Marshall McLuhan puts this preference for direct, concentrated and precise 
expression into a wider literary historical context. Where Pound pits Crabbe against 
Wordsworth to demonstrate the error of ‘abstraction’ and ‘ornamentation’, McLuhan 
discusses Pound’s own ideology and style in relation to the works of Ben Jonson, 
Chaucer and Shakespeare. ‘The values of plastic hardness and precision in Chaucer 
and Ben Jonson’, he writes ‘are readily overlooked [by English and American critics] 
in favour of the rich associations of Shakespeare’.65 To McLuhan, the ‘direct’ and 
‘concrete’ method Pound recommends is embodied in the style he uses to make his 
recommendations; a style suggestive of the author’s refusal to meet conventional 
expectations of ‘causally connected conceptions’.66 Ideas, McLuhan suggests, do not 
need to be linked methodically and logically to one another. Indeed, he goes on to 
claim that Pound’s discursive method usefully challenges the misconceived 
‘expectation that prose is obliged to carry the reader forward’.67 Where Pound extols 
the virtues of ‘hard’ or ‘concrete’ modes of expression, McLuhan talks about ‘plastic 
hardness and precision’, recommending that a good writer – like Pound, or Chaucer 
or Jonson – uses words like ‘an engraver’s tools’, presenting his or her images and 
ideas in sharp focus by a method that is ‘analogical’ rather than connective or fluid.68 
As McLuhan says of Pound’s 1938 study Guide to Kulchur, his prose often works 
‘without any overlayering of underlying concepts but … by the affirmation of the                                                              
64 Ezra Pound, ‘How to Read’, in Literary Essays, ed. by Eliot, pp.15-40, p. 23. 
Originally published in The New York Herald Tribune (January, 1929).  
65 McLuhan, p. 169. 
66 Ibid., p. 169. 
67 Ibid., p. 169. 
68 Ibid., p. 169. 
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proportions which are present in the juxtaposition of persons, places, things’.69 
McLuhan sees this ‘method of direct comparison’, as a means of arriving at  ‘a point 
of decisive discrimination’.70  In other words, Pound measures each thing, person, 
sound, thought or idea he perceives or feels sharply and clinically against the other 
in order to discern the subtle differences between them and the ‘complex actualities’ 
of the world.71  
Guide to Kulchur will be seen in Chapter Three, ‘Eschatology, Economics and Fascism’ 
to have been one of four texts of the 1930s that marked Pound’s shift in focus from 
literature to culture, politics and economics. Along with The ABC of Economics (1933), 
Social Credit: An Impact (1935) and Jefferson And/Or Mussolini (1935), it lays out a 
system of thought that connects the unorthodox ideas of inter-war American 
economist Major C.H. Douglas, the meta-historical and morphological theories of 
early twentieth century German anthropologist Leo Frobenius and the politics of 
Benito Mussolini. These texts are crucial to an understanding of Pound’s 
appreciation of Miller since they delineate his notion of social, political and economic 
evil after the First World War and ‘the prospect’ of a solution in the future.72 
Moreover, the language Pound uses to express these ideas is not only strikingly 
similar to the language he uses to champion Miller, it bears a marked resemblance to 
the meta-historical and eschatological imagery and tone of Miller’s Cancer.  
For McLuhan, the writer’s ability to generate an expressive contrast between various 
ideas, places and people constitutes the ‘copula of agglutination … the copula of 
existential reality and not the copula which connects enunciations and conceptions in 
rational discourse’.73 In this way, new impressions and images are accumulated 
without the usual causal explanation that aids understanding, in a manner that 
mirrors the ‘existential reality’ of the random visions and thoughts genuinely 
experienced by the subjective mind. We shall see that McLuhan’s ideas are related to                                                              
69 Ibid., p. 170. 
70 Ibid., p. 170. 
71 Ibid., p. 170. See my p. 31. 
72 Ezra Pound, Guide to Kulchur (Norfolk, Connecticut: New Directions, 1952 [orig. 
ed.: 1938]), p. 96.  
73 McLuhan, , p. 170. 
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Pound’s use of Chinese pictorial characters - ideograms – to get past the 
representational and communicational limitations imposed on writers by western, 
linear sentence structures. As Pound puts it in Guide to Kulchur, ‘the ideogrammic 
method consists of presenting one facet and then another until at some point one 
gets off the dead and desensitized surface of the reader’s mind, onto a point that will 
register.’74 For Pound, the Chinese pictorial method enabled the artist to harness the 
inconsistencies and incoherencies of thought and argument that are an essential part 
of the individual’s interior life. As Pound explains in The ABC of Economics, ‘none of 
these ‘incoherent’ or contradictory facts can be omitted. A problem in the resolution 
of forces can only be solved when all the forces are taken count of’.75 
For McLuhan, Pound’s use of apparently irrational and unconnected combinations of 
ideas, examples and images enabled a clearer and more advanced form of insight 
than that found in standard, rational discourse: ‘the anecdotes and reported 
conversations which enrich [Pound’s] essays [create a sense of] solidity and 
sharpness of particularized actuality …that baffles the reader who looks for 
continuous argumentation.’76 In Chapter Two of this thesis, these ideas will be seen 
to relate to Miller’s own interest and appropriation of what he calls the ‘ice-box 
madness’ in André Breton’s Surrealist approach. Indeed, Pound and Miller both 
experiment with aesthetics to arrive at a truth that exists below ‘the dead and 
desensitized surface of … the mind.’ However, as we will see, while Pound controls 
the conditions of his experiment to achieve particular results, Miller is expressly 
interested in the clarity that comes from a loss of control.  
Pound’s theories of ‘hardness’, ‘precision’ and juxtaposition were given 
programmatic shape in the various essays he wrote as the co-founder of Imagism 
(1914-19) and Vorticism (1914-15). Based on premises set out in politico-artistic 
manifesto form, the schools are closely related in terms of rhetoric and ideology. In 
both instances, Pound’s imaginative focus was fixed firmly on notions of ‘energy’, 
‘dynamism’, ‘concentration’ and ‘force’. Likewise, there is a binding conception of                                                              
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75 Ezra Pound, The ABC of Economics (London: Faber & Faber, 1933), pp. 37-38.  
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 41 
reality (or the individual’s perception of it) as a chaotic mass to be forcefully 
channeled and represented through the concentrated use of thought and word. As 
Richard Sheppard puts it in his study Modernism-Dada-Postmodernism, ‘[Pound’s] 
major concern is with the dynamism that things can release once they have been 
transformed into verbal images.’77  
For Pound as Imagist, the writer needed to meditate on the picture, sound, or feeling 
he or she was aiming to express until an image had been generated that could 
encapsulate its subject to the fullest degree.  This is connected to a tenet he lays out in 
his brief manifesto for Imagism, ‘A Few Don’ts by an Imagiste’, which was initially 
published in Poetry magazine in 1913 then included in 1918’s ‘A Retrospect’ and will 
be dealt with in detail later in this chapter. ‘An “Image”’ Pound writes, ‘is that which 
presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time’.78 His emphasis 
is on what he describes in ‘The Serious Artist’ as the ‘maximum efficiency of 
expression’, when ‘the writer has expressed something interesting in such a way that 
one cannot re-say it more effectively.’79. In other words, the writer must aim to 
compact the meaning and emotion of a moment into his or her images. Pound values 
this above both the amount of ground covered and the narrative unity of a body of 
work, a point that is well illustrated by another maxim from ‘A Few Don’ts by an 
Imagiste’:  ‘It is better to present one Image in a lifetime than to produce voluminous 
works’.80  
It is important to keep in mind that Miller’s own pronouncements on literary practice 
frequently contradict Pound’s recommendation for compactness, efficiency and 
restraint, a difference that will be explored in Chapter Two. Miller admires writers 
who were prone to ‘overelaboration’ and identifies this as a vital element of his own 
artistic approach. As he puts it in Cancer ‘what is called their “overelaboration” is my 
meat’; it is the sign of struggle, it is the struggle itself with all the fibers clinging to it, 
                                                             
77 Richard Sheppard, Modernism-Dada-Postmodernism (Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1999), p. 112. 
78 ‘A Retrospect’, p. 4. 
79 ‘The Serious Artist’, p. 56. 
80 ‘A Retrospect’., p. 4. 
 42 
the very aura and ambience of the discordant spirit’ (254). By his instinctual 
attraction to ‘the great and imperfect ones’, and his career-long mission to retell the 
story of his own life, Miller consciously resists recommendations towards 
concentrated and measured succinctness that appear throughout Pound’s literary 
essays and reviews (254). In marked contrast to Pound’s assertion that ‘great 
literature is simply language charged with meaning to the utmost possible degree’, 
Miler writes that ‘when you show me a man who expresses himself perfectly I will 
not say that he is not great, but I will say that I am unattracted’.81 These statements 
are indicative of the crucial dichotomy between control and excess in Pound and 
Miller’s aesthetics, which will be explored in chapters Two and Three. It relates, 
unsurprisingly, to their writing approaches as well as to their ideas about the 
individual’s place within bourgeois utilitarian moral and economic systems. 
Indeed, Pound’s Imagist approach relied on the controlled use of excessive forces, 
since it recommended channeling frictional energy created by oppositional images. 
Just as Marshall McLuhan focuses on the importance of the juxtaposition of images 
and ideas in Pound’s literary essays, in The Pound Era Hugh Kenner argues that the 
principal ideology behind Poundian Imagism was ‘energy … effort [that] does not 
appease itself by reproducing what is seen but by setting some other thing into 
relation’.82 . Kenner defines the relationship between language and subject in this 
situation as antagonistic, indeed directed by the notion that words are meant to 
operate as ‘lord over fact’,83 as deliberately chosen units that do not simply describe, 
but aim to encapsulate and ultimately dominate their material:  
The action passing through any Imagist poem is a mind’s invisible action 
discovering what will come next that may sustain the presentation – what 
image, what rhythm, what allusion, what word - to the end that the poem 
shall be … not the transcript of one encounter but the Gestalt of many.84 
By handling disparate images, rhythms and allusions violently, Kenner is saying, 
and ignoring conventional notions that ideas must be connected to one another                                                              
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82 Kenner, p. 186. 
83 Ibid., p. 186. 
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logically and methodically to create a controlled and satisfactorily complete picture, 
the Imagists aimed at a more profound existential truth. The placement of literary 
devices in opposition to each other – not only word and image but ‘rhythm … 
allusion’ – has, according to Kenner, the paradoxical effect of illustrating a universal 
pattern. This notion of ‘Gestalt’ and the presence of natural patterns in literature is 
again related to Pound’s ideogrammic method – and particularly its origins in 
Pound’s use of the Ancient Chinese philosopher Confucius. As we will see, Pound’s 
translation of Confucius’ Ta Hsio (‘The Great Digest’) led him to view written 
language as a means of replicating and so unlocking cosmological energies. 
Moreover, the compacted aphorisms he found in this text helped him crystalize and 
refine his own feelings about the relationship between the individual and the world 
and the artist and his or her material.  
For Pound as Vorticist, the guiding metaphorical vision - of the writer situated ‘at the 
heart of the whirlpool [the Vortex] … a great silent place where all energy is 
concentrated’ – worked according to a very similar premise.85 As he put it in Blast 1, 
the first installment of the Vorticist manifesto, literature should represent ‘every 
conception, every motion’ in its ‘primary form’, expressing ‘the most highly 
energized statement’ possible.86 Kenner’s ‘gestalt’ theory is as applicable to Pound’s 
conception of Vorticism as it is to his ideas on Imagism. Indeed, he goes on in the 
Blast manifesto to declare that he and Lewis are interested in ‘the picture that means 
a hundred poems, the music that means a hundred pictures … the … statement that 
has not yet SPENT itself in expression, but which is the most capable of expression’.87 
Throughout these early explorations, an intellectual anxiety about weak ‘second 
intensities’ or ‘secondary applications’ is evident, leading to repeated statements 
about the urgent need for artists to make ‘violent’ and ‘efficient’ use of the energy 
emanating from their subjects in order to produce work that is truly representative of 
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life.88 Art, Pound claims, must be continually and frenetically engaged with the 
essence of its subject, ‘conceiving instead of merely observing or reflecting’, in order 
to give a truthful account of experience.89 Setting themselves up in opposition to the 
Italian Futurist movement – who were in fact an integral contemporary influence – 
the Vorticists posited themselves as prophets and protectors of a new fertile and 
revolutionary kind of art. In Kenner’s words, ‘as Futurism receives perception, says 
Lewis, Vorticism conceives it.’90 
These ‘primary intensities’ are analysed by Mark Antliff, in his 2010 essay ‘Sculptural 
Nominalism/Anarchist Vortex: Henri Gaudier-Brzeska, Dora Marsden, and Ezra 
Pound’, through Pound’s interest in his sculptor friend and Vorticist ally Henri 
Gaudier-Brzeska. Antliff points out that Pound presents Gaudier-Brzeska, in his 1913 
essay ‘The New Sculpture’, as the figurehead of a new movement seeking to 
abandon the ‘classical’ premise that beauty in art depends upon the accurate 
delineation of natural proportions. What Pound admired in Gaudier-Brzeska, Antliff 
claims, was the attempt not to represent reality but to embody the ‘emotive ‘forces’’ 
detected by the artist in his or her subject: 
The new sculpture eschews classical idealism and the analytic methods of the 
realist, finding its raison d’étre in the unmediated expression of ‘desire’ and 
emotive ‘forces’. A focus on forces, especially the emotional drive intrinsic to 
the creative process, is the subject of the new sculpture.91  
This perception, Antliff goes on, echoes Gaudier-Brzeska’s own statement on his 
aesthetic aims in the first volume of Blast: ‘the demand that sculptors respond to the 
material’s unique qualities was the central tenet of his manifesto ‘Vortex. Gaudier-
Brzeska’ [Gaudier-Brzeska’s prose poem in Blast 1]’.92 The desire to get away from 
traditional representational modes of artistic expression led visual Vorticists like                                                              
88 Ibid., p. 153. 
89 Ibid., p. 153. 
90 Kenner, p. 338. 
91 Mark Antliff, ‘Sculptural Nominalism/Anarchist Vortex: Henri Gaudier-Brzeska, 
Dora Marsden, and Ezra Pound’, in The Vorticists: Rebel Artists in London and New 
York, 1914-18, ed. by Mark Antliff and Vivien Greene (London: Tate Publishing, 
2010), pp. 47-57, p. 51.  
92 Ibid., p. 52. 
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Gaudier-Brzeska to experiment with various non-Western forms, basing their 
revolution on the idea that ‘the “direct energy”, “feeling for form”, and “intensity” 
native to the sculpture of non-Western “primitives” was wholly absent in the 
sculpture of the Greeks‘.93 We shall see that a similar impetus lay behind Pound’s 
translations and recommendations of Confucius’ aphorisms, as well as his 
development of his own ideogrammic method. Indeed, the compactness and 
directness of pictorial language was a way for Pound to imbue his writing with the 
primary energy of direct experience rather than the secondary energy of indirect 
representation. 
Whereas Pound and Gaudier-Brzeska had previously condemned classical sculpture 
as a pale and normative ideal, they now called time on all ‘representational’ art, 
celebrating only what Pound refers to as ‘the primary media’, art that transmits the 
energy of concentrated subjective experience. In ‘Vortex: Gaudier-Brzeska’, Gaudier-
Brzeska explains this in terms of the group’s obsessive focus on subjective aesthetic 
and ethical taste and individual ‘will’: 
We have been influenced by what we liked most, each according to his 
individuality, we have crystallized the sphere into the cube, we have made a 
combination of all the possible shaped masses – concentrating them to to 
express our abstract thoughts of conscious superiority. Will and 
consciousness are our VORTEX.94  
This impulse to assert the force of focused subjective feeling over weak objectivity is 
summed up by Hugh Kenner via a letter Gaudier-Brzeska sent to Pound in 1913. As 
he was about to start work on Hieratic Head of Ezra Pound (1913), a marble bust of his 
friend, Gaudier-Brzeska warns Pound that he will not recognize himself in the final 
artwork: ‘You understand it will not look like you, it will … not … look … like you. It 
will be the expression of certain emotions which I get from your character’(Italics 
and ellipses are Gaudier-Brzeska’s).95   
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It is important to note the gendered and sexualized nature of these statements about 
art and creativity, a characteristic in Pound that will be seen in Chapter Two – ‘Moral 
and Aesthetic Intersections between Pound and Miller’ - to relate to Miller’s own use 
of language to assert his masculinity. Indeed, Pound’s Vorticist understanding of the 
artist as a harnesser of unspent energies is connected to a wider anxiety about male 
sexual expenditure, itself linked to a curious metaphor of the brain as sexual organ. 
His notion in Blast 1 of ‘the … statement that has not yet SPENT itself in expression, 
but which is the most capable of expression’ very clearly aligns the pure, strong 
artistic expression of energies with male potency, a counterpoint to weak and 
impotent art.96 Likewise, we will see that Miller relates the creative acts of thinking 
and writing to sex in various ways – from his declaration to Emil Schnellock that ‘I 
will explode in the Paris book’ to his claim in Cancer’s prequel, Tropic of Capricorn 
that he did ‘all [his] quiet thinking via the penis’.97 However, as with so many of the 
apparent points of crossover, Pound’s desire for control and Miller’s for its loss will 
be seen to have constituted very different forms of sexual (and indeed economic) 
anxiety.  
As various Pound scholars have pointed out, these statements about energy 
expenditure are part of a larger aggressive masculinism that pervades his reviews 
and manifesto essays. If Kenner implies forcefulness in his observation that 
‘Vorticism conceives’ rather than ‘receives’ its images, and William Chace – in his 
study The Political Identities of Ezra Pound and T.S. Eliot – calls Pound and Lewis’ 
project ‘intrinsically violent’ because it views ‘the artist … as antagonistic to the 
material with which he worked’, more recent critics have shown this violence to be 
specifically gendered.98 ‘Pound’s strategy’, writes Helen Carr in her essay ‘Imagism 
and Empire’ (2000), was to ‘create active, virile personae’ and to use the language of                                                              
96 ‘Vortex. Pound’, p. 154. 
97 Letters to Emil, p. 72, February 16th 1931; Henry Miller, Tropic of Capricorn (London: 
Harper Perennial, 2005 [orig. ed.: Paris: Obelisk, 1939]), p. 167. Referred to hereafter 
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‘brash machismo’ to assert the importance of himself as an artist, and of artists to 
society.99 ‘From 1912’, Carr goes on, ‘he had been recommending poetry in 
increasingly masculinist terms, poetry that was “harder”, “austere”, “like granite”, 
“nearer to the bone”’.100 Indeed, as K.K. Ruthven puts it in Ezra Pound As Literary 
Critic (1991), Pound associated good literature with masculinity and bad literature 
with femininity: 
The binary opposites ‘hard and ‘soft’ are in Pound’s criticism the organizing terms 
in a libidinal economy which pits the ‘masculine’ virtues of hardness and clarity 
of outline against such ‘feminine’ vices as ‘softness’, ‘emotional slither’, ‘wobbles’ 
and ‘slush’.101 
In Ruthven’s opinion, Pound intended Imagism as a reassertion of masculine 
qualities in a literary world harmfully feminized by inauthentic and outmoded 
schools of writers. The Symbolists, Ruthven notes, come in for particularly strong 
gendered criticism: ‘Symbolisme, which Imagisme set out to supercede, was coded 
feminine and its characteristics – nuance, metaphoricity and synaesthesis – were 
labeled ‘soft’.’102 
By ‘nuance’, Ruthven says, Pound means the multiplicity of meaning, indicative of a 
‘softening’ of intent. The Imagist drive towards direct ‘concrete’ expression thus                                                              
99 Helen Carr, ‘Imagism and Empire’, in Modernism and Empire, ed. by Howard J. 
Booth & Nigel Rigby (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 64-92, p. 
83. Carr develops these ideas about Pound’s ‘imperial masculinity’ in her 2006 article 
‘T.E. Hulme and the ‘Spiritual Dread of Space’ (in T.E. Hulme and the Question of 
Modernism, ed. by Edward P. Commentale and Andrzej Gasiorek (Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2006)) and her book Verse Revolutionaries: Ezra Pound, H.D. and the Imagists 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 2009).  
100 Ibid., p. 83 
101 K.K. Ruthven, Ezra Pound as Literary Critic (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 118. 
102 Ibid., p. 119. Pound’s positing of imagism as the movement to replace French 
Symbolism is explored later in this chapter when we deal with his interest in the 
writer’s ability to tap into and reflect mysterious, omnipresent patterns in nature. 
Pound desired a type of writing that was grounded in a sense of ‘theos’ [god] felt 
through earthly existence rather than the yearning for transcendence to another state. 
In her study Manifesto: A Century of Isms (London: University of Nebraska Press, 
2001) Mary Ann Caws explains the difference Pound saw between the two 
movements:  ‘To Symbolist “evocation,” Imagism as Pound conceives of it opposes 
precision, hardness, clarity of outline; to Symbolist transcendence, the natural 
world.’ (350). 
 49 
opposes what Pound dismissed as ‘the opalescent word’, the part of a sentence that, 
like an opal stone, could be viewed in different ways in different lights.103 The ‘mot 
juste’, a term borrowed from Gustave Flaubert to describe the use of the correct word 
in order to achieve exactness of expression, thus represents virtue for Pound. For 
Ruthven this is a distinctly masculinist mode of thought, guided by Pound’s desire 
for ‘a new poetry of “power” and “men”’.104 In this context, Pound also considered 
‘metaphoricity’ and ‘synaesthesia’ feminine obstacles to a more desirable masculine 
project of linguistic modernisation.105  
These categorizations and connections provide useful ways into the gender 
essentialism implied by Pound’s perspective on Miller as a ‘man-sized’ writer, but 
they are also inherently problematic.106 Ruthven’s identification of masculinism is 
borne out by the evidence in much of Pound’s actual writing, but the critic also relies 
on his own reductive gender codifications. Behind Ruthven’s theory lies the belief 
that Pound’s interest in experimental literature, in work that is created not simply for 
its reader’s enjoyment but for the development of the form, is in itself ‘masculine’: 
[Pound’s] experimentalism offers poetry not for experience but for inspection, and 
aspires to durability by getting itself talked about. The pleasure of the text is 
subordinated to the cerebrations of scrutiny in a maneuver now recognizably 
masculinist.107 
To simply equate ‘cerebrations of scrutiny’ with male and ‘pleasure’ with female 
reading and writing misinforms the discussion of gender in Pound’s narrative mode. 
It suggests, incorrectly and reductively, not only that Pound is driven by self-
conscious academicism and the desire to induce a cerebral rather than emotional 
reaction in its readers, but that self-consciously academic writing is an exclusively 
male domain. As such, the statement weakens Ruthven’s argument on Pound’s 
gendered position, serving as a warning against the oversimplification of these 
gender-related terms when they reappear in relation to Pound and Miller.                                                                
103 Ruthven, p. 118. 
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Nevertheless, anxieties about the threat posed by ‘female’ modes of thought and 
literary method abound in Pound’s critical prose. To Ruthven’s list of the terms in 
Pound’s lexicon that associate non-masculinity with literary malpractice we might 
also add ‘decorative frill’  ‘red-plush’, ‘perfumed’, ‘sweetness and refinement’.108 The 
list of terms that suggest masculinity as inherently positive is equally extensive – 
‘strength’, ‘clarity’, ‘directness’, and ‘rigor’ being taken at different points to be 
explicitly male literary qualities.109 
Pound’s desire to de-feminize language was closely connected to his frustration at 
the inability or unwillingness of writers to match the professionalism of their 
counterparts in the world of science. As will be explained in Chapter Two, he put the 
circumspection of English critics about James Joyce’s Ulysses down to a puerile and 
short-sighted squeamishness originating in a failure to appreciate that literature had 
as serious a social purpose as science, medicine and law. Joyce, Pound claimed in his 
review of Ulysses, had written an accurate and vital ‘epochal report’ for the early 
twentieth century, a text that meticulously delineated the thoughts and values of 
human beings at all levels of society, but his importance was being widely neglected 
‘for the sake of a few words every school boy has seen written on the walls of the 
privy’.110  To Pound, this squeamishness about the human body – indeed, any moral 
ambiguity of thought and action - indicated an unacceptable amateurism and 
cowardice he defined as feminine.  In the aforementioned essay on ‘The Rev. G 
Crabbe, LLB’, uses an essay on Alfred Tennyson by the prominent Victorian 
journalist Walter Bagehot to bolster this point: 
‘Is it credible that his (Tennyson’s) whole mind would be made up of fine 
sentiments?’ says Bagehot. Of course it wasn’t. It was that lady-like attitude 
toward the printed page that did it – that something, that ineffable 
‘something’ that kept Tennyson out of his works.111  
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The term ‘lady-like’ here implies a refusal to admit and explore the complexity – the 
roughness along with the fineness - of emotional and sensory experience.  Writers 
and critics alike are implicated in the culturally systemic crime of hiding - like 
fearful, prudish women - from the physical and psychological facts of life. If critics 
are at fault for desiring and encouraging this kind of hypocritical and unmanly 
refinement, writers are even more to blame for giving in to their prissy demands and 
failing to explore and express unrefined and truthful aspects. 
The misogynist nature of Pound’s writing at this time is complicated by two 
important contextual factors: in the first place, his concerns about the feminization of 
art closely echo the concerns of the establishment he purports to attack; secondly, his 
and Lewis’ Vorticist project was publically supportive of the anti-establishment, anti-
government principles and methods followed by Emmeline Pankhurst’s suffragette 
movement.  
The irony of Pound using words such as ‘unmanly’ and ‘ladylike’ to describe the 
popular writers and critics he sought to usurp is that this was exactly the kind of 
language those writers used to describe his generation. As William Wees points out 
in his study Vorticism and the English Avant-Garde, there was widespread anxiety 
amongst the critical old guard of the early 1910s about the softness of the artists who 
were coming up through the ranks. For example, Roger Fry’s radical ‘post-
impressionist’ school of 1912 – who sought to do away with conventional, reverential 
attitudes towards Renaissance composition – was roundly pilloried by established 
reviewers like Sir William Richmond for its contaminative, emasculating influence 
on ‘the youth’: 
For a moment there came a fierce feeling of terror lest the youth of England, 
young promising fellows, might be contaminated here. On reflection, I was 
assured that the youth of England, being healthy, mind and body, is far too 
virile to be moved, save in resentment against the providers of this unmanly 
show.112  
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Indeed, Professor Tonks at the influential Slade School of Art encouraged his 
students to stay away from Fry’s exhibition at the Grafton Galleries because the 
paintings on show could be a source of ‘contamination’ for the minds of healthy 
young men. Despite dramatically contrasting ideas of what constituted masculinity, 
Pound and these older critics – traditionalists opposed to change – were equally 
invested in the retrograde quest to safeguard the purity of young, potentially 
corruptible, male minds. As Paul Edwards puts it in his introduction to a 2003 series 
of essays on the Vorticist manifestos, ‘The Great London Vortex’, ‘the masculinist 
rhetoric of the Men of 1914 was deeply complicit with the patriarchal aspects of the 
‘public’ culture that they were otherwise fighting.’113 
This conflict between progressive ideas and patriarchal protectionist language is also 
mirrored in Pound and Lewis’ use of Blast 1 to ‘bless Lillie Lenton’, a major 
figurehead of the 1910s campaign for woman’s suffrage.114 It is also evident in 
Pound’s regular contributions to The New Freewoman and The Egoist, periodicals that 
were edited at different times by Dora Marsden, a nominalist anarchist who applied 
German theorist Max Stirner’s ideas of mental and spiritual self-liberation 
specifically to the problem of female subjugation. As we shall see in Chapter Two, 
Pound’s essays for Marsden’s periodicals are identified by Paul Edwards as a 
demonstration of his unique, anti-humanist and egoist take on the philosophy of 
Henri Bergson. Since Miller was also engaged in his own idiosyncratic readings of 
Bergson, this aspect of Pound’s aesthetic sheds light on major correlations and 
divergences between his and Miller’s approach to the problem of expressing 
subjective experience through art. In the context of Pound’s approach to gender, his 
ideological association with Marsden and his Vorticist statements of solidarity with 
Lenton point to a version of masculinism concerned not with the threat of female 
autonomy but with femininity as a mark of soft, mannered and unambitious cultural 
attitudes.   
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Thus, in Pound’s manifestos of the 1910s, the ‘feminine’ represents both the 
combination of a genuine attempt to protect and assert essentially male qualities and 
a radical, anarchic desire to antagonize the comfortable literary status quo. The 
‘masculine’ is used for simultaneously traditionalist and progressive purposes, a way 
of returning art to fixed, ahistorical values by praising and promoting radical, 
aesthetically veracious work. Importantly, Pound posits Henry Miller as a corrective 
to the ‘lady-like’ modes of discourse and aesthetic listed above, a ‘man-sized’ voice 
whose prose, he states in a 1936 letter to T.S. Eliot, is ‘more part of permanent 
literature than [anything written by] such half master slime as the weakminded, 
Woolf female.’115 Woolf, whose experimental prose style sought to redress many of 
the same literary conventions as Pound’s, is cast as a poisonous false prophet; 
‘female’ and therefore intellectually flaccid. Pound’s faith in Miller relates directly to 
this – his countering of the corruptive methods employed by his mainstream 
contemporaries as well as the perceived femininity of other voices within the avant-
garde.  
Addressing the textual relationship between Pound and Virginia Woolf, Edwards 
suggests that Woolf was engaged in ‘the cultivation of moments of beauty that 
apparently transcend the fret, stir and competiveness of masculine culture’.116 As 
with Ruthven, it is important to approach these labels of ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ 
literary features cautiously. Nonetheless, Edwards reaffirms the slippage between 
avant and rear garde impulses in Pound’s literary discourse. This will be returned to 
in Chapter Two since it relates to a similar problem in Miller’s work – namely, the 
tension between radically progressive ideas about aesthetic perspective and 
regressively essentialist conceptions of individual and group identity. The 
contradictions and subtle complexities of Miller’s attitudes towards gender are thus 
partly evident in Pound’s reading of him as correctively masculinist. A literary 
artists’ healthy development, in other words, depends upon the transition from 
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boyhood to manhood, from weak, mimetic feminine ‘second intensities’ to strong, 
innovative male ‘primary’ ones.  
As will be shown in Chapter Two, Miller also aggrandizes and punishes himself 
according to a comparable standard of masculine virtue. Pound and Miller are both 
interested in the individual’s capacity to maintain a sense of internal order, a quality 
they discuss in terms that ordinarily exclude women.  For Pound, these ideas relate 
to his idolization of particular male figures – from Confucius to the radical American 
economist Major C.H Douglas and Italian fascist statesman, Benito Mussolini. For 
Miller, masculinity is explicitly associated with the ability to withstand failure, 
humiliation and rejection, to exist outside the secure parameters of family and 
society and yet retain one’s ‘moral health’. It resides in a particular kind of 
irreverence for responsibility that arises from the defeat of neurosis and the ability to 
know exactly what one needs and desires. ‘I have lived out my melancholy youth,’ 
Miller writes in Cancer, ‘I don’t give a fuck what’s behind me or what’s in front of 
me’ (239). As Chapter Three, ‘’The Festival of Death’ - Eschatology, Economics and 
Fascism’, will demonstrate, Pound admires Miller for his resilience under the 
pressures of social and economic marginalisation, a quality that Miller consistently 
discusses as a major aspect of his philosophy on existence.  
In keeping with the chauvinism of his discourse on feminine and masculine literary 
characteristics, Pound continually took up a position of zealous indignation in regard 
to his peers, categorizing them throughout his essay and review work according to a 
stark moral fissure. In fact, he repeatedly identified three of his most commercially 
successful English contemporaries - H.G Wells, Bernard Shaw and Arnold Bennett – 
as the principal ‘tellers of half-truth in literature’.117 Though very different in style 
and focus – Wells is best remembered as a Utopian Science Fictionist, Shaw was an 
Anglo-Irish socialist playwright, and Bennett produced popular novels about 
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domestic life in the English midlands - Pound objected to them all collectively on the 
grounds that they dealt in ‘stock’ fiction.118  
Indeed, in the late 1910s and throughout the 1920s, Pound built what amounted to an 
antithetical system that pitted these writers – active carriers, he believed, of the 
‘abstraction’ strain - against James Joyce and Wyndham Lewis, the two men he 
championed as emblematic of a stylistic and expressive literary mode concerned 
with the unembellished presentation of the individual’s subjective reality. In his 
reviews of Joyce and Lewis and William Carlos Williams he is as concerned with 
condemning H.G. Wells and George Bernard Shaw as he is with praising his subjects, 
objecting as he does to Wells’ and Shaw’s misuse of literature towards 
‘confectionary’ ends.119 The implication here is of sweet-tasting short-term 
gratification and an inability to engage with the narrative beyond its insulated and 
narrowly structured imaginary world. Pound believes that Wells, Shaw and Bennett 
deliberately falsify character types and set-piece episodes to engender insidiously 
comfortable and pleasant emotions in their readers. In the William Carlos Williams 
essay he describes the ‘narcotic’ effect of Wells’ prose, accusing the author of 
attempting to ‘soothe the tired mind’ of the reader, rather than challenge him or her 
with accurate reflections of the world.120 This, he says, is the result of authors and 
readers having concerned themselves for too long with ‘the desirability of sweetness 
and refinement’, effects that are harmfully distracting and of ‘a different order of 
existence … from pity, terror, tragedy and those things which art [should be] 
concerned’.121 
The ‘perfumed writers’ he criticizes in the same essay, the producers of 
‘confectionary’ prose, are looked upon not only as technically deficient and 
irresponsible but symptomatic of the unprofessional literary climate discussed                                                              
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earlier.122 In a retrospective essay on Pound’s early career, Wyndham Lewis 
summarizes the conditions that catalyzed his and Pound’s corrective, revolutionary 
fervor: 
A huge middle class rentier army of the intellectual or the artistic emerged, like a 
cloud of locusts, from the Victorian Age, and it covered the entire landscape, to 
the dismay of the authentic artist. They drifted dreamily out, paint-brush in hand, 
or with the novelist’s notebook tucked away in their overcoat pocket, choking 
professional talent – drawing all the applause to themselves … because they were 
such awfully nice people.123  
Against this background of perceived dilettantism, Pound presents Lewis – in his 
aforementioned essay ‘Wyndham Lewis’ - as a writer who fulfills his proper duty 
because he ‘hustles his reader, jolts him, snarls at him’, forcing uncomfortable 
engagement with the material presented, but offering a truthful account of its 
narrator’s existence. 124 Pound goes on to claim that Tarr, Lewis’ critically 
unsuccessful debut novel of 1918 ‘differs from the general descriptiveness of cheap 
fiction in that [his] general statements are often a very profound reach for the 
expression of verity’.125 Like Joyce, Lewis is described as countering the fraudulently 
polished ‘red-plush Wellsion illusionism’ of the period.126 In response to ‘awfully 
nice’ poets and novelists, Tarr is a healthily antagonistic alternative that can be 
forgiven its multiple ‘defective’ techniques because it demonstrates the ‘highly 
energized mind’ of its author.127  
This belief that a work of literature is truthful because it antagonizes its reader, and 
that such a work can have great value despite being technically flawed is pertinent in 
relation to Miller.  Pound’s identification of a similarly provocative narrative mode 
in Cancer is one of the reasons why he considers it a morally consistent and 
constructive text. Echoing his reading of Tarr, Pound judges Miller’s debut novel to 
be virtuous because it aggressively exposes the reader to the full gamut – and                                                              
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specifically the excessive force - of its protagonist’s mental and emotional existence. 
According to this critical scheme, weaknesses and inconsistencies of form and 
technique are unavoidable byproducts of unrestrained truth-telling narratives, 
necessary sacrifices to the cause of producing honest confessional art. 
Furthermore, the confessional atmosphere of Cancer arises from a form of 
consciously manic rage reminiscent of Lewis in Tarr and his non-fictional prose 
writing. Miller’s text is built around his celebration of his narrative self as an abrasive 
and experimental artist, willing and eager to admit and express his ‘murderous 
contempt’ towards people who are, in effect, 1930s Parisian versions of the ‘awfully 
nice’ practitioners and patrons Lewis condemns.128 These connections between 
Pound and Lewis’ anti-humanist, anti-collectivist campaign in 1910s London, and 
Miller’s attack on the pretensions of the bohemian expatriate community in Paris two 
decades later reveal the complexities and contradictions within Pound and Miller’s 
projects. As we will see, both writers have surprisingly ideological agendas that belie 
their professed objections to art that promotes partisan ethical and political 
messages.  If Pound wilfully contravenes the conventions of the critical essay, filling 
his reviews with excessively long or excessively short anecdotal passages, the 
connections between the different parts of Miller’s narrative are often deliberately 
tenuous in similar ways.   
Pound’s criminalization of the mediocre artist has its roots in the social and political 
significance he attributes to the written word. He consistently states the primary 
influence of nomenclature on the development of civilization, and believed that 
writers had a social responsibility to avoid using words inaccurately or falsely.  
‘Once the application of word to thing becomes “slushy” and inexact, or excessive or 
bloated’, he states in ‘How to Read’,  ‘the whole machinery of social and of 
individual thought and order goes to pot’.129 Thus, a novel containing a dramatically 
embellished episode or a poem that uses a metaphor which does not form itself 
naturally in the reader’s imagination presents a threat not only to the future of letters 
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but to the future of individual thought and of society itself.  In his essay on Joyce’s 
Ulysses, he goes on to ascribe unprecedented political and judiciary importance to 
literature: ‘We are governed by words, the laws are graven words, and literature is 
the sole means of keeping these words living and accurate.’130 Following this logic, 
writers who do not understand literature’s protective role in relation to language and 
to the adjunctive arenas in which language is utilized must be judged not only as 
inadequate practitioners but dangerously irresponsible human beings. With no hint 
of irony, in ‘The Teacher’s Mission’ he returns to his extended metaphor of illness 
and disease, employing the idea of medical malpractice to illuminate his point: 
 If you saw a man selling defective thermometers to a hospital you would 
consider him a particularly vile kind of cheat. But for 50 years an analogous 
treatment of thought has gone on … without throwing any discredit whatever on 
its practitioners.131 
This hyperbole is echoed, to some extent, in Miller’s own work on the writing 
process. In essays like ‘The Universe of Death’ (1945), his esoteric reading of James 
Joyce and D.H. Lawrence, and ‘Un Être Étoilique’ (1940), in which he discusses work 
by his literary ally and lover Anaïs Nin, Miller also takes up exaggeratedly 
authoritative and uncompromising positions. His fiction and non-fiction styles rely 
on the absence of caution and the tendency to overelaborate without apology. 
Indeed, in Cancer Miller discusses this characteristic as one he most admires in other 
writers - ‘what is called “overelaboration” is my meat: it is the sign of struggle, it is 
struggle itself with the fibers clinging to it’ (254). Like Pound, Miller makes a 
performance of viewing his literary subjects from extreme positions, eschewing 
balanced analysis or evidence in favour of sanctification and vilification. He has no 
interest, for example, in providing proof for his claim that Anaïs Nin is a writer of 
‘extraordinary genius’ or for the following highly cryptic and elusive statement on 
Joyce’s Ulysses: 
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Joyce is the lost soul of this soulless world. His interest is not in life, in men and 
deeds, not in history, not in God, but in the dead dust of books. He is the high 
priest of the lifeless literature of today.132 
This oracular approach to literary criticism will be looked at in Chapters Two and 
Three as part of the anti-logical, ostentatiously self-contradictory positions both 
writers take up in their prose narratives. Through his 1920s and 30s pronouncements 
on social and economic issues, Pound will be seen to have mirrored his earlier 
instructions to the artists of his age, trusting his own sense of ‘the process now going 
on’ over the ‘chronological facts’ that inform empirical analyses.133  Likewise, Miller’s 
narrative identity is constructed around the narrator/author’s ecstatic, blind faith in 
his powers of perception and artistic creation, a faith that effaces the logical doubt 
accrued from his past failures to be published. As he puts it at the start of Cancer, ‘A 
year ago, six months ago, I thought I was an artist. I no longer think about it, I am’ (9-
10). In this way, both writers sanctify their philosophical shortcomings and self-
contradictions by presenting them as the foundations of their truthfulness and 
originality.  
Focusing now on Pound’s moral approach to literary expression, however, there are 
complex and deceptive overtones to his ostentatiously straightforward statements on 
truth and falsehood, purity and contamination. His theory is problematized by its 
conflation of two opposing positions – one implied by his model of the truth-telling 
artist who has no agenda and the other by his separate and strongly felt belief in the 
importance of a ‘hierarchy of values’.134 Pound’s literary critical work is both 
undermined and empowered by the fact that his ‘truth’ is inextricably linked to a set 
of moral standards, which at times are as abstract as those of the writers he criticizes.  
Crucially, his fight against overelaboration also implies an objection to proselytizing 
narratives that make sentimental demands on the reader; a critical position he 
inherited, Ruthven notes, from Confucius as well as the nineteenth century French                                                              
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novelist Gustave Flaubert. In Cathay, his 1915 translation of selected classical Chinese 
poems, Pound states his intention to follow Confucius’ example by promoting 
writers who ‘set forth their matter without moralizing and without comment’.135 In 
the same vein, Ruthven goes on, Pound praises ‘the Flaubertian method’ which ‘does 
not comment on the materials but simply presents it, thus washing its hands of 
theories’.136  Pound’s promotion of the virtues of ‘precision’, ‘clarity’ and ‘concrete’ 
expression thus also attacks the use of the abstract words to transmit specific 
ideological messages.137 
In this way, amateurish poets are criticized in ‘A Retrospect’ not only for their 
reliance on ‘abstraction’ but their ‘rhetorical din’ and ‘emotional slither’.138 He vilifies 
poetry that aims, by sly technical trickery and manipulation of feelings, to persuade 
the reader of the merits of a particular cause. Broadening his scope to include all 
artists in his essay ‘The Serious Artist’, Pound claims that the reading or viewing 
public should be treated not as a potential converts to a way of thinking but as 
objective recipients of a report on human behavior and human conditions:  
If an artist falsifies his report as to the nature of man, as to his own nature, as to 
the nature of his ideal of the perfect, as to the nature of his ideal of this, that or the 
other, of god, if god exist, of the life force, of the nature of good and evil, if good                                                              
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and evil exist, of the force with which he believes or disbelieves this, that or the 
other, of the degree in which he suffers or is made glad … That he may conform 
to the taste of his time, to the proprieties of a sovereign, to the conveniences of a 
preconceived code of ethics, then that artist lies.139. 
The idea of the reader as an independent observer holding the artist’s ‘report’ to 
account is paramount for Miller as well. The diarist’s format Miller uses in his trilogy 
of 1930s semi-autobiographical novels allows him to move between two contrasting 
positions: one in which he draws the reader in as a co-conspirator in his anarchical 
polemic, addressing him or her with the familiarity of friend or literary ally; the 
other in which he invites the reader’s voyeuristic attention and disapproval through 
a graphic irreverence towards taboo material. Miller’s continual vacillation from one 
to the other creates a dynamic between author and reader whereby the latter is 
perennially destabilized  – at one moment participatory and the next, exteriorly 
observant. Equally, there are connections to be made between this kind of treatment 
of the reader and a more general distrust of ideology in literary texts. The complex 
implications of a reading of Cancer’s narrative as anti-ideological or free of 
sentimental, moral or political bias, will be analysed in detail in Section 1.2,  ‘A 
Hierarchy of Values’, through Pound’s review of that text.  
Pound’s presentation of the reader as someone who requires protection from morally 
didactic authors is problematized by the fact that he himself often partakes in an 
equivalent mode of discourse. Thus, in his attempt to circumvent ideology his essays 
on literature themselves become paradoxically ideological, an irony that relates to a 
larger problem at the center of both Pound and Miller’s projects: by searching for a 
mode of aesthetic expression that represents life in its ‘natural colors’, they are both 
engaged in an impossible, self-defeating mission.140 In chapter 1.2, this desire for a 
true and natural aesthetic will be seen in sharper focus in the context of Pound’s own 
ideological appropriations of Miller’s writing and authorial persona. 
 
The tension between Pound’s denigration and protection of moral purpose in 
literature is well illustrated by his belief in a set of indisputable values that had been                                                              
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upheld through the novels of Henry James, from the late nineteenth century up until 
the turn of the twentieth. In his review of Miller’s Cancer, Pound posits James as an 
ethical gold standard against which mediocre writers of the 1920s and 30s should be 
judged: 
 Thirty years ago Henry James … maintained a literature which took count of a 
fairly full gamut of values. The slump towards the impoverishment of values, 
towards the cheapening of every mental activity whatsoever can be best 
illustrated by Mr G.B Shaw’s Ersatz (88). 
In a 1918 essay written for a special ‘Henry James’ issue of The Little Review, Pound 
calls James the most accomplished ‘recorder of people, of their atmospheres, society, 
personality, setting’ to have written in English for over a century.141 Indeed, he 
presents his fellow American expatriate as a guardian of specific moral values that 
have since become ‘impoverished’ under the neglectful supervision of morally 
suspect artists. However, the suggestion that he ‘took count of a fairly full gamut of 
values’ appears not to emphasize his values themselves but, rather, the 
expansiveness of his scope. Pound admires James’ moral protectionism while at the 
same time praising his ability to absorb and reproduce a complex, diverse array of 
difficult-to-distinguish standards held to by different individuals and groups. Again, 
Pound vacillates between the celebration of artists who accept and express multiple 
values and the aggressive intolerance of artists that do not believe in Pound’s own 
inflexible system.  
Since some attention has already been paid to the latter position, it will be helpful to 
explore the democratic connotations of his approach to Henry James. In particular, 
what does Pound mean when he says that James ‘took count of a full gamut of 
values’?  He goes on in the obituary to explain it in terms of a furthering of 
‘communication’ between people:  
Henry James understood that the whole of great art is a struggle for 
communication … and communication is not a leveling, it is not an 
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elimination of differences. It is a recognition of differences, of the right of 
differences to exist, of interest in finding things different.142 
This is, Pound goes on, James’ ‘peacekeeping’ quality, the kind of statement that has 
led many critics to read Pound as an inherently tolerant writer, one whose interest in 
the delineation of differences between people stems from a unifying rather than 
divisive impulse.143 McLuhan, for example, ascribes the same characteristics Pound 
identifies in James to Pound himself, claiming that Pound’s use of language 
demonstrated ‘the utmost fidelity of sensuous and intellectual discrimination.’144 
Pound’s attitude, McLuhan claims, is one of ‘complete humility in the presence of the 
actual diversity of things’.145 In other words, he demands the clear and correct words 
in literature because it is the only way to truly discern and understand the finite and 
complex differences between human beings and their perceptions. Likewise, Hugh 
Gordon, who in 1950 examines Pound in the light of his Chinese translations, 
identifies his principal purpose as the encouragement of communication between 
cultures – ‘The value of Pound’s lonely pioneer work’, he writes ‘in the higher orders 
of gap-bridging will one day receive the honors due to him.’146  
Pound emphasizes a related quality in his essay ‘Joyce’. Joyce’s ‘power’, he claims, ‘is 
in his scope’, a quality he defines in the review of Ulysses as the ability to put down 
in writing a ‘variegation of dialects’ that ‘allow him to get across his [characters’] 
tones of mind’ with an accuracy missing from the vast majority of twentieth-century 
novels.147 ‘Values’ then are equated both with the psychologically explorative quality 
of a writer’s eye and ear - with his or her capacity to appreciate distinctions of 
‘tonality’ – but also with the substance of those tonalities themselves. By 
understanding a wide range of principles or standards for different people, Pound 
asserts, a writer is empowered to accurately render the subtle tonal distinctions 
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between their thoughts. In Joyce’s work, the reader is presented with characters ‘who 
not only speak their own language, but … think their own language too.’148.  
Writers, like musicians and painters, are successful or unsuccessful according to their 
understanding and intelligent manipulation of tonality. Discussing Joyce’s A Portrait 
of the Artist as a Young Man in ‘Joyce’, Pound again turns to Shaw, Wells and Bennett 
in order to assert Joyce and James’ superiority: ‘There are few people who can read 
[Shaw, Wells and Bennett] … without feeling that there are values and tonalities to 
which [they are] wholly insensitive.’149 
In his idiosyncratic translation of Confucius’ ‘Ta Hsio: The Great Digest’ (1928) – 
more of a poetic interpretation than a direct translation - as well as his 1937 essay 
‘The Immediate Need of Confucius’, Pound uses the importance of individual 
tonalities to explain the Imagist quest for clarity and sincerity. The creation of 
literature that has value, he writes in ‘Ta Hsio-The Great Digest’, relies on the process 
of “finding the precise word for the inarticulate heart’s tone’. 150 Describing ‘the men 
of old’, Pound translates Confucius in these words: ‘desiring self-discipline, they 
rectified their own hearts; and wanting to rectify their own hearts, they sought 
precise verbal definitions of their inarticulate thoughts [the tones given off by the 
heart]’ (Square brackets are Pound’s).151 Applying this notion of self-governance to 
the process of creating art, Pound declared that the instinctual desires, ideas and 
emotions that are felt interiorly must be apprehended and expressed by the artist. 
This, he goes on to say, ‘means not lying to oneself, as in the case of hating a bad 
smell or loving a beautiful person, also called respecting one’s nose’.152   
In admiring James and Joyce for their tonal sensitivities, Pound posits them not just 
as artists who are able to accurately hear and translate the tonalities of the exterior 
world, but as rare explorers of their own instincts, tastes and desires. The artists                                                              
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Pound celebrates are those able to address the disorder of their own emotional, 
intellectual and sensory realities and to fashion truthful, harmonious lines of prose 
from it.   
It is a process that is usefully explained by Pound’s translation of the Chinese 
ideogram ‘Shen’, a symbol he borrows from Confucius’ Ta Hsio and applies to his 
overall literary approach. Comprising of an eye grafted onto a heart, ‘Shen’ is 
understood in most Chinese-English dictionaries to mean ‘be watchful’ or ‘be 
cautious’, but Pound appropriates it for his own purposes, taking its composite parts 
literally and arriving at the phrase, “the eye … looking straight into the heart”.153  
In ‘Ezra Pound: Some Notes on his Philosophy’, Brian Soper identifies this maxim as 
a tenet of Pound’s literary criticism and poetry. ‘Pound’ he writes ‘re-establishes 
“gout” rather than specific norms of judgment’ making a clear distinction between 
‘taste’ as a faculty that is felt instinctually and ‘judgment’ as an intellectual process. 
Soper interprets Pound’s focus on the ‘Shen’ ideogram to mean that a work of 
literature can only truly have a positive impact on its readers if the author 
understands his or her own instinctual preferences.154 Indeed, Soper points out 
Pound’s belief that truthful expression of these preferences will result in a profound 
communion between writer and reader transcending the purely intellectual. In this 
way, as Pound puts it in Guide to Kulchur, the writer ‘gets off the dead desensitized 
surface of the reader’s mind, onto a part that will register’.155 As Soper goes on to say 
of Pound’s own writing method, the true artist ‘enters into the minds of his readers 
perceptually and by example, rather than canonically and through dogma.’.156  
We shall see that Miller proffers similar ideas. In various essays and interviews that 
explore his own writing process he frequently states his opposition to notions of 
literature as a predominantly cerebral art-form, preferring to think of the author’s 
role as that of detector and ‘transmitter’ of materials present in the world around him 
but inaccessible via the intellectual faculties. ‘What is an artist?’ he asks himself                                                              
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during the 1963 Paris Review interview mentioned earlier, answering: ‘He’s a man 
who has antennae, who knows how to hook up to the currents which are in the 
atmosphere, in the cosmos’.157 In the Henry James essay and, later, in ‘The Teacher’s 
Mission’, Pound uses the same metaphor but to slightly different ends, proclaiming 
that ‘artists are the antennae of the race’158 
As we will see in Chapter Three, Pound’s decision to couch his theory of artistic 
perception in terms of ‘the race’ connects troublingly with his theories on national 
and racial difference as aligned with and informed by his attraction to cultural 
physiognomy and Mussolini’s fascism. Nonetheless, there are similarities between 
Miller’s and Pound’s interpretation of metaphysical energies.  As Miller puts it in the 
same interview, ‘elements that go to make up a poem or a great novel … are already 
in the air … They need the man, the interpreter, to bring them forth.’159 This notion of 
creativity bears resemblance to Pound’s metaphysical philosophy as based on a chain 
of transmitted energy from nature to writer to reader. Indeed, in his 1921 essay 
‘Axiomata’, this energy is defined as ‘theos’, the Ancient Greek word for God, an 
omnipresent life-force that, by its very nature is unknowable, except by its effects on 
the consciousness: 
The theos may affect and may have affected the consciousness of individuals, 
but the consciousness is incapable of knowing why this occurs, or even in 
what manner it occurs, or whether it be the theos.160 
The serious artist, to borrow Pound’s proscriptive term, imbues his or her words 
with the patterns of reality he or she aims to reflect. As emanations of ‘theos’, these 
patterns are felt and tapped into by the artist but ultimately evade any attempt at 
intellectual apprehension. The reader responds positively to the text because he or 
she intuits what Hugh Kenner, in The Pound Era, describes as a ‘patterned process’ - a 
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true expression of the universal ‘patterned process’ that exists in nature: ‘words 
pattern process, and … Nature, from which language comes, is patterned process’.161 
The proof for this, according to Pound, is that, throughout history, ‘honest’ minds 
have always arrived at similar conclusions: ‘It is of the permanence of nature that 
honest men … come repeatedly to the same answers in ethics, without need of 
borrowing each other’s ideas.’162 In other words, there are latent, indisputable ethical 
truths that exist in nature and can be detected and expressed only by rare literary 
artists. The combination of words in a great line of poetry or passage of prose 
originates then, not in the mind of the individual writer, but in the energies in the 
world around him or her.163  The idea is developed to its organic extreme when, in 
1949’s The Pisan Cantos, Pound proffers the possibility of “the stone knowing the 
form which the carver imparts.’164 According to Soper, Pound sees a kind of 
primordial relationship between the physical world and art that will be rendered 
from and into it because he believes that ‘the god is in the stone’ and that ‘what 
conceals him is a mode of expression – whether it be language or music, sculpture or 
painting – lacking in virtue’.165 If we take the sculptor’s manipulation of stone as a 
metaphor for the literary artist’s handling of language, we come to the 
understanding that Pound sees latent energy not only in the world around him but 
in the medium of language the artist uses to represent that world. As Kenner puts it, 
Pound is determined to ‘let no man with an eye forget what energy it is that fills 
words: the energy of the process in nature.’166  
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The term Soper picks up on - ‘the god is in the stone’ - is Pound’s translation of 
Vacuos exercet aera morsus, a line from Ovid’s Metamorphoses. His application of this 
classical aphorism to his wider aesthetics is helpfully explained via The Imp, a 
sculpture by Henri Gaudier-Brzeska that Pound particularly admired. A phallic 
block of alabaster roughly moulded into humanesque form, The Imp gives off 
connotations both of the ethnographic and the futuristic, the figure suggesting either 
a tribal god or a science fictional imagining of an alien. Its eyes, nose, mouth and 
neckline are moulded in such a way as to appear faintly etched into the stone, 
implying an animate force trapped inside and merging with the inanimate material. 
Consequently, the viewer may witness a life brought to the surface of the stone by 
the artist’s hand, the ‘god’, ‘theos’ otherwise concealed by a ‘mode of expression … 
lacking in virtue.’    
To Pound’s mind, the artist must prepare for the task of receiving these latent, 
natural forces by meditating on what it is he or she actually enjoys, loves, desires, 
abhors, detests, fears or is repelled by. As Soper recognizes, the writer should be 
engaged not in the active delineation of exterior patterns but in the contemplation of 
his or her interior self:   
The reality which we usually call ‘external’ has already within it the force 
creative of its patterns … either implicitly … or explicitly, in the works of 
man. The cosmic harmony is not something given which we learn to 
“appreciate” as if it were some tangible object to be picked up and examined 
under a glass; rather is it a quality responsive to principles of order in human 
consciousness, both controlling it and being controlled by it in turn.167  
Pound’s understanding of reality and of a literary artist’s capacity to reflect reality, 
Soper claims, depends upon ‘the precept or moment of interpreted “onsight” – 
Anschauung’ that arises from a process of patient contemplation, implying a 
passiveness on the part of the artist that seems to contradict Pound’s Vorticist 
statements on the need for the violent use of material.168 Even if we factor in the idea 
that the individual artist must contemplate his own intention and taste in order to 
align him or herself with the latent energies of nature, Pound appears to promote a                                                              
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subversion of the Vorticist relationship between artist and subject, the artist no 
longer acting - in Kenner’s words - as ‘lord over fact’, but rather as patient recipient 
of pre-existing energies. It is a dissonance exemplified by the difference between 
Pound’s admiration for poets like William Carlos Williams who, we remember, 
‘paints the world in its natural colors’ and his sabre rattling to the tune of Wyndham 
Lewis’ Tarr who ‘jolts, hustles the reader’.169  
According to Soper, this contradiction is a sign of the inter-relationship between 
‘known’ and ‘felt’, ‘noumenal’ and ‘phenomenal’ forces, dynamics in which the ‘felt’ 
and the ‘phenomenal’ must inevitably take precedence:  
While the exceptional artist may be able to use his or her creative mind to 
capture the ‘felt’ and ‘phenomenal’, he or she cannot take credit for creating 
that force. As Pound puts it in his 1934 essay on the Italian poet Guido 
Cavalcanti:  ‘The force is arrested, but there is never any question about its 
latency, about the force being the essential, and the rest ‘accidental’.170 
This is yet another paradox mirrored in Miller’s aesthetic. In various essays and 
interviews on the process of literary creation, Miller consistently advocates a passive 
approach to work: ‘stop thinking and let ‘it’ come’ he tells aspiring writers in his 
1963 interview with The Paris Review.171 This is contradicted, however, by his quest 
for a mode of literature that truly embodies day-to-day subjective experience, by the 
vitriol and bitterness that characterize the narrative tone in Cancer and, most 
crucially, by Miller’s belief in the individual’s subjective world as a product of the 
imagination.  
Examining both areas of Pound’s thinking on ‘tonality’ – in other words the 
individual’s ability to produce art by detecting exterior and interior patterns - we are 
directed again towards the connection between Pound’s approach to ‘values’ and his 
anxiety about standardized approaches. He is concerned throughout his criticism 
about a negative literary trend towards narrow artistic perspectives that ignore the                                                              
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subtle intricacies of subjective reality. He is worried that his contemporaries and 
successors are neglecting to report on the differences between the ways in which 
other people think, feel and express themselves. As we will see in the following 
section, Pound’s opinions in his review of Cancer are as abstractly expressed and 
unsupported by evidence as in much of his literary criticism, but the review also 
contains some of his starkest statements about an acceptable ‘hierarchy of values’. 
The many paradoxes within Pound’s aesthetic and ethical worldview, and the detail 
of what Pound means when he talks about ‘hierarchy’, ‘good and evil’ and ‘values’ 
will be explored and delineated through a close reading of this review.  
Pound’s statements against ‘poppycock’, ‘rhetorical din’ and ‘emotional slither’, his 
belief that writers should listen carefully to the subtle tonalities inside themselves 
and the outside world are the early incongruous foundations for his belief that Miller 
represents a set of productive values at the mid-point of the 1930s.172 In Chapters 
Two and Three we will see how these aesthetic tenets had metamorphosed into 
eccentric political and economic theories by the time he wrote his review of Cancer. I 
will delineate the different ways in which Pound found proof for those theories in 
Miller’s prose. In preparation for that analysis the following section uses Pound’s 
ideas about truth and untruth, good and evil in works of literature to decode his 
many references to scope, tonality and moral stability in the Cancer review. 
Importantly, we will see that Pound’s beliefs about the written word as a means of 
protecting healthy, non-partisan and masculine values is the starting point for a 
reading of Miller’s work that defines the author himself as healthy, sane and strong. 
In this context, I will ask how Pound was able to arrive at such a conclusion when 
the ‘overelaborate’ Miller so clearly flouted the former’s fundamental Flaubertian 
directive to carefully seek out ‘le mot juste’ for each thought, feeling or idea.        
         
 
 
                                                             
172 ‘A Retrospect’, p. 3. See my p. 29.  
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1.2 A ‘hierarchy of values’: Pound’s ‘Review of Tropic of Cancer’ (1935) 
‘For a hundred and fifty pages the reader not having started to think very hard, 
might suppose the book is amoral, its ethical discrimination seems about that of a 
healthy pup nosing succulent “poubelles”, but that estimate can’t really hold. Miller 
has and has very strongly a hierarchy of values. And in the present chaos, this 
question of hierarchy has become almost as important as having values at all.’ Ezra 
Pound, ‘Review of Tropic of Cancer’ (1935)173 
‘When a book like Tropic of Cancer appears, it is only natural that the thing people 
notice should be its obscenity. Given our current notions of literary decency, it is not 
at all easy to approach an unprintable book with detachment. Either one is shocked 
and disgusted, or one is morbidly thrilled, or one is determined above all else not to 
be impressed.’ George Orwell, ‘Inside the Whale’ (1940)174 
Pound was alone among early reviewers of Cancer in his belief that the novel was 
built around a clearly identifiable, consistent and sympathetic moral framework. 
Aside from Pound, the 1930s and 40s English and American critics who commented 
positively on Miller’s banned book fell into two camps– the majority who believed 
that his writing was actively immoral, ‘sordid’ or ‘obscene’ and the few, referred to 
above by Pound, who adhered to the notion that ‘the book [was] amoral’ and lacking 
in ‘ethical discrimination’.  
Edmund Wilson, associate editor of the left-wing American literary periodical The 
New Republic in the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, is representative of the 
former camp. In one of Miller’s first reviews in English, Wilson wrote that ‘from the 
point of view of both its happenings and of the language in which they are conveyed 
[it] is the lowest book of any real literary merit that I ever remember to have read’.175 
Wilson’s gist is that Miller’s writing is good despite rather than irrespective or 
because of the profane language and morally suspect subject matter. An essay by 
Anglo-French critic Montgomery Belgion, printed in T.S. Eliot’s The Criterion in 1935, 
offers a similar appraisal. Whilst congratulating Miller for the ‘dynamism’ of his 
                                                             
173 ‘Review of Tropic of Cancer’, p. 88. 
174 Orwell, p. 95. 
175 Wilson, ‘Twilight of the Expatriates’, p. 91. 
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prose, Belgion laments his ‘wearisome iteration of certain words’ and what he 
dismissively terms the ‘sustained retching’ of its narrative.176  
The chief proponent of this ‘amoral’ position was George Orwell, who met Miller in 
1934 while stopping over in Paris on his way to fight in the Spanish Civil War. 
Orwell’s 1940 essay ‘Inside the Whale’ argues that Miller’s quality resides in his 
opposition to moral and political positivism, claiming that the narrator of Cancer 
represents a ‘voice from the crowd, the underling, from the third-class carriage, from 
the ordinary, non-political, non-moral, passive man.’177 It was a position, we shall 
see, largely informed by Miller’s incredulous reaction to Orwell’s support for the 
Spanish republican cause. In his review of Cancer, Orwell prefaces his discussion of 
the novel by recounting their meeting and self-deprecatingly applauding Miller for 
mocking his idealism. By disengaging himself from the widespread partisanship of 
the pre-World War Two Anglo-American literary scene, Orwell claimed, and by 
demonstrating a narrative tone that was ‘bold, not frightened’, Miller was able to 
write exceptionally truthful prose.178  
Orwell’s reading is crucial to an analysis of Pound’s moral and narrative relationship 
with Miller since it celebrates Cancer as an important 1930s text for reasons that are 
narrowly political and therefore antithetical to Pound’s. Moreover, Orwell’s essay 
has had a much more significant impact than Pound’s on later studies of Miller, 
leading to reductive readings that tend to ignore the latter’s moral position 
altogether and consequently misunderstand the complexities of his aesthetic 
approach. For this reason, the details of Orwell’s review will be analysed in relation 
to Pound’s later on in this chapter. For the moment, however, it is important to note 
that Orwell was the most prominent of a small group of reviewers - including Philip 
Rahv, a contributor to Wilson’s The New Republic - who understood Miller as a figure 
of ‘total negation’; symptomatic of a pre-war period in which politics and literature 
were increasingly thought of as redundant, and a reaction against the ineffectual                                                              
176 Montgomery Belgion, ‘French Chronicle’, October 1935, no. 58, in The Criterion, 
1922-1939, Vol. Oct 1935-July 1936 (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), pp. 85-92, p. 86 
177 Orwell, ‘Inside the Whale’, p. 128. 
178 Ibid., p. 129. 
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political posturing of more fashionable and commercially successful novelists and 
poets.179 
Pound’s review of Miller is fiercely defensive against accusations both of immorality 
and amorality, permeated as it is by the fundamental belief that Cancer presents a 
fully formed and ordered world, neither immoral nor amoral in its content or style.  
He positions himself in direct opposition to the critics – whose reactions he regards 
as misguided and short-sighted – and the general reading public – who are 
dismissed as ‘cow-towing’ and ‘submissive’ in their susceptibility to shock and 
offense at Miller’s choice of language (87).180 In addition, Pound argues against the 
notion that Miller’s interest in ‘low-life’ characters, his unabashed and de-
romanticized descriptions of sexual experience and his disregard for conventional 
moral judgment render Cancer simply a ‘bawdy’ text: 
The bawdy will welcome this bawdy book with guffaws of appreciation, but the 
harassed and over-serious critic … will be glad of deliverance from a difficult 
situation (87) 
Pound paints a heroic picture of Miller as the possessor of ethical faculties that are 
rare and necessary amongst literary artists, welcoming Cancer as an antidotal 
addition to the Anglo-American landscape. Strikingly, his admiration for the semi-
autobiographical novel extends to a favorable comparison with the works of his two 
principal literary champions: 
 At last we have a full-sized 300 page volume that can be set beside [James] Joyce 
and [Wyndham] Lewis [and] gives one a chance and right to mention their 
limitations  (88) 
The implication here is twofold: first, that the scope, the sensitivity to tonality, the 
‘standards’ that Joyce and Lewis had until this point alone embodied, are now finally                                                              
179 Rahv, ‘Henry Miller’, p. 31 
180 The general public, referred to in Pound’s essay ‘Henry James’ as ‘the bullet-
headed many’, are roundly pilloried throughout his literary critical writings (‘Henry 
James’, p. 297). ‘The mob’, he writes in his review of Ulysses, are dangerous 
legitimizers of ‘Wells, Shaw and Bennett’, a parochial, undereducated constituency 
who allow themselves to be ‘swaddled’ by comforting but insidious ideas of equality 
and universalism. The subject of Poundian elitism in relation to Miller’s narrative 
mode is dealt with in detail towards the end of this chapter.  
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recognizable in a new piece of writing; second, that Miller’s prose meets Pound’s 
criteria regarding literary method in a way that Joyce and Lewis do not.  
As with so much of his writing, Pound is deliberately provocative in his defense of 
Miller. He premises his argument by self-conscious flouting apparently obvious 
readings of Cancer, asserting that where others are bound to see the absence of order, 
of a code of behavior that dictates thought and action in the text, what is actually 
present is the exact opposite. As with the Joyce, James and Lewis reviews, his 
eschewal of explanation and evidence creates the unsettling impression that Pound 
considers his assertions too obvious to require proof. Problematically, he works on 
the basis that the proponent of an idea proves its truth by his fundamental faith in it 
and by presenting it to the reader as indisputable fact.  
Chapters Two and Three will elaborate on this discursive style. Mirrored in Miller’s 
writings, it lays the groundwork for their deliberately self-contradictory narrative 
modes. For William Chace, Pound’s consistent refusal to offer evidence gives him 
‘the manner of a man who confidently assumes his answer to the problems of the 
world will have a validity denied to the mere experts.’181 T.S. Eliot, Pound’s close 
friend and literary confidant, offers a similar appraisal of Pound’s zealous prose 
style. According to Eliot, Pound ‘presents the appearance of a man trying to convey 
to a very deaf person the fact that the house is on fire.’182  
                                                             
181 Chace, The Political Identities of Ezra Pound and T.S. Eliot, p.73.  
182 T.S. Eliot, ‘Introduction’, in Literary Essays, ed. by Eliot, p. xii. Intriguingly, 
Marshall McLuhan puts Pound’s cocksureness about the validity of his arguments 
down to his small-town, evangelical American roots: ‘With entire Yankee optimism, 
he has insisted on the universal import of his interests, where Mr. Eliot’s skeptical 
wisdom has led him to soothe the literate and to seek understanding only from a 
few. Mr. Pound brought to letters the evangelical public spirit of the American town-
meeting.’ (Marshall McLuhan, ‘Pound’s Critical Prose’ (1949), in An Examination of 
Ezra Pound, ed. by Russell, pp.165-171, p.166). This idea of Pound having catalyzed 
English letters by importing New World ‘optimism’ is echoed by the position Miller 
creates for himself in Paris. In fact Pound homes in on the ‘incurable optimism’ he 
finds in Cancer, an attribute that Miller half-jokingly puts down to his own ‘retarded’, 
atavistic American spirit (56). The anomaly of two tonally very American writers 
ending up expounding prophetical theories to European readerships will be 
addressed in Chapter Three, particularly in relation to their enthusiastic attempts to 
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Each writer Pound reviews is in some way appropriated for the purpose of 
promoting and developing his programmatic literary agenda. Indeed, in his 1961 
essay ‘Poet of Many Voices‘, George P. Elliot argues that this propagandist element 
in Pound’s writing acts as an impediment to the reader’s appreciation of it:  
[Pound’s] prose, which not infrequently deals with ideas, events, persons, phrases 
that appear in his poetry, can turn you against these by its very techniques. After 
the mid 1920’s, he  … turned to the writing of prose propaganda.183 
Miller’s own rather less illustrious reviewing career contains evidence of a similar 
proselytizing tendency, his literary essays often serving as promotional platforms for 
the writers he admires. ‘Un Être Étoilique’, his 1939 essay on Anaïs Nin, for example, 
presents her as a writer of an entirely new form of confessional literature, one that 
surpasses anything written before it. He frequently makes bold, unsupported 
statements as if they are undisputable facts. Her diary represents, he claims, nothing 
short of ‘a mythological voyage towards the source and fountainhead of life’.184 
Furthermore, despite Nin’s relative obscurity at this stage in her career, ‘the 
importance of such a work to our time hardly needs to be stressed’.185 This tendency 
towards hyperbole, as we will see, supports the eschatological aspects of Miller and 
Pound’s narrative modes. The certainty with which both writers promote their 
contemporaries is invariably connected to a sense of urgency about the epoch in 
which they are writing. It is a characteristic aligned with what Frank Kermode 
describes, in his lecture and essay ‘The Modern Apocalypse’ as the ‘powerful 
eschatological element’ common to experimentalist writers of the early twentieth 
century, a state of naïve self-absorption arrived at by literary artists seeking to invest 
their works with greater historical significance (1967): 
The first phase of modernism, which so far as the English language goes we 
associate with Pound and Yeats, Wyndham Lewis and Joyce, was clerkly                                                                                                                                                                               
communicate complicated eschatology in an instinctual and de-intellectualized 
manner.    
183 George P. Elliott, ‘Poet of Many Voices’ in Ezra Pound: A Collection of Critical 
Essays, ed. by Walter Sutton (Spectrum: New Jersey, 1963), pp. 152-162, p. 152. 
184 ‘Un Être Étoilique’, in The Best of Henry Miller, ed. by Durrell, pp. 287-306, p.  288. 
Originally published in The Cosmological Eye (New York: New Directions, 1939). 
185 Ibid., p. 288. 
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enough, skeptical in many ways; and yet we can without difficulty convict 
most of these authors of dangerous lapses into mythical thinking.186 
Kermode ‘convicts’ these writers of assuming: 
[their] own crisis [is] pre-eminent, more worrying, more interesting, than 
other crises: the vain belief, in other words, that their particular epoch, 
represented by their particular art, was more integral to the past and future of 
civilization than any before it.187 
More importantly, Kermode saw evidence of an even shorter sighted ‘mythological’ 
and ‘eschatological’ perspective in the modernisms that emerged after World War 
Two.  Pound and Miller can – in their different ways – be located in the interzone 
between Kermode’s models of the ‘clerkly’ apocalyptic mode of the early modernists 
and the unchecked counter-cultural mythologies of the 1950s and the 1960s, an issue 
that will further analysed in Chapter Three.   
In Pound’s review of Cancer, he employs proselytising language and tone to defend 
Miller from the lazy criticism he predicts will come his way. The average reader, 
tempted either to dismiss or applaud the book because of its negation of the concept 
of moral order, is reprimanded since, in Pound’s view, ‘If an obscene book is obscene 
because of any vileness in the author’s mind this book is certainly not obscene’ (88).  
Underlying this defense is the premise that ‘obscenity’ and ‘immorality’ are terms 
that should be applied not to work which shocks by its subject matter but to writing 
that fails to abide by Pound’s core tenets. In ‘The Serious Artist’ Pound complains 
that ‘it takes a deal of talking to convince a layman that bad art is ‘immoral’, that 
good art however ‘immoral’ it is, is wholly a thing of virtue. Purely and simply … 
good art can NOT be immoral’.188  The morality of a work of fiction, in other words, 
should be measured according to artistic veracity - and therefore quality - rather than 
any set of objective standards. It is the writer who ‘makes false reports … either 
deliberately or through negligence’ who should be judged as immoral not he who, 
                                                             
186 Frank Kermode, ‘The Modern Apocalypse’, The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the 
Theory of Fiction (New York: OUP, 1967), pp. 91-124, p. 104. 
187 Ibid., p. 94. 
188 ‘The Serious Artist’, p. 44. 
 78 
like Miller, handles material ordinarily categorized as ‘obscene’.189 Indeed, like Joyce 
- praised by Pound for dealing accurately with subjects that are ‘obscure, even 
obscene’ - Miller is regarded as having a sound moral grounding irrespective of his 
actual subject material.190 
Pound discusses obscenity at length in his 1922 review of Joyce’s Ulysses, addressing 
general objections to what he calls the ‘faecal analysis’ in the novel.191 He admonishes 
the critics who have condemned Ulysses ‘for the sake of two or three words which 
every small boy has seen written on the walls of the privy’, making the case that it is 
infantile to judge a book as immoral according to its use of words, images or ideas 
that offend or embarrass the sensibilities of its readers.192 Furthermore, he claims in 
‘The Serious Artist’, readings that incorrectly identify a work as obscene for these 
reasons are unable to identify the depth of personal dishonesty at the root of most 
popular literature: 
Bad art is false reports as to the nature of man, as to  …. [the author’s] nature, as 
to the nature of his ideal of the perfect, as to the nature of his idea of this, that or 
the other, of god, if god exist, of the life force with which he believes or 
disbelieves this, that or the other, of the degree in which he suffers or is made 
glad.193 
In comparing Miller to Joyce and arguing against readings that categorize the former 
as ‘bawdy’ or morally corruptive, Pound counters what he believes to be 
unsatisfactory, standardized notions of obscenity and a writer’s moral responsibility. 
As he states in the Cancer review, ‘all question of verbal license can be left out of the 
estimate (for that … has been an impediment to criticism)’ (88). 
Pound’s reaction to Miller thus becomes another way to define a ‘natural’ rather than 
contrived literary method. A work of literature, he states in ‘A Retrospect’, is deemed 
virtuous by its ability to generate feelings of ‘sudden liberation’, ‘of freedom from 
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time limits and space limits, the sense of sudden growth’.194As mentioned earlier, in 
the same passage (originally published as ‘A Few Don’ts for an Imagiste’) he defines 
‘‘an “Image”’ as ‘that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an 
instant of time.’195  For Pound, ‘The presentation of such a “complex” 
instantaneously’, through the successful combination and alignment of words, 
produces an emotional response in the reader akin to that experienced when 
observing beauty in the natural world. The reader of a beautiful line of literature and 
the perceiver of a beautiful moment in nature, he implies, are equally liberated from 
the temporal and spatial bounds of the present. 
Thus the artist, whose words unlock the ‘virtu’ in the world around him, is 
envisioned as offering the reader a form of escape, or transcendence from restrictive 
and mundane reality. In the ‘Cavalcanti’ essay, this idea is developed through the 
comparison of the currents tapped into by artists and the currents detected with the 
discovery of electricity.  What he nostalgically desires is an aesthetic based on the 
potential of untapped energies – a way of thinking about life and art that existed in 
medieval times but has since been lost: 
A medieval ‘natural philosopher’ would find this modern world full of 
enchantments, not only the light in the electric bulb, but the thought of the 
current hidden in air and in wire would give him a mind full of forms.196  
These kinds of connections, between the natural world, the artist’s creation of an 
image and the reader’s response to it, are crucial. In the ‘The Serious Artist’, for 
example, Pound uses an instance from nature to explain the difference between an 
honest and dishonest appreciation of beauty: 
I mean beauty, not slither, not sentimentalizing about beauty, not telling 
people that beauty is the proper and respectable thing. … You don’t argue 
about an April wind, you feel bucked up when you meet it. [In the same way] 
You feel bucked up when you come on a swift moving thought in Plato or a 
fine line in a statue.197 
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By equating the effect of a ‘swift moving thought in Plato’ with the feeling of a 
spring breeze, Pound hints at artistic capabilities that facilitate communication 
beyond the cerebral and even the emotional, and into realms of the divine. Indeed, 
like a religious leader instructing his congregation, he encourages his readers not to 
question the pleasure, the sense of ‘growth’ or enlightenment felt when he or she 
reads beautiful literature or views a great work of sculpture since it comes from a 
place of unarguable, natural truth.  In alliance with this, the art that Pound advocates 
is consistently described in terms of its magically illuminating quality, its ability to 
shed light on universal truths by inscrutable means. In the essay about Cavalcanti, 
for example, Pound is nostalgic for a time when art was produced alchemically: 
We appear to have lost the radiant world where one thought cuts another 
with clean edge, a world of moving energies …  [of] magnetisms that take 
form, and that are seen, or that border the visible, the matter of Dante’s 
paradiso, the glass under the water, the form that seems a form seen in a 
mirror, these realities perceptible to the sense, interacting, ‘a lui si tiri’ [from 
light to shade].198 
Pound’s notion - discussed in the previous section  - of the artist as ‘antennae of the 
race’, thus becomes a way of thinking about a creative method of communion with 
unseen metaphysical forces.199 This is the purpose of the ‘analogical’ method 
highlighted by McLuhan, the effect the writer is aiming for when he juxtaposes 
contrasting ideas and images.200  The artist is not only ‘antennae of the race’, detector 
and expresser of the natural forces at play in the world, he or she is a being who 
perceives an alternate reality, unseen and unfelt by ordinary human beings.  
Although, in his review of Cancer Pound does not talk about Miller in exactly these 
metaphysical terms, he identifies Miller’s mode of expression as ‘natural’ and 
therefore conducive to the feelings of restoration and liberation mentioned above 
(89). Echoing his comment about William Carlos Williams’ ability to ‘understand 
something in its natural colors and shapes’, Pound claims that Miller ‘paints in 
honest colors’ the life that he experiences, thus imbuing his narrative with ‘an                                                              
198 ‘Cavalcanti’, p. 154. 
199 Pound, ‘Henry James’, p. 297; ‘The Teacher’s Mission’, p. 58. See my p. 65. 
200 McLuhan, p. 169. See my p. 38. 
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undercurrent of comfort’, which carries the reader along, affirming and improving 
his or her moral health in the midst of apparently chaotic conditions.201  
Indeed, Pound describes Miller as “incurably healthy”, a term he lifts directly from 
Cancer’s narrator, who describes himself in the following way: 
I've lived out my melancholy youth. I don't give a fuck anymore what's 
behind me, or what's ahead of me. I'm healthy. Incurably healthy. No 
sorrows, no regrets. No past, no future. The present is enough for me. Day by 
day. Today! (65).  
 Pound emphasizes Miller’s unmitigated honesty, praising the resilience that arises 
from this. He believes that it is by ‘human necessity’ as ‘an “incurably healthy” and 
genuinely poverty-stricken vagabond’ that Miller finds himself begging on the 
streets of Paris, and – blessedly -not as an experimental ‘searcher for low-life’ (88). 
Despite the hardship of his position, it is impossible to ‘cure’ Miller’s narrator’s 
‘healthy’ mind and, in turn, impossible not to share in his good health. Employing 
Miller’s own deliberately paradoxical language Pound implies that Miller’s moral 
being is robust to the point of indestructibility. If he cannot be cured of his own 
‘health’ and optimism (despite existing within optimum conditions for a 
psychological breakdown), then there is no conceivable way he can be described 
either as obscene or corruptive. 
Miller’s belief in his own incurable optimism or ‘health’ is the cornerstone of his 
existential and literary theory. He refers repeatedly to it in Cancer and in his essays 
on writing and the private letters he wrote while he was finishing Cancer. When 
Anaïs Nin admonished him for his ‘indifference’ and ‘callousness’ in response to her 
recent bout of nervous exhaustion, he replied with a revealing analysis of his state of 
mind. It was ‘Health!’ he claimed ‘not indifference, not callousness’ that prevented 
him from sympathizing with her: 
It’s a very human condition which lifts you, temporarily at least, above so 
many useless problems and vexations. You just can’t be made wretched, 
sorrowful, miserable. You live there for a while, at the apex of clarity, and 
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you see things with the naked eye and everything looks good, is good. It’s 
almost like getting religion – only so much better, so much more sane.202 
Miller’s tendency to take up apparently callous positions in response to other 
people’s suffering will be further examined in Section 2.1 ‘Monstrosity and the 
Aesthetics of Destitution’, as a significant aspect of his narrative approach. Miller’s 
justification of his behavior towards Nin likewise has its origins in the notion of an 
improved approach to suffering that takes into account the ‘multiplicity of things’ 
and it is in this context that the standard categorization of Miller as an anti-humanist 
writer must be questioned.  While he is characterized both by his detractors - 
including Kate Millet (Sexual Politics, 1969) and Salman Rushdie (‘Outside the 
Whale’, 1984) – and his supporters - like George Orwell and Philip Rahv – as 
disinterested in compassion, I argue that he comes at the human condition from a 
startling but nonetheless deeply empathetic angle.  
Pound’s decision to reference Miller’s ‘incurable health’ and optimism assimilates 
Miller into his extended metaphor of aesthetic and ethical health and sickness, 
strength and weakness, purity and impurity. In contrast to the ‘stock novelists’, the  
‘G.B. Shaw ersatz’ of the 1910s and 20s, imagined by Pound as the carriers of 
defective literary technique, he presents Miller’s own infections, paradoxically, in 
terms of health and optimism.203 Miller’s ‘sickness’ is his existential resilience, thus 
marking him out against the mass of trivial, unhealthy writers that is tolerated by a 
tired and out-of-step Anglo-American literary establishment.  
Importantly, there is also the suggestion here, that by his frequent, candid use of 
profanity and taboo subject matter, Miller attempts to inoculate himself against the 
moral squeamishness of his age. The metaphor of inoculation provides useful ways 
of thinking about his writing in relation to morality since he consistently answered 
the charge of ‘obscenity’ with the theory that his writing functions as a ‘tonic’ for the 
writer and reader alike; a means of attaining cleanliness through the acceptance of 
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dirt, of becoming healthy by acknowledging the inevitability of impurity and 
sickness. As will be seen in the following section – a close reading of Cancer as well as 
Miller’s essays on writing in the context of Pound’s ideas - this notion of immunity 
through excessive exposure permeates Miller’s aesthetic, both in relation to obscenity 
and his vision of himself as a resiliently optimistic artist in a doomed epoch.  
As with Pound’s statements on writers’ ‘tonalities’, Confucius provides the basis for 
this idea of ‘healthy’ literary expression. Indeed, Pound’s interest in Miller is 
connected to Hugh Kenner’s aforementioned interpretation of Pound’s Confucian 
project – to ‘let no man with an eye forget what energy it is that fills words: the 
energy of the process of nature.’204 As we shall see, in his essay ‘Immediate Need of 
Confucius’, Pound promotes Confucius’ Ta Hsio as an essential and timeless remedy 
for the moral vagaries of modern Western society. Again, dealing in binary concepts 
of purity and contamination, he implies that a true artist must understand the energy 
his or her words originate from, and must utilize those words in their purest form. If 
a word, phrase or sentence’s power comes from its relation to a natural object, image, 
feeling or thought, then its incorrect usage tampers and harms that natural state. 
Moreover, in Pound’s translation of Ta Hsio:, The Great Digest, he applies this idea 
about words and nature to the process of creative and intellectual thought. 
According to Pound, Confucius advocates ‘developing and restoring to its primitive 
clarity our reason’.205 A person’s rationale, Pound believes, is hindered rather than 
improved by the professed advancements of modern Anglo-American thought. In 
this sense, he uses Confucius to promote an alternative mode of reasoning, a way to 
see the world clearly through a natural paradigm rather than the contrived 
conditions created by particular historical, cultural codes or ideologies. That natural 
paradigm can arise, Pound contests, through careful and serious contemplation of 
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Confucius’ Ta Hsio: ‘the whole of Western idealism is a jungle … to think through it, 
to reduce it to some semblance of order, there is no better axe than the Ta H[s]io.’ 206 
As we shall see in Chapter Three, the idea that Confucius’ philosophy and the 
ideogrammic method are tools for cutting through and clearing up the wild 
overgrowth of ‘Western idealism’ is connected to Pound’s fundamental hatred of 
protestant utilitarianism and usury. Martin Luther’s acceptance of the ancient 
‘Semitic’ sin, his allowance and deregulation of monetary gain through 
disproportionate interest led, according to Pound’s economic theory of the 1930’s, to 
the complete breakdown of moral values in the western world. Indeed, as he puts it 
later on in ‘Immediate Need of Confucius’: ‘the semitic is against ANY scale of 
values. The Church in the middle ages evolved a hierarchy of values. It is mere 
shouting for the home team to pretend that the so-called Christian virtues were 
invented A.D 1 to A.D 32 in Judea.’207 The particularities of Pound’s objection to 
usury – the links he makes between impure economics and the moral, political and 
social impurities of interwar Europe – form the basis of my analysis of Miller as a 
Poundian writer in Chapter Three. Indeed, the objection to usury – and the anti-
Semitism that accompanied it - is integral to an understanding of Pound’s belief in 
Miller’s ‘hierarchy of values’ in the 1930s.  
Setting aside the complex issue of Pound and economics for the moment, Pound’s 
appropriation of Confucius to teach writers about ‘primitive clarity’ and ‘the energy 
[that] fills words’ and also situates the former in a direct lineage of American 
nineteenth-century transcendentalism. As Ira B. Nadel observes in his 2003 essay 
‘Constructing the Orient: Pound’s American Vision’, Ralph Waldo Emerson and 
Walt Whitman – writers whom Pound acknowledged as his poetic predecessors but 
scorned for what he saw as their embarrassingly romantic archaisms (of Whitman, 
for example, he begrudgingly concedes that ‘his message is my message’ before 
describing him as ‘an exceedingly nauseating pill’) – appropriated ancient Chinese 
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ideas for similar reasons to him.208 Crucially, Nadel contends, Pound’s use of 
Confucius’ ideograms to think about the natural, primal root of each word is 
distinctly Emersonian: 
Chinese for Pound meant the recovery or reinvention of Adamic speech, “in 
which words contain the essence of the things they name,” a return to the 
world Emerson had outlined. Chinese was for Pound the restitution of what 
Emerson saw as the special requirement of language: to “fasten words again 
to visible things”.209 
Pound, Whitman and Emerson understand, Nadel goes on, that ‘nature precedes 
language’, as summed up by Emerson in his essay “Nature” with the statement that 
“words are signs of natural facts’.210 In Nadel’s opinion they share a belief in 
ideogrammic symbols as signifiers of the ‘visible things’ that words were originally 
intended to represent. By returning words to their nomenclatural origins, or 
‘fastening’ them to ‘visible things’, the writer had the power to reinstate a connection 
between humanity and nature that had been dislocated over years of intellectual and 
artistic development.  
Thus, in his quest to purify written language by assimilating Chinese ideas about 
words, Pound in fact activates a project started by a group of nineteenth-century 
writers he in many ways opposes. Moreover, Emerson and Whitman applied these 
non-Western formulations to their ultimate cause of originating an intrinsically 
American vernacular language. As Nadel puts it, Emerson and Whitman ‘remained 
part of Pound’s literary psyche, even as he rejected and criticized them’.211 Despite 
declaring that he reads Whitman’s Leaves of Grass ‘with acute pain’ and ‘frustration’, 
he is begrudgingly indebted to Whitman and Emerson for his aesthetic and ethical 
approach.212  Beyond theories of language, Pound’s Confucian revolt against ‘western                                                              
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idealism’ is also steeped in the ethics propounded by these ostensibly idealistic men. 
Indeed Nadel goes on to make the direct link between Pound’s reading of Emerson 
and Whitman and his interest in the ‘practical ethics’ of Confucius: 
Representation of the practical ethics of Confucius, as seen in the work of 
Emerson and others, partially shaped Pound’s admiration for the Confucian 
notion of the guiding leader who evolves into the patron and the political 
strongman … Emerson’s representation of Confucius … as establishing a 
government that regulates society by philosophic principles was fundamental 
to Pound. The importance of morally founded regulations also appealed to 
Pound, who understood that for the American transcendentalists, “the Orient 
was the home of the oldest philosophic truths; [but] to the British 
Romanticists it was a source of poetic glamour.”213  
Moreover, Emerson and Whitman applied these non-Western formulations to their 
ultimate cause of originating an intrinsically American vernacular language. 
Interestingly, Miller acknowledges the influence of these two writers on his own 
very American voice, taking an Emerson quote for his epigraph in Cancer (‘These 
novels will give way, by and by, to diaries or autobiographies – captivating books, if 
only a man new how to choose among what he calls experiences and how to record 
truth truly’ (8)) and describing Whitman late on in the novel as ‘that one lone figure 
America has produced in the course of her brief life’ (241). Pound’s incongruous 
interest in the sprawling, inconsistent and street-level narrative in Cancer takes on 
new connotations in the light shed by Miller’s admiration for these American 
transcendentalists, and – more importantly – his own simultaneous attraction and 
repulsion to them. 
As part of this, Pound’s interest in Confucius’ ideas of self and social governance will 
be explored more in Chapter Three, particularly in relation to the anti-democracy 
and anti-usury ideas discussed earlier. The simplicity and finality of Confucian 
tenets about personal, familial and governmental order provided Pound with a 
sacred benchmark against which to test what he considered the corrupt and 
irresponsible democratic establishments of his day. As he puts it in ‘Immediate Need 
of Confucius’, ‘we are oppressed by powerful persons who lie, who have no                                                              
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curiosity, who smear the world and their high offices with Ersatz sincerity’, even 
going so far as to claim that ‘men suffer malnutrition by millions because their 
overlords dare not read the Ta Hsio’.214  
Yet the fierceness of Pound’s ethical and political application of Ta Hsio is also 
indicative of a major difference between his and Emerson’s approaches to Confucius: 
Pound was enamored not with the potential for expansion or, indeed, transcendence 
in these representations of life but with the precise definitions of objects, thoughts 
and ideas he found in each ideogram. Indeed, taking his lead from the private 
notebooks of the American philosopher and historian of Far Eastern art Ernest 
Fenollosa – given to him by the latter’s widow, whom he befriended in London in 
1913 - Pound attempted to mark himself out as a true disciple of Confucius, arguing 
that the value of ideogrammic words lay in their overlaying of pictures representing 
precise objects and categories in nature: 
Fenollosa accented the Western need of ideogrammic thinking. Get your ‘red’ 
down to rose, red, cherry, if you want to know what you are talking about. 
We have too much of this talk about vibrations and infinites.215  
As Nadel puts it, in contrast to Emerson’s declaration that ‘if the East loved infinity, 
the West delighted in boundaries’, Pound looked to Confucius to consolidate the 
borders between things rather than dissolve them.216 
From his first reading of Confucius through Fenollosa, Pound came to view the 
pictorial ideograms of the Ancient Chinese language as powerfully reflective of the 
energies within nature and therefore of greater use aesthetically than the traditional 
units of language in European discourse. From Fenollosa, Pound took the notion that 
the patterns in European language were reflective of a restrictively static logic that 
was limited in its capacity to represent ‘active’ reality. Paraphrasing Fenollosa, 
Richard Sheppard writes: 
European logic is like a brickyard and the European logician like a bricklayer 
who selects little hard units and sticks them together with “is” or “is not” in                                                              
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order to build linear linguistic units that are incapable of dealing with 
interactive, multi-dimensional “nature”.217  
As Rebecca Beasley puts it in her 2007 study Theorists of Modernist Poetry: T.S. Eliot, 
T.E. Hulme and Ezra Pound, Pound was attracted to Fenollosa’s ‘argument that 
compound words in Chinese picture not only things, but the relationship between 
things’, reflecting ‘the activity of the natural and human worlds.’218 In other words, 
ideograms not only captured clearly defined things as they exist in the world but 
also the energy generated in the juxtaposition between them; the energy, indeed, that 
was discussed earlier as the key premise of Pound’s Imagist and Vorticist aesthetics.  
Pound’s appropriation of Fenollosa’s Confucian thesis is thus both evidence of his 
complicated relationship with his transcendentalist American forebears and another 
example of his and early English modernism’s wider campaign to cull ineffectual 
‘units’ of language. As we will see, Pound’s part in this campaign has interesting 
implications for Miller’s theories about the incapability of words and fixed ideas to 
render the constant flux of subjective experience. As Sheppard points out, 
Fenollosa’s skepticism about linear logic coincides with the early twentieth century 
philosopher Henri Bergson’s notion of ‘eidos’ – or classical logic – as a false and 
damaging paradigm, exclusionary of the intuitive and felt basis of subjective 
experience.219 Significantly, Miller frequently alludes to Bergson as an influence on 
his own conviction that ‘ideas’ and ‘ideals’ were sources of ‘debauch[ery]’ rather 
than virtue or enlightenment, pointing to an important area of crossover with 
Pound’s attraction to ideograms.220 
These recommendations to move towards the organic and the natural in rejection of 
the inorganic, the unnatural and the modern are directly related to the value of 
intellect and instinct in Pound’s literary philosophy. They imply a preference for 
artistic expression that comes as the result of the artist’s instinctive rather than 
intellectual connection to his or her material. The sentiment is well illustrated by a                                                              
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promotional letter Pound sent in 1912 to Harriet Monroe, editor of the English 
periodical Poetry, extolling the merits of work by fellow Imagist Hilda Doolittle – to 
whom he gave the penname H.D. In her poetry, Pound argues, there is evidence of a 
writer who “has lived with [her subjects and ideas] since childhood. She knew them 
before she had any book-knowledge of them.”221 The instinct is posited as the 
original source of an artist’s creativity, the vital starting point for a work of art before 
the intrusion of the cerebral faculties. Pound’s differentiation of ‘book-knowledge’ 
and instinct will also be seen in Chapter Three to emerge in his 1930s economic 
treatise Guide to Kulchur. There, he refocuses the concept of the individual’s 
contemplation of inner tonalities – of the Confucian notion of ‘Shen’ or ‘eye looking 
straight into the heart’ –to think about essential, personal  ‘ideas, facts, notions … 
which are in one’s stomach or liver’. 222  It is a curiously medieval image gleaned 
from archeologist and cultural anthropologist Leo Frobenius and it is remarkably 
similar to an image Miller uses to talk about creative thought and ethical judgment in 
Cancer: ’live ideas, kidney ideas, intestinal ideas’ (243).   
As we shall see in Chapter Two, these connected ideas point to the different ways in 
which each writer deals with the notion of pre-modern values as a remedy for the 
ethical instability of the modern Western world. Pound’s interest in Confucius leads 
him to the belief that there is a non-religious but timeless ethical standard that unites 
an elite number of intelligent, good people from epoch to epoch, a concept that 
Miller echoes through his reading of Oswald Spengler and his descriptions of his 
struggle to make it as a writer in Capricorn and Cancer. This shared touchstone also 
involves a shared belief in a ‘breakdown’ in gender and sexual ‘polarity’ and the 
disintegration of the individual’s sense of identity and purpose within the ‘collective’ 
life.223  Nonetheless that focus on the individual artist’s position within the 
‘collective’ life causes Miller to arrive at a set of ideas about what constitutes ‘radical’ 
writing that is inherently contradictory to Pound’s.  
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Clearly, Pound’s reading of Miller as a natural rather than cerebral writer is not the 
celebration of an instinctual disengagement from politics and morality that it first 
appears. Indeed, the idea of Pound’s Miller as an artist who has successfully 
divorced himself from moral decision-making is strongly contradicted by the 
former’s underlying conviction that Miller does have values beyond simply the 
representation of ‘life as he has seen it’.224 As quoted at the beginning of this section, 
Pound writes that: 
for a hundred and fifty pages the reader not having started to think very hard, 
might suppose … [the novel’s] ethical discrimination seems about that of a 
healthy pup nosing succulent “poubelles”, but that estimate can’t really hold.225 
For Pound, Miller’s writing is permeated not by freedom from the constraints of 
moral choice but by a sense of ‘eminent fairness’, a clear and stable perspective on 
’good and evil’ (88). Throughout the review, Pound approaches Cancer as if he is the 
one man who truly understands it, since he is the one man for whom Miller’s 
perspective on the world is not only apparent but makes absolute ethical sense. If the 
literary critical establishment will interpret Miller as  ‘a healthy pup nosing succulent 
“poubelles”’, Pound believes that he alone is able to see past the surface of taboo 
subject matter and irreverence to a sturdy moral framework below. The extent of 
Pound’s moral affinity with Miller is most clearly demonstrated by yet another 
statement of comparison with Joyce and Lewis - ‘he [Miller] has a sense of good and 
evil [in Cancer] probably sounder than that of either Joyce or Lewis’ (89). Since, up to 
this point, Pound had repeatedly championed these two as the only morally 
productive writers of period, it is significant that he not only assimilates Miller into 
their circle but asserts his superiority.   
The fundamental basis for this comparison with Joyce is the idea of aesthetic and 
ethical ‘scope’ alluded to in Section 1.1. Pound admires Joyce’s Ulysses for its 
irreverent reportage on a wide range of characters, their experiences, thoughts and 
situations and for its understanding of the dual and symbiotic existence of beauty 
and ugliness, sordidness and sublimity. ‘There is nothing so beautiful’ he writes,                                                              
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‘that Joyce cannot touch it without profanation … and there is nothing so sordid that 
he cannot treat it with metallic exactitude’.226 Pound applauds Joyce for being able to 
turn his careful attention suddenly from such ‘obscure’ subjects as the ‘figseeds in 
[Cranshawe - a minor character’s] teeth’ to the complex aesthetics of ‘the art of St. 
Thomas of Aquinas’.227 For Joyce, Pound claims, ‘the sordid is there in all conscience. 
But Joyce’s power is in his scope’.228 
By scope, then, Pound means the willingness to write about a wide range of subjects 
- human beings, inanimate things or ideas - that are not easily married, and the 
ability to remain alert to the actuality of experience rather than judging it. The high 
and the low are tackled with equal seriousness, sometimes also simultaneously, in a 
manner that Pound describes as technically astute and harmonious. It is, he says ‘the 
bass and treble of Joyce’s method’, an attempt by a supremely skilled artist to 
capture the ‘swift alternation of subjective beauty and external shabbiness, squalor 
and sordidness’:229 
 It has to do with the clarity and vigor of ‘any and every’ thought and opinion. It 
has to do with maintaining the very cleanliness of the tools, the health of the very 
matter of thought itself.230 
Pound treats Miller’s range of subject matter in a similar fashion: 
The book takes shape with an excursion to Havre, sailor’s bordello, and by perfect 
contrast to [the] Lyceee in Dijon, the grim greyness wherof balances both the 
jincrawl and the lights of Paris. (88) 
 As with his analysis of Joyce, a certain democratic impulse is detectable, since 
Pound’s emphasis falls on the inclusiveness of Miller’s perspective and his sensitivity 
to the nuanced aesthetic contrasts between visual and emotional experiences. Like 
Joyce with his ‘bass and treble’, Miller is presented as a writer who understands 
balance and the importance of tempering one tone with another, in line with Pound’s 
ideas on interior and exterior tonality. Significantly, Pound also perceives Miller as                                                              
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Joycean in his willingness to take vice as seriously as virtue, to include in his novel 
his lusty experience of the ‘sailor’s bordello’ and the sober ‘grim greyness’ of his time 
as a school teacher at the ‘Lycee in Dijon’. As Pound says early on in the Cancer 
review ‘nothing is too low to be left out’ (87).  
This aspect of Miller’s writing is, of course, also the main reason for critical readings 
that define him as amoral. Orwell’s essay ‘Inside the Whale’, for example, relies 
heavily on the totemic image of Miller as the ‘unflinching, passive’ recorder of every 
situation, the rare author who treats all possible events and scenarios without 
recourse to moral or political judgment.231 ‘Miller’ Orwell writes, ‘is simply a hard-
boiled person talking about life’, a fact that permits him to honestly and authentically 
represent the subjective experience of the ‘the average sensual man.’232 Like Pound, 
Orwell also makes the link to Joyce, highlighting the same ‘willingness to mention 
the inane squalid facts of everyday life’ but his reading discounts the possibility of 
any sort of moral or aesthetic system behind Cancer.233 In his review, Philip Rahv also 
claims that Miller’s ‘stream of exhortation, narrative’, his ‘anarchic’ approach to ideas 
and imagery render him ‘above all morally passive’.234 At the root of these 
interpretations lies the misplaced assumption – as we will see in the following 
chapter – that Miller’s morally uninhibited representation of what Orwell calls the 
‘dirty handkerchief’ side of life, connects him in some way to ‘the common man’.235 
In turn, the oversimplified association between poverty and amorality, and the 
conflation of the terms ‘morality’ and ‘moralism’ in this context fail to realize the 
inherently elitist role Miller cast himself in as an experimental, serious artist.  
Pound, then, uses the inclusiveness of Miller’s aesthetic for opposite ends to these 
more conventional readings. For him, Miller’s receptiveness to incongruous extremes 
of emotion, his ability to experience joy in an ostensibly unharmonious or distressing 
situation, and his refusal to exclude or disapprove of ‘external shabbiness, 
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sordidness, squalor’ is part of his subtle but strictly ordered system of aesthetics and 
morals.236 Rather than proving his passive, or quietist protest against the 
responsibility to engage with questions of morality, Miller’s acceptance of a wide 
range of aesthetic shades in fact represent something closer to Joyce’s schema. 
Fundamental to Pound’s reading is his belief that Miller and Joyce share the 
understanding that ‘there is no perception of beauty without a corresponding 
disgust’.237 Pound explains this statement in the following way: 
I have yet to find in Joyce’s published works a violent or malodorous phrase 
which does not justify itself not only by its verity, but by its heightening of 
some opposite effect, by the poignancy which it imparts to some emotion or 
to some thwarted desire for beauty. Disgust with the sordid is but another 
expression of a sensitiveness to the finer thing.238 
In other words, the ugly elements in works like Ulysses and Cancer not only serve as 
truthful representations of the ugly elements that exist in life but remind us of the 
fact that beauty and ugliness are symbiotic states. Pound suggests that Joyce and 
Miller’s representations of ‘the sordid’ are so complexly and truthfully rendered that 
the disgust these images induce also carries with it hints of a ‘corresponding’ beauty. 
Just as the power of narrative resides for Pound in the juxtaposition of images and 
ideas, the power of beauty arises out of the sordidness it suggests and vice versa. 
 This aspect of Pound’s perspective on Cancer will be seen in Section 2.1 ‘Monstrosity 
and the Aesthetics of Destitution’, to correlate with readings of Miller by French 
social and literary theorist Georges Bataille. Bataille, who discusses Miller in his 
essay ‘La Morale de Miller’ as both a ‘"monster of immorality"’ and a ‘saint’ of 
‘uncouth intelligence’, sheds important light on a set of productive paradoxes at the 
heart of Miller’s writing.239 Through a reading of Bataille’s essays, Pound’s idea of 
the beautiful and sordid in Joyce and Miller will be seen to connect to a wider idea of                                                              
236 ‘Joyce’, p. 412. 
237 ‘Joyce’, p. 417. 
238 Ibid., p. 417. 
239 Georges Bataille, ‘La Morale de Miller’ (1946), in Oeuvres completes de Georges 
Bataille, (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), vol. vii, p. 1. Originally published in Critique  I (June, 
1946). Translated by Caroline Blinder but unpublished. Page numbers refer to 
Blinder’s unpublished translation. 
 94 
a correspondence between the abject and the sublime, two states of existence Bataille 
posits as equally unbearable to the observer. 
On the subject of Miller and Joyce’s scope, Pound proffers two ostensibly 
contradictory ideas. On the one hand he claims that Miller displays a ‘circle of 
reference considerably wider than that of Joyce’s fetid Dublin, or the much more 
special inferno of [Wyndham Lewis’] The Apes [of God]’ (88). On the other, he tempers 
his praise with the caveat that ‘the lack of Dantescan top floors is … apparent in 
certain chapters’ (89). Both statements draw the reader’s attention to Miller’s 
preference for the lower end of the moral scale. Pound’s comparison of Miller’s 
‘circle of reference’ to Lewis’ ‘inferno’ implies that the former has a heightened 
sensitivity to notions of human sin and suffering, that he is able to explore the ‘low 
life’ with greater insight than Lewis (88). His reference to Joyce’s ‘fetid Dublin’ 
corroborates this position.  Miller, Pound claims, understands a wider ‘fetid’ world 
than Joyce and should be applauded for it. The regret at his ‘lack of Dantescan top 
floors’ however, appears to present Miller as incomplete in his scope, less willing 
than Joyce and Lewis to take the upper portion of the moral scale into account.  
Crucially, these descriptions of Lewis, Joyce and Miller’s ‘infernos’ also have a 
particular political and economic significance for Pound.  
Nevertheless, Pound’s primary emphasis remains the inclusiveness of Miller’s eye: 
Miller’s ‘gamut of values goes up at least to the finest burst of praise and 
appreciation of Matisse and a better evaluation of Mattisse’s particular gift than I 
have found anywhere else’ (89). In other words, Miller’s writing might occasionally 
become, as Montgomery Belgion put it, ‘wearisome’ by its fixation on the underbelly 
of life, but when it does approach high artistic material it achieves Joyce’s veracious 
insight.240  
Pound’s celebration of Miller’s inclusionary approach, however, sits uneasily beside 
a more obvious conservative aspect to the review.  Soon after claiming that Miller 
has in some way restored ‘the values upheld by Henry James’, Pound praises the 
former because, in his writing, ‘the sense of the sphericality of the planets resides’                                                              
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(88). An odd astrological phrase, it also appears in Pound’s obituary to James. In both 
essays, what is implied by the word ‘sphericality’ is the author’s representation and 
reaffirmation of some version of natural cosmological order. Though the phrase is 
initially employed vaguely, Pound later uses it to refer specifically to the ways in 
which individual human beings, and different groups of human beings behave. It is 
James’s ability to render how ‘people are fundamentally different’, that restores the 
‘sphericality of the planets’ in his writing.241  
Pound elaborates on this idea, appropriating Henry James for the purpose of proving 
the permanence and potency of national differences: 
National qualities are the great gods of the present and Henry James spent 
himself from the beginning in an analysis of these potent chemicals; trying to 
determine from the given microscopic slide the nature of the Frenchness, 
Englishness, Germanness, Americanness, which chemicals too little regarded, 
have in our time exploded for want of watching. They are the permanent and 
fundamental hostilities and incompatibilities.242  
A good set of values, to Pound’s mind, takes into account unchangeably oppositional 
emotions, impulses, tastes and perceptions between groups as well as individuals. 
As mentioned earlier, in Miller, like James, Pound sees a writer whose worldview 
corroborates his own essentialism: ‘Miller’s Americans are very American, his 
Orientals, very oriental and his Russians, oh quite so’ (88).  
In Pound’s opinion then, Miller continues what he sees as Henry James’ project to 
delineate the ‘permanent’ differences between people. As with so many of the artists 
he considers ‘serious’, Pound attributes a courageousness of perspective to Miller, 
the ability to express uncomfortable truths about the essentialities of cultures that are 
too often glossed over by his contemporaries. It will be seen in the next section of this 
study that there are various ways in which Miller does indeed corroborate these 
ideas. As pointed out earlier in this chapter, Miller’s national, racial and gender 
prejudices have been flagged up by Kate Millet in her second-wave feminist study 
Sexual Politics (1969) and by Salman Rushdie in his 1984 essay ‘Outside the Whale’, 
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which offers a loose and unconvincing response to Orwell’s positive appraisal of 
Tropic of Cancer. Millet’s assessment of Miller as a ‘counter-revolutionary’ misogynist 
inadvertently highlights certain anxieties Miller exhibits about the de-polarization of 
gender relations and the de-sexualisation of human identity that results from this.243 
Commenting on Millet’s reading of Miller as well as Rushdie’s dismissal of him as a 
‘happy pornographer beneath whose scatological surface Orwell saw such 
improbable depths’, 244Elisabeth Ladenson correctly observes that: 
Miller has not weathered post-1960s fashions well … his evident misogyny 
and his tendency to call a spade a spade, for instance, have for some time 
made him ideologically suspect.245 
Indeed, many of his pronouncements about female, Jewish, African American and 
Indian characters are shot through with misguided and misinformed prejudices 
about inherent gendered and racial qualities. However, Millet and Rushdie – to some 
extent responsible for the general mistrust identified by Ladenson here - are blinded 
to the complex layers of Miller’s narrative voice and to his wider aesthetic and ethical 
project by embarrassment and outrage at these positions. It will also become 
apparent that both writers produce reductive readings because of their respective 
and equally totalising political agendas. 
Unsurprisingly, like these later critics Pound misappropriates Cancer for his own 
specific ideological purposes. Miller himself was pleased that his promotional efforts 
had yielded a positive reaction from Pound, and yet he complained to his friend and 
literary ally Lawrence Durrell that Pound was using his position as an influential 
critic and literary fixer to coerce him into supporting esoteric economic theories: 
‘[Pound] sent word … that I could be “taken care of” – if I would sort of swing the 
bat for his crazy Social Credit ideas.’246 As we will see, Pound’s racial essentialism 
and economic theories are fundamentally connected, a fact that suggests Pound’s                                                              
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reading of Miller as ‘moral’ also relies on a deeper racial agenda. Miller’s casual 
dismissal of Pound’s ‘Social Credit ideas’ as ‘crazy’ is thus also applicable to Pound’s 
increasingly intolerant statements about race in the 1930s. Nonetheless, an 
exploration of the issue of difference in Miller’s aesthetic will demonstrate various 
troubling ways in which their racial and national rhetoric often inadvertently 
overlaps. 
 ‘The Serious Artist’ sheds useful light on this aspect of Pound’s thinking. In it, he 
connects the notion of abstraction in language to a wider societal point about what 
he calls ‘the smearing of difference’, extending his theory on the evils of neglectful 
and indistinct nomenclature to include cultural identity and character.247 It is ill-
founded and irresponsible, Pound asserts, for a literary artist to assume that ‘all men 
are the same’.248 Indeed, he claims it is a key purpose of literature to assert the fact 
that people experience and react to the world in utterly conflicting ways: ‘From the 
arts … we learn that all men do not desire the same things.’249 The arts should protect 
the concept of individuality by rejecting an untenable and irresponsible ideology of 
universalism, a purpose very much in line with Miller’s disgust with the masses who 
unquestioningly conform to standard ethical and aesthetical codes. Thus, Pound’s 
fierce objection to universalism will be discussed in Chapter Two in relation to his 
interest in protecting and maintaining a particular form of elitism.  
These concerns about ‘the smearing of difference’ are naturally related to Pound’s 
anxieties, mentioned earlier, about the decline of professionalism in the arts. For 
Pound and Wyndham Lewis in London between the wars, the doctrine of ‘clarity’ in 
the use of words to define things and people includes the inability of critics and 
readers to discern serious art from amateur, confectionary distraction, and extends to 
a similar disdain for political systems that work according to an ideal of equality. 
Pound, as we will see, makes these connections throughout his work and is drawn to 
Mussolini precisely for his capacity to rectify the ‘smearing of difference’, to make 
definite judgments about the quality of things and people and to act upon them. In                                                              
247 The Serious Artist’, p. 46 
248 ‘Ibid., p. 46 
249 Ibid., p.46. 
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the context of Pound’s work before the 1930s, he saw the amateurish, archaic notion 
of ‘fair play’ as indicative of a similarly contaminated political system. On this issue 
Pound was in agreement with Wyndham Lewis, who - Rod Rosenquist points out - 
‘considered the result of the “dogma” of democracy as a loss of standards, with “one 
person being as good as another. Life for life’s sake is the attitude arising from this – a 
worthy sister to the theory of art for art’s sake”’.250  
Lewis follows up the statements quoted here with a bitterly sarcastic picture of post-
war Britain as a ‘painting, writing, acting, cultural paradise … in which everyone is 
equal (that is, equally “a genius”) and every one is free’.251 As Vorticists - we shall see 
- Pound and Lewis captured and converted this unbridled, anti-rational violence in 
the form of antagonistically, irreverently self-contradictory manifesto statements, 
attacking the structures of democracy through content as well as in the jagged 
syntactical and rhythmical structures of the manifestos.    
At the root of Pound’s admiration for the national essentialism he reads into Miller’s 
novel is thus a deeper symbolic appropriation of him as a figure of conviction in the 
face of an insubstantial universalism of taste and judgment. It is Miller’s fixedness 
and his acceptance of an order, rather than any specific ideological allegiance, that 
qualifies him as a serious writer in Pound’s eyes, an allegiance complicated by 
Miller’s commitment to a ‘hierarchy’ of values: ‘Miller has very strongly a hierarchy 
of values. And in the present chaos this question of hierarchy has become almost as 
important as having values at all’ (88). 
Again connoting the fascistic ideas he advocates in various other essays from the 
period, Pound welcomes the concept of order at any cost. Miller becomes a writer of 
value not because of the substance of his ideas but because of the consistency and 
rigidness with which he adheres to and applies them.  A specifically historical-
political reading of this, in the context of Pound’s pre-Second World War economic 
and political affiliations, will be applied in Chapters Two and Three. Miller is                                                              
250 Rosenquist, Modernism, the Market and the Institution of the New, p. 48. Rosenquist 
quotes Wyndham Lewis, The Art of Being Ruled (London: Chatto & Windus, 1926), p. 
391. 
251 Rosenquist, p. 48; Lewis, The Art of Being Ruled, p. 155. 
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interpreted by Pound as a writer fortified by self-knowledge in a literary climate that 
has undergone a ‘slump towards the impoverishment of values, toward the 
cheapening of every mental activity whosoever’ (88). In his considerations of 
Confucius, Pound proclaims his belief in the importance of the individual’s sense of 
internal moral order and its close relation to beauty. Further to this, in the thirteenth 
of his ‘Cantos’ he claims internal order as the only condition by which an individual 
can positively affect the outside world. Translating and paraphrasing Confucius in 
one of what have become known as his ‘China Cantos’, Pound writes: ‘If a man have 
not unity within him/He can not spread order about him.’252 
Pound is interested in Miller’s resolute submission to his deepest will and intention. 
He presents internal order, an awareness of the contours of his own moral system 
and an ability to transmit that sense of order, as Miller’s principal achievement. 
Following this logic, the mind that narrates Cancer is described as ‘incurably healthy’ 
because it offers a worldview unequivocal and undivided in its representation of its 
subjective reality.253  It does not, Pound believes, allow itself to be influenced by 
external moral settings and, for this reason, remains robust and uncontaminated in 
all situations. The idea is well illustrated by Pound’s reference to a line from French 
Symbolist poet Mallarmé’s work ‘Brise Marine’ in his review of Miller: ‘La chair est 
triste? Perhaps, but not till it begins to give way or wear and tear’ (88). 
Mallarmé uses ‘La chair est triste’ – normally translated as ‘the flesh is sad’ - to 
describe the unsatisfactory nature of sex motivated by carnal desire.  The expression 
is a lament at the false promise of transcendence from human suffering offered by 
sexual experience. By citing Mallarmé, whose narrator is weighed down with ‘ennui’ 
(most likely ‘weariness’ in this context rather than the English appropriation of that 
word) at the memory and prospect of meaningless sexual relations, Pound again 
seeks to present Miller as the antidotal figure, a writer and narrator liberated from 
the pressures and pains imposed by a conscience. Taken literally, Pound interprets                                                              
252 Ezra Pound, ‘Canto XIII. ‘Kung walked by the dynastic temple’ (Confucius)’, in 
Selected Cantos (London: New Directions, 1970), pp. 28-30, p. 29. Originally Published 
in A Draft of XVI Cantos (Paris: Three Mountains Press, 1924). 
253 ‘Review of Tropic of Cancer’, p. 88. See my p. 81. 
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Miller as immune to the anxieties surrounding sexuality that affect socially 
responsible, morally cautious and self-examining human beings.  
Miller, Pound is saying, understands good and evil better than Joyce and Lewis 
partly because he resists the temptation towards conventional and idealistic moral 
anxieties over his actions. The following section will test this theory - as part of the 
Pound’s wider belief in Miller’s ‘eminent fairness’ and ‘hierarchy of values’ – 
through a close reading of select episodes from Cancer and Miller’s 1938 short story 
Max and the White Phagocytes (88). Indeed, Pound’s unlikely and intriguing 
identification of a strong moral code in writing that abounds with apparently 
arbitrary hostility sheds light on Miller’s complex rethinking of social responses to 
suffering and kindness. By analyzing this hostility alongside Pound’s growing 
opposition to humanism and liberal democracy in the 1920s and 30s, it will be 
possible to better understand its origins and form a picture of its wider, subversive 

















2. Moral and Aesthetic Intersections between Pound and Miller 
 
2.1 Monstrosity and the Aesthetics of Destitution: The anti-humanist reversal in 
Tropic of Cancer (1934) and Max and the White Phagocytes (1938) 
‘It was from the despised and neglected ones that I learned about life, about God, 
and about the futility of “doing good”’ Henry Miller, Max and the White Phagocytes 
(1938) 254 
 
‘There are people to whom you feel immediately attracted, not because you like 
them, but because you detest them. You detest them so heartily that your curiosity is 
aroused; you come back to them again and again to study them, to arouse in yourself 
a feeling of compassion which is really absent. You do things for them, not because 
you feel any sympathy for them, but because their suffering is incomprehensible to 
you.’  Max and the White Phagocytes 255 
 
‘The more you reach out towards the world the more the world retreats. Nobody 
wants real love, real hatred.’ Henry Miller, Capricorn256 
 
 
Pound’s assertions about Miller’s ‘eminent fairness’ and ‘hierarchy of values’ run 
directly and provocatively in opposition to the immediate textual evidence.257 The 
semi-autobiographical narrator of Miller’s 1930s novels is consistently and explicitly 
antagonistic towards traditional definitions of ‘fair’ or virtuous behavior. Indeed, 
Tropic of Cancer  - as well as the short story Max and the White Phagocytes and Cancer’s 
New-York based prequel Tropic of Capricorn  - are permeated by consciously unjust 
diatribes against the undeserving, from the comfortable expatriates who feed and 
shelter him while he is living rough in Paris to fellow down-and-outs who rely on 
him for advice and financial aid. These tactics of moral subversion also lead Miller’s 
narrator not only to countenance but to sanctify petty cruelty and physical violence 
in fantastical digressions that externalize socially unacceptable prejudices and 
desires.                                                               
254 Henry Miller, ‘Max and the White Phagocytes’ in The Best of Henry Miller, ed.by 
Lawrence Durrell, pp. 134-67, p. 134. Originally published as Max and the White 
Phagocytes (Paris: Obelisk Press, 1938).  
255 Ibid, p. 134 
256 Capricorn, p. 59. 
257 ‘Review of Tropic of Cancer’, p. 88. 
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The relationship between writer and reader in such episodes is multi-layered. As we 
shall see, Miller engages in a complex strategy of seduction and entrapment – 
signposting the narrator’s wrongdoing but imploring the reader to take pleasure 
from it. Violence and unpredictability of expression are the hallmarks of Miller’s 
search for narrative truthfulness in Cancer, an enlightenment of perspective designed 
to liberate the individual to perceive and experience ‘life’ (287). As such, these 
provide relief from the boredom, dishonesty and ‘living death’ (113) signified by 
traditionally ‘fair’ and virtuous ways of behaving. Paradoxically, by relinquishing 
control over thought and action and accepting the violent contradictions that arise 
from this, the narrator claims to free up his moral and creative faculties for the 
production of truthful and enlightening art.  
 
This method relates to a paradox that is central to Miller’s rebellious project and 
provides the basis for much of the argument in this chapter – namely that he declares 
his independence from the restrictive expectations of others while simultaneously 
courting the attentions and complicity of his readers. As Sarah Garland puts it in her 
2005 thesis, Rhetoric and Excess: Style, Authority, and the Reader in Henry Miller’s ‘Tropic 
of Cancer’, Samuel Beckett’s ‘Murphy’, William Burroughs’ ‘Naked Lunch’, and Vladimir 
Nabokov’s ‘Ada or Ardor’, ‘even un-cooperative texts like [Miller’s] still desire a 
witness to their refusals. Rhetorically, their address is split between seduction and 
repulsion.’258 Following on from this, and related questions posed by Caroline 
Blinder in A Self-Made Surrealist: Ideology and Aesthetics in the work of Henry Miller, I 
will explore the conflict between Miller’s position as an anarchic moral transgressor 
and his eagerness to control proceedings – both as an entertainer and stable narrative 
authority. The conflict - Garland and Blinder point out – is usefully read via early 
twentieth-century modernist manifestos that embody a similar tension. Like the 
Dadaists, Garland writes, Miller’s ‘intention is to seek out like-minded souls as much 
as to affront the bourgeoisie … The reader is invited to share in the energy of 
                                                             
258 Garland, Rhetoric and Excess, p. 5. 
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invective, but also to feel the satisfactions of defiance.’259 Underlying all of this – we 
shall see – is Miller’s playful awareness that his strategy to effect complete freedom 
from literary and moral convention, and to embody real life in art, is inevitably 
scuppered by its own reliance on artifice. As James Decker writes in Henry Miller and 
Narrative Form: Constructing the Self, Rejecting Modernity (2005), ‘he simultaneously 
strives for spiritual “Truth” and acknowledges the difficulty of such a venture.’260  
Various episodes that induce Garland’s ‘split between seduction and repulsion’ will 
be explored in this chapter - alongside Miller’s more explicit comments on morality 
in his essays and fiction. The aim is to demonstrate two key elements within his 
writing style: first, the extreme disproportion between behavior and narrative moral 
judgment; secondly and more crucially, the expansive and progressive rethinking of 
binary moral positions through the exposition of their frailties and falsities. The 
apparently arbitrary and chaotic nature of Miller’s approach to human suffering will 
be shown, in fact, to be part of a wider theoretical project that sought to critique and 
improve on conventional notions of virtue and sin, sympathy and empathy. Miller’s 
implication of the reader in his crimes will be analysed in light of these ethical 
redefinitions. Significantly, his redefinitions will also be seen to lie at the root of 
Pound’s belief that he has ‘very strongly a hierarchy of values’, since they mark him 
out, for Pound, as a ‘moral’ writer, more truthful and substantive in his judgments 
than the bourgeois readers and critics who disapprove of Cancer.261   
 
Moreover, Miller’s reconfiguration of moral standards will be analysed in the context 
of various politically and philosophically humanist ideas contested among literary 
avant-gardists between 1906, when Pound’s essays started to be published regularly 
in literary magazines, and 1935, when he wrote his review of Cancer. Henri Bergson - 
whose ‘pluralist’ philosophy, according to Henry Mead in his 2008 essay ‘T.E. 
Hulme, Bergson and the New Philosophy’, ‘appealed to readers on both the right 
                                                             
259 Ibid., p. 6. 
260 James Decker, Henry Miller and Narrative Form: Constructing the Self, Rejecting 
Modernity (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 4. 
261 ‘Review of Tropic of Cancer’, p. 88. 
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and the left, those seeking a return to religious certainties on one hand, and those 
seeking a more radical progressivism on the other’ - is frequently identified by Miller 
as an integral influence on his own artistic and philosophical approach.262 In a 
passage from Tropic of Capricorn, indeed, Miller describes the moment he discovered 
Bergson’s Creative Evolution as one of perceptual and emotional epiphany: 
Everything which before I thought I had understood crumbled, and I was left 
with a clean slate … everything the brain has labored for a lifetime to 
assimilate, categorize and synthesize has to be taken apart and reordered. 
Moving day for the soul!263 
 
Bergson provides a useful link between Miller and Pound since his ‘vitalist’ 
formulation - of a perpetually evolving subjective reality and the universal potential 
for psychological and emotional liberation via the acceptance of ‘the intuitive nature 
of the human consciousness’ – also inspired T.E. Hulme, Pound’s great friend and 
philosophical mentor.264 Hulme promotes Bergson’s pluralistic theory about art and 
existence while simultaneously denouncing the ‘humanism’ that many ‘Bergsonians’ 
espoused – a philosophical and political worldview based, Hulme contends, on ‘the 
belief that life is the source and measure of all values, and that man is fundamentally 
good’.265 While Hulme was attracted to Bergson’s attempt to liberate human 
consciousness from the constraints imposed by the intellect, he was – as Mead, Mary 
Ann Giles (Henry Bergson and British Modernism, 1996), Rebecca Beasley (Theorists of 
Modernist Poetry: T.S. Eliot, T.E. Hulme and Ezra Pound, 2007), and Jesse Matz (‘T.E. 
Hulme, Henri Bergson and the Cultural Politics of Psychologism’, 2004) have all 
noted – strongly opposed to the use of these ideas in support of politically pluralist, 
anti-classical and anti-religious arguments. As we shall see, Hulme’s 1911 essay ‘Mr 
Balfour, Bergson and Politics’ records a meeting with Pierre Lasserre, the leading 
literary critic for the French far-right periodical Action Française, in which he outlines 
                                                             
262 Henry Mead, ‘T.E. Hulme, Bergson, and the New Philosophy’, European Journal of 
English Studies, 3rd ser., 12 (2008), pp. 245-260 (p. 245). 
263 Capricorn, p. 199-200. 
264  Ibid., p. 245. 
265 T.E. Hulme, ‘A Notebook’, in The Collected Writings of T.E. Hulme, ed. by Karen 
Csengeri (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 419-56, p. 444. Originally published in 
The New Age in seven installments (December 1915 – February 1916).   
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Lasserre’s contention that Bergson was incompatible with conservatism and anti-
romanticism. In that essay, Hulme also explains his own conservative interpretation 
of Bergson’s tenets. Although he eventually followed Lasserre’s lead in renouncing 
the French philosopher, this early accommodation of apparently oppositional ideas 
sheds crucial light on Miller’s experiments with brutal, confessional language to 
achieve genuine compassion.  
 
Hulme’s reaction to Bergson’s Creative Evolution helps explain Miller’s position as a 
writer who had faith in the positive potential of the individual but was skeptical 
about idealistic and sentimental approaches to humanism in ways that echoed 
Pound’s early modernist pronouncements. As we saw in Chapter One, Pound’s 
identification of Cancer as a progressive text was enabled by certain reactionary 
literary trends, trends summarized by Wyndham Lewis in his 1919 cultural study, 
The Caliph’s Design: 
Against this [Victorian] sentimentality people of course reacted. So the brutal 
tap was turned on. For fifty years it will be the thing to be brutal, 
‘unemotional’.266    
 
Significantly, Lewis goes on to call this ‘fashion’ ‘“inhuman”, a term that Miller 
regularly uses to define himself in Cancer, beginning with his epiphany halfway 
through the novel: ‘Today I am proud to say that I am inhuman’ (255). Lewis also 
predicts the ‘absurdities that this … fashion inevitably breeds’, a supposition that is 
both borne out and signposted by Miller’s knowingly ludicrous description of his 
own ‘inhumanity’. Indeed, Miller will be seen to have made use of much of the 
extreme language of his age for simultaneously urgent and – in Garland’s words –
‘parodic’ purposes, hyperbolically talking up his importance as an epoch-changing 
artist while at the same time denouncing that very idea as farcical.267 As Indrek 
Manniste points out in his 2013 study Henry Miller: The Inhuman Artist: A Philosophical 
Enquiry, Miller’s rejection of humanism involves the outlandish claim to have 
evolved emotionally, perceptually and morally beyond the narrow limits of ordinary 
human life. It is to this end – Manniste notes - that he boasts:                                                              
266 Lewis, The Caliph’s Design, p. 268.  
267 Garland, ‘The Dearest of Cemeteries’, p. 209. 
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If I am inhuman it is because my world has slopped over its human bounds, 
because to be human seems like a poor, sorry, miserable affair, limited by 
senses, restricted by moralities and codes, defined by platitudes and isms.268  
 
By reading these kinds of statements against a backdrop of Pound and Hulme’s more 
prosaic anti-humanist theories, I will show that Miller’s approach to human suffering 
was more complex than his braggadocio suggests. The fantasy Manniste identifies, of 
the narrator as ‘first member of the inhuman artist race … [possessing] the ecstatic, 
mixed qualities of a holy man, a criminal, a madman, a child, and a scholar’, will be 
analysed in the context of certain political and philosophical arguments that 
preoccupied writers and philosophers in the 1910s, 20s and 30s.269 Moreover, by 
thinking about the radical reactionary aspect of Miller’s work in the context of these 
literary and cultural currents, it is possible to make better sense of his oppositional 
impulses towards organisation and anarchy. In comparison to writers like Hulme, 
who believed in order and absolute moral positions while admiring Bergson for his 
‘exploration of … the opposition between immediate experience and organizing 
concepts’, Miller both exemplifies and critiques a very particular high modernist 
political paradox.270   
 
Miller’s hostility to conventional codes of behavior in Cancer is most vividly evident 
in the attacks he makes on the comfortable friends and acquaintances who support 
him in his struggle to live as a writer. Destitute and occasionally homeless, the 
narrator frequently cadges a meal or a bed for the night from a network of local 
artists and expatriate Americans he meets in the cafes of Montmartre. Perhaps the 
most glaring examples of this come in the scenes he describes at the house of the 
playwright Sylvester, whose wife he is having an affair with. Against the backdrop 
of the couple’s polite suppertime hospitality, we are given the following aggressively 
macho and reproachful interior monologue, a passage that merits quoting in full 
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since it encapsulates many of the complexities and contradictions within his attitude 
towards respectability and reasonableness: 
 
To think that a poor withered bastard with those cheap Broadway plays up his 
sleeve should be pissing on the woman I love … The cheek of him! To think that 
he can lie beside that furnace I stoked for him and do nothing but make water! My 
God, Man, you ought to get down on your knees and thank me. Don’t you see 
that you have a woman in your house now? Can’t you see she’s bursting? You’re 
telling me with those strangulated adenoids of yours – “well now, I’ll tell you … 
there’s two ways of looking at that” … Fuck your two ways of looking at things! 
Fuck your pluralistic universe … Don’t hand me your red wine or your Anjou …. 
hand her over … she belongs to me! … You smile at me so confidently, so 
calculatingly. I’m flattering the ass off you, can’t you tell? While I listen to your 
crap she’s got her hand on me – but you don’t see that. You think I like to suffer –
that’s my role, you say. O.K. Ask her about it! She’ll tell you how I suffer. “You’re 
cancer and delirium”, she said over the phone the other day. She’s got it now, the 
cancer and delirium, and soon you’ll have to pick the scabs. Her veins are 
bursting, I tell you, and your talk is all sawdust. No matter how much you piss 
away you’ll never plug up the holes. (65) 
 
Miller’s tone betrays the embattlement of a desperate man attempting to assert 
himself against his own sense of financial and social failure. By affirming his sexual, 
and intellectual superiority to Sylvester, he redresses – in his own mind at least - the 
balance of power between them. More crucially, by refusing to acknowledge either 
the kindness of his hosts or the double betrayal of sitting down to dine with a man he 
is duping, he demonstrates his contempt for polite protocol, offering in its place a 
savage character assassination of the husband, decimating both his masculinity and 
artistic ability (‘a poor withered bastard with those cheap Broadway plays up his 
sleeve’). The force of Miller’s internal aggression works in inverse proportion to the 
tone and sentiment he knows the situation demands and, indeed, the way in which 
he is actually behaving. ‘Flattering the ass off’ his host while inwardly cursing him, 
he emphasizes the disjunction between these two states. 
  
In this role of outrageous misanthrope, the narrator attempts to garner sympathy for 
himself, positing rage and indignation as honest reactions to the weakness and 
dishonesty of Sylvester’s bourgeois behavior. Indeed, his outburst – directed 
conspiratorially as an aside to the reader – plays on the potential boredom of the dull 
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and stifling supper table atmosphere. Miller absolves himself of wrongdoing by 
depicting the functionality of the domestic sphere as offensive and unbearable to 
narrator and reader alike. In the midst of a sterile conversational set piece, in which 
opinions are measured and consequently diluted by protocol – ‘well now, there’s 
two ways of looking at things’ - Miller’s viscerally angry interior monologue offers 
relief. Thus he presents the rupture of bourgeois family codes as a necessary act on 
the side of what he later calls ‘life’ (287). Although repelled by the viciousness of the 
attack, we are also simultaneously compelled - by his juxtaposition of vigorous with 
lifeless voices - to see through ‘the crap’ and ‘the sawdust’ of Sylvester’s patter and 
discover an ethical truth based on desire rather than duty. Excruciatingly aware of 
the logical, moral responsibility to sympathize with a hapless, jilted husband, the 
reader is nevertheless manipulated to side with Miller’s rough and passionate 
declaration of his natural right over Tanya.  
 
It is a complicated seduction that works on the premise of monstrosity – manifested 
in Miler’s morally unacceptable aggression – as a source of fascination but also shock 
and warning for the unenlightened reader. As James Decker notes, Miller uses: 
vitriolic explosions not to indicate [the author’s] struggle, but to operate 
instead as warnings or wake-up calls to those who march like automatons to 
a rhythm alien to their true desire.271  
 
Miller’s disdainful treatment of Sylvester’s apparent reasonableness can therefore be 
read as an attempt to jolt the reader into a state of greater consciousness. Autonomy 
over the self is paramount, and it can only be achieved by externalizing socially 
unacceptable and inexpressible desires. For the average, unenlightened individual, 
unwilling or incapable of living in accordance with his or her true instincts, the 
spectacle of someone who does, Miller says, is monstrous. In The Time of the Assassins 
his 1946 study of nineteenth-century French poet Arthur Rimbaud, Miller defines 
monstrosity through a comparison of exceptional artists with ordinary, 
unenlightened human beings. Psychological and spiritual monstrosity, he claims, is a 
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sign of enlightened individuality and a ‘prodigious’ rather than cautious and limited 
approach to life: 
“The real problem,” as Rimbaud pointed out, “is to make the soul 
monstrous.” That is to say, not hideous but prodigious! What is the meaning 
of monstrous? … “any organized form of life greatly malformed either by the 
lack, excess, misplacement or distortion of parts or organs; hence, anything 
hideous or abnormal, or made up of inconsistent parts or characters, whether 
repulsive or not.” The root is from the Latin verb moneo, to warn … Timid 
souls always see monsters in their path, whether these be called hippogriffs 
or Hitlerians. Man’s greatest dread is the expansion of consciousness … “Let 
us live in peace and harmony!” begs the little man. But the law of the 
universe dictates that peace and harmony can only be won by inner struggle. 
The little man does not want to pay the price for that kind of peace and 
harmony; he wants it ready-made, like a suit of manufactured clothes.272 
Miller consistently employs such ‘vitriolic explosions’ in an attempt to communicate 
his own expansions of consciousness and to extoll their benefits to his readers. By 
positing his narrator as courageous because of his apparent monstrosity, the 
outbursts in Cancer can be read as Miller’s attempt to ‘make the soul monstrous’ - a 
‘hideous’, ‘malformed’ and ‘inconsistent’ embodiment of the conventional, bourgeois 
reader’s fears. By presenting himself in this way, he tries to ‘warn’ the reader of the 
cowardice and futility in the desire for effortless ‘peace and harmony’, indeed for an 
immediate release from the tension created by the conflict between the narrator’s 
aggression and his hosts’ formal hospitality. 
 
Miller also suggests something more complex and physical in his description of the 
‘monstrous’ Rimbaud. By using terms of bodily normality and mutation to contrast 
the souls of the cowardly ‘little man’ and the brave, truth-telling artist, he points to a 
direct connection between the disgust, fear - even pity - experienced in the presence 
of deformity and the unenlightened or uninitiated reader’s response to serious 
‘monstrous’ literature. The fearful individual wants books - as he or she desires 
existential ‘peace and harmony’ – that fit ‘like a suit of manufactured clothes’, 
shunning serious work because it requires an ‘inner struggle’ to understand. Truly 
important writing, Miller suggests, is defined by its ‘lack, excess, misplacement or                                                              
272 Miller, The Time of the Assassins, p. 31. 
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distortion of parts’, constituting a flawed, disturbing but nonetheless pure truth, 
superior to the superficial representations of life that appear in most attempts at 
literature. Miller’s attraction to deformity will be further explored in Section 2.4, ‘The 
Attraction of the Blemish: Pound and Miler’s sexual aesthetics’. By celebrating ‘the 
jaded appetite of the male’ in Cancer, both in an aesthetic and sexual sense, Miller 
focuses on ‘whatever set the object apart, or made it unserviceable’ (50) – and with 
deliberate provocation - his arousal at the ‘added spice’ of a ‘missing tooth or a nose 
eaten away or a fallen womb’ (166). 
  
In the present context, however, deformity and monstrosity are ways of 
understanding intellectual and moral fears about artistic and ideological non-
conformity and how these may be products of a limited and limiting conformist 
paradigm. Miller’s curious equation of Rimbaud’s spiritual and artistic monstrosity 
with the political and social monstrosity of the ‘Hitlerian’ is a deliberately 
provocative albeit clumsy means of exposing the individual’s fear of excess as timid 
and psychically harmful. If it carries with it the dangerous implication that Hitler’s 
political philosophy – like Rimbaud’s poetry - has the potential to induce ‘expansions 
of consciousness’, Miller’s primary focus remains the cowardly bourgeois tendency 
to repress the presence of political extremism rather than whether such ideologies 
carry any benefits. The fear of Hitler as a monster, he suggests, is as naïve and 
unproductive as the child’s fear of mythological creatures like the ‘hippogriff’, since 
it reduces existence to the binary terms of good and evil, conformity and deformity. 
Clearly, in a post-Auschwitz world, Miller himself appears spectacularly naïve in his 
conflation of romantic, artistic excesses with the ideological and political excesses of 
the Nazis. This conflation of ideology and excess is nonetheless crucial for an 
understanding of Miller’s rhetoric.  Chapter Three further examines Miller’s rhetoric 
in the light of Pound’s fixation on the political and economic role literature should 
take in the 1930s, with all of its attendant fascistic overtones. 
 
The use of individual monstrosity to attack the banal collective is also connected in 
Chapter Three to the ideas about ‘excess’ and ‘prodigality’ propounded by French 
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literary and social theorist Georges Bataille. Miller embodies what Bataille calls the 
‘heterogeneous’ impulse towards excessive and wasteful expenditure of energy – in 
terms of un-reproductive sexual activity and the refusal to take up socially 
productive, gainful employment. His position at ‘the edge of the infantile 
revolution’, as Bataille puts it, meaning his rejection of the responsibilities of work 
and family, represents his alignment with the ‘ceaseless prodigality’ that drives all 
existence.273 Moreover, Miller shares Bataille’s interest in taboos – and particularly 
the taboo implied by abject poverty, vagabondage and destitution – as 
manifestations of heterogeneous energy that cannot be assimilated by the ordinary 
homogeneous collective. Bataille’s ideas are paradoxically motivated, in turn, by 
some of the same anti-capitalist impulses as Pound’s. It will be seen that these two 
writers, distinguishable from other Miller critics in their belief that he has strong 
moral convictions, are also united by their disdain for the rational, utilitarian basis of 
capitalist economics. Though they represent opposite ends of the political spectrum – 
Bataille positing the Marxian socialism Pound despised as an alternative to liberal 
democratic capitalism - they make similar points about Miller’s readjustment of 
ethical ‘relations’, his ‘search’, as Bataille puts it, ‘for moral values lost’ as a 
consequence of capitalist production and utilitarianism.274  
 
In the light shed by Miller’s subversion of social etiquette, Pound’s proclamation of 
Cancer’s ‘fairness’ seems consciously perverse, derived in part from Miller’s disdain 
for the bourgeoisie. Indeed, both writers occupy narrative positions in which they 
reserve a special vitriol for individuals who are socially respectable but intellectually 
and morally weak. The tone of Miller’s diatribe against Sylvester is in fact curiously 
reminiscent of Pound’s in his 1914 poem ‘Salutation the Third’, a scathing attack on 
the London literary old guard– personified as one imagined reviewer - who remain 
unconvinced by his, Wyndham Lewis, Gaudier-Brzeska and T.E. Hulme’s 
modernising efforts: 
HERE are the TOMB-STONES.                                                              
273 Georges Bataille, Literature and Evil (London : Boyars, 1985), p. 137. 
274 Bataille, ‘La Morale de Miller’, p. 1. 
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           They supported the gag and the ring: 
A little black BOX contains them. 
           SO shall you be also, 
You slut-bellied obstructionist, 
           You sworn foe to free speech and good letters, 
You fungus, you continuous gangrene. 
Come, let us on with the new deal, 
           Let us be done with Jews and Jobbery 
Let us SPIT upon those who fawn on the  
            JEWS for their money, 
Let us out to the pastures.  
PERHAPS I will die at thirty, 
Perhaps you will have the pleasure of defiling my pauper’s grave 
I wish you JOY, I proffer you ALL my assistance 
It has been your HABIT for long to do away with true poets, 
You either drive them mad, or else you blink at their suicides, 
Or else you condone their drugs, and talk of insanity and genius, 
BUT I will not go mad to please you. 
            I will not FLATTER you with an early death. 
OH NO! I will stick it out, 
            I will feel your hates wriggling about my feet, 
And I will laugh at you and mock you, 
And I will offer you consolations in irony, 
           O fools, detesters of Beauty. 
I have seen many who go about with supplications, 
           Afraid to say how they hate you. 
HERE is the taste of my BOOT, 
           CARESS it, lick off the BLACKING.275 
 
The virulent anti-Semitism of lines 9-11, Pound’s first undisguised public statement 
of this kind, is dealt with in Chapter Three as a precursor to the conspiratorial links 
he would later identify between governments, banks, the media and arms 
manufacturers in the run-up to World War Two. At this early stage in his career, 
however, Pound triumphantly scapegoats Judaism from the self-appointed position 
of spokesman for the young and embattled avant-garde. To write freely and well, 
without fear of poverty or censorship, he suggests, a new writer must be brave 
enough to resist the pressure towards ‘jobbery’ and reject a system in thrall to 
sinister Semitic, economic forces. Moreover, as Pound demonstrates by his 
vituperative tone, the serious writer is obliged to use brutal language to demolish the 
barriers erected by establishment forces with a vested interest in censoring obscenity.                                                              
275 Ezra Pound, ‘Salutation the Third’, in Blast 1, ed. by Lewis, p. 45.  
 113 
As we shall see, Pound’s definition of Miller as a writer of the future originates in his 
theory that the narrator of Cancer represents a sane, virtuous figure at the mercy of 
those forces. For Pound, Miller’s daring use of obscenity and his professedly 
‘incurable optimism’ in defiance of dire economic circumstances, symbolize a protest 
against capitalism and usury that begins with the vague, conjectural equation of 
Judaism, business and censorship.   
 
This intimation that Miller is virtuous in the face of a racially originated economic 
evil begs some vital questions: principally, how can a writer who consistently denies 
the usefulness of political action be interpreted in such politically active terms? As 
pertinently and more troublingly, are there clues to this racialist affinity in Miller’s 
attitudes towards Jews and Judaism? At this juncture, however, it is important to 
note the rhetorical similarities between Pound’s ‘Salutation the Third’ and Miller’s 
diatribe against Sylvester. In the first place, both writers startle their readers by the 
disproportionate and sadistic violence of their reactions to mild-mannered men. 
Where Miller revels in the idea of sexually infecting his rival with ‘Cancer and 
delirium’, Pound viciously predicts the death of the critic who has dared question his 
experimentalism. Where Miller rounds on Sylvester the ‘poor withered bastard’, 
Pound calls the critic a ‘slut-bellied obstructionist’. Pound’s rhetoric is as deliberately 
extreme as Miller’s. Both defend the emotionally honest artist, who understands 
‘BEAUTY’, against attacks from cerebral, cynical ‘detesters of beauty’ who obstruct 
rather than encourage ‘true poets’. In this way, their narrative voices share a 
consciously manic desperation to assert and protect the elite status of the 
experimental avant-garde in a world of proscriptive aesthetic mediocrity.  
 
Indeed, notwithstanding the differences implied by the fact that Miller is vying for 
sexual dominance in a love triangle, Sylvester occupies a comparable position in 
Cancer to Wells, Shaw and Bennett in the Pound reviews. Like these ‘third rate’ stock 
novelists,276 he is a paid, professional and commercially successful writer – a writer 
of ‘cheap Broadway plays’ – who fails to understand the seriousness of the artist’s                                                              
276 ‘Review of Tropic of Cancer’, p. 87. 
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mission. Where Pound accuses Wells, Shaw and Bennett of producing 
‘confectionary’ prose for the ‘tired minds’ of the mass market, Miller depicts 
Sylvester as a writer who latches on to fashionable labels and ideas for the suspect 
purpose of selling tickets and filling suppertime silences.277 ‘My next play’, Sylvester 
says, immediately before Miller’s rant, will be ‘on the pluralistic universe’ (65). This 
is followed by a superficial and patronizing attempt at writerly camaraderie with 
Miller: ‘Let’s see, you’re a surrealist aren’t you?’ (65).  
 
Crucially, Sylvester’s manners and rhythm of speech are impeccably English, calling 
to mind Lewis’ disdainful dismissal of the ‘awfully nice’ poets and painters who 
dominated the London scene.278 Almost two decades on from their attack on the 
post-Victorian ‘impressionistic fuss’, Miller is thus engaged in a comparable battle 
against shallow, amateurish writers.279 Like Pound, his antagonism works on the 
basis of the artist’s entitlement to deference from inferior practitioners.  Moreover; 
Pound creates a dynamic between the narrator, the target of his aggression and the 
reader that is similar to Miller’s. As in the latter’s Sylvester-Tanya episode, the reader 
of ‘Salutation the Third’ derives pleasure and discomfort from the same source - the 
feeling of complicity in the narrator’s violent subjugation of his enemy. The 
aggressive, unreasonable, even unhinged artist is set up as a victim of oppression 
and the reader is invited to partake in his relish as he loses control, lashing out at his 
literary gatekeepers. In a sense, Pound makes a more legitimate demand on the 
reader’s sympathies than Miller, since his contempt is based on a grievance about 
artistic and professional close-mindedness rather than the apparent desire to shirk 
responsibility for his own dishonorable act. 
 
And yet a crucial difference between Pound and Miller’s narrative tones is 
exemplified by their most violent taunts to their enemies. While Miller writes that 
Sylvester ‘ought to get down on [his] knees and thank’ him for having sex with his 
wife, Pound offers the critic ‘the taste of my BOOT. CARESS it, lick off the                                                              
277 ‘Dr Williams’ Position’, p. 395.  
278 Lewis, ‘Ezra Pound’, p. 260. See my p. 55. 
279 Lewis, ‘Our Vortex’, in Blast 1, pp. 147-49, p. 149.  
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BLACKING’. If Miller uses sadistic language to boast of his sexual prowess, Pound’s 
reference to boots and blacking foreshadows the militaristic violence of his 1930s 
fascist writings.  It will become clear that Miller’s vision of enlightened sexual 
relations was often mired in a troublingly totalising desire to punish the 
unenlightened, but his internal raving at Sylvester is also comical in a way that 
Pound’s categorically is not. Where both writers create exaggerated and ridiculous 
narrative personae, Miller seems to be aware of that ridiculousness and its comedic 
potential, hamming up his narcissism, latching on to unjustifiable feelings of self-
righteousness and indignation and working himself into a state of apoplectic rage. 
While Pound’s vitriol is also performative it is presented in a way that makes it 
appear to be deep-seated and genuine – a precursor to his vicious political and racial 
attacks in the 1930s. 
 
Nevertheless, humour cannot mask the fact that Miller’s appealing battle on behalf of 
the experimental artist also includes the reader in an unprovoked assault. Later on in 
Cancer Miller raises the stakes of this strategy, mercilessly lampooning Nanantatee, 
an Indian acquaintance in Paris whom he nicknames ‘Nonentity’ and scorns for 
‘playing the good Samaritan’ when he has him to stay in his apartment on the 
wealthy Rue Lafayette (86). Miller couches his outrage in unpleasant terms of 
imperial rather than artistic or masculinist entitlement, compensating for his feelings 
of humiliation at having to help an Indian with his housework by means of 
scatological caricature:  
He wouldn’t think of using toilet paper, Nanantatee. Must be against his religion. 
No, he calls for a pitcher and a rag. He’s delicate, the little fat duck. Sometimes, when 
I’m drinking a cup of pale tea in which he has dropped a rose leaf he comes 
alongside me and lets out a loud fart, right in my face. He never says “Excuse me!” 
the word must be missing from his Gujarati dictionary. (87) 
 
This is one of the moments in Cancer that most clearly corroborates Ladenson‘s claim, 
mentioned in the previous chapter, that ‘Miller has not weathered post-1960s 
fashions well.’280 ‘His evident misogyny,’ we remember Ladenson saying, ‘as well as 
his tendency to call a spade a spade … have for some time made him ideologically                                                              
280 Ladenson, Dirt for Art’s Sake, p. 169. See my p. 96.  
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suspect.’281  If it is important to mark a distinction between twenty first century and 
1930s responses to Miller’s casually offensive treatment of another race and religion, 
it is also important to note that the passage clearly functions as a form of deliberate 
provocation. While modern readers are naturally more sensitive to the offensiveness 
of his flip cultural stereotyping, the sense of discomfort to most of Miller’s 1930s 
readers would have been less about cultural habits and more about the discrepancy 
between Nananatee’s act of generosity and Miller’s aggressive ingratitude. In this 
later age, Miller’s racist slurs intensify the ‘split between seduction and repulsion’ 
Sarah Garland identifies in Miller’s narrative style, probably an unintentional 
addition to the feelings of rapprochement Miller encourages in the reader. By 
identifying with Miller as an independent, long-suffering underdog, he or she 
becomes complicit in his behavior, a feeling that is at best awkward and at worst 
wholly objectionable.  
 
Pound in his poem and Miller in his diatribes embody elements of what Mary Ann 
Caws describes as the ‘demesure’ of the manifesto form. Introducing her survey: 
Manifesto: A Century of Isms, Caws writes ‘the manifesto is an act of demesure, going 
past what is thought of as proper, sane, and literary. Its outreach demands an 
extravagant self-assurance.’282 Indeed, appropriately – since ‘Salutation the Third’ 
appeared in Pound and Lewis’ first Vorticist manifesto, Blast 1, and Miller produced 
his own partly parodic version of a manifesto in 1937 - the demesure in both passages 
arises out of the authors’ impulse towards impropriety, insanity as well as a form of 
outrageous arrogance. It is an arrogance that is alluded to by Marjorie Perloff in her 
study The Futurist Moment (1986) as ‘an appeal … to an audience ready to applaud 
that poet or artist who can épater le bourgeois, and, beyond the bourgeois, who can 
epater the artists of the ruling culture’283 In these terms, the writer of artistic                                                              
281 Ibid., p. 169. 
282 Mary Ann Caws, ‘The Poetics of the Manifesto: Nowness and Newness’, Manifesto: 
A Century of Isms, ed. by Mary Ann Caws (London: University of Nebraska Press, 
2001), p. xx.   
283 Marjorie Perloff, The Futurist Moment (University of Chicago Press: London, 1986), 
p. 91. 
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manifestos is in the business of skillfully manipulating the reader’s desire for 
violence against the status quo, drawing him or her in to a fight that ends up having 
little to do with genuine defensible objections and everything to with prejudice.  
 
If the Sylvester-Tanya episode demonstrates Miller’s concerted irreverence and 
antagonism for bourgeois codes of fidelity and loyalty, he is similarly irreverent and 
antagonistic towards hypocritical responses to tragedy and pain. Later in Cancer, 
when Miller has secured a job at a newspaper, the announcement that his colleague 
Peckover has fallen down the office elevator shaft and died is met with brazen 
indifference. The incident, we are told, ’was pathetic and ludicrous at the same time’ 
since Peckover – whose name conspicuously implies ‘pecker’, the American slang for 
penis - ‘was a zero, and even the fact that he was dead wouldn’t add a cipher to his 
name’ (143). Again, Miller puts the reader in a compromising position, rounding 
cruelly on an apparently blameless victim while extending the tempting invitation to 
share in his crass and unreasonable joke. As with the Sylvester-Tanya episode, he 
posits collective, bourgeois modes of behavior as absurdly inadequate means for 
expressing emotion, the real focus of his disdain being the collective reaction he 
imagines the other newspapermen will have.  Miller and his friend Carl ‘laughed all 
night about it’ he writes ‘and in between times we vented our scorn and disgust for 
the guys upstairs, the fatheads who were trying to persuade themselves, no doubt, 
that Peckover was a fine fellow and his death was a catastrophe’ (142).  
 
What Miller highlights is the futility in conforming to exteriorly imposed standards, 
both regarding what constitutes a ‘tragedy’ and how people should respond to one. 
By extension, he also attacks the emerging corporate culture he has entered into at 
the newspaper, a culture in which ‘there was an invisible wall between the guys 
upstairs and the guys down below’ and in which a lowly proof-reader like Peckover 
must die before he is shown a modicum of respect (142). Miller and Van Norden call 
Peckover a ‘zero’, ‘a cipher’ even after he is dead to prove that point (143). Indeed, by 
laughing about it, Miller laughs in the face of the demand for sensitivity, a demand 
he views as ridiculous and offensive, since it induces reactions dictated by a 
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dishonest sense of social responsibility rather than genuine concern for the victim. 
Marlowe, their journalist colleague who solemnly relays the news, is labeled vain, 
self-serving, and hypocritical: ‘he wanted to weep, if possible, to show that he was a 
regular guy’ (142). He will, Miller goes on, be ‘carrying his delicate little obituary 
around with him for months, praising the shit out of himself for the way he handled 
the situation. We felt all that, Joe and I. without saying a word to each other. We just 
stood there and listened with a murderous silent contempt’ (142).  
 
This unforgiving, sardonic critique of the people who uphold a corporate power 
structure relates in interesting ways to Miller’s wider theories about dishonest 
societal reactions to failure and material poverty. In his short story Max and the White 
Phagocytes, published four years after Cancer in 1938, Miller tests the social pressure 
to display compassion towards destitute and marginalized people against the actual 
feelings induced by direct contact with them. ‘It was from the despised and 
neglected ones’ he writes in his opening paragraph, ‘that I learned about life, about 
God, and about the futility of “doing good”’.284 As with Peckover, he takes an 
unapologetically sadistic approach to Max, his homeless and ‘morally defeated’ 
protagonist, reveling in his use of him for experimental artistic purposes.285 ‘Today 
I’m going to listen to you, you bugger’ he writes, again in an aside to the reader 
rather than to his subject’s face, ‘listen to every nuance. I’ll extract the last drop of 
juice – and then, overboard you go!’286 As with Sylvester in Cancer, he shows a great 
deal more outward respect (and indeed kindness) to Max than this statement would 
suggest, giving him a bed for the night and introducing him to his friend Boris 
(Michael Fraenkel), whom he thinks might be able to help him find a permanent 
place. By confessing to such cold and contemptuous motives, Miller establishes a 
schism between action and thought, narrator and action, thus instigating another 
instance where the schism between the narrator’s sentiments and the events taking 
place constitute part of the narrative charge. 
                                                             
284 ‘Max’, p. 134. 
285 Ibid., p.136. 
286 Ibid., p. 143. 
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The unsettling disjunction between outward compassion and an internal sadistic 
impulse is therefore connected to Miller’s general preoccupation with the 
performative aspect of apparently virtuous behavior as well as to the performative 
aspect of writing itself. However altruistic an act of charity might appear to the 
observer and – indeed - the donor, it is inevitably motivated by a desire to be seen in 
a certain light. In order to purge him or herself of this hypocrisy, the individual must 
confess his or her innermost unacceptable thoughts even, or perhaps especially, in 
the process of helping someone in distress. Max proclaims Miller to be his ‘dear 
friend’ for good reason: Miller offers him companionship as well as ‘courage’ when he 
is at his lowest ebb, his kindness even eliciting ‘tears of happiness’ from him.287 Yet 
by deliberately and harshly quashing any potential sympathy the reader might be 
developing for the author-narrator, Miller warns him or her against delusions about 
his apparently altruistic, compassionate acts. At the same time, he warns the reader 
against reading the narrator as a ‘truthful’ oracle in moral terms.  
In line with this, the prodigious monstrosity Miller refers to in the Rimbaud essay 
constitutes a major element of his own confessional style. Describing in Capricorn 
how he eventually arrived at his unique narrative voice, he writes: 
the book commenced to write itself, screaming the things which I never 
breathed, the thoughts I never uttered, the conversations I never held, the 
hopes, the dream, the delusions I never admitted. (47) 
Indeed, as Norman Mailer puts it in his 1983 study of Miller, Genius and Lust, ‘Henry 
Miller contains the unadvertised mystery of how much of a monster a great writer 
must be.’288 Miller’s courage and value, Mailer suggests, lies in his determination to 
transcribe the kind of private thoughts that appear ugly and malformed when 
converted to written words on the page. In doing so, he attempts to garner both 
shock and a corresponding confession from his readers. Likewise, Jane Nelson, 
whose study Form and Image in the Fiction of Henry Miller (1970) interprets Miller as a 
                                                             
287 Ibid., p. 166, p. 142. 
288 Mailer, Genius and Lust, p. 10. 
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Jungian confessional writer, sheds light on these ideas via Rousseau’s theory of 
confession: 
In Rousseau … the confession form is merged with the novel form, producing 
eventually the fictional autobiography and the Künstelerroman. In Miller, the 
fictional autobiography moves clearly into the archetypal world of 
projections. Granted a freedom from mimesis, the illusions of past and 
present can be ignored; characters can appear or disappear as they are 
symbolically appropriate, and the reader’s interest in their eventual “history” 
is not stimulated.289 
By ‘projections’ Nelson means images produced by the unconscious. Miller’s 
narrative form represents an evolution of the ‘fictional autobiography’, she believes, 
because it rests on the eschewal of realistic, chronological narrative in favor of these 
emotionally connected symbols rather than logically arranged events and ideas. In 
this way, ‘the autobiographical produces the confession’.290  Although her application 
of Jungian theory to Miller is overly proscriptive, Nelson’s approach nonetheless 
illuminates Miller and Anaïs Nin’s use of emotional and psychological ‘chaos’ to 
produce art, an area that will be explored later in this chapter. The resultant 
excessive, professedly uncensored truthfulness of Miller’s confessions, Nelson 
suggests, induce ‘aversion rather than pleasure’ in the reader.291 Citing Simon 
O’Lesser, she argues that Miller ‘fails to “disguise and control” his revelations’, and 
in this way ‘brings us too close to the real.’292 The feeling of aversion – cut with rather 
than in place of pleasure, I argue – comes from the fact that Miller forces the reader 
to confront and confess his or her own comparable hypocrisies. His writing 
embodies what Nelson calls the ‘zeal to do justice to our repressed tendencies … 
with a minimum of disguise and control.’293 It is, as Anaïs Nin puts it in her diary, an 
aggressive reaction against the kind of illusory art that mirrors and encourages the 
                                                             
289 Jane Nelson, Form and Image in the Fiction of Henry Miller (Wayne State University 
Press, Detroit 1970), pp. 77-78. 
290 Ibid., pp. 77-78. 
291 Ibid., p. 22.  
292 Ibid., p. 22. 
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moral dishonesties of its readers: ‘He hates poetry and he hates illusion. His own 
savage self-confessions demand the same of others.’294  
To Miller’s mind, the catchall principle of “doing good” is hypocritical and ‘futile’ 
since it denies the visceral repulsion that materially comfortable people inevitably 
feel in the presence of those who are materially and psychologically destitute. Miller 
is fascinated by the disjunction between what he regards as an irrepressible physical 
rejection of the sight and smell of the poor and the respectable face of pity ordinarily 
presented to the world. Indeed, passing a group of sleeping homeless people outside 
a metro station in Cancer, he concludes brutally that ‘even the dead horses and the 
cows and sheep hanging from the greasy hooks look more inviting’ (243).‘But these 
filthy beggars lying in the rain, what purpose do they serve? What good can they do 
us?’ he asks himself - answering that ‘they make us bleed for five minutes, that’s all’ 
(243). Thus, pity is satirically posited as superficial and self-serving, a temporary 
distraction from the feelings of disgust and anxiety that overwhelm the observer, 
rather than a genuine attempt to commune with or aid the poor. 
 
More importantly, Miller goes on to describe these conclusions as ‘night thoughts 
produced by walking in the rain after two thousand years of Christianity’, an 
observation that connects to his wider revulsion at the Protestant utilitarian origins 
of bourgeois morality and capitalist economics (243). In Chapter Three it will become 
apparent that Pound’s own economic and social criticism is also constructed on 
specifically anti-Protestant grounds. Indeed, their shared animosity towards the 
impact of Lutheran doctrine on European and American attitudes towards work and 
sex goes some way towards explaining Pound’s admiration for Miller.  Unlike Miller, 
however, whose antagonism towards the church is expressed through erratic 
invectives against a hypocritical clerical establishment, Pound builds a sustained 
argument in his essays of the 1920s and 30s that posits Christian approaches to 
industry and financial gain as generally poisoned.                                                                
294 Anaïs Nin, The Diary of Anaïs Nin: 1931-1934, ed. with an intro. by Gunthar 
Stuhlmann, 3 vols (New York : Swallow Press/Harcourt), vol I, p. 15. 
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In Max and the White Phagocytes Miller develops the conscious cruelty of these ‘night 
thoughts’ to their extreme, taking as his protagonist and case study Max, a near-
suicidal, middle-aged beggar who latches onto him for support and using him to 
explore the aesthetic effects of destitution and failure. ‘There are some people’ Miller 
writes about Max: 
to whom you feel immediately attracted, not because you like them, but 
because you detest them. You detest them so heartily that your curiosity is 
aroused; you come back to them again and again to study them, to arouse in 
yourself a feeling of compassion which is really absent.295  
 
Bataille, who celebrates Miller as a ‘moral’ writer in his 1946 essay ‘La Morale de 
Miller’, sheds interesting light on this position. ‘Charitable pity’, Bataille says in an 
earlier essay ‘The Psychological Structure of Fascism’ (1938), is in fact a ‘shameless … 
evasion’ of the true repulsion felt in the presence of absolute dejection.296 ‘The 
nauseating forms of dejection provoke a feeling of disgust so unbearable’, he writes 
‘that it is improper to express or even to make allusion to it.’297 Miller’s approach can 
be read as an exposition of a similar truth. Both writers understand ‘material 
poverty’ and ‘abjection’ as states that somehow supersede moral judgment.298 As 
mentioned earlier, these aspects of human experience belong, in Bataille’s view, to 
‘the heterogeneous world’, a sphere of existence separate from and unclassifiable 
within conventional societal definitions of virtue and vice, good and evil. ‘The 
impoverished classes’, he writes in ‘The Pyschological Structure of Fascism’, are one 
of ‘numerous elements or social forms that homogeneous society is powerless to 
assimilate’.299 
                                                              
295 Ibid., 134. 
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Heterogeneity implies the excessive and wasteful expenditure of energy. It is used by 
Bataille to discuss all areas of existence – from class relations to sexuality, from the 
production of art to the excretion of bodily waste. It means, he says, ‘everything 
rejected by homogeneous society as waste or as superior transcendent value’.300 Thus, 
he envisions society as a body that deems itself healthy as long as it can exclude the 
heterogeneous, and material poverty as foreign matter it cannot physically accept or 
incorporate. Conditions of destitution are rejected by homogeneous society, Bataille 
suggests, because they carry with them the prospect of ‘excessive consequences’; 
namely the terrifying prospect that established structures of thought, morality and 
government might be overthrown. Indeed, because of the ‘abjection’ experienced and 
represented by the poor and socially destitute, contact with them is as overpowering 
as contact with symbols of the divine: 
 
The theme of sacred poverty – impure and untouchable – constitutes 
precisely the negative pole of a region characterized by the opposition of two 
extreme forms … an identity of opposites between glory and dejection, 
between exalted and imperative (higher) forms and impoverished  (lower) 
forms.301  
For Bataille, the observer’s nausea in the presence of the physical manifestations of 
extreme poverty is akin to the transcendent experience of encountering ‘(higher) 
forms’. By this he implies that the ordinary, materially and socially functional human 
being is as distanced from the materially and socially defunct human being as he is 
from the heroic and ‘exalted’ figures represented in myth and religion. Both ‘exalted’ 
and ‘impoverished’ forms of life impose what Bataille calls an ‘insuperable gap’ 
between themselves and the rest of humanity. This gap, he says, inevitably terrifies 
the non-abject, non-divine ordinary human being.  
Miller shares this belief in the ‘excessive consequences’ of material poverty as 
something that generates very particular feelings of disgust as well as desire. To him, 
the feeling of ‘disgust’ comes from the destitute figure’s externalization of everything 
we fear, but chiefly our own mortality. In his or her totemic representation of truths 
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that exist beyond the realms of conventional moral judgment, the viewer is forced to 
encounter his own limitations and fears. About Max he writes: 
 
Everything he said was true, horribly true … People don’t want to hear these 
truths. They can’t hear them, for the reason that they’re all talking to 
themselves in the same way.  The only difference is that Max said them 
aloud, and saying them aloud he made them seem objective.302 
 
 In this instance, Miller refers to Max’s compulsive vocalization of his neuroses – a 
mode of involuntary expression that, in many ways, reflects Miller’s own creative 
method. Indeed, in place of – or rather to replace - his fears and anxieties, Miller 
vocalizes repressed anger, obscenity and prejudice. ‘I believe in saying the truth’, he 
said in his 1963 interview with The Paris Review, ‘coming out with it cold, shocking if 
necessary, not disguising it.’303 The same principle applies to Max’s decrepit physical 
appearance - his prematurely aged face and ill-fitting suit are active symbols, Miller 
says, for all the ‘woes … miseries … disease … unemployment’ in the world.304 
Physically and psychologically dysfunctional characters are terrifying, Miller 
suggests, because they express and symbolize our frightened, unhinged private 
selves. 
 
‘Untouchables’ like Max represent a perpetual potential; a potential that operates 
both within an economic sphere, the loss of all financial control, as well as 
symbolically in terms of the paradoxical aesthetic liberation that comes in foregoing 
all artistic control.305 By accepting and expressing his feelings of fear and disgust 
when faced with Max’s failure - indeed harnessing them for aesthetic purposes – 
Miller posits himself as liberated from the lie of his own respectability and altruism. 
Crucially, Miller uses this apparently brutal approach to other peoples’ suffering – 
alongside an exploration of his own suffering – the two collapsing into one another. 
As Lawrence Durrell put it when asked in a 1985 interview about Miller’s use of 
                                                             
302 ‘Max’, p. 136. 
303 ‘An Interview with Henry Miller’, Writers at Work, p. 153-54.  
304 ‘Max’, p. 136. 
305 Bataille, ‘Psychological Structures’, p. 144 
 125 
obscenity, ‘what he’s trying to do down is the dreadful sentimentality which 
disguises brutality.’306  
 
Thus, a curious reversal takes place in which Miller’s apparent sneering rejection of 
humanist ideals in fact masks a deeply empathetic approach. It is a complex aspect of 
his work that has been reductively overlooked by critics intent on seeing him as, on 
the one extreme, disinterested in compassion and, on the other, spiritually and 
mystically enlightened on matters of the body and the heart. As Caroline Blinder 
puts it in her Ph.D thesis Henry Miller’s Sexual Aesthetics: A Comparative Analysis of 
Selected Twentieth-Century Influences on Henry Miller’s Writing, there is an ‘all-too-
common polarization between those who admire him as a prophet of sexual 
liberation, and those who see him chiefly as representative of a violently patriarchal 
sensibility.’307 In place of ‘sexual’, I argue, we could as easily substitute ‘spiritual’. 
 
Kate Millet’s 1969 study, the inaugural second-wave feminist attack on Miller, reads 
him as a ‘counterrevolutionary sexual politician’ whose misogynistic anecdotes 
demonstrate the insensitivity and brutality of his age – principally as manifested in 
male chauvinistic attitudes towards women but also by the chauvinism that exists 
between all human beings in a patriarchal society.308 Likewise, George Orwell, Phillip 
Rahv and Edmund Wilson – all of whom, we have seen, admired Miller’s work - 
took his antagonism towards sentimentality at face value.  In this sense, Orwell 
ultimately misinterpreted Miller’s theories on perceptual awakening and the 
autonomy of subjective experience to mean simply a quietist retreat from the 
complications and politics of the outside world.   
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If Millet, Orwell, Rahv and Wilson failed to look beyond the surface of the callous 
behavior described in Cancer or Miller’s crass and blasé statements on suffering, 
many critics since the 1960s have correctly interpreted him as a profoundly 
compassionate writer. As such, most critics have ignored the fact that Miller’s violent 
rhetoric is integral to his explorations into empathy and compassion. Karl Shapiro 
and Kenneth Rexroth praised Miller in the 1960s for his radically progressive 
approach to sexuality and human relations but they chose to gloss over, rather than 
examine, his expressions of cruelty in order to argue the case for his humanism. As 
Rexroth puts it, ‘absolute freedom from … the sense of guilt, implication and 
compromise, makes Miller humane, maybe even humanistic.’309 Because they are 
concerned with appropriating Miller as a messenger of libertarian, anti-puritanical 
ideals, readings like Rexroth’s and Shapiro’s make little use of the complex 
resonances that arise from his experiments into the human reaction to suffering. As 
we shall see later in this chapter, more recent work by Bertrand Mathieu (Orpheus in 
Brooklyn: Orphism, Rimbaud and Miller, 1976), Gilles Mayne (Eroticism in Georges 
Bataille and Henry Miller, 2001) and James Decker (Henry Miller and Narrative Form: 
Constructing the Self, Rejecting Modernity, 2006) does engage with Miller’s approach to 
suffering. However, Mathieu, Mayne and Decker  – as examples – nonetheless fail to 
understand Miller’s use of cruelty as a deliberate ploy; a ploy designed to expose the 
discrepancy between the ways in which people react to misery in themselves and 
other people.   
 
Thus, rather than proving Miller’s amorality, the rants against Sylvester, Max and 
Peckover in fact demonstrate his reconfiguration of morality along new and radical 
lines. There is an unlikely sense of order beneath the apparent arbitrariness of 
Miller’s enmity that serves as one of the main reasons for Pound’s belief in his strong 
‘hierarchy of values’. As mentioned earlier, this order is rooted in the paradox 
surrounding Miller’s simultaneous rejection of Sylvester’s ‘pluralist universe’ and his 
fascination with the philosophically pluralist ideas of Henri Bergson. Bergson’s 1907                                                              
309 Kenneth Rexroth, ‘The Reality of Henry Miller’, in Critical Essays on Henry Miller, 
ed. by Gottesman, pp. 95-102, pp. 96-100, p. 99. Originally published in Rexroth, Bird 
in a Bush (New York, New Directions, 1959). 
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text Creative Evolution, which defines subjective experience in terms of a continual 
evolution involving ‘the multiplicity of elements and the interpenetration of all by 
all’, is echoed and cited throughout Cancer and Capricorn as well as in various of 
Miller’s essays after the 1930s.310 In Capricorn, he devotes three pages to describing 
his discovery of Creative Evolution as a young man in New York, a ‘new Bible’, which 
‘gave [him] the courage to stand alone’311 When we come to analyse Miller’s vision 
for an evolved form of sympathy, Bergson’s theories will be seen as pivotal to the 
former’s understanding of contradictory values (aesthetic and ethical) as 
simultaneously existent and incommensurable. Indeed, through Bergson Miller 
comes to the zealously tolerant conclusion in Cancer ‘that everything [is] justified, 
supremely justified’ (102).  
Yet Miller’s aim to expose the collective illusion of socially acceptable modes of 
compassion also carries with it an aggressive rejection of exactly this idea. The 
narcissism of his infantile, explosive invectives – summed up when he tells Sylvester 
to ‘Fuck your two way of looking at things!’(65) – are apparently anathematic to his 
Bergsonian faith in ‘the multiplicity of things’.312 In other words, Miller’s absolute 
tolerance of all thoughts and values exists side-by-side with a pronounced refusal to 
tolerate any contradictory point of view.  
The paradox is helpfully explained through an analysis of work on pluralism by 
Pound’s radically conservative literary collaborator, the previously mentioned T.E. 
Hulme. Crucially, Hulme embodies a Bergsonian skepticism about the capacity of 
intellectual logic to apprehend subjective experience and uses Bergson’s philosophy 
to predict of ‘the break up’ of ‘the Renaissance humanistic attitude’313 and its 
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replacement by a set of ‘absolute values’.314 Like Miller, Hulme agrees with Bergson’s 
premise about the complex multiplicity of the impressions the individual perceives 
and experiences – writing in his essay ‘Intensive Manifolds’ that ‘every emotion is 
composed of a thousand different elements which dissolve into and permeate each 
other without any precise outline’315 - but he challenges the related political 
assumption that this must lead to a universalist and democratic approach to people 
and ideas.316 As he puts it in his 1915-16 essay ‘A Notebook’, those who use 
philosophical pluralism to support pluralistic, liberal democratic politics are guilty of 
‘applying order to chaotic experience, and then confusing the artifice for reality’.317 
For Hulme, the use of Bergson to posit the unification and progressive evolution of 
humanity through the acceptance of difference constitutes a dangerous reduction of 
the actual complexities philosophical pluralism reveals. 
 
Allying himself with Pierre Lasserre’s far-right French group, Action Française – 
which advocated a return from republicanism to the traditional institutions of 
monarchy and church - Hulme believed Bergson’s value lay in his effort to grasp the 
constant flux and renewal of subjective reality through intuition but he also warned 
against applying the same theory to history and politics. In his 1911 essay ‘Mr 
Bergson, Balfour and Politics’, Hulme describes meeting Lasserre and being 
impressed by the Frenchman’s conclusion that ‘Bergsonism was nothing but the last 
disguise of romanticism.’318 He recalls Lasserre telling him: 
To our judgements on politics in the name of reason interpreting experience 
the Bergsonians oppose to us what they call “Life: - life which is always 
creation and always incalculable …. It is useless, they say, to search in the 
past for general truths which shall be applicable to the present, because there 
is no common measure between the political and social situations offered us                                                              
314 Hulme, ‘A Notebook’, in The Collected Writings of T.E. Hulme, ed. by Csengeri, p. 
444.  
315 Hulme, ‘The Philosophy of Intensive Manifolds,’ in The Collected Writings of T.E. 
Hulme, ed. by Csengeri, pp. 170-90, p. 176. 
316 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 162. 
317 Hulme, quoted in Mead,  ‘T.E. Hulme, Bergson, and the New Philosophy’, p. 250. 
318 Hulme, ‘Mr. Balfour, Bergson, and Politics’, The Collected Writings of T.E. Hulme, 
ed. by Csengeri, pp.160-165, p. 165. Originally published in The New Age (November, 
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by the past and those of the present. If we ask why, we are told that Bergson 
has now proved that Time is real – that is, that the present moment is a 
unique moment and can be paralleled by nothing in the past – “Time is real”, 
so that there is no repetition.319 
 
Using Lasserre’s criticism, Hulme asserts that Bergson’s careful analysis of chaotic 
subjective experience has become an intellectually suspect tool for ignoring the 
lessons of history. Hulme accommodates Bergson’s philosophical understanding of 
the constant change that occurs in the individual’s experience of reality with a desire 
to regulate change in the political and social spheres, asserting and protecting strong, 
essential political and social values that maintain order. Again referring to Lasserre’s 
loss of faith in Bergson, Hulme claims ‘I can find a compromise for myself … which I 
roughly indicate by saying that I think time is real for the individual, but not for the 
race’.320 
 
The irony in Hulme’s appropriation of a philosopher whose ‘creative evolution’ 
theory was widely used to support not only pluralist but humanist approaches, 
elucidates the regressive and progressive paradox in Miller and Pound as well as  the 
simultaneous acceptance of disorder and admiration for hierarchy that lie at the 
heart of their aesthetics. Hulme is exemplary of the incongruous and tense marriage 
between Bergsonian pluralism and politically radical conservatism during that 
decade and, as such, highlights some of the conservative aspects of Miller’s radical 
project that are conventionally overlooked. As Henry Mead puts it in his essay ‘T.E. 
Hulme, Bergson, and the New Philosophy’  - mentioned at the start of this chapter - 
Hulme ‘was attracted to Bergson by his anti-liberal implications’.321 ‘Hulme’s 
articles’, Mead goes on, ‘use Bergson to critique … idealism, showing how … 
liberalism … relied on intellectual fictions, constructed over intuitive reality.’322 
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Crucially, this appropriation of Bergson to expound the flaws in liberal progressive 
politics, and his role as an inspiration for much in Pound and Lewis’ ideas on art, 
provides a means through which to understand Miller’s straddling of brutal and 
humanist positions. Indeed, Hulme’s negative definition of ‘the humanist attitude’ 
provides a useful philosophical reference point for that paradox in Miller: 
 
The Humanist attitude: When a sense of the reality of these absolute 
[religious ethical] values is lacking, you get a refusal to believe any longer in 
the radical imperfection of either Man or Nature. This develops logically into 
the belief that life is the source and measure of all values, and that man is 
fundamentally good. Instead, then, of/ Man (radically imperfect) ... 
apprehending …. Perfection, -/ you get the second term (now entirely 
misunderstood) illegitimately introduced inside the first [elipses and brackets 
Hulme’s own]. This leads to a complete change in all values. The problem of 
evil disappears, the conception of sin loses all meaning.323  
 
As we will come to see over the course of this chapter, Miller’s moral approach 
incorporates a strong faith in the individual’s potential for emotional, spiritual and 
sensual evolution alongside a strong belief in imperfection as the defining condition 
of humanity. His vision of a future in which - as he puts it in his 1944 essay ‘Of Art 
and Future’ - there is ‘no feeling of class, caste, color or country … no need of 
possessions, no use for money, no archaic prejudices about the sanctity of the home 
or marriage’ in many ways encapsulates the idealism Hulme despises.324 Indeed, in 
one sense, Miller corroborates the humanist notion of the human condition as 
abundantly perfectible, a fanciful belief, according to Hulme, based on the fallacy 
that ‘our political ideal should be the removal of everything that checks the 
“spontaneous growth of personality.”325  
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
New Age, who desired to break way from the past, and establish a new ‘year zero.’  
(Mead, p. 246), he also ‘appealed to Catholics in so far as he spelt out the limits of 
rational cognition, as he did in his early books’ (Mead, p. 253).   
323 ‘A Notebook,’ p. 444.  
324 Henry Miller, “Of Art and the Future,” in The Best of Henry Miller , ed. by Durrell, 
pp. 228-41, p. 232. Originally published in Sunday After the War (Norfolk, 
Conneticutt: New Directions, 1944). 
325 Hulme, ‘A Notebook’, p. 444. 
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And yet, in another sense, Miller’s aesthetic and moral project is driven – like 
Hulme’s - by a profound objection to any notion of progress that ignores the chaotic 
and often unpleasant reality of social and subjective human experience. Both 
characterize standard humanist responses as squeamishly fearful, motivated – in 
Hulme’s words - by ‘the same kind of sensation as one gets form turning up a stone 
and seeing the creeping things revealed.’326  Although Pound himself was outwardly 
dismissive of Bergson – in fact concluding that Hulme’s weekly philosophical salons 
had been ‘diluted with crap like Bergson’ – we shall see later in this chapter that his 
own work incorporates the same tension between a philosophically pluralist 
understanding of subjective experience and a politically absolutist approach to 
morality.327  
 
Returning to the Sylvester-Tanya episode, Miller’s provocative taunt to Sylvester to 
‘fuck your pluralistic universe’ corroborates Pound’s belief that he writes against 
universalist notions of taste and judgment, at the same time situating him 
incongruously within the particular mode of anti-humanist discourse defined by 
Hulme (65). Despite his passionate belief that ‘everything is justified’, by sneering at 
the idea that Sylvester’s ‘next play will involve a pluralist conception of the 
universe’, Miller takes up arms against the naïve and lazy appropriators of Bergson 
that Hulme refers to (65). Indeed the term ‘pluralist universe’ appears to come 
directly from the title of a 1909 lecture given by Bergson’s ‘pluralist’ admirer William 
James, which contributed to the popularization of these ideas and, crucially, ended in 
the categorization of all values as ‘incommensurable’ (equally valid).328 This lecture 
will play an important role in my later analysis of Bergson and his influence on 
Miller’s theories regarding an evolved form of sympathy.  
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Pound, we remember, is enamored with Joyce’s ‘variegation of dialect’ and Miller’s 
‘scope’ but also impressed by these writers’ abilities to delineate ‘permanent and 
fundamental hostilities and incompatibilities’ between people.329 He admires Miller, 
as he admires Henry James, for resisting what he regards as the populist temptation 
to depict human life in a manner that suggests ‘all men are the same’ and ‘desire the 
same thing’.330  
 
Thus, in his own way, Miller exhibits something of the combination of inclusionary 
aesthetic and exclusionary moral tendencies that push against each other in Pound’s 
review work. Both writers are incensed by what they see as the oversimplification of 
human existence in the service of false and shallow attempts to promote tolerance 
and cooperation. According to Pound in his review of Henry James: ‘to want all men 
to think and feel the same way and to desire the same things is plain stupidity.’331 For 
Miller in the Sylvester-Tanya passage, his subjective viewpoint is not the correct 
viewpoint for everyone but it has greater worth than Sylvester’s because it is his 
alone.  
 
Miller shares Pound’s faith in the unquestionable authority of the individual’s 
singular perspective, however inconsistent or chaotic that may be.  By exclaiming 
‘Fuck your two ways of looking at things’, he implies a form of anti-intellectualism 
that rejects reasoned and objective responses to the world as empty and 
unproductive. Moreover, Miller’s artistic snobbery, his apparent rejection of 
universalism, and his refusal to accept the equal value of contradictory opinions, 
imply a degree of allegiance to the kind of elitism championed by Pound and Lewis. 
As will be seen in Chapter Three, there are important and troubling connections to 
be delineated between this aggressively subjective and anarchical style of writing 
and the socially and racially essentialist theories Pound came to advocate in the 
1930s.   
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Like Pound, Miller attempts not only to justify and privilege but apply order to 
instinctual and visceral emotional states. ‘Chaos’, he writes at the start of Cancer, ‘is 
the score on which reality is written’, implying living and writing as dual creative 
processes equally involved in a form of anarchical expression (10). As we will see, 
this forms much of the motivational basis for the self-contradictory and formally 
aggressive narrative modes in Miller and Pound’s manifesto writings.  
 
Indeed, both writers work on the basis that the greatest ‘truths’ exist beyond rational 
analysis, an idea that was prevalent among avant-gardists in the 1920s and 30s, 
particularly – as Caroline Blinder points out – within Breton’s school of Surrealism. 
From the Surrealists, Blinder writes, Miller inherited the ‘premise that an uncensored 
flow of words without any conscious elaboration could in fact signal deeper 
metaphysical and universal truths.’332 Miller and Breton share the aim of using 
writing to liberate unconscious thought and desire, a crossover that is 
comprehensively explained in Blinder’s 2000 study, A Selfmade Surrealist: Aesthetics 
and Ideology in the Work of Henry Miller, and in Paul Jahshan’s Henry Miller and the 
Surrealist Discourse of Excess (2001). As we shall see, Miller’s statements on his 
‘uncensored, formless’ method and his reasons for writing Cancer echo Breton’s in 
his first ‘Surrealist Manifesto’ (1924).333 More importantly, however, Blinder 
identifies Miller as having doubted fundamental aspects of Breton’s approach and 
adapted his own aesthetic accordingly. These doubts and the suggestions for 
improvement that they inspired relate directly to the elements of his aesthetic that 
coincide with Pound’s.  
 
Though their own aims and conclusions will be seen to have differed dramatically, 
Pound and Miller both make aggressive use of self-contradiction to arrive at new and 
important truths, a similarity that is evident in Pound’s Vorticist and Ideogrammic 
writings and Miller’s semi-autobiographical fiction, the ‘Booster/Delta’ manifesto he 
composed with his friend Alfred Perles (1935) and his literary essay work of the 
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1940s and 50s. This interest in deliberately creating paradoxical rhetorical 
pronouncements is exemplified by Pound and Wyndham Lewis’ Vorticist Manifesto 
Blast 1 – looked at in the previous chapter in relation to Pound and Gaudier-
Brzeska’s ‘Vortex’ pieces – a treatise in which they announce the movement’s right to 
‘fight first on one side, then on the other, but always for the SAME cause, which is 
neither side or both sides and ours.’334 
 
Thus, the authorial control inherent in Miller’s centralizing of the narrative voice is 
inevitably at odds with his claim to abstain from moral judgment. He is caught up in 
an irresolvable conundrum  – while his subjectivity lies at the center of the story and 
we rely entirely on him for its narration, Miller’s narrator also attempts to remain 
subversive, Cancer’s moral universe is attacked but simultaneously created and 
preserved by Miller the author, he is never quite the marginal figure he imagines 
himself to be. If he purports to cede control, his readers are always aware that this is, 
ultimately, a pose. As will become clearer later in this section, the amoral, 
iconoclastic rebel is deprived of legitimacy because the central power he claims to be 
fighting, ultimately, resides in his own iconic person.   
 
Bataille, once again, offers useful insight into the paradox:  ‘Miller calls God the 
Father " the wormeaten son of a bitch" [and] "old goat"! he writes, ‘However, if there 
does exist a God it is Henry Miller.’335 The notion that Miller takes up the voice both 
of prophet and deity in his narratives will be explored further in Chapter Three in 
relation to a marked tendency among 1930s modernist writers to secularize 
apocalyptic rhetorical modes. Pound and Miller both display what Sarah Garland 
calls ‘the repercussions to the self’ caused by the occupation of Jeremiad positions in 
a post-religious age.336 In this context, however, Bataille highlights the fundamental 
impossibility of Miller’s anti-authoritarian stance. Miller might rail against the 
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authority and sanctity of ‘God the Father’, but he does so in order to claim the same 
authority and sanctity for himself as author, both of his text and the world he 
perceives. Thus his irreverence towards established power and collective moral 
standards becomes, in effect, an aggressive instatement of his own moral dominance 
in his world. 
 
Miller’s subversive pronouncements are compromised by an incongruous but 
inescapable conservatism at the root of his project, an idea that is addressed by 
Blinder and Jahshan as well as Gilles Mayne in his 1993 study, Eroticism in Georges 
Bataille and Henry Miller. Mayne identifies Miller’s attempt to subvert morality as a 
perversely proscriptive rather than liberating insurrection: 
Under the guise of liberalism, Miller’s universe hides the most cynical, 
dangerous realities. His transforming evil into a good does not make evil a 
“lesser” entity but, on the contrary, what Heimonet calls the “worst” evil: evil 
not felt as an evil and just performed without the awareness of it (although 
with a certain pleasure); the icy evil of brutal force; evil legitimated, legalized 
and institutionalized – made a totalitarian system.337 
Miller overthrows the tyranny of bourgeois taboo and ‘fearful’ conceptions of right 
and wrong, Mayne suggests, but inadvertently replaces them with a totalitarian 
system equally tyrannical and fundamentally less stable. Echoing Bataille’s 
description of Miller as omnipotent and unaccountable in his own text, Mayne 
explains that his transgression is predicated on destructive, reactionary motives 
rather than a desire to improve the world. Consequently, he suggests, Miller is 
incapable of offering a positive means of going forward. Although this correctly 
highlights something of the anti-humanist/humanist reversal in Miller’s aesthetic, 
over the course of this chapter and – more definitively in Chapter Three – it will be 
seen that Miller’s connections with the radical conservatism of Pound and Hulme in 
fact imply something more complex, linguistic and humane than Mayne allows for. 
Mayne correctly identifies Miller’s ‘revolt against society as a necessary revolt 
against the language of that society’, pointing to a crucial slippage between                                                              
337 Gilles Mayne, Eroticism in Georges Bataille and Henry Miller (Alabama: Summa 
Publications, 1993), p. 167. 
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progressive ideas and violent, totalising language in his work. Going on to describe 
Miller’s ‘obscenity’ as a method ‘to disclose a greater realism’, however, he 
underestimates the possibility of a humanist purpose behind the use of shocking 
language in Cancer.338 
Despite his oversights, Mayne sets an important precedent in Miller studies by 
exploring the possibility that the latter’s subversive pronouncements might in fact be 
disingenuous. Blinder takes up a similar line of enquiry, claiming that Miller’s work 
embodies  ‘the issue of whether true complicity can exist between literature and 
transgression’.339 How can a writer of confessional prose, that garners the reader’s 
attention through shocking revelations, claim to be genuinely subversive? His 
purpose, surely, is to perpetuate the narrative rather than disrupt it, to titillate rather 
than uproot existing structures and values? Sarah Garland takes this further still, 
questioning whether someone like Miller, who claims to refuse the writer’s standard 
communicational tricks, announcing Cancer as his ‘gob of spit in the face of art’ (10), 
is perhaps even more desirous of a sympathetic audience than the conventional 
writers he despises: ‘even gestures of renunciation imply an audience—especially 
those antagonistic gestures that maintain their purpose is to alienate and turn away 
from the perceived dictates of an implied readership.’340   
 
These suggestions of inauthenticity or unreliability in Miller’s rebellious persona are 
helpfully developed by Jahshan, who uses Roland Barthes’ term ‘the wrestler’ to talk 
about Cancer’s narrative voice. Miller’s readers, Jahshan says, are ‘offended in [their] 
logic’ because the narrator vacillates between positions of revolt and obedience. 
Directly applying Barthes’ description of the inconsistently subversive writer, 
Jahshan argues:  “Sometimes he rejects the formal boundaries of the ring and goes on 
hitting an adversary legally protected by the ropes, sometimes he re-establishes these 
boundaries and claims the protection of what he did not respect a few minutes 
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earlier.’341  Jahshan refers specifically to Miller’s literary technique and form – an area 
that will be addressed later in this chapter - but the principle is equally applicable to 
Miller’s moral stance. It is the wrestler’s ‘inconsistency, far more than treachery or 
cruelty’, Barthes says, that ‘sends the audience beside itself with rage’.342  
I would argue that the narrator’s straddling of contradictory moral positions in 
Cancer and Max and the White Phagocytes’ is not so much infuriating as perplexing but 
fascinating. Appearing to both ‘detest’ and ‘revere’ Max for his weakness and failure, 
to take pleasure in his vitriol for Sylvester while remaining aware of the fact that this 
vitriol is unreasonable and irregular, he intrigues rather than enrages the reader.  
According to Jahshan: 
[Miller’s] text is excessive and unpredictable and seemingly “inconsistent” in 
the jumps it makes between the marked and unmarked passages; he is a 
transgressor of linguistic and literary laws, yet he can as quickly revert to 
normality’.343  
This relationship with the reader implies something close to Pound’s analysis of 
Lewis as a writer who ‘hustles his reader, jolts him, snarls at him’.344 In the same 
vein, the delirium that permeates Miiller’s outrageous monologues is acknowledged 
by the narrator himself as a ploy; a trick of sorts. His defiant declaration during the 
Sylvester-Tanya episode that he is  ‘cancer and delirium’ – interpretable as illnesses 
he either personifies or carries – is crucial (65).  Throughout his essays and fiction, 
Miller returns to the image of a corruptive (cancerous) and delirious mode of 
thinking. As he puts it towards the end of Cancer, his aim has been to ‘depict the 
conduct of a human being … in the grip of delirium’ (244).  
By delirium, Miller means a state of mind that induces ecstasy through a sense of 
disorder. It is helpfully explained by the term “divine jumble”, coined in a letter from 
another friend, Michael Fraenkel, to criticize the unevenness of his work, and then 
appropriated by Miller to positive ends. ‘As for the “divine jumble”,’ he writes in                                                              
341 Paul Jahshan, Henry Miller and the Surrealist Discourse of Excess: A Post Structuralist 
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reply to Fraenkel, ‘I adore it. I see nothing to be gained by straightening it out.’345 
What he implies is a route to existential and artistic transcendence through the 
acceptance of intermingled and contradictory thoughts and feelings. As he puts it in 
Capricorn, ‘my idea has been to present a resurrection of the emotions, to depict a 
human being in the stratosphere of ideas’ (244). It is only by experiencing and 
expressing the true frenzy of his inner emotional life without attempting to organize 
or rationalize it, that the artist may achieve insight. To highlight the apparent 
madness in this method, Miller goes on to describe it as a way of ‘collaborating with 
myself’, thus being able ‘to get off the gold standard of literature’ (244).  
 
And yet for Miller, like Pound in his appropriation of Confucian ideas, creating art is 
also a way to fashion order out of the chaotic materials of subjective experience. ‘The 
task which the artist implicitly sets for himself’ Miller continues in Cancer, ‘is to 
overthrow existing values, to make of the chaos about him an order which is his 
own’ (189). The result is a mode of expression fraught with ‘confusion’ and 
‘stuttering’ that is also paradoxically ‘nourishing’ because it enables him to express 
the imperfection and imperfectability of subjective experience (189).  
 
Crucially, delirium also implies the absolute loss of moral bearings, a state of mind 
that is simultaneously frightening and liberating, a reflection of what, in Max and the 
White Phagocytes, Miller describes as his ‘first [and lasting] impression of the world – 
that it was good, but terrifying.’346 As we shall see, Pound’s approval of Miller’s 
‘hierarchy of values’ coincided with his development of an economic theory that 
connected the loss of social, political and literary values to the breakdown in the 
relationship between money, and the goods it is supposed to afford. When Miller 
offers to buy Max a meal in a restaurant of his choice, the latter is incapable of 
making a decision: 
                                                             
345 The Michael Fraenkel: Henry Miller Correspondence Called Hamlet (London: Carrefour, 
1939), p. 171, June 19th, 1936.  
346 ‘Max’, p.157. 
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 He wants to eat in a prix fixe at five and a half francs. When I make a face he 
points to a de luxe restaurant at eighteen francs the meal. Clearly he’s 
bewildered. He’s lost all sense of values (161).  
 
Like Miller’s narrator in Cancer, Max’s delirium indicates an inability to abide by 
fixed systems of logic or value. In their loss of these restrictive and futile bearings, 
Miller’s narrator and Max reflect the chaos and thus become valuable ‘instrument[s] 
to reveal the naked truth’347   
 
A crucial difference between them, however, is that Max struggles against his 
inability to differentiate between good and bad, helpful and damaging, even down 
to the apparently elementary difference between five and a half francs and eighteen 
francs. There is a harrowing contrast between Cancer’s outpourings of ostensibly 
delirious, contradictory and unrelated images and the supplicatory letter the terror-
stricken Max writes to Miller at the end of Max and the White Phagocytes. Miller 
marvels at the ‘ecstasy’ that comes over him as: 
 
so much crowds into my head … images, gay ones, terrible ones, maddening 
ones, the wolf and the goat, the spider the crab, syphilis with her wings 
outstretched and the door of the womb always on the latch, always open, 
ready like the tomb (253). 
 
Max’s rambling stream of neuroses, on the other hand, represents a mind collapsing 
under the pressure of unrelated, contradictory thoughts and emotions it cannot 
process: 
I am crying and cant stop, I hear music playing in my ears, but in reality I 
hear screaming in the street, I suppose a pimp must have beated up his hur – 
it is a terrible noise, I cant stand it, the water tape is running in the sink, I cant 
do a wink of sleep I am reading your bok Miller in order to quieten me, its 
amusing me but I have no patience I am waiting for the morning I’ll get out 
in the street as soon as daylight breaks.348  
 
Max’s abject helplessness, the contrast between his and Miller’s ‘jumbled’ thought 
processes are accentuated by the spelling errors. Out of his depth psychologically                                                              
347 Ibid., p. 161.  
348 ‘Max’, p. 166. 
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and morally, Max lacks even the basic grammatical tools to express his terror 
correctly. Miller on the other hand is caught compellingly between his twin desire to 
cede and retain control of the thought process, the narrative and his sense of 
morality. Crucially, Max serves as a warning to Miller of the risks inherent in his 
own degeneration into poverty and ‘delirium’. To experiment with suffering for 
artistic purposes, Miller suggests, is to play with the dangerous possibility of 
genuine physical and mental implosion. To maintain control of the ‘jumble’ inside 
his own mind and heart, Miller must accept its divine ordination rather than impose 
exterior logical rules. By positing Max as the genuine sufferer gone mad he reminds 
himself of this terrifying potential, currently dormant but easily activated under the 
wrong conditions. As he puts it in ‘An Open Letter to Surrealists Everywhere’, 
‘madness is tonic and invigorating. It makes the sane more sane. The only ones who 
are unable to profit by it are the insane.’349  
 
As Blinder and Jahshan have pointed out, this interest in the creative and 
philosophical possibilities within non-rational states was a way to continue where 
the avant-garde poetics of André Breton’s Surrealist movement had left off.  ‘Scarcely 
anything’, Miller goes on to write in the same essay, ‘has been as stimulating to me 
as the theories and the products of the Surrealists’.350 Explaining his reading of the 
Surrealist Manifesto, he writes that ‘Breton’s madness is a sort of “ice-box madness” 
… not real madness’, a state of mind Miller claims he inherited unconsciously – via 
the Surrealists’ predecessors, the Dadaists - as a young aspiring author in New York: 
‘I was perhaps the unique Dadaist in America, and I didn’t know it … I was so lucid 
they said I was daffy’.351  
 
In these pronouncements, Miller seems to acknowledge, rather than conceal, the 
contrivance at the heart of the Surrealists’ and his own project, a paradox that 
mirrors his self-defeating impulse to abnegate moral responsibility. To cultivate and 
prepare madness like cubes of ice in a box, to stimulate the conditions necessary to                                                              
349 ‘An Open Letter to Surrealists Everywhere,’ p. 159. 
350 Ibid., p. 159.  
351 Ibid., p. 180-81; Capricorn, p. 260. 
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produce the violence and self-contradiction of the delirious monologue, is to negate 
Miller’s fundamental purpose, namely to embody his actual existence in his art. 
Throughout Cancer and his literary essays, he makes it clear that his project is 
motivated by a desire to move away from the ‘dead forms’ of representation in 
literature, and towards the kind of book that serves as a ‘human document’, that is 
‘exclusively biographical’.352 Indeed, he states early on in Cancer that he ‘will record 
all that has been omitted from books’ (11). Intriguingly then, his deliberate 
development of a delirious mode of writing appears to jeopardize an overriding 
quest to produce a pure confessional form; a form that escapes the boundaries 
imposed on ‘Literature’ in favour of actual lived life.  
 
As Blinder points out, however, Miller discusses his own attempts to explore 
delirious modes of thinking as an improved and less contrived version of the 
Surrealists’. Miller dismisses as self-defeating Breton’s ‘Automatism’ – a method of 
artistic creation defined in the First Surrealist Manifesto as ‘voluntary hallucination’. 
Indeed, in ‘An Open Letter to Surrealists Everywhere’ he claims that ‘when we look 
at the Surrealist products … we notice two elements which are lacking … guts and 
significance. Without vital guts there can be no true madness’.353 What he is getting at 
is a falsity that comes from what he goes on to call the attempt ‘to establish an 
Absolute … to usher in the glory of the unconscious’.354 As Blinder puts it, for Miller 
‘it is the voluntary aspect which makes the process of Automatism suspect in itself’355 
since: 
 
on the one hand, Breton stresses the fact that a personal resolution must 
necessarily motivate the Automatic process, but on the other hand it must 
nevertheless present itself without any rationalizing intervention.356  
 
                                                             
352 ‘Un Être Étoilique’, p. 288. 
353 ‘An Open Letter to Surrealists Everywhere’, p. 181. 
354 Ibid., p. 181. 
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It is disingenuous, Miller claims, to ‘try with all powers of consciousness’ to produce 
insanity, indeed to offer up the mind as part of an ideological and aesthetic 
experiment, since the aim and result will always be a constructed rather than 
‘genuine’ madness.357 The correlations between ‘Miller’s fascination with creativity as 
a progressive force’ and ‘the Surrealist effort to capture the forces of the imaginary’ 
are jeopardized, Blinder says, by the former’s fierce individualism, gleaned in part 
from his reading of Bergson.358 This area of Miller’s aesthetics will be explored in 
detail in the next section. Although Miller’s attempts at expressing the chaos of 
thought and feeling had some of their roots in Breton’s quest to ‘transcribe the 
unconscious’, his interest in Bergson’s Creative Evolution links him paradoxically to 
Pound’s own anti-humanist existential philosophy. Through a reading of Miller’s 
theories about the creative nature of artistic and existential perspective, my aim is to 
illustrate that Bergson, in fact, provides a central point of crossover and departure 
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2.2 ‘Inside the Whale’: ‘A world dominated by vision’  
‘If I am inhuman it is because my world has slopped over its human bounds, because 
to be human seems like a poor, sorry miserable affair, limited by the senses, 
restricted by moralities and codes defined by platitudes and isms. I am pouring the 
juice of the grape down my gullet and I find wisdom in it, but my wisdom is not 
born of the grape, my intoxication owes nothing to wine …’ Henry Miller, Cancer 
(257) 
 
The paradoxical intentions to achieve mental and moral order by accepting their 
opposite, and to accept delirium while simultaneously delineating it through 
writing, are addressed by Miller in his literary essays, letters and interviews. 
Amongst other things, this section will rethink Miller’s intentions via Aldous 
Huxley’s metaphor of living ‘in the belly of the whale’.359 The expression is taken 
from Huxley’s 1929 article, ‘Meditations on El Greco’ an analysis of the sixteenth 
century renaissance painter’s aesthetics. Huxley uses it to refer to the infernal 
atmosphere in El Greco’s painting The Dream of Philip II. The left of the piece shows a 
court scene in which royal astrologers are depicted interpreting the Spanish king’s 
dream. On the right-hand-side, where this interpretation is represented, an 
enormous whale looms, mouth ajar apparently swallowing the contents of the world 
– people, cities, mountains and the sky. 
 
Huxley coins the term ‘inside the belly of the whale’ to express what he sees as El 
Greco’s vision of a ‘visceral prison’ in which ‘clouds, rocks, drapery have all been 
mysteriously transformed into mucus and skinned muscle and peritoneum.’360 For 
Huxley, the painting’s atmosphere is terrifyingly constrictive, an expression of the 
limits imposed on the individual by ‘the physiological root of ecstasy’, and a sign of 
El Greco’s more sensually honest Baroque age in which ‘even the loftiest experiences 
were admitted to be primarily physiological’.361 He is troubled, but also exhilarated 
by the feeling the painting triggers in him – that sexual and spiritual ‘ecstasy … 
annihilates the personal soul, not by dissolving it out into universal infinity, but by 
                                                             
359 Aldous Huxley, ‘Meditations on El Greco’ in Music at Night and Other Essays 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1970 [orig. ed.: 1931]), p. 57. 
360 Ibid., p. 59. 
361 Ibid., pp. 63 & 66. 
 144 
drawing it down and drowning it in the warm, pulsating, tremulous darkness of the 
body’.362 In contrast to Huxley’s sense of terror, Miller revels in the constriction 
implied by this ‘belly of the whale atmosphere’.363 Writing about Anaïs Nin’s diaries 
in his 1938 essay ‘Un Être Étoilique’, Miller takes Huxley’s symbol to denote the 
human potential for existential self-sufficiency, for the creation of a fulfilling and 
contented state of being through the meditation on and appreciation of one’s own 
unique ‘vision’, however grim and oppressive: 
 
Standing before [El Greco’s] paintings one realizes that this is a world! A 
world dominated by vision. It is no longer a man looking at the world, but a 
man inside his own world ceaselessly reconstructing it in terms of the light 
within.364 
 
There is more to say later in this chapter about Huxley’s identification of ‘visceral’ 
imprisonment in El Greco, particularly since he applied related ideas to the sexual 
aesthetics in Miller’s Cancer, but Miller’s interpretation of ‘the whale’ shifts the focus 
away – on the surface at least – from instinct towards a notion of spiritual and artistic 
regeneration. He uses the ‘belly of the whale’ as a way to positively reimagine the 
apparent limits imposed by the individual’s field of vision. These limits become the 
means for limitless joy and invigoration, for the ceaseless reconstruction of the 
perceived world through a singular and inimitable vision. This, Miller suggests, is a 
source of hope rather than despair: 
 
We who imagined we were sitting in the belly of the whale and doomed to 
nothingness suddenly discover that the whale was a projection of our own 
insufficiency. The whale remains, but the whale becomes the whole wide 
world, with stars and seasons, with banquets and festivals, with everything 
that is wonderful to see and touch.365 
 
A fundamental tenet of Miller’s philosophy, it relies on the individual’s ability to 
defend him or herself against exterior influences, particularly if they prevent the 
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realization of his or her capacity for self-knowledge and aesthetical fulfillment. The 
whale, for Miller, represents the individual’s field of visual, sensory and imaginative 
perspective. By constructing this in a way that is entirely true to the self, a person is 
liberated from the ‘insufficiency’ and ‘doom’ otherwise imposed by exterior values 
and expectations. It is only by privileging one’s personal perspective over all exterior 
perspectives, and by accepting and appreciating its ultimate sufficiency, that a 
person is afforded access to limitless joy, to the ‘stars and seasons, and banquets and 
festivals [and] everything that is wonderful to see and touch’. Miller is invested, 
then, in a paradoxical model that suggests perceptual liberation through the 
acceptance of apparently constrictive limitations. As he puts it, again in ‘Un Être 
Étoilique’: 
Every one who has made a world of his own realizes that it is precisely the 
fact that his world has definite limits which is what is good about it … 
because it is rigidly limited [it] permits the only true condition of freedom.366  
 
The following chapter will extend this analysis of a profound contradiction in 
Miller’s work, a schism between the importance of rigid confines and what the critic 
Frank Kermode called the ‘torrent’ of his prose style.367 If he advocated the 
productiveness of limits when it came to the artist and the individual’s ‘vision’, he 
was simultaneously engaged in a rejection of structural and narrative restraint 
through an emotional and instinctual process of writing. Indeed, as Miller explains to 
Emil Schnellock in his August 1931 letter about Cancer: ‘I start tomorrow on the Paris 
book: first-person, uncensored, formless—fuck everything!’368 In a later essay entitled 
‘Reflections on Writing’, he expands on this method:  
I scrap at will. I invent, distort, deform, lie, inflate, exaggerate, confound, 
confuse as the mood seizes me. I obey only my own instincts and intuitions 
… often I put down things which I do not understand myself, secure in the 
knowledge that later they will become clear and meaningful to me.369 
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El Greco. Adoration of the Name of Jesus (Dream of Philip II) c.1570. Courtesy El Greco 
Foundation 
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The ‘inside the whale’ metaphor is useful to Miller for two connected reasons: first, 
as a way of understanding the role of the imagination in the individual’s perception 
of reality; second, as a way of thinking about the literary artist’s creation of textual 
worlds. When he refers to ‘every one who has made a world of his own’, he means 
both the individual human being’s imaginative creation of the world he or she sees 
and the artist’s creation of a work of art. The artist, in Miller’s view, must recreate his 
or her own unique perceptual world, to be able to produce a truthful and important 
world in his or her art. As James Decker, J.D. Brown (1986) and Leon Lewis (1986) 
have noted, this is derived from Miller’s fundamental conviction that art is above all 
else an expression of the artist’s personality. As Brown puts it “the inseparability of 
the artist and his art is clearly at the heart of Miller’s aesthetic vision”, a statement 
that is supported throughout Miller’s writing but particularly in his 1936 novel Black 
Spring where he proclaims that ‘the book is the man that I am, the confused man, the 
negligent man, the reckless man, the lusty, obscene, boisterous, thoughtful, 
scrupulous, lying, diabolically truthful man that I am’.370   
 
Again, the paradox lies in a form of anarchy as the starting point for the creation of 
beautiful, virtuous art. ‘Chaos’, Anaïs Nin quotes Miller as telling her, ‘is rich …  is 
fecund’, a site that embodies dissolution and birth, despair and hope.371 Indeed, early 
on in Cancer Miller makes this point by reference to the origins of the universe, 
presenting chaos as the condition from which all life, experience and art originates – 
‘when into the womb of time everything is withdrawn chaos will be restored and 
chaos is the score upon which reality is written. You Tania are my chaos. This is why 
I sing.’ (10). El Greco, Miller believes, communicates a vision that comes honestly 
and entirely from the disorder within. He has gone beyond the standard artistic 
process of simply ‘looking at the world’ and recording what he sees and instead 
constructs the world according to his personal instinctive vision. According to Michael 
Woolf in his 1992 essay ‘Beyond Ideology: Kate Millet and the Case for Henry Miller’ 
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‘Miller’s “delirium” or “divine jumble” are expressions of the fertile fields from 
which the narratives emerge’.372  
 
This correlates with Pound’s interest in Confucius and particularly with his focus on 
the ideogram ‘Shen’ – discussed in Chapter One. Although we shall see Miller’s 
focus on the formulation of an existential and artistic vision from the chaotic mess of 
experience relies on an acceptance of disorder that is anathema to Pound, they are 
united by a common faith in the importance of the artist’s ability to transcribe that 
personal disorder. Indeed, both want art that excludes exterior influence and comes, 
as Pound puts it in ‘Ta Hsio: The Great Digest’, from the artist ‘looking straight into 
one’s own heart and acting on the results’.373  Both are interested in the notion that, 
the individual and artist must implement order in him or herself before attempting 
to represent order in the world. As Pound says of the Ancient Chinese philosophers 
in ‘Ta Hsio’,: ‘Desiring self-discipline in the world they rectified their own hearts’.374 
With these shared anxiety about outside influences comes a concomitant antipathy 
towards the attempt to effect external change – in and through the aesthetics of art or 
socially and politically through ideology - without taking the self into consideration. 
In ‘An Open Letter to Surrealists Everywhere’, Miller writes: 
 
The artist is the opposite of the politically-minded individual, the opposite of 
the reformer, the opposite of the idealist. He does not tinker with the 
universe: he recreates it out of his own experience and understanding of life. 
He knows that the transformation must proceed from within outward, not 
vice versa.375  
 
Pound and Miller’s mutual distrust of ideologues – and particularly Christian 
ideologues - stems from such concerns; an antipathy towards what Pound called 
‘meddling in the moral lives of others’ and Miller ‘saving the soul’. As Miller goes on 
to say in ‘An Open Letter to Surrealists Everywhere’: 
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Let each one turn his gaze inward and regard himself with awe and wonder, 
with mystery and reverence; let each one promulgate his own laws, his own 
theories; let each one work his own influence, his own havoc his own 
miracles.376 
  
In line with this, both Miller and Pound are involved in aesthetic explorations that 
embody vital questions around pure art as distinct forms of expression and 
communication. Miller’s belief that the artist must ‘gaze inward’ and Pound’s that he 
or she must ‘look straight into one’s own heart’, indeed their shared sanctification of 
the artist as a rare individual who represents truth by harnessing his or her inner 
intuition, suggests a creative process capable of adding nothing – as Pound puts it in 
the Cancer review - ‘to life as he has seen it’ (88). The conflict lies in their shared 
desire for literature that, on the one hand, is precise, accurate and anti-aesthetic and, 
on the other, unique, imaginative and visionary. Echoing Pound on Miller, William 
Carlos Williams and Joyce, Anaïs Nin writes that Miller ‘is suspicious of poetry and 
beauty. Beauty, he seems to say, is artifice. Truth only lies in people and things 
stripped of aesthetics.’377 Peter Nicholls, in his study: Ezra Pound, Politics, Economics 
and Writing: A Study of the Cantos comments on the aesthetic/documentary axis in 
Pound’s writing: 
Almost all his work reveals a major tension between the visionary Platonism 
which coloured much of his thought about poetic language, and his strong 
desire to seize the concrete, to confront directly the material problems of his 
time.378  
 
These issues of subjectivity and objectivity are also at the root of a major discrepancy 
between Miller and Pound’s aesthetics. While Miller’s ‘Inside the Whale’ metaphor 
highlights the crossover with Pound’s Confucian ideas, it also demonstrates that 
their motives for producing art differed dramatically. As we will see in Chapter 
Three, Miller was primarily interested in exploring his own perceptual world, in 
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effecting and representing his own very personal perceptual revolution. As part of 
this process, he playfully appropriated the language and ideas of social and cultural 
change. Pound, on the other hand, was always interested in detecting the larger 
forces and patterns at play in the world for the purpose of proving the intrinsic 
connections between literature, society, economics and politics. He believed – we 
shall see – in the power of words to effect real social, economic and political change, 
not through the dissemination of particular political messages but the realignment of 
language with reality. We shall also see that these differences derived from a 
fundamental philosophical point of departure: while Miller understood each 
subjective experience to be the individual’s own creation, Pound believed there were 
indisputable ‘truths’ in the external world.  
 
Pound’s belief in an ‘an interactive force’, a universal ‘theos’ or ‘virtu’ that is the 
source of meaningful literature (dealt with in Chapter One), is integral to the 
distinction between his and Miller’s approach to artistic perception.379 While Pound 
understood the artist to be a detector of the ‘energy that fills the world’, subordinate 
to what Kenner called the ‘patterned process’ of nature, Miller credited the 
individual with greater creative control.380 The ‘inside the whale’ metaphor has a to 
do with ‘making life a poem … the adoption of a creative attitude towards life’ as 
preparation for the production of a work of art.381 As Anaïs Nin puts it in her diary, 
‘as an artist he held the proud notion that every image came out of his own 
spontaneous chemistry, not from any synthetic formula.’382 If Pound advocates 
finding ‘precise verbal definitions of [the] inarticulate thoughts’ of the heart,383 a 
method of organizing the inner ‘chaos’, Miller’s writing about art, on the other hand, 
imagines the individual luxuriating in the ‘divine jumble’ of his thoughts and 
feelings.  
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As we also saw in chapter One, Pound and Miller share a belief in the idea of the 
artist as ‘antennae’, capable of detecting and transmitting these natural forces, but 
Miller differs from Pound in his conviction that the rare individual who is capable of 
picking up on those forces must accept and express rather than sort through and 
organize them. This point of departure between them is connected to Pound’s 
concomitant idea that the artist’s antenna works in the service of ‘the race’. As we 
will see, Pound’s attempt to assert a political, economic and aesthetic alliance with 
Miller based on an idea of cultural, social and indeed racial responsibility rests 
uneasily with Miller’s focus on the individual as primarily responsible to him or her 
self.  
 
This distinction is complicated, however, by the fact that Miller vacillates between 
two conflicting positions: first, the self-fixated individual uninterested in the 
‘process’ of nature, time, and the history of human development; second, the passive, 
metaphysical explorer meditatively waiting to find connections with the cosmos. In 
Cancer, the second position is represented by the trope of fluidity, of sewer water, 
semen and urine as conductive elements for latent universal energies to connect 
people and things. ‘I … love everything that flows’, he writes in Cancer, ‘rivers, 
sewers, lava, semen, blood, bile, words, sentences’ (258). Indeed, he closes the novel 
with an ode to the ‘process’ of nature, gazing out onto the Seine and declaring that ‘I 
feel this river flowing through me – its past, its ancient soil, the changing climate. 
The hills gently girdle it about: its course is fixed’ (318). If Miller’s aim is to in some 
way receive and reveal that ‘flow’, then Pound’s idea of energy alignment has a more 
active and controlling purpose. This aspect of Miller’s work will be looked at in 
detail in Section 2.4 ‘The Attraction of the Blemish: Pound and Miler’s sexual 
aesthetics’ as part of both writers’ wider interest in sex as a means of establishing 
fluid metaphysical connections.  
 
In ‘Inside the Whale’, his 1940 essay on Cancer, George Orwell homes in on Miller’s 
use of Huxley’s metaphor. For Orwell, Miller’s theory implies a quietist retreat from 
political and moral responsibility, rather than the appreciation of the world in which 
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he or she exists as self-created and self-defined and therefore free from the 
circumscription imposed by objective reality. ‘The whale's belly is simply a womb 
big enough for an adult’ Orwell writes, ‘there you are, in the dark, cushioned space 
that exactly fits you, with yards of blubber between yourself and reality, able to keep 
up an attitude of the completest indifference, no matter what happens.’384 While he 
correctly identifies Miller’s impulse towards the comforting constraints of a 
womblike condition, towards what Miller calls ‘the luxurious, effortless sense of 
security which [all people] knew in the womb,’ Orwell reads Miller as a simple and 
unflappable common man and consequently overlooks both the philosophical and 
artistic impetus behind the idea.385 To Miller’s mind, the fantasy of returning to the 
womb is universal, but it is only realized by a minority of people who are able to 
move beyond ‘blind, unconscious yearning’ and ‘transform the world in which they 
live’ to produce the desired conditions.386 Rather than a metaphor for the ordinary, 
frightened individual’s sanctuary from the outside world, Miller’s ‘belly of the 
whale’ is a way to think about the especial artist’s use of suffering and the 
imagination to effect existential and creative rebirth. Where Orwell sees a fantasy of 
prenatal security, in reality it represents an active route towards a new mode of 
aesthetics based on his realization that he alone controls his emotional and 
perceptual experience of the world.     
 
Orwell’s description of Miller’s attitude in Cancer as ‘passive, accepting’ seems to be 
supported by the latter’s many anti-positivist and anti-ideological statements.387 
However, this position of passiveness is arrived at, paradoxically, through serious 
ideological struggle and through a bitter engagement with many of the same notions 
of struggle, suffering and ideology undergone by Pound. Orwell is too willing to 
take Cancer’s laissez-faire declarations at face value - to reduce Miller to the symbolic 
status of a man who has effortlessly relinquished all moral and political responsibility. 
What Orwell fails to see is that Miller’s apparent ‘indifference’ arises out of a                                                              
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philosophical position that rejects ideas of collectivity as outmoded and in need of 
debunking. The existential transformations Miller discusses are part of his wider 
campaign to defend the freedom of the individual against the false and tyrannical 
ideal of a united, fraternal collective. As he puts it in the essay ‘An Open Letter to 
Surrealists Everywhere’: 
 
The brotherhood of man is a permanent delusion common to idealists 
everywhere in all epochs: it is the reduction of the principle of individuation 
to the least common denominator of intelligibility. It is what leads the masses 
to identify themselves with moviestars and megalomaniacs like Hitler and 
Mussolini. (152)  
 
Not only does Miller doubt the idealism of a so-called ‘brotherhood of man’, he 
locates real fellowship and ‘brotherhood’ in the human propensity towards 
‘criminality’ and ‘sin’.388 His comments regarding ‘the reduction of the principal of 
individuation’ demonstrate a strong anxiety about collective enthusiasm and 
dangerously oversimplified ideas of boundless fraternity that distract people from 
individual self-determination. His promotion of the freedom of the individual in 
opposition to the hysteria arising in response to ‘moviestars and megalomaniacs like 
Hitler and Mussolini’ will, as further outlined in Chapter Three, mark Miller as 
fundamentally resistant to the fascistic aesthetics of Pound.    
 
In fact, Miller’s writing is permeated by a sense of the individual in perpetual conflict 
with the collective, a concern he dramatizes via the humanistic emphasis on spiritual 
evolution as the principal indication of societal progress. To this end, in The Time of 
the Assassins – his study of Rimbaud analysed in Chapter One - he promotes the 
‘abnormal’ artistic individual as a heroic, truly ‘human’ figure who presages a 
necessary and inevitable evolution of consciousness by opposing the collective: 
 
Until the old world dies out utterly, the “abnormal” individual will tend 
more and more to become the norm. The new man will find himself only 
                                                             
388 The writings of Georges Bataille and the Marquis de Sade will be seen to have 
influenced this subversion of the standard moral binary. 
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when the warfare between the collectivity and the individual ceases. Then we 
shall see the human type in its fullness and splendor.389 
 
Miller uses his version of Rimbaud as a marginalized, ‘monstrous soul’ to advocate 
the individual’s deliberate alienation of himself from society. He promotes the ‘split’ 
between the individual and society as both inevitable and positive since, far from 
implying a loss of humanity, it in fact makes the individual more ‘human’. Crucially, 
Orwell’s notion of Miller as disinterested in the fate of the individual within society 
is contradicted by this conviction that the individual changes society by his or 
deviation from collective moral and aesthetic standards. Moreover, Rimbaud 
represents for Miller the individual’s full acceptance of his or her strangeness, 
delirium, and mania. Rather than reject the notion of human progress, Miller shifts 
its possibility from the political organization of groups to the individual. Thus, 
perceptual rebirth and regeneration become revolutionary acts on the side of 
individual freedom, and of humanity against oppressive collectivity. As Miller puts 
it in ‘An Open Letter to Surrealists Everywhere’, ‘there is no feasible scheme for 
universal liberation.’ The search for freedom, he goes on, ‘is fundamentally personal 
and religious. It has nothing to do with liberty and justice, which are idle words 
signifying nobody knows precisely what.’390 
 
The ‘personal and religious’ transformation Miller is advocating is helpfully 
explained by his description of himself as ‘incurably optimistic’ and ‘incurably 
healthy’ in Cancer. As we saw in Chapter One, these terms were also picked up on by 
Pound in his review of the novel. ‘As against Joyce’s kinks and Lewis’ ill-humour’, 
Pound writes in his review of Miller’s novel, ‘we have a last a book of low life 
“incurably healthy”’ (88).  As we will see, the idea of health corresponds to Pound’s 
admiration for ‘hierarchy’ and order in Cancer. First and foremost, it suggests the 
location of psychological robustness in the body rather than the mind.  Indeed, Miller 
first talks about his ‘incurable optimism’ and ‘health’ as a triumphant means of 
explaining his mental resilience against the daily humiliations of life on the streets:                                                              
389 The Time of the Assassins, p. 6 
390 ‘An Open Letter to Surrealists Everywhere’, p. 153. 
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Walking along the Champs-Elysees I keep thinking of my really superb 
health. When I say “health” I mean optimism, to be truthful. Incurably 
optimistic! Still have one foot in the nineteenth century. I’m a bit retarded, 
like most Americans. Carl finds it disgusting, this optimism. “I only have to 
talk about a meal,” he says, “ and you’re radiant!” It’s a fact. The mere 
thought of a meal – another meal – rejuvenates me. A meal! That means 
something to go on – a few solid hours of work, an erection possibly. I don’t 
deny it. I have health, good solid, animal health. The only thing that stands 
between me and a future is a meal, another meal. (56) 
 
By perceiving ‘optimism’ - interchangeable with psychological ‘health’ - as an 
indication of abnormality, corruption and arrested mental development, Miller 
posits pessimism and psychological and spiritual weakness as normal, uncorrupted 
states of mind. He displays awareness - astonishment, in fact - at his ability to retain 
‘superb health’. Though the appearance he gives is, as Orwell puts it, one of the 
‘completest indifference’, it is in fact generated from a conscious engagement with 
the dysfunctional nature of his situation, and a defiant, unrepentant and unashamed 
admission of the socially, materially marginalized reality he endures.391 Miller’s 
assumption of an exterior position in his observation adds to the sense of it having 
been arrived at through a mysterious and untraceable process. A similar effect is 
produced when he expresses his state of mind on the opening page of Cancer, 
proclaiming ‘I have no money, no resources, no future, but I am the happiest man 
alive’ (9). By some miraculous transformative event, he has been rendered immune 
to ordinary human suffering.  
 
This condition is clearly connected to his theory of suffering as a perverse source of 
‘nourishment’ or sustenance (184). From its title to its final page, Cancer is built on 
the extended metaphor of inoculation against pain, suffering and failure, via a 
process of excessive exposure to these states, of spiritual regeneration within an 
environment more conducive to the degeneration of the spirit. Indeed, Miller 
constructs his landscape in Cancer out of a meticulous fixation on suffering, 
specifically his own suffering as an outcast in a foreign city. For example, he                                                              
391 Orwell, p. 131. 
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describes his first year in Paris, when he had ‘not a single friend’ as ‘the golden 
period’ (23). ‘One can live in Paris’ he continues  ‘on just grief and anguish. A bitter 
nourishment – perhaps the best there is for certain people’ (184). As such, the city of 
Paris does not exist for him, outside the bounds of his intense suffering. Indeed, in 
response to a request by his wife, visiting from America, to ‘show me that Paris … 
you have written about’, Miller states: 
 
I suddenly realized the impossibility of ever revealing to her that Paris which 
I had gotten to know, the Paris whose arrondissemnets are undefined, a Paris 
that has never existed except by virtue of my loneliness … This Paris, to 
which I alone held the key, hardly lends itself to a tour … It is a Paris to be 
lived, that has to be experienced each day in a thousand different forms of 
torture (184)  
 
Suffering is therefore connected to sincerity and existential autonomy. It is a 
necessary means, in Miller’s system of thought, by which the individual attains 
complete authority over the world he or she perceives and inhabits. Fundamentally, 
he posits the grief and anguish he endures in Paris as nourishing because it is proof 
of his unique, self-created and self-maintained existence. Asked in 1959 interview 
why he continued to struggle as a poor artist in Paris rather than take a paid job, he 
says: 
It’s your own life, it’s your own misery … you’re all of a piece. Whatever 
happens whether it’s good or bad, you are taking it and not some double, not 
some divided self … when you’re … naked, exposed and vulnerable you feel 
that you’re carrying your own self as it were.392 
 
By the same token, when comparing Max’s suffering in Max and the White Phagocytes 
to his own, he writes:  
That was something to go through – and come out singing. Luck! Well, call it 
that if you like. Call it luck if it makes you feel any better. Only I happen to 
know differently. Happens it happened to me – and I know.393  
 
                                                             
392 Henry Miller, ‘Henry Miller Recalls and Reflects: an interview with Ben Grauer, 
1956’, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q7Yx8Jz7ics [accessed 29th January, 2014] 
393 157 Max and the White Phagocytes. 
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The robustness and resilience Pound admires in Miller’s narrative outlook is derived 
from this positive utilization of the emotions induced by failure and, indeed, a 
shared tendency to think about suffering in terms of virtue and sincerity. As 
mentioned in Chapter One, to tell the truth about ‘the degree to which he suffers or is 
made glad’ is one of Pound’s fundamental commandments in his essay ‘The Serious 
Artist’.394 In this context, Pound is enamored in his review of Cancer with the idea of 
Miller as an honest sufferer ‘from human necessity, not a searcher for the low life’, 
thus presenting him as the antithesis of the pretentious bohemian artist who dabbles 
in poverty for the purpose of producing meaningful work (88). ‘A searcher of the low 
life’ could also be a reference to George Orwell’s semi-autobiographical novel ‘Down 
and Out in London and Paris’, published just two years before Cancer (1933) and 
famous for its author’s documentation of his partly voluntary descent into poverty 
and homelessness. Indeed, Pound goes on to talk about Miller as a victim of ‘the 
destiny of our epoch, namely the monetary system’, a claim that pits him against 
introspective artists ‘fussin around with their innards’ and socially conscious writers 
like Orwell who aim to report factually on the problems of their age but fail because 
their suffering is self-imposed.395 Rather than contriving to experience poverty and 
degradation for artistic or ideological reasons, Pound believes that Miller records his 
experience of misfortune with honesty and integrity.  
 
It is not difficult to see why Pound arrives at this conclusion about Miller. Miller 
presents himself in Cancer as someone who came to Paris an older, more seasoned 
sufferer than most of the contemporaries he encounters there. When his younger 
friend Carl (the fictional alias for his friend and literary collaborator Alfred Perles) 
sinks into a state of depression and threatens to ‘blow his [own] brains out’, Miller 
claims: 
I’ve been all over that ground – years and years ago. I’ve lived out my 
melancholy youth. I don’t give a fuck any more what’s behind me, or what’s 
ahead of me. I’m incurably healthy. No sorrows, no regrets. No past, no                                                              
394 Pound, ‘The Serious Artist’, p. 43.  
395 ‘Review of Tropic of Cancer’, p. 88; Ezra Pound, ‘Letter to Robert McAlmon’, 
Pound/Joyce: The Letters of Ezra Pound to James Joyce with Pound’s essays on Joyce, ed. 
with commentary by Forrest Read (London: Faber, 1968), p. 255.    
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future. The present is enough for me. Day by day. Today! Le bel aujourd’hui! 
(57) 
 
Like Pound, Miller has no time for the idea of romanticizing poverty, dismissively 
saying of his wife that ‘she wants to be poor in a romantic way’ (155). Indeed, he 
describes himself as an evolved figure, a man who has used his suffering to propel 
himself beyond the neuroses, the bohemian vanities and the idealisms of his less 
experienced friends and peers. According to James Decker, Miller’s narrator is able 
to ‘move among’ his expatriate friends ‘grotesques’ ‘but avoids their existential 
emptiness, for his actions indicate not the decadent, ossified spirit of his compatriots, 
but a purity of intention.’396 
 
While Orwell’s Down and Out in Paris and London might be read as an artificial 
experiment compared to Miller’s Paris days, it is worth remembering that in Cancer, 
Miller is also explicitly involved in his own autobiographical ‘experiment’. As he 
claims in 1963’s Plexus, his writing in the 1930s arose out of a yearning to record the 
pain of his experience as a rejected lover and social, professional failure. Having 
found a semblance of emotional and financial stability by the time he came to write 
Cancer – through his artistic and relationship with Anaïs Nin, the friendships of other 
like-minded writers like Alfred Perles and Michael Fraenkel and his temporary 
position as a newspaper proofreader – he made a concerted effort to re-remember the 
worst of his troubles, to, ‘suffer deliberately, in order to understand the nature of 
suffering’.397 As he goes on to say, it was a task that involved the deliberate revisiting 
of a pain he no longer felt: 
 
Once I thought that I had been wounded as no man ever had. Because I felt 
thus I vowed to write this book. But long before I began the book the wound 
had healed. Since I had sworn to fulfill my task I reopened the horrible 
wound.398 
 
                                                             
396 Decker, p. 68. 
397 Henry Miller, Plexus (London: Granada, 1981 [orig. ed.: Paris: Obelisk Press, 1953), 
p. 460. 
398 Ibid., p. 460 
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This acknowledgment, that his suffering is manipulated for creative purposes, 
partially undermines Miller’s claim to ‘autobiographical’ authenticity. In fact, his 
masochistic search for negative feelings to induce the creative process taints the 
notion of the ‘human document’ in various ways.399  In her diaries, Anaïs Nin 
describes Miller’s approach to his second wife June in these terms: ‘She may destroy 
Henry the human being, but she fascinates Henry the writer, and he is more enriched 
by the ordeals she imposes on him than by happiness.’400 Miller wants to show 
suffering as it really is – and as no one has succeeded in showing it before – but in 
order to do so he must contrive, first to experience and then recall it.  
 
Nonetheless, this process is tempered by Miller’s ability to acknowledge the inherent 
impossibility of his task.  In most of his writings on literature, art is posited as a 
necessary but infuriatingly limited vehicle for self-discovery. In fact, he frequently 
presents the artist as a heroic figure struggling to embody life despite the obstacle of 
his or her medium. Cancer, he claims in the novel itself, is ‘a gob of spit in the face of 
art’, his attempt at ‘the triumph of the individual over art’ (19).  Likewise, in The 
Wisdom of the Heart Miller argues that ‘unconsciously … every great artist is trying 
with might and main to destroy art … to break down this wall between himself and 
the rest of humanity.’401 As Blinder observes, ‘With a life-long interest in writing 
which emphasized … self-creation, Miller can perhaps be seen as one of the last great 
optimists when it came to believing in the actual capabilities of literature.’402 
 
Again echoing the Surrealists, he recognizes an aspect of his writing that some of his 
more laudatory critics tend to overlook. In their 1925 ‘Declaration’, Breton, Louis 
Aragon, Paul Éluard and Max Ernst claimed ‘We have nothing to do with literature; 
But we are quite capable, when necessary, of making use of it like anyone else.’  ‘We 
are specialists’, they go on, ‘in Revolt/ There is no means of action which we are not 
                                                             
399 ‘Un Être Étoilique’, p. 288. 
400 Nin, p. 42. 
401 ‘The Wisdom of the Heart’, in The Cosmological Eye, p. 167. 
402 Blinder, Sexual Aesthetics, p. 26. 
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capable, when necessary, of employing.’403 Miller is not quite as candid or 
confrontational in his statements on the individual and art but he espouses a similar 
kind of attack. Like the Surrealists, he is aware that his insurgence must be mounted 
using the language and form of his declared enemy; like them, he also takes pleasure 
in the audacious inconsistency of his position, performing the role of the ‘wrestler’ – 
as Jahshan suggests – who revels in the offence he causes to the audience’s ‘sense of 
logic’.   
 
With these thoughts in mind it is necessary to revise standard ideas about Miller’s 
radical stance on literary convention. James Decker, in his study Henry Miller and 
Narrative Form, claims that Cancer ‘disregards virtually all previous fictive 
conventions and forges a bond between form and individual virtually 
unprecedented’, thus ‘drilling to the core of literary hypocrisy’.404 While we have 
seen  - and will see more clearly in Chapter Three - that Miller is often successful in 
his attempts to express frenzied patterns of thought and emotion unfettered from a 
constrictive idea of morality, Decker misses the fact that Miller himself understood 
‘drilling to the core of literary hypocrisy’ to be an impossible and ridiculous task. In 
his 1961 essay ‘Henry Miller and John Betjeman’, Frank Kermode is excessive and 
naïve in his criticism of Miller as a writer whose ‘central muddle …. is that he makes 
his nihilistic gestures from a pulpit of very commonplace design’.405 However, 
Kermode hints at an important truth – namely that Miller’s rebellion against literary 
convention was transparently literary. Contrary to Kermode’s belief that Miller was 
too absorbed in his own anti-literary posturing to see that ‘disgust with literature is 
very literary,’ the conspicuous syncretism, the borrowing of high modernist and 
eschatological images and ideas throughout Cancer – all of which will be further 
detailed in Chapter Three via his textual relationship with James Joyce and Oswald 
Spengler – suggest an awareness of this paradox at the heart of an ostensibly anti-
literary revolution.406                                                               
403 ‘Declaration of January 27, 1925’, in Caws (ed.), Manifesto, pp.445-451, p. 450 
404 James Decker, p. 76. 
405 Kermode, ‘Henry Miller and John Betjeman,’ p. 89.  
406 Ibid., 89. 
 161 
 
In The Time of the Assassins, Miller understands this as part of a deeper, inescapable 
paradox in all serious artistic endeavors: 
All art must … must one day disappear … Man must become thoroughly 
religious, not a believer, but a prime mover, a god in fact and deed … and of 
all the detours along this path, art is the most glorious, the most fecund, the 
most instructive. The artist who becomes thoroughly aware, consequently 
ceases to be one.407 
 
In other words, art can be a ‘glorious … fecund … instructive’ means for the artist 
and audience to experience enlightenment but this primary aim, when taken to its 
ultimate conclusion, results in the medium’s own redundancy. Miller demonstrates 
the same contradictory dynamic between proclamations of purpose and a deeper 
understanding of the futility of his fight in Cancer. Miller’s position as ‘incurably 
optimistic’ inoculated against suffering is built on the paradoxical notion that 
aspiration itself is an unproductive psychological and emotional mode. Just as he 
describes taking ‘nourishment’ from suffering, he also talks about ‘the salutary effect’ 
of ‘the realization that nothing was to be hoped for’ (103).  This statement comes at 
the end of a particularly demoralizing evening spent chaperoning an inexperienced 
acquaintance around the brothels of Montmartre. ‘Suddenly inspired by the absolute 
hopelessness of everything’ he goes on, ‘I felt relieved, felt as though a great burden 
had been lifted from my shoulders’ (103). In other words, his exposure to the 
experience of intense humiliation carries with it the concomitant exposure to an 
equally intense longing for its alleviation, creating a situation in which he in fact 
becomes immunized against feelings of hope and longing themselves.  
 
 This notion of a sense of productiveness arising from hopelessness is emphasized 
repeatedly throughout Cancer, and particularly through the narrator’s projection of 
Paris as an alternative to the New York of his early life. In America, he says, 
‘potentially every man is Presidential timber. Here it’s different. Here every man is a 
potential zero … It’s just because the chances are against you here, just because there 
is so little hope, that life is sweet over here’ (154-5).  The Paris he experiences is ‘a                                                              
407 The Time of the Assassins, p. 115 
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world without hope but no despair’ (156). The conceit is clearly connected to the 
liberating quality of limitation, the individual’s realization of the sufficiency of his or 
her field of vision and the relinquishing of his or her desire to fight to change it. By 
accepting and appreciating the limits of his situation and by ceasing to struggle 
against them, the narrator finds himself liberated to experience relief and 
‘contentment’.  
 
In these terms, both Pound and Miller are interested in the possibility of a positive 
existential transformation as contagious to the reader and observer. If, as we have 
already seen, Pound expresses his own ‘relief’ at the ‘undercurrent of comfort’ he 
finds in Cancer – implying that Miller somehow transmits his contented state to the 
discerning reader – Miller also explores the idea of the comfort to be had in 
observing such ‘incurable optimism’. Throughout Cancer and his other semi-
autobiographical works of the 1930s, he presents his narrative persona as a 
psychologically and spiritually strengthening influence on the people around him.  
 
Miller gravitates towards people in whom he detects a similar capacity for 
sufficiency within ostensibly insufficient, dysfunctional environs. He talks wistfully 
and proudly, for example, about his prostitute lover Germaine whose talent for self-
preservation is rendered within a limited, degrading and cut-throat environment. 
‘However vile and circumscribed was that world she had created for herself’ he 
writes ‘she functioned superbly within it. And that in itself is a tonic thing’ (52).408 
Germaine offers a similar sort of invigoration to Miller, as his narrative in turn offers 
Pound. Such an alignment raises issues surrounding the power dynamic between the 
two writers – specifically relating to Pound’s partisan use of Miller in his battle 
against literary and economic veniality, which will be further explored in Chapter                                                              
408 It will be seen that this word ‘tonic’ comes up repeatedly in interviews with Miller 
and in his correspondences with other writers in the immediate wake of Cancer’s 
publication, most often in explanation for his use of sexual obscenity. Miller talks 
about his personal experience of employing such graphic and taboo terms in relation 
to sex as purgatory and speculates also that the same effect is transmitted to his 
readers. These intentions and effects are dealt with later in this section when we 
come to focus on Miller’s sexual aesthetics in detail. 
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Three. Indeed, Pound can be read as having idealized Miller the down-and-out, 
vagabond artist just as Miller idealizes Germaine, the down-and-out, vagabond 
prostitute. Observing Germaine’s display of resilience, of ‘superb’ functionality in 
the midst of difficult and dysfunctional circumstances, Miller is somehow cleansed 




























2.3 ‘She functioned superbly’: Reimagining the dysfunctional in Tropic of Cancer 
 
‘No reverence. No piety. No longing. No regrets. No hysteria.’ Henry Miller, Cancer 
(245) 
 
‘Now all my faculties become alert. I know how to avoid work, how to avoid 
entangling relationships, how to avoid pity, sympathy, bravery, and all the other 
pitfalls.’ Henry Miller, Capricorn 409 
 
Behind Miller’s admiration for the prostitute Germaine, there is something more 
complex still than the notion of suffering as a means of self-liberation – namely an 
agenda, partly shared with Pound, to re-envision human functionality as exactly its 
opposite. A close reading of the rest of the ‘Germaine’ passage (originally published 
in 1931 as the short story ‘Mademoiselle Claude’ by the American-French Periodical, 
New Review) is symptomatic of this process: 
 
It gave me pleasure to sit on the terrasse of the little tabac and observe her as 
she plied her trade, observe her as she resorted to the same grimaces, the 
same tricks, with others as she had with me. “She’s doing her job!” – that’s 
how I felt about it, and it was with approbation that I regarded her 
transactions … Germaine was a hustler. She didn’t wait for you to come to 
her – she went out and grabbed you. I remember so well the holes in her 
stockings, and the torn ragged shoes; I remember too how she stood at the 
bar and with blind, courageous defiance threw a strong drink down her 
stomach and marched out again. (53) 
 
In contrast to the disgust he feels at Sylvester’s suppertime hospitality – a scene of 
quiet civility and polite functionality – Miller celebrates this most chaotic, unstable 
and dysfunctional of working environments, as ethically and aesthetically sound. 
The description works according to an intuitive faith in the virtue of the spirited 
enactment of ostensibly immoral or dishonest behavior. Like El Greco within ‘the 
belly of whale’ Germaine has ‘created’ the world in which she exists, or so Miller 
imagines. Just as Miller relishes the apparent grimness of El Greco’s ‘The Dream of 
Philip the Second’, for the artist’s full inhabitation of his vision, he sees Germaine’s 
‘vile and circumscribed’ world as beautiful and virtuous because of her complete 
                                                             
409 Capricorn, p. 207. 
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acceptance of and command over it. Indeed, Miller embraces rather than resents his 
lover’s commodification of her body and her use of ‘the same tricks’ on other men as 
she initially used on him, because of a perceived naturalness within her performance 
of the role. According to Miller, she both accepts her position as a prostitute – as he 
puts it later in the text, ‘she was thoroughly satisfied with her role’  (52) - and carries 
it out with a rare courage and gusto, defying weariness and ennui to ‘march out 
again’. Immunized against ordinary suffering, Germaine is also presented as 
immune to moral or aesthetic disapproval because of the conviction with which she 
enters into her so-called ‘transactions’.  
 
Germaine represents a useful counter-point to Max in Max and the White Phagocytes 
within Miller’s theory on the aesthetics of destitution. The ‘pleasure’ and 
‘approbation’ the narrator feels in her presence contrasts starkly with the ‘disgust’ 
Max induces in him, and yet she is appropriated for a similar purpose - to attack and 
circumvent the temptation towards the false moral positions of compassion and 
moral outrage. If Max allows Miller to articulate feelings about the physical reality of 
suffering and misfortune, Germaine’s situation allows him to explore his ideas about 
the hypocrisy of standard humanist reactions in a subtler way. Again, by his 
deliberate detachment from a more instinctive or conventional moral feeling – from 
the urge either to sympathize with her for the physical hardship she endures as a 
prostitute or to resent her and her pimp for the ‘tricks’ they play  – he forces the 
reader to confront poverty and prostitution as physical, real conditions rather than 
abstract taboos that engender moral and condescending responses. And yet the point 
he makes, as with Max, is a perversely humane one – namely, that admiring or 
denigrating marginalized people on an aesthetic level is more honest and virtuous 
than displaying compassion or moral outrage.  
 
Moreover, Miller finds something innately honorable in the guiltless enactment of 
moral transgression. In his eyes, Germaine attains worth by her marginality and her 
perceived lack of anxiety either about using her body as a commodity or breaking a 
moral or legal taboo. His approving exclamation that “She’s doing her job!” very 
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deliberately puts her ‘superb’ functionality as a sex worker in superior relation to 
practitioners of more respectable professions. Whereas Germaine is celebrated for 
her work ethic, the fastidiousness of his colleagues at the expatriate newspaper is 
regarded with contempt. Indeed, describing the working men’s café he and the other 
newspaper workers frequent, he writes that ‘it’s gratifying to observe how miserable 
they [his colleagues] can look when they are obliged to sit beside a pimp who, 
despite the little hardships of his profession, lives a life of luxury by comparison’ 
(159).  Unlike Peckover’s hypocritical mourner – who will ‘buy a wreath and go the 
funeral [and] be praising the shit out of himself for the way he handled the situation’ 
– Germaine and the prostitutes and pimps at the cafe are under no illusions and are 
therefore automatically absolved of their crimes (142). Similarly, if these men at the 
office are under the false impression that their employment is gainful and contains 
some sort of wider significance, Germaine understands and fully accepts the ‘vile 
and circumscribed’ nature of her field.  Indeed, the parallel we saw in the previous 
chapter between Pound’s appropriation of Miller and Miller’s appropriation of 
prostitutes rests on the acknowledgment that ethical improvement is impossible. In 
both cases, the absence of explicitly moral thinking paradoxically implies true 
morality, a courageous appreciation of the world as it is rather than as the observer 
thinks it should be. According to Nin, Miller preferred the company of prostitutes 
because ‘There is no pretense there. They wash themselves in front of you.’410  
 
His identification of moral transgression as a purifying act is based on the belief that 
sinfulness unites the individual with collective humanity, as opposed to piety - 
which denotes a desire for perfection and thus spiritual and psychological isolation. 
It is a theory that he outlines explicitly when describing life before Paris in Capricorn: 
 
I have always fallen in with thieves and rogues and murderers … And is it 
not just because of my crimes that I am united so closely to my fellowman? 
Always when I see a light of recognition in the other person’s eyes, I am 
aware of this secret bond.  It is the just whose eyes never light up. It is the just                                                              
410 Nin, p.10 
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who have never known the secret of human fellowship. It is the just who are 
committing the crimes against man, who are the real monsters. It is the just 
who demand our finger-prints, who prove to us that we have died even when 
we stand before them in the flesh. It is the just who impose upon us arbitrary 
names, who put false dates in the register and bury us alive. I prefer the 
thieves, the rogues, the murderers.411   
 
If traditional definitions of justness are equated with true ‘monstrosity’ it is because 
they encroach upon the individual’s freedom to act on his or her instinctive feelings. 
The criminal, condemned by the authorities, is able to feel a genuine sense of 
fraternity with others, as opposed to the person who believes in false notions of the 
‘brotherhood of man’ described in ‘An Open Letter to Surrealists Everywhere’. It is a 
stronger, more palpable ‘human fellowship’, Miller suggests, since it comes from a 
feeling of complicity rather than the self-righteous, smug sense of unity people feel 
when they obey laws and condemn others who do not. In this way, he posits the 
acceptance of moral transgression as a manifestation of the productive ‘split’ 
between the individual and collective discussed earlier.  
 
In Chapter Three, these thoughts on moral transgression will be examined as part of 
a wider desire to return to the state of psychological and moral impunity found in 
childhood. It is a fixation that permeates Miller’s career-long semi-autobiographical 
project and is astutely identified by Georges Bataille in ‘La Morale de Milller’ as the 
foundation for his moral code in Cancer. By accepting the ‘dire material and social’ 
consequences of his refusal to comply with adult expectations of social 
productiveness, Bataille claims, Miller engages in the impossible yearning for a 
return from the ‘exile from childhood’.412 Although Miller presents himself as a ‘a 
monster of immorality’, Bataille says, he should not be taken at face value. Rather 
than the anarchic rejection of all attempts to categorize behaviour as good or bad, 
‘his books should be read as though the author wanted them to be " a search for 
moral values lost.”’413   
                                                             
411 Capricorn, p. 208.  
412 Bataille, ‘La Morale de Miller’, p. 1 
413 Ibid., p. 1.  
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Importantly, Miller’s pronouncements on justness and criminality also share certain 
reference points with those of late eighteenth century pornographer and philosopher 
Marquis de Sade, a link Bataille provides the basis for by devoting a chapter to de 
Sade in his 1985 study, Literature and Evil. Imprisoned for the physical crimes of rape 
and torture but also for transgressing literary obscenity laws, de Sade believed that 
vice should be accepted and celebrated rather than suppressed, since it functioned as 
a necessary balancing force in the natural order of things. Bataille addresses this 
aspect of de Sade’s philosophy by quoting a letter de Sade wrote to one of his critics 
while in prison:   
Everything would perish in an instant if there were nothing but virtues on 
earth … You do not want to understand that, since vice must exist, it is as 
unjust of you to punish it as it would be to poke fun at a blind man.414 
Because the existence of vice sustains the existence of virtues, de Sade claims, the 
morally absolute desire for its annihilation is absurd and self-defeating. Miller’s 
declaration of solidarity with ‘the thieves, the rogues, the murderers’ arises from the 
same kind of impetus. The just ‘whose eyes never light up’, he believes, are unable or 
unwilling to understand the simple fact that their ‘virtue’, their position in relation to 
criminals or sinners is dependent upon the very existence of concepts such as sin and 
crime. Miller’s identification of a fraternal spirit amongst criminals relies on the 
premise that the people who indulge in and admit to their tendency towards 
criminality understand that all human beings are necessarily and perpetually subject 
to this fundamental moral dynamic. On the other hand, those who believe 
themselves to be ‘just’ falsely, hypocritically and stupidly attempt to evade the 
possibility of crime as in and of itself truthful. As Miller puts it in Capricorn, ‘I know 
what it means to be human, the weakness and the strength of it. I suffer from this 
knowledge and I revel in it also’.415 ‘Down to the closest friend’, he writes later, 
‘every man is a potential murderer.’416  
                                                             
414 Marquis de Sade, 29th January 1782, quoted in Bataille, Literature and Evil, p. 111. 
415 Capricorn, 208 
416 Ibid., 262. 
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Miller’s interest in the unifying power of moral transgression is illuminated by 
Simone de Beauvoir’s discussion of de Sade’s work in ‘Marquis de Sade: An Essay’ 
(1953). Here de Beauvoir identifies two related questions at the heart of de Sade’s 
work that can be applied to Miller: ‘Can we, without renouncing our individuality, 
satisfy our aspirations to universality? Or is it only by the sacrifice of our individual 
differences that we can integrate ourselves into the community?’417 According to de 
Beauvoir, a crime is the expression of a person’s ‘individual differences’, differences 
that ‘are carried to the point of outrageousness’ by de Sade.418 Moral obedience and 
the denial of the impulse towards vice are motivated by the desire to be ‘integrated 
… into the community’, a desire that damagingly renounces individuality. Thus, 
Miller’s embracement of criminality can be connected to a Sadean desire for the 
elevation of the ‘evil’ acts of the individual over the diluted ‘good’ of the collective. If 
de Beauvoir presents de Sade’s work as an embodiment of the paradox between 
yearnings for ‘universality’ and individuality, Miller understands vice as the very 
resolution of that paradox – both the evidence of a person’s uniqueness and the 
common denominator that unites all human beings.  
Like de Sade, whom Bataille says ‘based himself on a common experience’, Miller 
channels the sensory experiences of pleasure and pain to move beyond questions of 
moral acceptability and towards an understanding of life according to the 
dominance of appetite and desire.419  Miller’s descriptions of prostitutes again point 
to the theory of the morally dysfunctional re-envisioned as functional, a way to 
connect the physical with the spiritual. As Pound suggests with his application of 
Mallarmé’s line ‘the flesh is sad’ in relation to Cancer, Miller rethinks ethical 
approaches to sex in a way that focuses questions of good and evil onto the relative 
physical functionality of the people involved rather than the social or material 
context in which the act takes place. As mentioned in Chapter One, in his review of 
Miller’s novel, Pound writes ‘La chair est triste? Perhaps, but not till it begins to give 
                                                             
417 Simone de Beauvoir, quoted in Richard Seaver, introduction to Marquis de Sade, 
Letters from Prison (London: The Harvill Press, 1999), p. 6. 
418 Ibid. p. 6. 
419 Literature and Evil, p. 120.  
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way to wear and tear’, implying an innate virtue in the experience of sensory 
pleasure that negates or neutralizes the potential anxiety generated by the 
commodification of flesh (88). This observation is corroborated by Miller’s terrace-
side portrait of Germaine as a ‘natural’ whore: 
Germaine was thoroughly satisfied with her role, enjoyed it in fact, except 
when her stomach pinched or her shoes gave out, little surface things of no 
account, nothing that ate into her soul, nothing that created torment. Ennui! 
That was the worst she ever felt. Days there were, no doubt, when she had a 
bellyful, as we say – but no more than that! Most of the time she enjoyed it – 
or gave the illusion of enjoying it. (52) 
 
The impression here is aligned with Pound’s identification of Miller as an individual 
whose code of ethics is unaffected by external standards. Germaine, like Pound’s 
Miller, is thus liberated from spiritual, psychological or emotional suffering. To 
Miller, the physical sensations of each moment – the pinched stomach because of 
hunger, the bruised feet because of worn-down shoes – are the true signifiers of good 
and evil in Germaine’s world, not the social standards imposed by others or even her 
sexual objectification. By her daily endurance of physical hardship Germaine - like 
Miller - is desensitized to the fears and anxieties that are concomitant with a more 
physically healthy and stable existence.  
 
Interestingly – given his narrow-sighted political reading of Miller – George Orwell 
arrives at a similar conclusion about the psychological effect of material poverty in 
Down and Out in Paris and London. ’There is [a] feeling of great consolation in 
poverty,’ he writes ‘a feeling of relief, almost pleasure’: 
It annihilates the future. When you have a hundred francs in the world you 
are liable to the most craven panics. When you have only three francs you are 
quite indifferent; for three francs will feed you till tomorrow, and you cannot 
think further than that.  You are bored but you not afraid.420 
Orwell’s affinity with Miller arises in part from his belief that Miller understood the 
reality of the common man’s plight, recognizing that by suffering at the bottom end 
of the social scale he is relieved of incrementally damaging anxieties about morality                                                              
420 George Orwell, Down and Out in Paris and London (London: Penguin, 1987 [orig. 
ed.: London: Gollancz, 1933]), p. 19. 
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or politics. Despite his misreading of Miller’s ‘whale’ metaphor, Orwell recognizes 
Miller’s fundamental objection to ideological approaches to poverty and criminality. 
The ‘just’ and the pious are criminalized by Miller because of their attempts to apply 
abstract, foreign and irrelevant ethical standards to the lives of suffering people; 
indeed, it is not only futile but contaminates those people who are in fact blessedly 
free of neuroses. Exasperated at his friend Boris’ attempts to psychoanalyse the 
‘morally broken’ Max, Miller exclaims: ‘everybody wants to right the world [but] 
nobody wants to help his neighbor. They want to make a man of your soul without 
taking your body into consideration. It’s all cockeyed.’421  
Miller expands on this polarized picture of physical suffering and moral abstraction 
in his 1963 interview with The Paris Review: 
Whenever a taboo is broken something good happens, something vitalizing 
… Taboos after all are only hangovers, the product of diseased minds, you 
might say, of fearsome [sic] people who hadn't the courage to live and who 
under the guise of morality and religion have imposed these things upon 
us.422   
Thus the individual’s defiance of a taboo is not only courageous and self-restorative, 
it functions as an act of revolutionary defiance against historically entrenched fears 
and constraints. More importantly, it highlights the absurdity and irrelevance of the 
power taboo wields over the collective imagination, engendering the thrill of 
discovery and newfound liberty both for the person who breaks it and the person 
who observes this. These ideas will be seen in Section 2.4, ‘The Attraction of the 
Blemish: Pound and Miler’s sexual aesthetics’, to lie behind much of Miller’s obscene 
language and imagery in Cancer. 
Miller’s mission to overthrow the oppressive power of taboo comes from the 
apparently anti-humanistic feeling – evident throughout his writings – that the 
individual’s subjective experience of reality naturally abounds with imperfection, a 
simple truth that should be embraced. ‘The world’, Miller writes in ‘Reflections on 
Writing’, ‘is pregnant with failure, is the perfect manifestation of imperfection, of the                                                              
421 ‘Max’, p. 151. 
422  ‘Henry Miller’, in Writers at Work, p. 154.  
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consciousness of failure. In the realization of this, failure is itself eliminated.’ 423 
Because she accepts the imperfections of her world, Germaine demonstrates the 
existential benefit of this ‘realization’. Similarly, the judgmental observers of 
prostitutes – his friends from the newspaper office who ‘begrudge [Lucienne’s] 
dishonesty’ and the bourgeois critics and readers who condemn Miller for such ‘low’ 
subject matter – are dismissed as misguided.  
 
Miller develops this further still in Cancer, describing a moment of sudden revelation 
after a nightmarish tour of the brothels: 
 
In this sort of hair-trigger eternity I felt that everything was justified … If at 
any moment anywhere one comes face to face with the absolute, that great 
sympathy which makes men like Guatama and Jesus seem divine freezes 
away; the monstrous thing is not that men have created roses out of this dung 
heap, but that for some reason they should want roses. For some reason or 
other man looks for the miracle, and to accomplish it he will … debauch 
himself with ideas, he will reduce himself to a shadow if for only one second 
he can close his eyes to the hideousness of reality. (102) 
 
Here, Miller draws an ethical distinction between actual and theoretical approaches 
to reality, between an understanding of human behavior that takes account of 
existence as infinitely complex and a desire for an oftentimes reductive and 
restrictive version of perfection. His notion of imperfection rests on the premise that 
the true subjective experience of the world is corrupted or ‘debauched’ rather than 
illuminated or purified by the development and application of ‘ideas’. As I alluded 
to in my analysis of Bergson, Miller and T.E. Hulme in Section 2.1, Miller posits not 
only religious but humanist models of social and spiritual progress as evasive of 
reality and therefore counter-productive. By making a conventional ideological or 
moral judgment on the sphere in which Germaine exists the concerned observer, 
paradoxically, ‘closes his eyes to … reality’. Like ‘justness’ in Capricorn, the concept 
of diluting existence through the prism of ideas, of ‘wanting roses’ instead of 
accepting the ‘dung’ of reality, is deemed ‘monstrous’, unnatural and inhuman.  
                                                             
423 ‘Reflections on Writing’, in The Best of Henry Miller, pp. 242-251, p. 246. Originally 
published in The Wisdom of the Heart (New York: New Directions, 1941). 
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Like T.E. Hulme, Miller combines an objection to the ideological desire for 
unattainable social progress with a progressive, Bergsonian approach to the 
individual’s apprehension of subjective reality. In line with his reading of Bergson, 
Miller posits fixed ideas as inadequate means for framing and rendering the 
complexities of human experience, instead advocating an appreciation of ‘the 
multiplicity of things’, the simultaneous existence of opposing sensations, emotions 
and values in one moment, as the fundamental basis for a meaningful existential and 
artistic approach. Miller’s epiphany in the brothel echoes Hulme in its celebration of 
philosophical pluralism as a revolutionary force against accepted paradigms of social 
and political evolution. Miller’s impatience with ideologues who ‘close [their] eyes to 
the hideousness of reality’ thus corresponds with Hulme’s labeling of Bergson’s 
average reader as a ‘progressive dotard’ who looks away from reality like a child 
‘turning up a stone and seeing the creeping things revealed’.424  Indeed, both 
appropriate Bergson for the simultaneous purposes of liberating the individual from 
the urge towards unity and perfection and instating a new sense of order that 
understands life as it is, rather than as it should be. As mentioned earlier, in Capricorn 
Miller claims that after discovering Bergson, ‘everything the brain has labored for a 
lifetime to assimilate, categorize and synthesize has to be taken apart and 
reordered’.425 He goes on to say that Bergson ‘endowed me with such a marvelous 
sense of order that if a comet suddenly struck the earth and jarred everything out of 
place … I could orient myself to the new order in the twinkling of an eye’.426  Hulme, 
in his essay ‘Mr Balfour, Bergson and Politics’, describes his own discovery of 
Bergson in similar terms:   
 
The state of my mind before I read Bergson … can be compared to the state of 
men imprisoned all their life inside a walled town from which they would 
fain escape. They have been told that outside the walls there are green fields 
and the rest of it, but they cannot legitimately believe in these things as long 
as the walls of the town remain unbroken.427                                                               
424 Hulme, quoted in Mead, p. 250. See my p. 131. 
425 Capricorn, p. 199-200 
426 Ibid., p. 201. 
427 Hulme, ‘Mr. Balfour, Bergson, and Politics’, p. 161.      
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Their common readjustment of perspective, to take in the newly revealed 
imperfectability of existence, and their shared intolerance of people who are unable 
to, implies a certain conservative realism in Miller’s project that is anathema to his 
wider objection to moral laws. Unlike the radically conservative Hulme, Miller’s 
skepticism about of ideas of human perfectibility is apparently contradicted by his 
fundamental conviction that the pluralism of subjective experience means ‘that 
everything [is] justified’. Paradoxically, the basis of this feeling is exactly the pluralist 
philosophy William James takes from Bergson in his lecture ‘A Pluralistic Universe’, 
discussed in Section 2.1. As mentioned earlier, James popularized Bergson’s belief 
that life – from the external workings of the physical and material to the internal 
activity of the mental and emotional – can be defined according to ‘the multiplicity of 
elements and the interpenetration of all by all’.428  These two vital facts are 
‘conditions that can hardly be reconciled in the field in which our … intellect, is 
engaged.’429 The subjective experience of reality is, Bergson claims, characterized by 
the constant fluid motion and interpenetrating feeling, thought and memory, of a 
process of perpetual creation and invention that cannot be fully apprehended by 
systems of logic: 
 
The intellect, so skillful in dealing with the inert, is awkward the moment it 
touches the living. Whether it wants to treat the life of the body or the life of 
the mind, it proceeds with the rigor, the stiffness and the brutality of an 
instrument not designed for such use.430   
 
Bergson’s premise is paraphrased and developed by James in ‘A Pluralistic 
Universe’. ‘Concepts’, James writes, ‘are not parts of reality, not real positions taken 
by it, rather, notes taken by ourselves, and you can no more dip up the substance of 
reality with them than you can dip up water with a net, however finely meshed.’431  
                                                             
428 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 162. 
429 Ibid., p. 162-63.   
430 Ibid., 182. 
431 William James, ‘A Pluralistic Universe’, in A Pluralistic Universe (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977 [orig. ed.: 1909]), p. 113.  
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In other words, the use of logical ideas or models to capture the truth of existential 
experience is both illusory and absurd. 
 
Miller’s description of a moment in the brothel as a ‘sort of hair-trigger eternity’ in 
which ‘everything is justified’, his conviction that ideas are a debauched form of 
distraction from ‘the hideousness of reality’, appropriates Bergson’s theories towards 
a different paradigm that is both pluralistic and anti-pluralistic in its purposes, both 
democratic and humanistic in its approach to people and values and curiously in line 
with T.E. Hulme’s objections to humanism as a falsely optimistic ideology.432 In 
attacking any restrictions on what he defines as infinitely complex and contradictory 
emotional experiences, Miller clearly corroborates the pluralist critique of 
conceptualization. Moreover, he appears to accept the proposition – rejected when he 
tells Sylvester to ‘fuck your two ways of looking at things’ - of all positions and 
values as equal and incommensurable, equally valid and justifiable.433 Whereas 
Bergson and James employ their philosophical approach in terms that imply a 
celebration of variety, Miller’s pluralistic theory splices it with a partisan accusation 
levied at conventional, unenlightened people who ‘want roses’ instead of accepting 
the ‘hideous’ multiplicity of things.  
 
 These contradictions provide the impetus for the alternative mode of sympathy 
Miller proffers in Cancer. In place of ‘that great sympathy which makes men like 
Guatama and Jesus seem divine’, Miller offers a paradoxical model that is both more 
and less tolerant, a mode of reaction to suffering that sympathizes with all behavior 
and experience and therefore gives the appearance of sympathizing with none.434 It is 
best delineated by returning to Miller’s 1933 correspondence with Anaïs Nin  - 
referenced in Chapter One  – in which he attempts to explain his ‘indifference’ to her 
recent psychological troubles: 
 
                                                             
432 Cancer, p. 102. 
433 Cancer, p. 65. See my p. 106. 
434 Cancer, p. 102. 
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It is health not indifference or callousness. It’s a very human condition which 
lifts you, temporarily at least, above so many useless problems and vexations. 
You just can’t be made wretched, sorrowful, miserable. You live there for a 
while, at the apex of clarity, and you see things with the naked eye and 
everything looks good, is good.435 
 
This new approach can be read as akin to the state of ‘incurable optimism’ outlined 
earlier. Just as Miller implied inoculation against fear, humiliation and the subjective 
experience of suffering through overexposure and acceptance of them, he suggests a 
transcendental perspective that makes all anxiety appear futile and therefore 
unworthy of sympathy. It was not callous to react without kind words to Nin, Miller 
suggests, since at that moment he understood a higher truth – that suffering should 
be met with acceptance rather than struggle, since it is an integral aspect of the 
human condition. It is – in essence – a total reliance on intuition, close in origin to the 
higher state of sympathy that Bergson uses to explain his theory of ‘creative’ time: 
 
That each instant is a fresh endowment, that the new is ever upspringing, that 
the form just come into existence … could never have been foreseen … all this 
we can feel within ourselves and also divine, by sympathy, outside ourselves, 
but we cannot think it, in the strict sense of the word, nor express it in terms 
of pure understanding.436  
 
Nonetheless, like his claim that ‘everything is justified’, Miller’s ideas about 
‘sympathy’ are jeopardized by his presumption of absolute authority and his refusal 
to consider the person he addresses. By assuming his own position at the ‘apex of 
clarity’ and dismissing Nin’s emotional issues as ‘useless problems and vexations’, 
he suggests an omniscience and benevolence that is in reality entirely self-fixated. 
 
Significantly, Miller himself alerts the reader to the strange and suspect nature of his 
new position: 
Sympathy alone flourishes, not a human sympathy, a limited sympathy – it is 
something monstrous and evil. You care so little that you can afford to 
sacrifice yourself for anybody or anything. At the same time your interest, 
your curiosity, develops at an outrageous pace. This tool is suspect, since it is                                                              
435 Miller, A Literate Passion, p. 159. See my p. 81. 
436 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 164. 
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capable of attaching you to a collar button just as well as to a cause. There is 
no fundamental, unalterable difference between things: all is flux, all is 
perishable.437  
 
Thus he presents the enlightened capacity to perceive existence and human behavior 
in its full complexity as carrying with it the frightening but exhilarating risk of losing 
perspective on ordinary human values. When the individual arrives at the 
conclusion that ‘there is no fundamental, unalterable difference between things’, he 
or she also forfeits the ability to discriminate between good and bad, beneficial and 
harmful.  
 
Coincidently, in his essay ‘Un Être Étoilique’, Miller ascribes the same visionary 
capacity to Nin herself, claiming that Nin’s writing develops ‘a new kind of 
sympathy, a free, non compulsive sort’ born of ‘the totality of vision’ and an all-
encompassing and all-embracing ‘tolerance’.438 Thus, he redefines sympathy as a way 
of behaving that comes directly from individual freedom rather than as a reaction to 
collective expectations. Sympathy in its truest sense, he implies, arises from the 
individual’s realization and appreciation of the pluralist nature of reality. A street 
scene in Cancer forms a prelude to the epiphanies described above:  
 
This is the moment when the deserted street on which I have chosen to sit is 
throbbing with people and all the crowded streets are empty. This is the 
moment when any restaurant is the right restaurant so long as it was not 
indicated to you by somebody. This is the best food, though it is the worst I 
have ever tasted … “The roquefort, was it good?” asks the waitress. Divine!’ 
(18) 
The rare expansive perspective, Miller suggests, apprehends the co-existence of ‘best’ 
and ‘worst’ in the same object, the same taste, the same image. In stark contrast to 
Max in Max and the White Phagocytes who – we remember – descends into a state of 
panic when asked to choose between an expensive and cheap restaurant, Miller 
serenely surveys and accepts the inherent uncertainty of an objective reality: the 
crowded street can be ‘deserted’ if he desires it to be deserted; the objectively terrible                                                              
437 Capricorn, p. 59 
438 ‘Un Être Étoilique’, p. 301. 
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roquefort can be ‘divine’ if he so chooses. Paradoxically and problematically he 
suggests that the enlightened individual – and particularly the enlightened artist - 
can gain command over the multiplicity of experience both by submitting to it and 
exerting his or her true personal taste – ‘this is the moment when any restaurant is 
the right restaurant so long as it was not indicated to you by somebody.’ As we will 
see in the next section, this is a fundamental reason for Pound’s identification of a 
Joycean scope in Cancer. 
 
Katy Masuga uses this exploration of the multiplicity and ambiguity of impression as 
proof of her theory that Miller employs language to assert its limitations. Citing a 
similar episode in his novel Sexus (1949), in which Miller makes ‘small talk about 
matches with a driver, while hitchhiking … inwardly ponders the fundamental 
meaninglessness, and hence infinite meaning, in any facet of existence’, Masuga 
concludes that Miller’s writing process is an attempt to express the same truth about 
writing.439 His ‘fumbling over objects trying to transfer them into words’ is a 
knowing exposition, Masuga believes, of the impossibility of ever truly representing 
experience in literature: 
 
Miller playfully encourages the reader to question the idea that the object 
being described could ever be something beyond its presented manifestation 
in the text and to give up the vain and desperate desire to establish a 
reductive mental picture of an object beyond the fragmented components of 
the slippery and dynamic prose.440  
 
This analysis is useful in so far as it establishes the impossibility of a fixed, objective 
truth as something that crosses over from Miller’s ideas on existence into his writing, 
but it neglects the strong sense of authorship implicit in the writer’s power to dictate 
his or her impression of reality. In other words, for Miller the chaos implied by the 
collapse between crowdedness and emptiness, between ‘the best food’ and ‘the worst 
I have ever tasted’ does not mean that all attempts to express experience in literature                                                              
439 Katy Masuga, The Secret Violence of Henry Miller (Rochester, New York: Camden 
House, 2001), p. 75. 
440 Masuga, p. 75-6. 
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or make value judgments in life are doomed, but that the discerning individual can 
achieve understanding if he or she adheres to a deeper, visceral and wholly 
subjective truth.441 
 
In line with this, Miller’s redefinition of sympathy involves a necessary meditative 
distance between the purveyor and the sufferer. As he puts it in ‘Un Être Étoilique’, 
Nin’s work evolves from a position of ‘exaggerated sympathy for others’ to one 
where ‘the birth of a sense of humor denotes the achievement of an objectivity which 
the one who has realized himself attains.’442  In Miller’s paradoxical mode of 
thinking, objective distance leads to a stronger sense of communion between people. 
Rather than reacting compulsively and automatically to the pain of others, he 
suggests, the enlightened observer perceives that pain clearly in the context of the 
wider multiplicity of experience and so is able to respond with humor and genuine 
compassion.  
 
This theory is manifested in Cancer through automatic outpourings of laughter and 
tears that propel the individual beyond rational and moral judgment and 
demonstrate the futility of struggling against suffering. While counseling his friend 
Fillmore about his turbulent relationship with his French lover, Miller presents 
crying as an act of pure, unmitigated emotional release that neutralizes anguish: 
 
The tears gushed forth and he blurted out: “I’d like to be home with my 
people. I’d like to hear English spoken. The tears were streaming down his 
face. He made no effort to brush them away. He just let everything gush 
forth. Jesus, I thought to myself that’s fine to have a release like that. Fine to 
be a complete coward at least once in your life. To let go that way. Great! 
Great! It did me so much good to see him break down that way that I felt as 
though I could solve any problem. I felt courageous and resolute. (308-309) 
 
Thus surrendering the body to the true extremity of a set of negative emotions is 
posited as natural and incontestably good, an antidote to the lie of physical, mental 
and moral robustness. Fillmore, who has been agonizing endlessly about his next                                                              
441 Cancer, p. 18. 
442 ‘Un Être Étoilique’, p. 301. 
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move, is only able to understand what he truly wants when he lets everything ‘gush 
forth’. His cowardice is thus posited as a perverse form of bravery, an evolutionary 
emotional step. Using war as a loose metaphor for daily life later in Cancer, Miller 
writes that ‘one goes on butchering and butchering and the more cowardly one feels 
the more heroically does he behave’ (147).  
 
Miller’s exclamation that ‘it did me so much good to see him break down that way’ 
appears at first to imply schadenfreude – and yet when Miller writes that it is ‘fine to 
be a complete coward at least once in your life’, he refers to the unifying strength that 
resides in the confession of weakness, the breakdown of the façade of the benefactor 
and the beneficiary, the imperative and the suppliant. Fillmore is presented as 
having liberated the narrator perceptually and emotionally by experiencing his own 
perceptual and emotional epiphany.  
 
In the same vein, Miller posits laughter as a way to relieve the individual of the 
familiar, corruptive patterns of thought, idea and moral judgment that dictate his or 
her reactions to each situation: 
 
When you laugh until the tears flow and your belly aches, you are really 
opening the skylight and ventilating the brain. Nobody can persuade you at 
that moment to take a gun and kill your enemy: neither can anybody 
persuade you to open a fat tome containing the metaphysical truths of the 
world and read it.443  
 
Like crying, laughter is valuable because it is automatic rather than cerebral, a 
spontaneous physical reaction that demonstrates the instinctive acceptance of 
tragedy, suffering, guilt and humiliation as integral parts of life.  In the moment of 
laughter, the mind – so used to searching for reasons as to why something has 
happened, what the self truly feels, how the self should respond – is relieved of the 
desire to make these connections. By extension, the bodily experience of laughter 
neutralizes righteousness – about the self or a collective cause – and renders violent 
thought and action impossible. Ultimately, Miller implies, laughter affirms the                                                              
443 Capricorn, p. 277. 
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primacy of instinct and the absurdity of intellectual and moral investigations into 
suffering.  
 
Where Fillmore’s ‘gushing forth’ of tears demonstrates his realization and 
externalization of the full extent of his pain, Miller understands laughter as the 
catalyst and the symptom of an even greater revelation: 
 
If you know what freedom means, absolute freedom and not a relative 
freedom, then you must recognize that this is the nearest to it you will ever 
get … I don’t say that God is one grand laugh: I say that you’ve got to laugh 
hard before you can get anywhere near God. My whole aim in life is to get 
near to God, that is to get nearer to myself. This is why it doesn’t matter to me 
what road I take.444 
  
The full implications of this equation between the proximity to God and the 
proximity to the true self will be further delineated in Chapter Three. As Sarah 
Garland points out, Miller is caught up in a suspect and self-harmful mode of 
rhetoric that secularizes the prophetical religious language of an earlier era, often 
presenting the first person narrator as either God Himself or a messenger of 
concealed, metaphysical truths. This kind of rhetoric, Garland writes, ’puts the writer 
in a double bind: modernity and industrial society are felt as devastating to the self, 
but these almost superhuman efforts to galvanize the self in opposition are also 
potentially devastating.’445 In this context, uninhibited laughter is a pre-requisite for 
self-knowledge and a clear understanding of the world one perceives. In other 
words, laughter induces the conditions necessary for the artistic and existential 
creativity for living ‘inside the whale’: ‘At that moment you can really feel the hole in 
the top of the head; you know that you once had an eye there and that this eye was 
capable of taking in everything at once.’446  
 
The narrator of Cancer is prone to laugh at incongruous and inopportune moments, 
usually where there is nothing expressly funny happening and sometimes,                                                              
444 Ibid., p. 277 
445 Garland, ‘The Dearest of Cemeteries’, p. 207. 
446 Capricorn, p. 277 
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mechanically and disturbingly, in the face of people who are experiencing pain. As 
he tells himself in Capricorn, ‘you are always laughing at the wrong moment, you are 
considered cruel and heartless when in reality you are only tough and durable’ (51). 
The most illustrative examples in Cancer involve his friend Boris, who represents 
Miller’s close companion and literary collaborator Michael Fraenkel and, we shall see 
in Chapter Three, is caricatured as a pompous pseudo-philosopher. Here, the 
narrator reacts to Boris’ grief over his estranged wife: 
 
It is so tragic and so ridiculous at the same time that I am obliged to stop now 
and then and laugh in his face. “Why do you laugh so?” he says gently, and 
then he commences himself, with that whimpering, hysterical note in his 
voice, like a helpless wretch who realizes suddenly that no matter how many 
frock coats he puts on he will never make a man. (30) 
 
In this instance, the philosophical ideas behind the act of laughing are eminently 
attractive – Miller appears to be relieving himself of the burden of anxiety that comes 
with personal experience of suffering and the effort to empathize with others by 
having the courage and audacity to dismiss it all as futile and absurd. But then, 
characteristically, he sadistically asserts his own masculinity over his weaker friend. 
Like Boris himself, we are duped into a feeling of camaraderie and complicity with 
Miller, only to be let down. Unlike Boris, however, we are made aware of Miller’s 
betrayal. In this sense, the anti-humanist reversal works the other way also: Miller 
presents laughter as a tonic to be shared in the face of mystifying, debilitating 
psychological and emotional pain, but quickly and unexpectedly subverts it to score 
a cheap point against a friend and consolidate his superior position. 
 
Thus, while redefining sympathy and compassion in terms he intends to represent a 
real rather than idealistic view of humanity, Miller implicitly warns the reader not to 
trust him. This is the moral manifestation of Masuga’s comment on Miller’s textual 
game. ‘The reader discovers the multiplicity of the text’ Masuga claims, ‘through a 
use of language that calls attention to itself, suggesting that what is being described 
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is never a limitation’.447 In place of ‘text’, I argue, one might just as easily read 
‘values’. This is a man, we remember, who admits his ability to ‘orient myself to the 
new order in the twinkling of an eye’, and is determined to understand the world on 
his own terms, even if that means excluding the ‘useless problems and vexations’ of 
others. Flagging up his own unreliability, Miller reasserts his concerns about the 
fallibility of ideology and belief, in the process refusing to give the reader a stable or 






















                                                              
447 Masuga, p. 76. 
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2.4 The Attraction of the Blemish: Pound and Miller’s sexual aesthetics 
‘Instinct, like sex, cannot go wrong, whereas ideas – and particularly ideals – lead us 
woefully astray and bring about various mental and nervous disorders. Therefore, 
sexuality is exalted as salvation.’ Charles I. Glicksberg, The Sexual Revolution in 
Modern American Literature (1970)448  
 
Significantly, both Miller and Pound posit sexual activity as another natural and 
instinctual cure for the ‘debauchery’ or ‘cramp’ of intellectual beliefs and ideas.449 
Like the automatic processes of laughter and tears, sex functions for Miller as a 
means of breaking free from the rigid constraints imposed by intellectual thought, 
allowing the individual to move beyond the absolute logical positions of the mind 
and towards an appreciation of the full scope of experience. Significantly, Pound was 
motivated by a similar anti-puritanical drive to Miller. As such, he will be seen in 
this section to have understood the appreciation of the flesh as a pre-requisite for 
individual and cultural health and sanity. If both writers regard sex as a vital 
conductive force in literature and life, this is largely because they make comparable 
connections between the creative processes of the body and the mind.  
 
As a prelude to a comparative analysis of their sexual aesthetics, it is important to 
delineate how Miller’s ideas about perceiving the world through a ‘naked eye’ and 
attaining a ‘totality of vision’ relate to Pound’s belief in the similarities between 
Miller and Joyce’s aesthetic ‘scope’.450 As mentioned in Chapter One, Pound bases his 
positive critique of Joyce on the premise that he is able to see and apprehend a wide 
range of experiences – from the aesthetically high to the aesthetically low.  Moreover, 
Pound sees Joyce as able to perceive beauty in situations, thoughts and experiences 
that are apparently ugly or sordid and vice versa, understanding fundamentally that 
‘there is no beauty without a corresponding disgust’.451 Pound’s identification of 
these same qualities in Cancer is supported by Miller’s own comments on his artistic 
method:                                                              
448 Charles I. Glicksberg The Sexual Revolution in Modern American Literature (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971 [orig. ed.: 1970]), p. 130. 
449 Miller, Cancer, p. 102; Pound, ‘Axiomata’, p. 260.  
450 Miller, ‘Un Être Étoilique’, p. 301; Pound, ‘Joyce’, p. 410. 
451 ‘Joyce’, p. 417. See my p. 93. 
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In the discarded, worthless thing which everyone ignored there was 
contained the secret of my regeneration … I had a microscopic eye for the 
blemish, for the grain of ugliness which to me constituted the sole beauty of 
the object. Whatever set the object apart, or made it unserviceable … attracted 
and endeared it to me.452  
 
By experiencing beauty via the ‘microscopic’ focus on ‘the grain of ugliness’ in an 
object, Miller suggests an aesthetic thrill. To seek out ‘the grain of ugliness’ is to posit 
that part of the object, person or feeling as distilled to a point of preciousness and 
truth, thus subverting standard equations of the beautiful and the symmetrical with 
the pure. He presents his project as an attempt to clear away the dross that ordinarily 
constitutes beauty in order to reveal an essential and fecund ugliness at the core of 
reality.  
 
In this respect, Miller’s position corroborates Pound’s belief in the symbiosis of these 
two extreme aesthetic states. The microscopic, irregular blemish entices him because 
it exists next to the larger regular whole. In line with Miller’s Sadean reading of vice 
and virtue, the perception of one depends on the existence of the other and Miller’s 
aesthetic works, as Pound suggests, with that vital correspondence at its center. 
Abnormalities and defects are presented in Cancer as elements to be relished because 
their corruptive presence contrasts with and intensifies the natural and the beautiful. 
Observing the difference between sexual tastes in New York and Paris, Miller writes 
approvingly of what he regards as the French attraction to deformity:   
I have never seen a place like Paris for varieties of sexual provender…. A 
missing tooth or a nose eaten away or a fallen womb, any misfortune that 
aggravates the natural homeliness of the female, seems to be regarded as an 
added spice, a stimulant for the jaded appetites of the male. (166) 
Later in this chapter, Miller’s sometimes unsettling detached and graphic 
objectification of the female body will be explored as evidence of the connection 
between his and Pound’s essentialist rhetoric. In this context, however, it is 
interesting to note his belief in aesthetic ugliness as an aggravation of the natural and 
beautiful, a disturbing but alluring reminder of its opposite counterpoint. Miller’s 
project, indeed, is permeated by the desire to show that the human appetite – sexual                                                              
452 Capricorn, p. 50.  
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and aesthetic – is in its nature ‘jaded’ rather than wholesome or pure, drawn to a 
certain ‘spice’ that exhilarates and tantalizes by its imperfect deviation from the 
norm.  
Just as physical suffering, humiliation and hopelessness are posited as perverse 
sources of spiritual and psychological strength, aspects which are conventionally 
regarded as ugly become a source not only of truth but unparalleled creativity. As 
Miller puts it when describing the visionary quality of Matisse’s paintings in Cancer, 
‘that feline beauty which has us by the balls … is finished. To fathom the new reality 
it is first necessary to dismantle the drains, to lay open the gangrened ducts which 
compose the genito-urinary system that supplies the excreta of art’ (170). For Nin, 
indeed, Miller ‘has an eagerness to catch everything without make-up, without 
embellishment, women before they comb their hair, waiters before they don artificial 
smiles with their artificial bow-ties.’453    
 
These associations of the unadorned and unembellished with an overlooked, vital 
truth become part of Miller’s conscious campaign against conventional moral 
aversions to bodily functions and sensual pleasure. Pound’s appreciation of Miller’s 
‘scope’, indeed his ‘hierarchy of values’, comes to a great extent from his own 
antagonism towards censorship and the association of the body and the flesh with 
sin and dirt. In various essays about art, Pound rails against the ‘stupidity’ of 
prudish moral codes. In his essay ‘Cavalcanti’, for example, he is apoplectic at the 
‘idiotic asceticism’ that infects artistic attitudes towards sex. The ‘belief that the body 
is evil’, he writes, is ‘masochistic and hell-breeding … almost always accompanied 
by bad and niggled sculpture’.454  To Pound’s mind, the question of sex in art is, like 
so many important questions, a clinical one – ‘it is not the body but its diseases and 
infirmities which are evil’, he writes.455 
 
                                                             
453 Nin, p. 16. 
454 ‘Cavalcanti’, pp. 150-51. 
455 Ibid., p. 150. 
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 Where Pound understands moral squeamishness about the body as motivated by 
the sadistic impulse ‘to punish, not to heal, the individual sufferer,’ Miller uses the 
violence and obscenity that arises from graphic sexual language and imagery as a 
means of therapy.456 ‘I was getting the poison out of my system’ he writes to his 
friend Alfred Perles in 1947, ‘Curiously enough, this poison had a tonic effect for 
others. It was as if I had given them some kind of immunity.’457 The roots of Miller 
and Pound’s shared animosity towards ‘aescetism’ and ‘puritanism’ will be seen in 
Chapter Three to reside partly in what Pound calls the ‘hell-breeding’ Protestant 
ethic of Martin Luther. In this context, however, it is important to recognize that 
Miller intends his unadulterated descriptions of sex as an antidote to what he 
considered a poisonous collective moral embargo. As he puts it in the 1963 Paris 
Review interview: 
I am for obscenity and against pornography. The obscene would be the 
forthright, and pornography would be the roundabout. I believe in saying the 
truth, coming out with it cold, shocking if necessary, not disguising it.458 
To get a better idea of Pound’s approach to sex and obscenity in Miller, the allusion 
to Mallarmé in his review of Cancer needs to be taken into account. In some respects, 
this is Pound’s only nod to the presence of sex or profanity in the novel, in which he 
suggests Miller’s unembarrassed celebration of the flesh as a means of escaping the 
sadistic and masochistic moral system described above. Separating the body from 
the moral questions that surround its usage, Pound implies that the individual 
reclaims self-autonomy by refusing these questions. The functionality of the flesh 
itself is presented as a democratizing medium that propels the issue of sexuality 
beyond narrow subjective suppositions about normality and depravity and into the 
realm of unarguable physical facts. Getting beyond presumptuous and reductive 
                                                             
456 ‘Cavalcanti’, p. 150. 
457 Henry Miller, ‘My Aims and Intentions,’ in Henry Miller on writing / selected by 
Thomas H. Moore from the published and unpublished works of Henry Miller (New York: 
New Directions, 1964), p. 155. Originally published in Art and Outrage. A 
correspondence about Henry Miller between A. Perlès and Lawrence Durrell (London: 
Putnam, 1959). 
458 ‘An Interview with Henry Miller’, Writers at Work, p. 153. 
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judgments about whether the flesh is fit for use, the flesh itself offers a truthful and 
objective answer.  
Sex in Cancer does appear to always be posited in terms of lust rather than love, the 
emphasis falling on physical satisfaction, and explicitly not spiritual communion. As 
Norman Mailer puts it in Genius and Lust, ‘Miller is one of the first to explore lust 
separated from love’.459  Miller’s narrator talks about ‘a quick lay’ in the same way as 
he talks about urinating, sleeping and eating. ‘Fucks happen as naturally in Miller’s 
prose’, Mailer writes, ‘as a piss against the wall’.460  Nonetheless, Miller’s apparent 
callousness belies a profoundly humanist concern – namely his genuine belief in the 
spiritual importance of sexuality, if not for the union it creates between the two 
people involved then for the autonomous individual in relation to the world. As 
Michael Woolf puts it in  ‘Beyond Ideology: Kate Millet and the Case for Henry 
Miller’, ‘Sex is … what Miller called the ‘omphalos’, the central point of a system 
from which all else flows’.461  Throughout Cancer and in his essays, Miller talks of the 
genitalia as prime conductors of a unifying life force. ‘Perhaps a cunt’, he writes in 
The World of Sex ’smelly though it may be, is one of the prime symbols for the 
connection between all things.’462 Describing Germaine, he says that her vagina is ‘a 
magic, potent treasure, a God-given thing’, indisputably ‘good’ by its capacity to 
connect him and her with the natural order of the cosmos: ‘That Sunday afternoon, 
with its poisonous breath of spring in the air, everything clicked again.’ (51) ‘It 
glowed down there between her legs where women ought to glow,’ he continues, 
‘and there was established that circuit which makes one feel the earth under his legs 
again’ (53). 
Woolf’s reference to the ‘omphalus’ draws attention to the crucial issue of carnal 
pleasure as a way to bypass the abstraction of ideas. In the Cancer passage from 
which Woolf takes this word, Miller declares his desire ‘to erect a world on the basis 
of the omphalos, not an abstract idea nailed to a cross’ (244). ‘Omphalos’, in its                                                              
459 Mailer, Genius and Lust, p. 94. 
460 Ibid., p. 63. 
461 Woolf, p. 175. 
462 Miller, The World of Sex, p. 134, quoted in Mailer, p. 94. 
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original Ancient Greek, means ‘the navel’ and was used to describe the canonical 
stone at the oracle of Delphi, thought by the Greeks to have marked the center of the 
earth. Since Miller also associates ideas here with the crucifixion, he suggests a 
replacement of the weakness and abstraction of monotheistic religious symbolism 
with a pure, primal and sexual alternative. In line with this, the totemic image of 
Germaine’s vagina takes on ironic biblical significance – ‘Whenever I looked at 
another woman I thought immediately of Germaine, of that flaming bush which she 
had left in my mind and which seemed imperishable’ (53). Thus, he attempts to 
reanimate cold, dead religious symbolism by celebrating and sanctifying the female 
sexual organ, his play on the Old Testament image of the burning bush and a slang 
word for vagina emphasising the absurdity of moral systems that constrict and deny 
the pleasure and power of sexual activity.  
 
The same impulse towards a non-Christian, re-sexualized mode of thinking is 
manifested in Pound’s writing in his emphasis on the healthy religious symbols of 
pre-Christian and pre-capitalist civilizations. As we shall see in Chapter Three, he 
and Miller were both anxious about the influence of Protestant-rooted utility as an 
ideal in modern society. In the introduction to his translation of The Natural 
Philosophy of Love by French philosopher Remy de Gourmont, Pound posits the faith 
human beings place in machinery and utilitarianism as part of a grave and ill-
advised migration away from the natural approach to sensuality and sexuality of 
ancient polytheistic societies:      
In its growing subservience to, and adoration of, and entanglement in 
machines, in utility, man rounds the circle almost into insect life, the absence 
of flesh; and may have need even of horned gods to save him, or at least of a 
form of thought which permits them.463  
Thus the re-animalisation, the re-sexualisation of deific symbolism – ‘or at least a 
form of thought which permits them’ – becomes a way of reconnecting the mind 
with the body and arresting man’s devolution towards an inhuman and mechanical 
mode of existence.                                                               
463 Ezra Pound, ‘Introduction’, Remy de Gourmont, The Natural Philosophy of Love, 
transl. by Ezra Pound (London: Neville Spearman, 1957), p. ix. 
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In line with this, Miller and Pound share an interest in the harmful effects of 
desexualized ideology on the creative potential of the mind. ‘Ideas’, Miller writes, 
‘have to be wedded to action; if there is no sex, no vitality in them, there is no action’ 
(158). He follows this up later in the text with an explicit reference to libidinal energy 
and the willingness to admit and discuss sex, as duel sources of creativity: ‘a man 
who is intent on creation … hitches the dynamo to the tenderest part’ (251). Where 
Miller sees sexuality as the catalyst for valuable, creative existence and thought, 
Pound understands intelligence as the result of a heightened sensitivity to physical 
sensation as well as emotional complexity and intellectual argument. In ‘Cavalcanti’, 
he applauds the ‘medieval poets’ because, with them ‘the conception of the body as 
perfect instrument of the increasing intelligence pervades’.464 In other words, true 
intelligence is unachievable without a healthy appreciation of the body and its 
sensual existence.  
 
Pound goes on to claim that ascetic doctrines which are ‘anti-flesh’ inevitably lead to 
a way of thinking that is ‘anti-intelligence, that praises stupidity as ‘simplicity’, the 
cult of naivete’, making a direct link between the Alexandrian Emperor St. Clement’s 
‘prohibition on bathing by women’ and the diminishment of worthwhile and 
accurate artistic and philosophical discussion amongst his people.465 For Pound, the 
ascetic war against the flesh is ignorant and unpardonable, a corrupt campaign that 
arises out of ‘the envy of dullards who, not having ‘intelletto’, blame the lack of it on 
innocent muscles’.466 
 
These anti-ascetic ideas, this condemnation of the corruptive tendency to celebrate 
the mind in opposition to the body, is connected in Pound’s writings to his use of 
sexual intercourse and fertilization as a metaphor for creative and intelligent 
thought. In the introduction to The Natural Philosophy of Love, he builds an argument 
around the extended metaphor of the brain as ‘a great clot of genital fluid held in 
                                                             
464 ‘Cavalcanti’, p. 152. 
465 Ibid., p. 154. 
466 Ibid., p. 154. 
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suspense or reserve’.467 Though the premise is eccentric and consciously absurd, he 
uses it to make various serious comparisons between the production of thought, 
image, argument and allusion in the brain and the growth, release and fertilizing 
activity of sperm. He is interested, he writes, in the similarities between ‘the 
enormous content of the brain as a maker or presenter of images’ and the seminal 
vesicle’s production of ‘spermatozoid’.468 ‘Creative thought’, he goes on ‘is an act like 
fecundation, like the male cast of the human seed’.469   The idea is elaborated on 
through a shift to the metaphor of vegetable rather than animal reproduction:  
I am perfectly willing to grant that the thought once born, separated, in 
regard to itself, not in relation to the brain that begat it, does lead an 
independent life much like a member of the vegetable kingdom, blowing 
seeds, ideas from the paradisial garden at the summit of Dante’s purgatory, 
capable of lodging and sprouting where they fall.470 
The following chapter will discuss how Pound also draws important parallels 
between a healthy, natural attitude towards sexual pleasure and reproduction and a 
healthy, natural approach to the economy. Thought, sex and economic activity are 
inextricably, mysteriously – and often troublingly – connected for Pound through a 
universal ‘process’ in drastic need of reform. 
Miller’s own belief in sex as ‘a pathway to enlightenment’ depends on the same kind 
of condemnations as Pound’s.471 It ultimately leads him to a polarized vision of the 
world, in which men and women who are sexually promiscuous and adventurous 
are celebrated as free and virtuous, whereas those who are prudish or respectably 
monogamist are despised for their inability to realize the basic potential for self-
autonomy. In contrast with the prostitutes he canonizes, Miller reserves a particular 
disgust for people who are sexually modest or reticent. The women in Capricorn who 
reprove him for his inappropriate sexual advances, or deny their own carnal desires, 
are presented as dumb beasts who sense the instinctive urge for freedom but are too 
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indoctrinated and afraid to act upon it. Veronica, a woman he courts but fails to 
seduce, is caricatured in just such a fashion:  
If you grabbed her by the boobies she would squawk like a parrot; if you got 
under her dress she would wriggle like an eel: if you held her too tight she 
would bite like a ferret. She lingered and lingered and lingered. Why? What 
was she after? … She was like a pigeon trying to fly with its legs caught in a 
steel trap. She pretended she had no legs. But if you made a move to set her 
free she would threaten to molt on you.472  
Similarly, the failure to make good on sexual desire is the basis for many of Miller’s 
attacks on men. In Cancer Boris, Sylvester and Sylvester’s friend Moldorf are 
lampooned as sexually neutered - through neurosis, a lack of assertiveness, or a 
combination of the two. Sylvester, we remember, ‘makes water’ rather than making 
love to his wife, a symptom of his misunderstanding of his fundamental role as a 
man (65).  
In Miller’s world, sexual modesty and timidity are particular kinds of slavery, 
exteriorly conceived but fundamentally self-imposed and therefore undeserving of 
sympathy. Like Pound on religious and artistic asceticism, he sees the use of modesty 
and honor in defense against the illusory sin of sexual misdemeanor as an example 
of base, dull stupidity masquerading as sophistication. Later on in Capricorn, Miller 
turns to his own family to explain the doctrinal origins of this unenlightened 
approach:   
My people were entirely Nordic, which is to say idiots. Every wrong idea 
which has ever been expounded was theirs. Among them was the doctrine of 
cleanliness, to say nothing of righteousness. They were painfully clean. But 
inwardly they stank. Never once had they opened the door which leads to the 
soul; never once did they dream of taking a blind leap into the dark.473  
When Miller observes Germaine ‘rubbing her pussy affectionately, stroking it with 
her two hands, caressing, it, patting it, patting it’, his tone is not lecherous, nor 
breathless with sexual arousal but awed by the reverence and care the prostitute 
shows her sexual organ (50). ‘She spoke of it’, he goes on, ‘as if it were some 
extraneous object which she had acquired at great cost, an object whose value had                                                              
472 Capricorn, p. 169. 
473 Capricorn, p. 11. 
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increased with time and which now she prized above everything in the world.’ (50). 
In Capricorn, by contrast, he rages at one of his conquests for coveting rather than 
celebrating and making good on her sexual endowments: 
She thought so much of her beautiful white ass that she wouldn’t part with it 
for anything. She wanted to take it with her to Paradise when the time came. 
As for her cunt … well that was just an accessory to be brought along. 474  
Clearly, Miller’s view of sex as an existentially liberating force is complicated and 
worryingly jeopardized by the retrograde, essentialist nature of these statements. By 
focusing on the physical release that takes place in the instinctive act of sexual 
intercourse, he paradoxically fixes and preserves women in ‘natural’ states of moral 
transgression and ‘healthy’ suffering. Moreover, because his imagining of them as 
virtuous is dependent on their sexuality, it is also dependent on their consolidation 
of his own ideological convictions about gender and class polarity. His quest to 
distill subjective reality to a point where it is dominated by instinct rather than 
ideology inevitably results in hyper-sexualized portraits of women. Thus, his 
progressive aims are yet again compromised by latent conservative concerns about a 
set of absolute values and truths that require protection.  
Miller’s affirmation of Germaine’s sexual potency, her strength and importance in 
her role as a prostitute carries with it the regressive implication that, as a woman of a 
certain background and disposition, her value is purely sexual. Thus Germaine and 
her ‘flaming bush’ work simultaneously as symbols of Miller’s program for 
existential enlightenment and the maintenance of an essentialist creed. ‘Germaine 
was a whore all the way through’, he writes, ‘even down to her good heart, her 
whore’s heart which is not really a good heart but a lazy one’ (52). Moreover, she  
‘glowed down there between her legs where women ought to glow’ (Italics are my 
own) (52). This gender polarization is emphasized further still by Miller’s 
comparison of Germaine with Claude, the prostitute he visits after his relationship 
with Germaine has ended: 
                                                             
474 Ibid., p. 170. 
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Later, when I had taken up with Claude, and I saw her night after night 
sitting in her accustomed place, her round little buttocks chubbily ensconced 
in the plush settee, I felt a sort of inexpressible rebellion toward her; a whore, 
it seemed to me, had no right to be sitting there like a lady, waiting timidly 
for someone to approach and all the while abstemiously sipping her chocolat. 
(53) 
For Miller, the quest to expose human sexuality as imperfect, as perplexing but 
wonderful, especially when detached from romantic idealism, brings with it a 
troubling, instinctive opposition to women who fail to meet his symbolic 
requirements. If he venerates the quintessential female prostitute above men because 
of her capacity for liberation through sexual experience, he also follows the standard, 
retrograde impulse to judge women more harshly than men for the crime of 
hypocrisy and ignorance in this area. Miller strips away romance to reveal a vital 
element of life that has been harmfully repressed by insidious moral dogmatism but 
in the process exposes his own dogmatic intuitions about the way women (and men) 
should behave. 
These ‘inexpressible’, felt truths about gender and sexual difference relate 
interestingly to Pound’s assertion, in his Cancer review, that in Miller’s world, ‘the 
sense of sphericality of the planets presides’ (88). As we saw in Chapter One of this 
thesis, Pound refers to Miller’s ability to identify the inherent characteristics of 
certain nationalities – ‘Miller’s Americans are very American, his orientals, very 
oriental and his Russians, oh quite so’ (88). These issues of cultural and racial 
difference will be further illuminated in Chapter Three through readings of Cancer. 
Most importantly though, Miller’s statements about his Jewish friends and 
girlfriends will be looked at in relation to Pound’s expressly Anti-Semitic 
pronouncements, principally as an example of Pound’s misinterpretation of Miller’s 
rhetoric and tone.  
The paradox of the essentialism at the center of Miller’s sexual and existential 
revolution is indicative of his desire – as Lawrence Durrell put it – to ‘do down … the 
dreadful sentimentality which disguises brutality’.475 Miller’s quest, in Anaïs Nin’s                                                              
475 ‘An Interview with Lawrence Durrell’, 1st October 1985. Quoted in Michael Woolf, 
p. 176. See my p. 125. 
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words, ‘to see the world naked, without makeup’ inevitably and paradoxically ends 
in a totalising vision from which elements of aesthetic and existential subtlety and 
ambiguity are excluded.476 Miller claims, as Nin says, to love the prostitutes ‘who 
wash themselves in front of you’.477 However, his fascination with their difference 
and their irreverence for social mores and taboos, willfully allows him to also lose 
sight of their complexity as human beings. As Norman Mailer puts it in Genius and 
Lust ‘the cunts are always closer than the faces’ and the idea is borne out by Miller’s 
wife June, whose distraught reaction to her own depiction in Cancer is recollected by 
Nin in her diaries: 
She died that night because of its brutality. She wept and repeated over and 
over again, “It is not me, it is not me he is writing about. It’s a distortion. He 
says I live in delusions, but it is he, it is he who does not see me, or anyone, as 
I am, as they are. He makes everything ugly.478 
 
June could well be speaking for Germaine, Claude or any of the women who appear 
in Cancer and Capricorn. In trying to explode others’ ‘delusions’ - about themselves, 
about life and society – Miller in fact falls fascinatingly but dangerously under the 
spell of his own. It is a source of his enlightenment, his strength and his violence and 
it will be examined in more detail when we look at the blood and fire of Miller and 
Pound’s eschatological narrative modes in the following chapter. At the heart of 
Miller’s aesthetics lay a totalising supposition - that a truly humanistic attitude could 
only be attained if the individual accepted his or her truly anti-humanist urges. As 
Anaïs Nin puts it, Miller’s writing, his radically progressive perceptual rebirth 
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3. ‘The Festival of Death’: Eschatology, Economics and Fascism 
 
3.1 ‘The Last Four Things’: Inter-war eschatological obsessions  
‘I understood then why it is that Paris attracts the tortured, the hallucinated, the 
great maniacs of love. I understood why it is that here, at the very hub of the wheel, 
one can embrace the most fantastic, the most impossible theories, without finding 
them in the least strange … Here all boundaries fade away and the world reveals 
itself for the mad slaughterhouse that it is. The treadmill stretches away to infinitude, 
the hatches are closed down tight, logic runs rampant, with bloody cleaver flashing. 
The air is chill and stagnant, the language apocalyptic. Not an exit sign anywhere; no 
issue save death.’ Henry Miller, Cancer480  
 ‘The milieu of La Coupole seen from somewhere near its nadir, but [not] thereby 
limited, the circle of reference considerably wider than that of Joyce’s fetid Dublin, or 
the more special inferno of [Wyndham Lewis’] The Apes [of God].’ Ezra Pound, 
‘Review of Tropic of Cancer’481 
 
Pound and Miller’s arrival at the shared aesthetic and ethical positions outlined in 
the previous chapter is connected to a mutual preoccupation with death, divine 
judgment and the prospect of an impending millennial dawn; tropes that were 
commonplace in much of Anglo-American avant-garde literature in the first three 
decades of the twentieth century but connect in peculiar ways across the works of 
these two writers. This common interest will be explored here, in the final chapter of 
the thesis, to consolidate the picture of Miller’s radical aesthetic and moral project 
formed over the previous two chapters. 
‘Eschatology’ (defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘the department of 
theological science concerned with ‘the four last things: death, judgment, heaven and 
hell’) has widely been identified – most notably by Frank Kermode, Northrop Frye 
and Bruce Comens – as a crucial concern in the writings of some of the principal 
members of the early twentieth century modernist avant-garde.482  Indeed, in his 
1967 lecture ‘The Modern Apocalypse’ Kermode declared that ‘during the first phase                                                              
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482 OED.com, ‘Home: Oxford English Dictionary’, 1709 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/64374?redirectedFrom=Eschatology#eid> 
[accessed 10th December 2013] 
 197 
of modernism, which as far as the English language goes we associate with Pound 
and Yeats, Wyndham Lewis and Joyce … the mood was predominantly 
eschatological’.483 Kermode’s seminal lecture will help to frame my conclusions about 
Pound in relation to “prophetical” theories and pronouncements, both in terms of 
Miller and Pound’s contemporaries and of writers traditionally associated with later 
modernisms. Indeed, Kermode goes on to draw a favorable comparison between this 
‘phase of modernism’ and the phase occurring in the 1960s, when he himself was 
working as a critic.484  In the writings of Pound, Lewis, Yeats and Joyce - Kermode 
claims - ‘a skepticism and a refined traditionalism held in check what threatened to 
be a bad case of literary primitivism’, whereas writers such as Jack Kerouac, Norman 
Mailer and Allen Ginsberg suffer for their lack of these checks.485 Miller’s own 
position as an author of ‘eschatological’ prose will be shown to fall somewhere 
between the ‘early modernists’ and the figures Kermode reluctantly discusses as 
their successors.  
That position is implied by Sarah Garland in her essay  ‘The Dearest of Cemeteries’, 
which connects Comens’ ideas to Leon Surette’s study of modernism and the 
apocalyptic, The Birth of Modernism: Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot, W.B Yeats, and the Occult 
(1993), and reads Miller through both. Surette notes that Pound, W.B. Yeats and D.H. 
Lawrence were heavily influenced by the ideas of Frederich Nietzsche, A.R. Orage - 
Pound’s early editor at 1910s London periodical The New Age - and early twentieth 
century German meta-historian Oswald Spengler. When Kermode refers to the 
‘eschatological’ ‘mood’ of the ‘first phase’ of modernism, he is commenting on a 
literary atmosphere in which a common emphasis fell on ideas relating to the 
epochal significance of the early twentieth century, the immanence of decay and the 
imminence of destruction in Western society. Comens, in his 1995 study After the 
Apocalypse, is one of many modernist scholars to explain this in relation to World 
War One and its predominance in the imaginations of writers like Pound, W.B. Yeats 
and Gertude Stein. As Comens, Marjorie Perloff (The Futurist Moment, 1986) and                                                              
483 Kermode, ‘The Modern Apocalypse’, p. 104. 
484 Ibid., p. 104. 
485 Ibid., p. 104. 
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Mary Ann Caws (‘The Poetics of the Manifesto: Nowness and Newness’, 2001) all 
point out, the period before, during and immediately succeeding the First World 
War also saw the emergence of various movements whose manifestos are steeped in 
language condemning the decadence of the old guard – political and artistic. Many 
of these suggest the inevitability of an apocalyptic military conflict that will create 
conditions conducive to aesthetic and political renewal. ‘Pound’s wartime artistic 
milieu’ Comens claims, ‘was particularly rife with apocalyptic rhetoric: consider the 
Dadaists’ destructive impulses, the Futurists’ glorification of war, the Vorticists’ own 
Blast.’486 
Indeed, William Wees (Vorticism and the English Avant-Garde, 1972) and Marjorie 
Perloff (The Futurist Moment, 1986) have both pointed out that, despite Pound and 
Lewis’ statements to the contrary, Marinetti’s Italian Futurist movement was a major 
influence on Vorticism, providing it with the precedent for its militaristic rhetoric as 
well as a foreign counter-model against which to define itself.487 The first Blast 
manifesto, for example, conspicuously commandeers Futurism’s tone and typeface in 
its attack on the ‘”advanced”, perfected, democratic Futurist individual of Mr. 
Marinetti’s limited imagination’.488 Likewise – as we have seen – Miller openly 
declared his solidarity with the anarchical and brazenly incendiary artistic 
pronouncements of the Dadaists and Surrealists. He went on, indeed, to mimic their 
syntactical formula for 1936’s ‘The Booster’, his, Lawrence Durrell and Alfred Perles’ 
own semi-satirical attempt at a manifesto. More importantly, there are clear 
correlations between the incendiary nature of Pound and Miller’s prose and the calls 
to arms that permeate Lewis and Pound’s Vorticist writings. As Wees puts it,‘the 
‘very militant years’ of 1910-14 were the germinating period of Vorticism, and the                                                              
486 Comens, Apocalypse and After, p. 29. We have seen and will see more evidence to 
support Comens’ claims regarding the Vorticists. As for the Futurists, their 1910 
manifesto announces ‘we will glorify war – the world’s only hygiene.’ (‘The 
Manifesto’, in Mary Ann Caws (ed.), Manifesto: A Century of Isms, p. 187).   
487 As Perloff puts it in The Futurist Moment ‘to study Blast and related books and 
journals of 1914 is to see that, whatever the protests lodged by Lewis, Pound, and 
their artist friends, Vorticism would not have come into being without the Futurist 
model’ (p. 173). 
488 ‘Manifesto II’, in Lewis (ed.), Blast 1, p. 24. 
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last summer [before the First World War] produced the movement in full bloom’.489 
Wees also asserts that the Vorticist movement ‘gave to the times an aesthetic and 
body of painting, sculpture and writing that transformed violence into art’, 
suggesting the conversion of brute force into written language discussed in Chapter 
Two as a key ingredient of Pound’s poetry and Miller’s diatribes.490 
The concerted monstrosity of both writers’ narratives must be understood in two 
contexts - first, the pre-war atmosphere that shaped Pound’s 1910s modernising 
project and, secondly, the cultural trauma of the Great War. In contrast to the manic 
but triumphalist condemnation of literary ‘obstructionists’ in Pound’s poem 
‘Salutation the Third’, his essays of the 1920s and 30s are characterized by social and 
economic ideas that are equally manic but delivered with unsettling certainty. 
Miller’s own reaction to the traumatized cultural landscape of post-war Europe 
incorporated an awareness of the mania and its roots in suffering as well as a 
conviction that real artistic and existential progress lay in the acceptance of 
irrationality rather than rational schemes for reform. As referenced among the 
epigraphs at the beginning of this chapter, Miller luxuriates in the idea that he has 
entered a post-war Paris in which morality has been permanently and irrevocably 
jilted: ‘the world reveals itself for the mad slaughterhouse that it is. The treadmill 
stretches away to infinitude, the hatches are closed down tight, logic runs rampant.’  
Though Pound did not fight in France, he was gravely affected by the wartime 
deaths of his two close friends and artistic allies, T.E. Hulme and Henri Gaudier-
Brzeska. Consequently, his writing after 1918 bears the mark of an obsessive desire to 
make sense of that war, and indeed all wars, in the context of larger political and 
economic forces. As William Chace puts it in The Political Identities of Ezra Pound and 
T.S. Eliot, Pound ‘sought to discover why wars were apparently so inevitable, so 
much the final product of laws and pressures beyond individual control’.491 Pound’s 
understanding of Miller as a writer of the ‘prospect’ must therefore be looked at in 
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relation to the former’s anti-war zeal and his notion that a revolutionary, millennial 
change could be brought about in the aftermath of a so-called ‘Armageddon’. 
 By contrast, as Sarah Garland points out in ‘The Dearest of Cemeteries’, the effect of 
war on Miller’s writing is more appropriately read via its absence from Cancer’s main 
narrative. Garland references Richard Sheppard’s Modernism-Dada-Postmodernism, 
mentioned in Chapter Two of this thesis: 
The modern megalopolis, mass politics and culture, and the Great War [have] 
increasingly come to be seen as complex, interrelated and deeply disturbing 
manifestations of modernity that … may be strikingly visible in modernist 
texts but that may also exist there … as their “repressed other”492  
Sheppard’s observations, Garland claims, bring new significance to Miller’s 
reluctance to write explicitly about the First World War, the radicalized politics it left 
in its wake or the increasing likelihood of another mass conflict. Indeed, despite 
living in a major European city deeply affected by the events of 1914-18, Miller 
‘never writes of the war, instead he writes around it and through it, using the 
apocalyptic voice to try to devour and absorb the power of death, disease and 
conflict.’493 We will see that Pound and Miller’s mutual attraction - Pound’s belief in 
Miller as a writer who was plugged into a meta-historical ‘process’, and Miller’s 
feeling that Pound’s Cantos ‘sounds like stuff I say to myself all day long’ – exists 
despite these differences; an anomaly that again points to Pound’s deeper 
misunderstanding of Miller’s purposes.494  In Section 3.3, ‘Miller’s Inferno: A 
Poundian economic reading of Tropic of Cancer’, Miller will be seen to have used 
economics to express ideas about the virtue of expending energy (specifically non-
reproductive sexual energy) without the promise of return – ideas that ally him in 
crucial ways with Georges Bataille rather than Pound. More importantly, Miller is 
drawn to Spengler’s eschatological prophecies for ‘the intoxicating’ effect of the 
language, making it clear that he feels this attraction despite rather than because of 
the intellectual theories expounded in The Decline of the West. Pound’s myopia 
concerning this crucial element in Miller’s approach to eschatology clearly                                                              
492 Sheppard, Modernism-Dada-Postmodernism, p. 7. 
493 Garland, ‘The Dearest of Cemeteries’, p. 209. 
494 Letters to Emil, p. 4 
 201 
undermines his reading of Cancer as a reflection of certain economic, cultural and 
social patterns but it also makes it paradoxically more relevant. Indeed, regardless of 
Miller’s purposes, Pound’s insistence on their ideological compatibility points again 
to the potential for an unintended slippage between progressiveness and regression 
in Miller’s work.  
Leon Surette offers a helpful, alternative means of approaching the ‘intoxicating’ 
effect of the language of ‘end times’ by understanding it in the context of a growing 
interest in the occult at the beginning of the twentieth century. Indeed, Surette 
redefines the eschatological mode in work by Pound and Yeats as incorporating 
precisely the ‘literary primitivism’ Kermode claims they manage to avoid. ‘Pound’s 
work’, Surette writes, ‘captures and expresses a set of passions, fears, hopes, and 
errors that were ubiquitous in the political and cultural history of the first half of the 
century.’495 Thus Pound’s literary and cultural essays can be read as evidence of the 
normalization of intellectually suspect ‘occult’ ideas in the works of otherwise 
skeptical English artists of the 1910s and 20s. Surette lays the groundwork for an 
exploration of the eschatological in Pound and Miller as a rhetorical mode 
dangerously predicated on epiphany rather than empiricism.  
As was clear throughout Chapter Two, Miller’s awareness of the absurdity and the 
risks involved in a personal instinctive response to the world mark him out from 
Pound. While Pound expressed his often diffuse and chaotic ‘occult’ hunches with 
unwavering conviction, applying a stringent, logical schema to apparently 
unempirical ideas, Miller’s writing demonstrates his pleasure in anticipating an 
incredulous reaction to his ‘impossible theories’. Thus, his position in the modernist 
lineage sheds new light on Kermode’s notion of ‘high’ or ‘early’ modernism as a 
healthily skeptical literary scene. As quoted in the epigraphs to the section, Miller 
writes of Paris in 1934 that ‘here, at the very hub of wheel, one can embrace the most 
fantastic, the most impossible theories, without finding them in the least strange’.496 
Miller’s consciousness of his own apparent credulity is pervasive in Cancer, his                                                              
495 Leon Surette, The Birth of Modernism: T.S. Eliot, W.B. Yeats, Ezra Pound and the 
Occult (London: McGill Queen’s University Press, 1993), p. 290. 
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literary essays and his correspondence from the period, and acts in crucial ways as a 
kind of ‘check’ on the ‘literary primitivism’ attributed by Kermode to Pound.  In this 
sense, Miller is an important commentator on, as well as participator in, the zeitgeist 
of intersecting modernist narrative and ideological modes in the interwar period.  
In line with this, Sarah Garland also discusses the eschatological preoccupations of 
writers like Yeats, Pound and Joyce as examples of non-religious or anti-religious 
writers secularizing traditionally religious rhetorical positions. As Peter Crisp 
suggests in his essay ‘Pound: Millenarian or Utopian?’, images relating to the 
apocalypse were no less prevalent in the Christian-skeptic literary milieu of the early 
twentieth century than in earlier, more religious ages (1996).497 Invoking Surette, 
Garland argues that the prophetical position taken up by the anti-religious Pound 
produces a problematic narrative because it renders Pound rationally accountable to 
himself alone. ‘One cannot step in and out of this portentous rhetoric’ Garland writes 
‘without repercussions for the self’.498 They are ‘repercussions’, that arise from ‘a 
kind of hubris that haunts eschatological language when it is secularized’.499  In other 
words, confident predictions of historical disaster and renewal are often founded on 
hyperbolic claims to extraordinary, instinctual insight; claims that loosen the author’s 
grip on reality and damage him or her psychologically. Indeed, by his ‘efforts to 
galvanize the self in opposition’ to the evils of ‘modernity and industrial society’ 
(principally war), Pound takes on the dangerously ‘megalomaniacal’ tone not only of 
the prophet but the deity he purports to denigrate.500 By making it his mission to 
highlight indisputable objective truths he ends up consumed by his own highly 
subjective and logically untenable vision.  
As such, Miller’s experimentation with ‘cancer and delirium’ for the purposes of 
truth and self-liberation can be contrasted with the genuine hysteria of Pound’s 
narrative voice.501 While Miller’s usually signposts madness, Pound regresses from 
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the deliberate use of an unhinged pose in his 1910s poems to a position of alarmingly 
unintentional irrationality in his post-First World War essays. Examined alongside 
Pound, Miller’s awareness of his persona’s ‘madness’ exposes rather than masks the 
dangers identified by Garland. From the viewpoint of someone who arrived ‘late’ on 
the scene, self-schooled and relatively uninitiated in the aesthetical and political 
discussions of the Vorticists, Futurists or Surrealists, Miller demonstrates the 
intoxicating yet highly suspect appeal of the prophetic register, with its heady, 
portentous rhetoric and post-biblical apocalyptic tropes.  
Pound’s presentation of himself as oracle – ‘the antennae of the race’ discussed in 
Chapters One and Two  - is mirrored in the works of various other ‘early modernist’ 
writers in ways that help explain his relationship with Miller.502 As Comens points 
out, James Joyce provides the blueprint for ‘The Author as God’ in A Portrait of the 
Artist As A Young Man when he defines his protagonist Stephen Daedalus as ‘the 
eternal priest of the imagination’. Joyce conceives of the artist, Comens writes, as 
‘closest to [a] visionary reality … which provides the basis of his art and insight’ and 
it is his ‘task to … mediate that vision and its wisdom for humanity.’503 Likewise, 
D.H. Lawrence’s essays of the 1920s contain the post-Romantic presumption of the 
author as an unquestionable authority on larger forces and patterns at play in the 
universe. They abound with abstractly symbolic references to ‘life’, ’livingness’,  ‘the 
sun’, ‘the blood’, ‘good’ and ‘evil’ that also find their way into Miller’s rhetoric. 
Essays like Lawrence’s 1921 piece ‘Aristocracy’, in which he claims that the 
‘democratic mass … are a vast, sluggish, ghastily greedy’ collective entity that 
require awakening from ‘inertia’, highlights the troubling and unintended fascistic 
overtones in Miller’s own theories about the artist and the masses.504  
These totalitarian implications in Lawrence’s narrative mode have been noted by 
various critics since the Second World War, chief among them Rex Warner (1946) 
and Bertrand Russell (1956). As such, the latter’s often-quoted conclusion that                                                              
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Lawrence’s ‘philosophy of “blood” … led straight to Auschwitz’ should be borne in 
mind when approaching Pound’s own increasingly anti-democratic position at the 
end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s.505 Lawrence and Pound’s ideological 
trajectories provide useful ways of reading Miller since, as seen in the previous two 
chapters, he himself straddled contradictory positions, at times displaying a 
pluralistic tolerance and at others a thoroughly elitist intolerance.  All three writers 
are caught up to different extents in what Caroline Blinder identifies as a 
dangerously ‘totalizing attempt – especially “metaphysical” – to define what is 
mystical and universal’.506   
The issue of hubris in secular eschatological narratives is fundamental to our reading 
of Miller, particularly in the context of Pound’s review. ‘Part of this prophetic and 
oracular tradition’, Blinder continues, ‘can be traced back to the act of egotism, the 
creative hubris which characterized early Romantic writers.’507 Indeed, as Sarah 
Garland observes in ‘The Dearest of Cemeteries’, Miller himself devotes long 
swathes of Cancer to the various ‘mad’, ‘megalomaniacal’ artistic voices who have 
influenced his writing style - writers like the aforementioned Spengler and 
Lawrence, as well as August Strindberg, Giovanni Papini and Van Gogh (whose 
letters Miller obsessed over). Moreover, Miller uses discussions of these artists to 
express his belief in an elusive but deeply personal, subjective inner truth, 
unbearably pure for writer and reader alike because it exists beyond literary, social 
or psychological borders: ‘If any man ever dared to translate all that is in his heart, to 
put down what is really his experience, what is truly his truth’ Miller writes in 
Cancer, ‘I think then the world would go to smash’ (250). 
By admiring and channeling instinctive and non-rational voices - ‘the violence of the 
prophets, the obscenity that is ecstasy, the wisdom of the fanatic, the priest with his 
rubber litany’ - Miller flags up the zealous and prophetical nature of his own 
narrative persona, consciously directing the reader’s attention to the sort of                                                              
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‘repercussions for the self’ that Garland points out in Pound.508 Miller’s aesthetic 
manipulation of that risk differentiates him again from Pound. The notion of Miller 
as immersed in portentous rhetoric, while simultaneously aware of its risks, is 
particularly pertinent in relation to the fascistic overtones he shares with Pound. As 
Pound puts it in 1933’s pro-Mussolini political treatise Jefferson And/Or Mussolini, the 
individual’s ‘authority comes [from the feeling] that he is more likely to be right than 
anyone else is’.509 These statements highlight a vital correlation between political 
fascism and the romantic urge to resist respectability and rationality by harnessing 
instinct rather than what Pound saw as the ‘mimetic’ forces of the intellect. As 
Surette points out, this problem arises because, ‘in D.H. Lawrence’s phrase, the 
reason is regarded as a “bit and bridle” on the soul.’510 
Garland likewise places Miller in this tradition of rhetorically and ideologically 
connected prophetical voices, when she defines him as a casual user of culturally 
pervasive militaristic language. Citing Comens on Pound, she argues that Pound and 
Miller’s offhanded proclamations of unfounded and outrageous apocalyptic 
diagnoses are proof of the ubiquity of eschatological and militaristic ideas and 
images in literary works of the period: 
Comens … argues that in 1915 war would have saturated consciousness to 
such an extent that the very casualness of Pound's use of the apocalyptic, 
coupled with the 'urgency and purpose' of the prose it is embedded in, can be 
taken as an indication of the pervasiveness of the apocalyptic narrative.511 
 Garland’s point extends her reading of Miller as a ‘syncretic and parodic’ 
appropriator of modernist modes and the eschatological, simply one of many 
popular stylistic turns Miller played around with in the 1930s. Nonetheless, Miller’s 
sense of playfulness is not only a fundamental difference between his and Pound’s 
approaches to the eschatological, it touches on certain fundamental differences 
between Miller’s modernism and that of his contemporaries. Moreover, it is one of 
the main reasons why Pound misunderstands Miller. In this sense, Garland                                                              
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underestimates the seriousness and depth beneath Miller’s parodic Jeremiad pose, 
particularly in relation to the mystical connection he claims to find with language 
used by Oswald Spengler and Pound.  If Miller described The Cantos as work he 
could ‘swallow down like homebrew’, Spengler was an equal source of intoxication 
and philosophical instruction.512  
Miller posits the imminent collapse of Western civilization as a simultaneously 
indisputable and farcical proposition. While announcing in Cancer that ‘the world is 
dying piecemeal’, that ‘we must get in step, a lock step toward the prison of death’, 
he also lampoons the ‘Death Theme’ in 1930s literature by creating caricatures of 
Michael Fraenkel and Walter Lowenfels, his friends and literary collaborators on the 
subject.513 Miller’s extreme and inconsistent treatment of these characters is one of 
many ways in which he postures aesthetically, entertaining contradictory notions of 
the artist as at times a genuine prophetic figure and - at others - a self-indulgent 
fantasist in search of his own catharsis.  
 As we saw in the previous chapter, Pound’s review of Cancer – like Orwell’s, 
Edmund Wilson’s and most other serious responses to Miller in the 1930s – also 
reflects the cultural trend towards eschatology. Pound’s belief that Miller’s writing 
corrects the ‘slump towards the impoverishment of values’ is in fact directly 
associated with the political, social and economic condition of Europe in the 
aftermath of the First World War.514 For Pound, the ‘hierarchy of values’ he sees in 
Cancer represents an antidote not only to literary but to political and economic 
‘chaos’.515 As we shall see, Miller passes what William Chace, in Political Identities in 
of Ezra Pound and T.S. Eliot, describes as Pound’s ‘test of man [in the 1920s and 30s] … 
his ability to endure the contemporary hell contrived by usurers’.516  Indeed, Pound 
opposes Miller to the mediocre critics and writers described in Chapter One, the 
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same sort of people who are later castigated in the forty sixth installment of The 
Cantos because they ‘think [they] will get through hell in a hurry’ (1944).517  
For both Pound and Miller, then, the artist’s ability to suffer ‘contemporary hell’, 
while steadfastly maintaining an independent social vision, is crucial. The following 
section will investigate the social, political and economic implications of the 
apocalyptic terms Pound uses in relation to Miller’s writing, as well as those Miller 
uses to present his own ‘experience’ and to describe other artists. By doing so, we 
may rethink the prominence of ‘Armageddon’ and the ‘inferno’ in the work of 
Miller’s contemporaries as well.  
Significant among these contemporaries was his aforementioned friend and 
collaborator Michael Fraenkel, an amateur philosopher and novelist whose 
interpretations of eschatological ideas (in particular Spengler’s The Decline of the 
West) are discussed by Miller as a major influence on Cancer. ‘You have’ Miller writes 
in a 1933 letter to Fraenkel ‘said it all violently, terribly, beautifully.’518 Hamlet, a 
compendium of correspondence between Miller and Fraenkel on ‘the Death Theme’, 
offers crucial insights into those episodes from Cancer that involve the character 
Boris, Fraenkel’s pseudonym in the novel, as evidence of what the two writers called 
their ‘School’ or ‘Festival’ of  ‘Death’. Not coincidentally, in his own early response to 
Miller’s debut novel, Fraenkel echoes many of Pound’s statements regarding the 
‘moral implication’ of Miller’s text.519  
Miller’s fidelity to the ideas he generated with Fraenkel also demonstrates another 
vital difference between his and Pound’s use of eschatological rhetoric and logic. 
Miller’s descriptions of the ‘Festival of Death’ can be read according to Comens’ 
categorizations of apocalyptic modes in Pound’s writing, resulting in a 
differentiation between Miller’s ‘perceptual revolution’ and Pound’s ‘historical or 
literal apocalyptic’. Indeed, taking Comens’ lead, Garland distinguishes between                                                              
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Miller’s interest in ‘the vocabulary of destruction … as hyperbole and global, 
eschatological prophecy’ and Pound’s ‘call for political revolution.’520 As we shall see, 
these categories are useful but not entirely stable – Miller is in fact more committed 
to his ‘prophecy’ and the socio-political changes it implies than the term ‘perceptual 
revolution’ allows for.   
The issue of whether we should implicate Miller in Pound’s national and racial 
essentialism – as discussed earlier – is complicated by Pound’s interest in Miller as a 
‘prophet’ of ‘End Times’, as well as by Pound’s growing fixation with the evils of the 
monetary system in post-war Europe and by Pound’s zealous conversion to the 
cause of economic ‘Social Credit’ and Italian fascism in the period when he wrote his 
review of Miller. Indeed, this correlation is both clarified and further complicated by 
Pound’s promotion of Miller as an important exposer of the evils of ‘usury’ in the 
early twentieth century. William Chace, K.K. Ruthven (Ezra Pound as Literary Critic , 
referenced throughout Chapter One) and Alec Marsh (‘Politics’, 2010), all focus on 
the economic basis behind Pound’s statements of support for fascism. As Chace puts 
it in The Political Identities of Ezra Pound and T.S. Eliot, Pound saw Mussolini’s 
totalitarian project as the sole possible ‘check’ on the ‘big lie’ of ‘capitalism’ in the 
aftermath of the Wall Street Crash.521 
In this context, the virtue that Miller and Pound associate with sincere responses to 
suffering must be read in the light of a realization of spiritual ‘death’ and ‘decay’ as 
something both immanent and inherent in the modernist project. They share the 
belief that images relating to the sensation of being alive within an emotionally and 
spiritually deadened world, situate true artists as the enlightened few amongst the 
‘cow-towing’, unenlightened many. Miller’s theory on the nourishment to be taken 
from suffering, on the spiritual regeneration and self autonomy derived from 
embracing physical and emotional hardship, take on new dimensions in this light.  
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Being alive begins with being awake to what Pound calls ‘the process’ and Miller ‘the 
death process’ or the ‘automatic infernal process’.522  
Taking its lead from Leon Surette’s conclusions on ‘the occult’ in early modernism, 
this chapter will treat Miller’s Cancer and Pound’s reading of it as idiosyncratic 
works that ‘capture and express a set of passions, fears, hopes, and errors that were 
ubiquitous in the political and cultural history of the first half of the century’.523 
Crucially, Pound reacts positively to Miller at a time when his own eschatological, 
economic and fascistic ideas are coming together to form a unified – albeit morally 
and often logically indefensible - theory of history. This points to various unlikely, 
fascinating similarities between the ways in which both writers absorb and manifest 
some dominant radical literary and political trends of the early twentieth century. 
Pound’s unusual cooption of Miller poses a set of fundamental questions: How can 
Pound, an elitist writer with an interest in clear and concrete writing have marked 
the professedly overelaborate, unrestrained and confessional Miller as a ‘prospect’? 
How can he have found such a strong sense of order in Miller’s muddled and ad hoc 
borrowings from philosophers like Spengler? Most importantly, how did Miller – so 
adamantly opposed to literature that preached a political or economic agenda – end 
up being boosted by Pound as a writer who understood the economic and racial 
‘process’?  By situating Miller within his particular scheme of social, economic and 
political morality, Pound does more than appropriate an emerging writer for his 
cause; he clears new ground for unexpected and crucial questions about Miller’s own 
complex textual response to eschatological, economic and fascistic ideas and tropes 




                                                             
522 Pound, Guide to Kulchur, p. 51-52; Miller, ‘An Open Letter to Surrealists 
Everywhere’, p. 194; Capricorn, p. 280.    
523 Surette, The Birth of Modernism, p. 290. 
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3.2 James Joyce and Henry Miller: ‘The retrospect’ vs. the ‘prospect’  
At the root of Pound’s perception of an infernal world in Cancer lies his belief that the 
narrator’s field of vision has expanded as a result of an involuntary social and 
economic descent. Miller the author/narrator is, Pound claims, ‘plunged into … the 
low life … by the destiny of our epoch, namely the monetary system’ (88). ‘The 
milieu of La Coupole [a Montmatre café synonymous in the 1920s and 30s with 
expatriate bohemian social life] is seen from somewhere near its nadir’, Pound goes 
on, producing a ‘circle of reference considerably wider than that of Joyce’s foetid 
Dublin, or the much more special inferno of [Lewis’] The Apes [Of God]’ (88).  
The comparison with James Joyce is crucial. As we have seen, Miller is praised for 
understanding and implementing Joyce’s premise that ‘there is no beauty without a 
corresponding disgust’ and for representing both the sordidness in the apparently 
beautiful and the beautiful in the apparently sordid. Pound compares Miller to Joyce 
because he sees him as achieving the equivalent ‘swift alternation of subjective 
beauty and external shabbiness, squalor and sordidness’,524 switching his attention 
seamlessly from destitute prostitutes by the city walls to ‘a finer appreciation of 
Mattise’s particular gift, than I have found anywhere else’ (89). Aesthetically, 
according to Pound, Miller shares Joyce’s talent for appreciating each scenario on its 
actual merits and without the sort of generalizing judgments that are standard in 
most works of literature. By this, Pound implies that Miller inherits Joyce’s flair for 
contrast, offsetting external squalor with the poetry of interior thought; ‘the contrast’, 
as Pound puts it in a 1918 letter to Joyce ‘between [Ulysses’ protagonist] Blooms [sic] 
poetry and his outward surroundings is excellent’.525  On closer inspection, however, 
it becomes clear that there is a vital connection between these descriptions of ‘scope’ 
and ‘a circle of reference’ in Joyce and Miller’s work and Pound’s idea of Miller as a 
‘victim’ of social and economic forces.  
                                                             
524 ‘Joyce’, p. 412. See my p. 91. 
525 Pound/Joyce: The Letters of Ezra Pound to James Joyce, ed. with commentary by 
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My earlier analysis of the Poundian Miller as virtuous and sincere in his suffering 
thus acquires heightened significance in the light of Pound’s wider historical and 
economic theories. His perception of Miller as ‘incurably healthy’ and a ‘natural’ 
sufferer is clearly related to his understanding of Cancer as an important text in a 
grander economic scheme (88). This scheme - inchoate in the 1910s reviews of Joyce, 
Lewis and Henry James - was developed in earnest in the late 1920s and the 1930s as 
economics began to take the place of literature as Pound’s principal area of interest. 
As K.K. Ruthven puts it in The Literary Essays of Ezra Pound, ‘by the middle of the 
1930s Pound had come to believe that the moment of literature had passed.526 “The 
vitality of thought now’ Ruthven quotes Pound writing, in a 1935 letter to his old 
University professor, ‘Bib’ Ibbotson ‘is in econ[omics]]’.527 Indeed, four works from 
the this later period - ABC of Economics (1933), Social Credit: An Impact (1935), Jefferson 
And/Or Mussolini (1935) and Guide to Kulchur (1938) - provide the basis of an 
economic theory that in crucial ways informs Pound’s aesthetic ideas. 
Through analysis of these works, this chapter will describe the radical economics 
that were integral to Pound’s opinions on literature in the 1920s and 30s and must be 
taken into account when interpreting his praise for Miller. In particular it will deal 
with Pound’s obsessive interest in ‘usury’ (defined in the Oxford English Dictionary 
as ‘the action or practice of lending money at unreasonably high rates of interest’528) 
as what Ruthven calls his ‘original sin’ at the root of a modern misalignment in 
linguistic, societal and sexual relations.529 It will be seen that Pound used economics 
to explain his concerns – delineated in Chapters One and Two - about the failure of 
abstract language to represent reality and of limited puritan ideas to express 
anything meaningful about sex. By focusing on the basic principle of usury – the 
growth of money from money alone – he thought he had identified the primal cause 
                                                             
526 Ruthven, p. 150. 
527 Pound, quoted in Ruthven, p.150. 
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of the literary and social evils that dominated his essays on writers like Joyce, Lewis 
and Henry James.  
In accordance with so much historical anti-Semitism, Pound’s hatred of usury also 
led to the programmatically racist ideas he propagated in the late 1930s and 40s. 
Crucially, he defines Miller as a writer of unparalleled relevance just as these 
intimations about usury are beginning to coalesce into a unified anti-capitalist, anti-
democratic and anti-Semitic economic and political theory. Having so far 
approached this controversial area of Pound’s worldview cautiously – in an attempt 
to avoid reductively focusing on his partisan appropriation of Miller at the expense 
of the more complex overtones of the Cancer review – I will now examine it alongside 
Miller’s own portrayal of an ‘inferno’ between the wars.  Over the following three 
sections, the ethical positions and eschatological imaginings of Miller’s narrator will 
be looked at in direct relation to Pound’s theories on usury, war, and fascism. In the 
process, it is important to note this is not an attempt to test the efficacy of Pound’s 
interwar theories – indeed, his extreme economic and political naivety has been 
successfully pointed out by various Poundian scholars, including Roger Griffin, Alec 
Marsh and Leon Surette. As Leon Surette notes, over the course of 1920s and 30s 
Pound became blinded by his ‘belief that he understood the au dela [the beyond], the 
world, and history was a fantasy. He was, after all, just a very talented poet, not a 
prophet or a seer.’530  
Before defining exactly what Pound means when he calls ‘the monetary system’ the 
‘destiny of the epoch’, it will be useful to go back a step and investigate the 
comparison of Joyce’s ‘foetid Dublin’ with Miller’s Paris.  The term refers to Joyce’s 
novel Ulysses (published in serialized form in 1918 and set over one day in June 
1904), which Pound took to represent the height of what could be done with 
literature in the years leading up to the First World War.531 In his 1922 review of 
                                                             
530 Surette, The Birth of Modernism, p. 36. 
531 Similarly, Wyndham Lewis’ 1930s novel The Apes of God is read by Pound as 
having violently exposed the cardinal sins of his age via the rarified setting of a few 
square miles in Bloomsbury. This is what he means when he writers about ‘the 
special inferno of The Apes’. In Lewis’ satire of 1920s London bohemia, Pound again 
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Ulysses, Pound writes that  ‘as far as matters beyond dispute, we must praise 
Ulysses’, going on to triumphantly declare that Joyce has ‘set out to do an inferno and 
has done an inferno’, suggesting an ambitious and successful attempt at capturing 
the evils of the pre-war period.532 For Pound, Miller’s significance depends on his 
ability to contribute to the 1930s what Joyce had to the 1900s and 1910s – namely, ‘an 
epoch-making report on the state of the human mind in the twentieth century’, 
reflecting the larger problems of its age by honestly recording the way that 
individuals in European cities thought and behaved.533 This reportage on the state of 
the times is what Pound refers to in the Cancer review when – as noted in Chapter 
Two – he writes that Miller ‘has very strongly a hierarchy of values. And in the 
present chaos this question of hierarchy has become almost as important as having 
values at all’ (88). 
If Pound depicts Joyce’s art as representative of Europe before the ‘Armageddon’ of 
The Great War, when he writes his review of Cancer he has begun to think of Miller 
as a post-apocalyptic, millennial artist.534 As we shall see, in his 1933 essay ‘Past 
History’ and in Guide to Kulchur Pound relegates Joyce to the category of ‘retrospect, 
not the prospect’. In the same period he promotes Miller in terms that suggest that, 
unlike Joyce, he is able to apprehend ‘the process as it is now going on’.535 Pound’s 
review of Cancer implies that Miller is alert where Joyce is ‘nearly unconscious’ to 
‘the dominant cleaving ideas of the last decade’.536 In order to understand Pound’s 
criteria for reading Miller in this way, it is first necessary to assess what Pound 
means and implies by ‘Joyce’s foetid Dublin’. What is the nature of the ‘inferno’ 
Pound sees in Joyce’s Ulysses? How does his reading of Miller at ‘the nadir’ of ‘milieu 
                                                                                                                                                                              
sees ‘sloppiness’ of expression as the principal target, delighting in Lewis’ exposition 
of the pretensions and hypocrisies of the London arts world. 
532 Ezra Pound, ‘Ulysses’, p. 406. 
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534 ‘Joyce’, p. 415 
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of the Coupole’ differ? In what ways – literary and philosophical - does he see the 
‘process’ of the 1930s reflected in Miller’s writing but ignored in Joyce’s? 
For Pound, Joyce’s early genius is his comprehension that many of the impurities of 
the modern world come directly from the imprecise use of language. As we saw in 
Chapter One, Pound’s literary essays and reviews of Joyce, Lewis and James 
consistently attribute the evils of the period to the inaccurate use of words in the 
public sphere. By adhering to Flaubert’s principle of the ‘mot juste’ – by respecting 
the direct relationship between ‘word and thing’ in each sentence and therefore 
fulfilling his primary responsibility as a writer - Joyce has exposed ‘the difference 
between reality and reality as represented in various lofty forms of expression’. This 
position is usefully summarized in Pound’s review of Joyce’s earlier novel, A Portrait 
of the Artist as a Young Man (1911): 
The obstructionist and the provincial are everywhere, and in them alone is 
the permanent danger to civilization. Clear, hard prose is the safeguard and 
should be valued as such. The mind accustomed to it will not be cheated or 
stampeded by national phrases and public emotionalities.537  
The clarity of Joyce’s prose, in other words, protects the reader’s mind not only from 
the tendency among ‘third rate’ writers like Wells, Shaw and Bennett towards 
‘abstraction’ – discussed in Chapter One - but from their provincialism (by which he 
means petty-mindedness rather than the political impulse towards decentralization) 
and jingoistic, reductive nationalism.538 More importantly, in his 1922 Ulysses review 
Pound goes on to claim that Joyce succeeds in satirizing ‘the various dead manners 
of language’, of ‘cliches and rhetoric’ instrumental in the civilization’s decline.539 By 
depicting ‘the variegation of thought’ of a range of characters in the specific locale 
and temporality of 1904 Dublin, Joyce has managed to demonstrate the psychological 
effects of a grossly inaccurate, corrupt and corruptive wider public discourse; a 
discourse that is overwhelmingly accepted by the majority of writers and artists, 
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themselves too assimilated to notice its malignancy.540 As Pound suggests in ‘Past 
History’, Joyce’s characters’ muddled streams of consciousness are the author’s 
deliberate attempt to show that the indistinct and false words used in the public 
domain – in journalism, government, the law-courts and literature – inevitably 
spread to the minds of individual citizens, contaminating their thoughts, values and 
actions:  
Ulysses is a summary of pre-war Europe, the blackness and mess and muddle 
of a “civilization” led by disguised forces and a bought press, the general 
sloppiness, the plight of the individual intelligence in that mess! [Leopold] 
Bloom [Joyce’s protagonist] very much is the mess.541  
If reading messy sentences leads one to have messy thoughts, the same can also be 
said for trivial ideas. In the ‘Ulysses’ review, Pound finds evidence for this in Joyce’s 
description of his protagonist’s wife Molly: 
Molly Bloom judges [Arthur] Griffith derisively by “the sincerity of his 
trousers,” and the Paris edition of the Tribune tells us that the tailors’ 
congress has declared Pres. Harding to be our best dressed Chief 
Magistrate.542  
These references to Irish and American politics (Arthur Griffith was the founder of 
Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army, and Warren Harding was 
the American President between 1921 and 1923), to the ‘Paris edition of the Tribune’, 
to ‘disguised forces’ and ‘a bought press’, hint at the complex web of conspiracy 
Pound identified as the cause of corrupt European and American foreign policy. In 
particular, he came to believe that international trade wars were conducted 
cooperatively by certain vested interests within all nations in order to uphold an evil 
financial system. As Alec Marsh explains in his 2010 essay ‘Politics’, ‘Pound believed 
that wars are made to create debt because under the perverse values of economic 
liberalism debt is equivalent to wealth.’543 Over the course of this chapter, we shall 
see that Pound’s reading of Miller was motivated by his search for writers who were                                                              
540 ‘Joyce’, p. 411. 
541 ‘Past History’, p. 251. 
542 ‘Ulysses’, p. 408. 
543 Alec Marsh ‘Politics’, in Ezra Pound in Context, ed. by Ira B. Nadel (Cambridge 
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capable of exposing and countering the damage wrought on individuals by 
pernicious and powerful elites. Indeed, his celebration of Miller as a ‘victim’ of ‘the 
monetary system’ is inextricably connected to his ideal of individuals battling against 
a ‘destiny’ determined by malevolent financial, political and industrial groups.544 
This is also the impetus, Marsh points out, for Pound’s promotion of fascist ideas in 
the 1930s and 40s: ‘[Pound saw Mussolini’s politics as] a check on the big lie that 
capitalism and political liberty were compatible’.545   
The connection between a highly politicized worldview and Pound’s literary critique 
are thus inseparable. Just as Pound sees ‘the blackness and mess and muddle of 
“civilization”’ reflected through specific literary and structural devices in Ulysses, his 
reading of Miller’s work cannot be divorced from his economic theories. According 
to Forrest Read in his introduction Pound/Joyce: The Letters of Ezra Pound to James 
Joyce, with Pound’s Essays on Joyce, ‘Joyce appeared to Pound as the great new urban 
writer, a great synthetic expresser of the modern consciousness’.546 By ‘modern 
consciousness’ Read refers to Pound’s admiration for Joyce’s ability to accurately 
depict ‘l’homme moyen sensual’ (the average sensual man), the city-dweller of medium 
intelligence who thinks sometimes intelligent, sometimes stupid, sometimes 
beautiful, sometimes ugly thoughts and experiences confused, intense and 
contradictory feelings. As Pound puts it in his Ulysses review: 
Bloom is … the man in the street, the next man, the public … l’homme moyen 
sensual; he is also Shakespeare, Ulysses, The Wandering Jew, the Daily Mail 
reader, the man who believes what he sees in the papers, Everyman, and “the 
goat” … πολλα … παθεν … κατα θυμον [he suffered all things … in his 
heart”, The Odyssey]547  
Again comparing him to Flaubert, Pound claims that both writers are adept at 
‘presenting all sorts of things that the average man of the period would have had in 
his head’.548 Though ‘the details of the street map are local’, he goes on, ‘Leopold 
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Bloom … is ubiquitous.’549 This ubiquity arises out of unpredictable thought and 
action, thus rendering Joyce’s ‘everyman’ more alive and accurately representative of 
individual subjective experience than Flaubert’s. As Pound puts it in a 1918 letter to 
Joyce: ‘[In Ulysses] anything might happen at any moment, while in [Flaubert’s 
novel] Bouvard [Bouvard et Pecuchet] they are anchored in the mud and even when 
some thing does happen you keep on feeling that nothing can.’550 For this reason, 
Pound exclaims in a 1918 unpublished note on the first serialized episodes of Ulysses, 
‘All Bloom is vital’ - he is a real human being who thinks and acts on moment-by-
moment impulses rather than a fixed representation of a set of ideas and values the 
author wishes to express.551  
Pound’s reading of an ‘inferno’ in Ulysses is aggressively critical of the conditions 
that have created ‘the modern consciousness’ but sympathetic towards Bloom as the 
hapless absorber and mimic of that mess: ‘Bloom suffers kata thumon [‘he feels it in 
his heart’]; “every fellow mousing round for his liver and his lights”: he is polumetis 
[“many-minded”, or “of many contrivings”] and a receiver of all things’552. These 
direct allusions to Homer’s Odyssey – the classical model for Joyce’s ‘schema’ in 
Ulysses – suggests the discrepancy between a sensory and emotional sensitivity that 
is timeless and an intellectual desensitization that blights the ‘modern 
consciousness’. The hell Pound believes ‘Joyce has set out to do’ is also the 
individual’s hell, created by his or her incurred inability to organize ideas and 
feelings. As the following passage from Ulysses shows, Bloom might receive and feel 
‘all things’ but he is unable to stay focused on one thought for long enough to 
process his impressions and produce intelligent or satisfying conclusions:  
Mild fire of wine kindled his veins. I wanted that badly. Felt so off colour. His 
eyes unhungrily saw shelves of tins, sardines, gaudy lobsters’ claws. All the 
odd things people pick up for food. Out of shells, periwinkles with a pin, off 
trees, snails out of the ground the French eat, out of the sea with bait on a 
hook. Silly fish learn nothing in a thousand years. If you didn’t know risky                                                              
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putting anything into your mouth. Poisonous berries. Johnny Magories. 
Roundness you think good. Gaudy colour warns you off. One fellow told 
another and so on. Try it on the dog first. Led on by the smell or the look. 
Tempting fruit. Ice cones. Cream. Instinct. Orangegroves for instance. Need 
artificial irrigation.553  
Bloom’s peripatetic thought process leads to an accumulation of endlessly 
unanswered questions and a sense of perpetual dissatisfaction. As Morton P. Levitt 
puts it in his 1972 essay A Hero of Our Time: Leopold Bloom and the Myth of Ulysses ‘the 
questions and answers of Bloom’s silent monologues suggest a kind of popular 
catechism of the rationalism of the age, that ethic of faith in reason to which Bloom is 
devoted but which has so patently failed him’.554 Because his mind is dominated by 
immediate instinctual reactions– like the dog in this passage, ‘led on by the smell or 
the look’ - he is doomed to search in vain for empirical causes, understanding 
everything vaguely and confusedly rather than clearly, in its wider intellectual 
context. Bloom’s ambling digression - from the scanning of the ‘shelves of tins’ at the 
bar, to ‘the odd things people pick up for food’, to the comment that ‘silly fish learn 
nothing in a thousand years’ then a rumination on the dangers of testing different 
kinds of food – thus represents for Pound the ‘sloppiness, the plight of the individual 
intelligence in that mess’.555 
By contrast, Pound’s depiction of Miller the author/narrator in the Cancer review 
suggests certainty in the face of external ‘sloppiness’. Where Joyce contributes to his 
epoch by using ‘clear, hard prose’ to express a mind helpless under contemporary 
pressures, Miller’s contribution to the 1930s is the literary documentation of his own 
ability to thrive rather than buckle at ‘the nadir’ of ‘the milieu of La Coupole’.556 In 
Pound’s scheme, Joyce diagnoses literary, social and political problems using a 
‘variegation of thoughts’ from other peoples’ heads but Miller counters them with 
his own uncontaminated thoughts: ‘he paints in honest colors life of the café 
international strata’ and he maintains a clear ‘sense of good and evil’ as well as a                                                              
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strong ‘hierarchy of values’.557 The following street scene from Cancer illustrates the 
point: 
Prowling around aimlessly. A beautiful day – so far. The Rue de Buci is alive, 
crawling. The bars wide open and the curbs lined with bicycles. All the meat 
and vegetable markets are in full swing. Arms loaded with truck bandaged in 
newspapers …High noon and here I am standing on an empty belly at the 
confluence of all these crooked lanes that reek with the odor of food … there’s 
a fever in the streets. Nothing like it anywhere, except perhaps on the East 
Side, or down around Chatham Square. The Rue de l’Echaude is seething. 
The streets twist and turn, at every angle a fresh hive of activity. Long queues 
of people with vegetables under their arms, turning in here and there with 
crisp, sparkling appetites. Nothing but food, food, food. Makes one delirious. 
(44-45) 
Like Joyce expressing Bloom’s thoughts, Miller the narrator purports to record each 
impression just as he receives it. Miller is equally ‘led on by the smell and the look’ of 
one image to the next, and from one idea to another in quick succession, giving the 
effect of a pair of eyes scanning the scene. Although his observations are abbreviated, 
like Bloom’s, to resemble the private thought process, they are more precise and 
purposeful. Miller might be ‘prowling around aimlessly’ but his thoughts are 
coherent, directed by assertions rather than questions. Indeed, his ideas are as 
unfounded as Bloom’s – ‘no where like it anywhere’ for example – but they are 
expressed with total confidence rather than doubtful speculation. Most importantly, 
Miller’s narrator differs from Bloom in his capacity to remain alert to the objects he is 
recording throughout the episode. His hunger dominates the scene - ‘crooked lanes 
that reek with the odor of food’, ‘walking about like a leper with crabs gnawing at 
my entrails’, ‘crisp sparkling appetites’ – but he is in control of rather than swamped 
by his instincts and the thoughts they produce. Contrasted with the melancholia 
induced in Bloom as he takes in the variety of strange foods available to him, Miller’s 
celebration of ‘crisp, sparkling appetites’ also suggests the difference between his 
American ‘optimism’ about consumption and the European pessimism of his friends, 
discussed in Chapter Two. Indeed, he explains his ‘really superb health’ in Cancer as 
a byproduct of being American: ‘Still have one foot in the nineteenth century … I’m a 
bit retarded, like most Americans. Carl finds this disgusting, this optimism: “I have                                                              
557 ‘Review of Tropic of Cancer’, p. 88. 
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only to talk about a meal,” he says, “and you’re radiant!”’ (56). If Pound sees Joyce’s 
protagonist as representative of the uncertainty and mess of the European ‘modern 
consciousness’, Miller’s freedom from that mess is also implicitly connected to the 
notion that he has resurrected a healthy, pre-modern American appetite.  
In many ways, Pound’s comparison of Miller with Joyce also echoes Miller’s own 
comparison of himself with the homeless neurotic Max in Max and the White 
Phagocytes. In relation to his poverty, his suffering, even the simple task of choosing 
between a cheap and expensive restaurant, Max is ‘bewildered. He’s lost all sense of 
values.’558 The hell Pound sees represented in Bloom’s streams of consciousness is a 
version – albeit a less extreme one - of the hell that Max endures. The Poundian 
Bloom is not terrified by the world as Max is – ‘I am crying and cant stop’ Max tells 
Miller, ‘I hear music playing in my ears, but in reality I hear screaming in the 
street’559 – but he is nevertheless hindered by his inability to define and order his 
perceptions and feelings: ‘All the odd things people pick up for food. Out of shells, 
periwinkles with a pin, off trees, snails out of the ground the French eat, out of the 
sea with bait on a hook. Silly fish learn nothing in a thousand years.’   
Thus Pound corroborates Miller’s own image of himself as superior to confused and 
inarticulate ordinary men who are unable to cope with the reality they perceive. 
Wondering the Parisian streets with the inconsolable Max, Miller feels ‘at peace with 
the world.’ ‘It’s the hour’, he goes on ‘when Paris produces almost the effect of music 
upon one. Each stop brings to the eye a new and surprising architectural order.’560 
Once again, Miller points out his ability to intuit a sense of order in the midst of his 
ostensibly disordered existence. Unlike Max – indeed, unlike Bloom – he has the 
wherewithal to still his thoughts and absorb the objective world in a clear and 
uncontaminated fashion. This is also indicative of the contradiction – discussed in 
Chapter Two – between his Bergsonian insistence that he is at ease within chaotic, 
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anarchical subjective reality and his deeper desire for a world that is more ordered 
and controlled.     
Beyond the contaminative effect of literature and journalism Pound, as previously 
mentioned, traces the principal cause of misalignment to the dominance of usurious 
banking practices. Indeed, usury lies at the heart of his conception of social, political 
and economic evil. He sees it as an unnatural practice ‘which,’ as K.K. Ruthven puts 
it, ‘by corrupting the benefits to be had from a “natural” economy, deferred 
endlessly the prospects of a just society’.561 By the 1930s, in fact, Pound is certain that 
the ‘growth of money from money alone’ has jilted the fundamental natural relations 
between people and things at all levels of existence – social, political, psychological, 
spiritual and sexual. Writing to his friend W.H.D. Rouse in 1934, Pound claimed ‘I 
have been for two years in a boil of fury with the dominant usury that impedes every 
human act, that keeps good books out of print, and pejorates everything’.562 
Pound’s identification of Joyce as ‘retrospective’ and diagnostic and Miller as 
prospective and curative comes from these changing ideas about ‘The Age of Usury’, 
a term coined in 1938’s Guide to Kulchur.563 In one of the many broadcasts he made for 
Italian government controlled Radio Rome during the Second World War, Pound 
went on to claim that Ulysses had ‘cooked up and served the unmitigated god damn 
stink’, suggesting a collective purging process facilitated by the transcription of the 
effects of economic evil.564 Similarly, in Guide to Kulchur he describes Joyce’s novel in 
terms of belching, vomiting and excretion; a scatological ‘answer’ as well as ‘the end, 
the summary’ to the 1910s:  
In 1912 or eleven I invoked whatever gods may exist, in the quatrain: Sweet 
christ from hell spew up some Rabelais,/To belch and … and to define 
today/In fitting fashion, and her monument/Heap up to her in fadeless 
excrement’ “Ulysses” I take as my answer … “Ulysses” is the end, the 
summary, of a period … the “age of usury”. The reader, who bothers to think,                                                              
561 Ruthven, p.151. 
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may now notice that in the new paideuma I am not including the 
monumental, the retrospect, but only the pro-spect.565 
In Pound’s socio-political-economic scheme, the term ‘paideuma’ means ‘the tangle 
or complex of the inrooted ideas of any period’, and it will be explored later in 
relation to Miller and Leo Frobenius, the archeologist and cultural anthropologist 
who coined it.566 When Pound talks in 1935 about a ‘new paideuma’ what he is 
getting at is a complex network of ideas that are definitive of that year. At this stage, 
however, it is important to note that the Joyce of Pound’s 1930s essay work is an 
artist who – by satire, or what Pound elsewhere calls ‘the Rabelaisian guffaw’ - 
represents the horror of the 1910s but whose vision is disconnected from current 
reality by an inability to render a new economic vision of Europe.567 According to 
Forrest Read, Joyce is ‘purged [by Pound] from the ranks of those who would define 
the present and prepare the future.’568  
Indeed, in his retrospective piece on Joyce, Pound goes on to discuss him as ‘ignorant 
[or] little concerned’ with the modern individual’s experience of life in a dramatically 
altered world: 
 A world in which technocracy has just knocked out all previous economic 
computations … in which the network of French banks and international 
munition sellers is just beginning to be expressible on the printed page; in 
which class-war has been, or is as I write this, simply going out of date …  
and being replaced by a different lineup or conflict.569 
Despite Miller’s own apparent lack of interest in practical economic problems, and 
the absence of references in Cancer to the new ‘world’ of ‘technocracy’, ‘French banks 
and international munitions sellers’, Pound sees him as representing the new ‘line-
up or conflict’ of Europe after World War One. A ‘chap called Miller’, he writes in a 
1934 letter to his lover Olga Rudge, ‘has written a bawdy that puts Joyce and Lewis 
                                                             
565 Guide to Kulchur, p. 96. 
566 Ibid., p. 57. 
567 ‘To Felix Schelling’, The Selected Letters of Ezra Pound, 1907-1941, July 8th 1922, p. 
181. 
568 Read (ed.), Pound/Joyce, p. 256. 
569 ‘Past History, p. 252.   
 223 
back in their cubby-holes: cause Miller is sane and without kinks’.570 If Joyce is 
presented as a pre-Armageddon voice, redundant in its aftermath, then Miller is seen 
as a writer who inspires hope for the future thereafter. In order to understand these 
opposite positions– and to fully appreciate the links Pound made between literature, 
society and economics between the 1910s and 30s - it is vital to explore his objection 
to ‘the growth of money from money alone’ and to relate this to Miller’s own ideas 
on economic bartering, exchange and exploitation. 
According to Pound, by practicing, facilitating and encouraging the earning of 
money from money alone, rather than in fair proportion to ‘work done’, the central 
banks of Western democratic nations have contaminated the value systems of the 
cultures they were designed to serve, from the daily running of the executive and 
legislature down to the behavior of each individual citizen. Usury or ‘usura’ – as he 
calls it in his 1937 canto of that name – represents a crime ‘against nature’: 
with usura, sin against nature,/is thy bread ever more of stale rags/ is thy 
bread dry as paper,/ with no mountain wheat, no strong flour/ with usura the 
line grows thick/ with usura is no clear demarcation …/ Stonecutter is kept 
from his stone/ weaver is kept from his loom/ WITH USURA/ wool comes not 
to market/ sheep bringeth no gain with usura/ … usura/ blunteth the needle 
in the maid’s hand/ … Usura slayeth the child in the womb/ It stayeth the 
young man’s courting/ It hath brought palsey to bed, lyeth/ between the 
young bride and her bridegroom/ CONTRA NATURAM.571 
His underlying premise is that usury causes the dislocation of the natural 
relationship between labor and production. The virtue of work lies in its manual 
rendering of the goods it eventually barters. Paper money should be understood as a 
‘promissory’ note of value, to be proportionately exchanged for goods according to 
their quality as well as the skill and effort that went into producing them. When 
money is regarded as an object of intrinsic value in and of itself, this natural 
relationship is hindered. As a consequence the skill of producers and the quality of 
goods inevitably fall into decline, leading to disastrous effects for the cultural health 
of the nation.                                                               
570 Pound, quoted in Read (ed.), Pound/Joyce, p. 256, December 1st 1934.  
571 ‘Canto 45 - With Usura’, Selected Cantos, pp. 67-68, p. 67. Originally published in 
The Fifth Decade of the Cantos XLII–LI (London: Faber & Faber, 1937). 
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Moreover, by lending money at interest rates that exceed the small percentage 
required for protection against non-payment, and by giving credence to the illusion 
that money is itself a ‘commodity’ rather than a ticket to be exchanged for a 
commodity, usurers are guilty of promoting ‘unnatural increase’.572  In Guide to 
Kulchur he expands on this theory, claiming that ‘the evils of usury’ lie in ‘the 
injustice of supposing that money ‘grows’ (vide Shylock, etc.), while goods perish.’573 
If a population becomes dependent upon a usurious banking system, the disease of 
‘unnatural increase’ works its way from the banking system into the working habits 
of its food producers, stonemasons, artisans, artists and inventors and ends by 
restricting the basic and vital function of sexual activity and reproduction (‘usura 
slayeth the child in the womb/ it stayeth the young man’s courting’).  
In this scheme then, usury causes the ‘dead manners of language’ represented and 
satirized by Joyce. Pound posits corrupt modes of economic exchange and growth as 
the primal reason for the ‘sentimento rhetorical journalism’ and ‘the blackness and 
mess and muddle of civilisation’ that finds its way into Bloom’s thought process.  
The ‘plight of the individual intelligence in that mess’ first takes shape through 
‘unnatural increase’ in monetary affairs, then spreads out to the newspapers and 
books before infecting the minds of individual readers. As we shall see in the 
following section, in the 1920s and 30s Pound became so convinced of the correlation 
between usury and language, creativity and thought that he believed he could ‘tell 
the bank-rate and component of tolerance of usury in any epoch by the quality of line 
in painting’.574 Indeed, elsewhere he writes that ‘the kind of thought which 
distinguishes good from evil, down into the details of commerce, rises into  … the 
clear definition of the word written’.575 The review of Cancer was written as Pound 
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was developing this method - pithily christened ‘usurocriticism’ by K.K. Ruthven - 
and it is in this context that its ‘circle of reference’ needs to be read.576   
If usurious art is discussed in the sexualized and reproductive terms of ‘unnatural 
increase’, Pound’s ideas about Miller’s healthy and uncontaminated thought process 
and ‘hierarchy of values’ can be reasonably connected to an opposing concept of 
‘natural increase’. Indeed, as we shall see in Section 3.3 ‘Miller’s Inferno: A Poundian 
Economic Reading of Tropic of Cancer’, Pound’s belief that Miller stands strong 
against the ‘destiny of the epoch – namely the monetary system’ is inseparable from 
his admiration for Miller’s approach to healthy sexual reproduction. Indeed, sex and 
economics are conflated in both writers’ thinking. In his 1986 study Language, 
Sexuality, Ideology in Ezra Pound’s the ‘Cantos’, Jean-Michel Rabaté makes the link 
between Pound’s animosity towards sexual puritanism and his identification of 
usury as the principal root of social evil. For Pound, Rabaté writes, ‘The difference 
between surplus and interest bears … heavily on sexual systems and moral codes’.577 
Rabaté goes on to quote Pound from his essay ‘Date Line’ (1934): 
Opposing systems of European morality go back to the opposed 
temperaments of those who thought copulation was good for the crops, and 
the opposed temperaments of those who thought it was bad for the crops.578 
‘Anti-flesh’ ideas and policies distort and damage human relations in much the same 
way as usurious economic systems, the existence of one implying the existence of the 
other. Indeed, in a 1921 interview with The New Yorker Pound described England’s 
recent conversion to high interest rate credit controls as a direct result of her 
‘insensitization’. A lack of sensitivity to bodily pleasure not only causes ‘dullness of 
mind’, the reduction of ‘intelleto’ referred to in the ‘Cavalcanti’ essay, but a reduction 
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in economic vitality: ‘I suppose the word sensitive gives an impression of femininity. 
And yet any scientist is anxious to have his instruments highly sensitized.’579  
The notion of usury as ‘unnatural increase’ thus connects in crucial ways with the 
anti-asceticism discussed in Chapter Two. Usury is understood as an asexual mode 
of reproduction whereby money makes new money without the necessary and 
natural contribution of the labor and the goods it relates to. We shall see that the 
figuration of the relationship between money and goods in natural and unnatural 
sexual and reproductive terms informs Pound and Miller’s shared interest in 
perpetual monetary circulation as a positive and purifying force. As Brian Soper puts 
it, Pound uses language in an attempt to liberate a stagnant monetary system - ‘his 
word tries to re-articulate an [economic and moral] world powerless to move on 
account of its many compound fractures’: 
the opposition of light, of chiarita, to the excremental, vertiginous obscurity, 
the turgidness of USURA, is everywhere present, and is seen by Pound to be 
moving forward, in the form given it by literary expression, towards 
something simple and self-contained.580  
By contrast to this idea, Miller’s own interest in perpetual circulation emphasized 
waste and excess through profligacy – in the monetary and linguistic sense as well as 
the sense of non-reproductive sexual activity. This, we shall see, is the source of a 
fundamental difference between Pound and Miller and evidence of the ways in 
which Pound – by contrast with Bataille - misreads Cancer economically. Where 
Pound sees a direct correlation between the serious writer’s use of words and an 
enlightened, sensible approach to monetary exchange, Miller’s belief that money is 
contaminative to humanity leads him to seek ways of sabotaging its conventional 
purpose by spending irresponsibly, without consideration of value. In other words, 
where Pound wants to rationalize the monetary system to improve society, Miller 
will be seen to advocate its de-rationalisation in the interest of reflecting anarchical 
desire and safeguarding individual freedom.  
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Pound’s objection to usury is linked to his approval of the straightforward national 
and racial categories, mentioned earlier, that he believes he finds in Cancer – ‘Miller’s 
Americans are very American, his orientals, very oriental and the Russians, oh quite 
so … the sense of the sphericality of the planets presides’.581 The reference to 
‘Shylock’ when he discusses usury in Guide to Kulchur points to a predictably racial 
dimension which also suggests that Pound’s perception of Miller as a victim of the 
monetary system might be connected to the more sinister supposition that he 
upholds racially and nationally essentialist values. As Leon Surrette, Alec Marsh and 
K.K Ruthven have noted, Pound became increasingly anti-Semitic in the 1920s and 
30s as his fixation on the economic evil of usury intensified. In Surette’s words, ’his 
anti-Semitism was motivated by a belief in a Jewish conspiracy.’582 All three scholars 
trace his regression from the first sporadic comments about ‘Jews and Jobbery’ 
(‘Salutation the Third’) then ‘Shylock, etc.’ to the viciously anti-Semitic outbursts of 
his Radio Rome broadcasts during World War Two.583 Having emigrated from Paris 
to Rapallo, Italy in 1924, Pound became a zealous supporter of Mussolini’s fascist 
cause and volunteered in December 1941 to rally English and American support via 
internationally broadcast state radio. ‘You let in the Jew and the Jew rotted your 
empire’ he told the British government and their people on March 15th 1942, ‘and you 
yourselves out-jewed the Jew’.584 ‘Your infamy is bound up with Judaea’ he went on, 
‘you can not touch a sore or a shame in your empire but you find a Mond, a Sassoon, 
or a Goldsmid’.585 Indeed, Pound consistently refers to usury as both a ‘Semitic’ and 
‘protestant’ sin in his essays of the early 1930s, with the historical figureheads of both 
religions castigated for their acceptance and encouragement of it: 
International usury is not entirely Jewish, but the evil done by the Jewish 
elements i.e international bleeding, is enough to explain hatred of Jewry ten 
times over. Nevertheless international usury contains more Calvinism,                                                              
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protestant sectarianism, than Judaism. Philosophically, the two forms of this 
monetary gangrene are pretty much the same.586   
 Significantly, Pound alludes to the connection between usury and religion in the 
Cancer review by crediting Miller with successfully opposing ‘the Protestant value-
scale’ and engendering a ‘return toward … catholicism’ (88). As we shall see in the 
next chapter Miller, Pound and Bataille’s approaches to Protestant morality and 
utilitarian economics all contain, in various forms, an opposition to Protestantism as 
the bulwark of a corruptive bourgeois value system. Despite his complicated textual 
relationship with both Protestantism and Judaism, however, Miller was not 
programmatically or economically anti-Semitic. He consistently caricatures Jewish 
friends like Michael Fraenkel and Max as ‘neurotic’ ‘sufferers’. More disconcertingly, 
in Capricorn there is a brief moment in which he expresses a deeply unpleasant 
nostalgia for his early childhood in Williamsburg, New York before ‘the invasion of 
the Jews’ but he does not attempt to blame economic corruption on the Jewish race.587 
It nonetheless remains important to explore Pound and Miller’s shared anxieties 
regarding the damaging misalignment of essential economic and social relations 
alongside these apparently anti-Semitic passages. As we will see in the following 
chapter, the nuances in Miller and Pound’s writing on Judaism must be weighed 
against each other – in particular, Pound’s consistent proclamations that usury is a 
‘Jewish’ evil and Miller’s desire to identify himself with and against ‘the Jews’ as a 
marginalized group.   
Pound’s anti-Semitic hunches developed it into a thoroughgoing, racialist economic 
worldview - in 1933, two years before he wrote the Cancer review. In that year he 
published his first fully-fledged economic treatise, The ABC of Economics, followed 
over the next five years by the three collections of economic and political works 
mentioned earlier  - Social Credit: An Impact and Jefferson and/or Mussolini in 1935 and 
Guide to Kulchur in 1938.  It will be helpful at this stage to get an overview of the 
international political-economic conspiracy theory that Pound developed as well as 
the economic solution into which he tried to fit Miller.                                                                
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In The ABC of Economics, Pound claims that his ‘duty’ is now to ‘think out a sane 
economics and to try to enforce it by that most violent of all means, the attempting to 
make people think.’588 By ‘sane economics’ he means specifically a set of reforms 
advocated by Major C.H. Douglas, an untrained and unorthodox American 
economist whose theories were gaining popularity in the wake of the Wall Street 
Crash and whom he met in the offices of The New Age, a London-based literary and 
political periodical they both contributed to.  Praising Douglas in his essay ‘He 
Pulled His Weight’, Pound writes ‘the actual battle with ignorance, in the acute 
phase wherein I shared, began with Douglas’s arrival’ in London.589 Indeed, 
throughout the 1920s and 30s Pound used his fame as a poet, literary critic and 
publicist to further Douglas’  ‘Social Credit’ cause, corresponding with influential 
economists and politicians to illicit their support, and publishing various reviews 
and articles on Douglas, including a contribution to 1935’s The Social Credit Pamphlets, 
a collection of pro-Douglas articles by the economist and his supporters. Tim 
Redman helpfully summarizes these concepts in his 1999 essay ‘Pound’s politics and 
economics’: 
The problem that Douglas attempted to remedy was that increases in 
productivity and the need for profit would lead to the eventual inability of a 
capitalist system to clear its markets; this inability led to dumping and 
layoffs, resulting in trade wars and depressions. To counter this problem, 
additional money had to be introduced into the system, and Douglas 
proposed to do this through the payment of an annual Social Credit dividend 
to all citizens.590 
As Redman suggests, Douglas believed that the Western world economic model was 
in trouble because of the discrepancy between an exponentially high rate of 
production and an equally low rate of ‘purchasing power’ among its citizens.591 The                                                              
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result was a state of ‘overproduction’ and ‘under-consumption’.592 Since goods were 
being produced regardless of peoples’ ability to buy and consume them, Douglas 
claimed, it was inevitable that supply outweighed demand, leading to ever more 
frequent ‘dumping’ of excess product as well as job ‘layoffs’. The consequence of this 
inverse and cyclical relationship between production and purchasing power, would 
lead to ‘trade wars’, and the only way in which the cycle could be disrupted was by 
rebalancing the relationship between production and purchasing power through a 
Social credit dividend to all citizens. Although the emphasis on commodities as a 
social driving force might immediately suggest the expansion of capitalism, in 
Political Identities of Ezra Pound and T.S. Eliot William Chace points out that Douglas’ 
theory is at root anti-capitalist, based on the belief that ‘capitalist production, by its 
very nature, inevitably creates surplus.’ 593 
Using the terminology and theorems presented by Douglas and other ‘Social Credit 
Cranks’ – a nickname given to Douglas’ supporters by a skeptical mainstream press - 
Pound was able to connect the ‘unnatural increase’ of usurious banking to the over 
production and under consumption of goods on a worldwide scale. Where his 
discussions of Ulysses are built around abstract pronouncements on financial avarice 
and institutional abuses of power, the essays of the thirties follow Douglas’ lead by 
engaging head-on with the nature of ‘money’, ‘labor’, ‘credit’ and ‘interest’ and the 
‘paradox between poverty and distress on the one hand and potential plenty on the 
other.’594 In Jefferson And Or Mussolini, Pound paraphrases Douglas:  
The way to solve the discrepancy between the goods on sale and the 
purchasing power of THE WHOLE PEOPLE, is by the issue of purchasing 
power DIRECTLY to the people, equitably and per person.595 
The moral basis of Pound’s Douglasite approach is helpfully illustrated by two of the 
economic tenets he sets out in Social Credit: An Impact: ‘1. Money is not a commodity; 
2. Work is not a commodity.’596 As in the Canto 46, ‘With Usura’, Pound deplores the                                                              
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contamination of a fair and natural system of exchange, only this time he couches his 
argument in the language of market economics. By treating money and work as 
articles of commerce to be sold independently of the products they represent and 
produce, bankers devalue the ancient, and fair relationship between labour and 
goods. Indeed, it is the belief that money and work are independent commodities to 
be sold, rather than exchanged, that drives the ‘stone cutter … from his stone’ and 
‘the weaver from his loom’, since it removes skill, quality and true value from the 
work-production equation.597 To focus on money and labour as means of making 
more money rather than feeding, clothing, sheltering, intellectually or sensually 
stimulating human beings, is to diminish and dilute the product, the craft that goes 
into its production and the human beings who make and use it.  These developing 
concerns about usury and the disconnection of the worker from his work will be seen 
in the next chapter to constitute a bizarre alignment between Pound and Bataille, 
whose theories of bartering and exchange arise out of an opposite Marxist-inspired 
political agenda, and whose astute observations on ‘la morale de Miller’ both 
elucidate and complicate the latter’s use of economic models in his writing.  
Crucially, Pound links his belief that ‘money is not a commodity’ to artistic and 
literary processes by thinking in terms of wasted potential. Wherever the economic 
focus is on production for the sake of accumulation rather than real need, the quality 
of objects – and particularly artistic objects – falls correspondingly into decline. The 
economic and social ‘paradox between poverty and distress on the one hand and 
potential plenty on the other’ is reflected in the paradox between a diminished 
investment in artistry and craftsmanship and the concurrent increased material 
wealth of the age. As Surette puts it, ‘Pound’s point is that we can no longer afford … 
fine things [beautiful cloth, stone, wool] even though the modern industrial world is 
far richer than the mediaeval craft world, which could afford them.’598 Indeed, in 
contrast to the pre-usurious middle-ages, the twentieth century is blighted by a 
combination of unprecedented material plentitude and artistic poverty, in the 
connected senses of material support for artists and the quality of the work they                                                              
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produce. Indeed, Pound saw it as an outrage, Surette writes, that ‘the twentieth 
century had less money for the arts than the fifteenth.’599 A production-centered 
economy driven by the buying and selling of money therefore sets the precedent for 
a society in which creativity is de-prioritized and diluted.   
Douglas’ ‘Social Credit’ theory provided Pound with a gratifying solution to this 
misalignment by proposing to reinstate the original promissory purpose of paper 
money. In its most basic components, Douglas writes in ‘The Use of Money’, the 
relationship between money and goods bartered resembles a ‘ticket system’.600 Like a 
ticket, a paper note of money should be thought of as a means of redeeming a 
product or experience that is equivalent to its value because of its quality and 
usefulness. This ticket should be valued for the goods and experiences it affords 
rather than coveted for its potential multiplying power. Indeed, according to 
Douglas: ‘[money] must be made to reflect the actual truth of the productive system 
and not attempt to control it. Finance must be made to follow industry and business 
and not control them.’601  
In his review of Douglas’ first book, Pound announces that the author’s ‘genius’ lies 
in his demystification of some basic but vital facts, obscured over time by 
irresponsible orthodox economists. Douglas, Pound suggests, bravely faces down a 
system infected by a form of insanity so deeply institutionalized that it is not only 
tolerated but rationalized by the mainstream academic establishment. Social Credit 
theory unpacks and lays bare, Pound says, the basic and proper function of each 
element in an economy, pointing out where and how these have been corrupted and 
where and how they have the potential to be restored. Douglas understands ‘the 
reason for growing food is to feed the people. The reason for weaving cloth is to 
clothe them. The function of a monetary system is to get the goods from where they 
are to the people that need them.’ 602  Pound’s support for Douglas’ ideas thus arises 
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from the desire to restore a sense of basic functionality to an economic system that 
has lost sight of its original purpose  
As section 3.3, ‘Miller’s Inferno: A Poundian Economic Reading of Tropic of Cancer’, 
will show, Pound’s disbelief and outrage at the unacknowledged madness of early 
twentieth-century capitalism is echoed not only in his review of Cancer but 
throughout the actual writing of Cancer and Capricorn. Although Miller advocates the 
individual’s freedom from this system rather than the need to regulate and reform it, 
he shared Pound’s belief that capitalism was a form of legitimized, institutionalized 
insanity. As he puts it in Cancer, ‘though the earth be rotting with good things, there 
is no time to pluck the fruits’ (188). Miller’s use of prostitution on multiple levels 
likewise presents an alternative moral code whose economic implications, 
principally in relation to work and financial prudence as slavery, seems to confirm 
the absurdity of so-called ‘normal’ work, of labor for money alone and of the earning 
of money from money. Though Pound was inherently more programmatic in his 
approach, Miller’s erratic invectives against capitalism and corrupt labour ethics are 
significant reasons for the affinity Pound feels with him.   
An aspect of Pound’s 1930s worldview that is more difficult to square with his 
interest in Miller is the connection he made between liberal democratic governments, 
international banking institutions and the companies that supplied weapons for war. 
Ruthven, Chace and Alec Marsh have all pointed out that, after T.E. Hulme and 
Henri Gaudier-Brzeska’s deaths in the First World War, one of Pound’s chief 
objectives was to uncover the economic and political reasons for its apparently 
purposeless carnage. As Chace writes, ‘Social Credit … offered … an astonishingly 
straightforward explanation’, enabling him to understand military conflict as a 
practice designed to preserve an international economic system that relied on the 
continual creation of debt to maintain momentum. 603Alec Marsh also addresses this 
in his essay ‘Politics’, writing that after meeting Douglas ‘Pound believed that wars 
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are made to create debt because under the perverse values of economic liberalism 
debt is equivalent to wealth’.604 
Thus, having initially hinted at the connection between vested economic interests in 
government and the outbreak of war, Pound came to see it as a deliberate conspiracy 
between governments, banks and arms companies to sustain the existing system. As 
Ruthven notes, Pound wrote in 1944 that ‘usurers provoke wars to impose 
monopolies in their own interests  … so that they can get the world by the throat’.605 
Indeed, seven years before – in 1937 - he refused to contribute to his friend Nancy 
Cunard’s survey, Authors Take Sides On the Spanish Civil War, claiming that the war 
‘had occurred so that $1 of petrol [could] be sold for $5.’  Just as in the First World 
War, he goes on, ‘the kikes were financing both sides’.606 For Pound, ‘the network of 
[Jewish run] French banks and international munition sellers’ are embroiled in an 
ongoing conspiracy to force European governments into conflict with one another: 
‘the creation of wars by competing nations demanding foreign outlets for their 
immobilized goods.’607  
These ideas also catalyzed Pound’s rejection of liberal democracy in favor of 
Mussolini’s fascism. In Jefferson And/Or Mussolini, his pamphlet defending the Italian 
leader from liberal attack, Pound rounds on the British government for pandering to 
‘the unscrupulous bankers [and] a few gangs of munitions vendors’.608  Thus he 
associates the ‘insanity’ of international monetary affairs with weak and hypocritical 
liberal democracies of England, France and America who refuse to stand up to 
international Jewish usurers. As Chace notes in The Political Identities of T.S. Eliot and 
Ezra Pound, Pound’s essays between the late 1910s and the 1930s demonstrate ‘an 
extreme revulsion against liberal democracy … paralleled in few other writers of the 
century’.609 Similarly, Michael North points out Pound’s disgust, in 1938’s Guide to                                                              
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Kulchur, with what he saw as the contamination of British democracy by ‘the running 
sore’ of ‘liberalism’.610 In Mussolini’s fascist government, conversely, he saw the best 
chance of facing down ‘the kikes’, installing a ‘“sane economic system” and avoiding 
military conflict. Indeed, as Alec Marsh explains, the great irony of Pound’s support 
for the totalitarian Italian fascist state was that it was initially motivated by a naïvely 
idealistic ‘anti-war’ and anti-repressive sentiment. He saw Mussolini’s absolute 
dictatorship, Marsh says, as the one hope Europe had of applying ‘a check on the big 
lie that capitalism and political liberty were compatible’.611  
In this scheme, the ‘god-damn stink’ Pound sees ‘cooked up’ in Joyce’s Ulysses refers 
not only to corrupt language and banking but to the liberal democratic politicians 
who led Europe into the First World War; moreover, the positive solution he sees 
represented in Miller’s Cancer is invariably tied into a vision of the future in which 
Mussolini’s fascism protects the world from economic evil and military conflict.612 
Indeed, Pound writes in his essay ‘Joyce’ that ‘If Armageddon has taught us 
anything, it should be to abominate the tellers of half-truths’.613 He goes on to attack 
Lloyd George, who ‘took the legislative power out of the hands of the legislators and 
left it for wranglers and pettifoggers, to be construed to the gang’s greatest 
advantage.’614 By the time Pound promotes Miller’s ‘hierarchy of values’ in ‘the 
present chaos’, he has made the case for Mussolini as a ‘constructive’ alternative to 
the corrupt and ineffectual leaders of every other Western state.  In Jefferson And/Or 
Mussolini, which affirms a kinship between Mussolini’s dictatorship and the paternal 
agrarian politics of eighteenth-century American president Thomas Jefferson, he 
writes ‘the problem of democracy is whether its alleged system, its de jure system, 
can still be handled by the men of good will; whether real issues as distinct from red 
herrings CAN be forced into the legislatures (House and Senate).’615 By contrast to 
                                                             
610 Michael North, The Political Aesthetics of Yeats, Pound and Eliot (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 2.   
611 Marsh, p. 99. 
612 Pound, quoted in Pound/Joyce, ed. by Read, p. 267. 
613 ‘Joyce’, p. 415.  
614 Ibid. p. 415. 
615 Jefferson And/Or Mussolini, pp. 103-04 
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this corrupt and irresponsible façade, the totalitarian state of ‘modern Italy is a fact 
and not merely theory’.616 ‘Mussolini’ ‘has done something, constructive or otherwise. 
While the others have merely talked.’ 617 As Leon Surette points out:   
Among the features of Mussolini’s fascism that appealed to Pound was its 
pretension to be the beginning of a new and wonderful era, the era fascista … 
Pound thought Mussolini was his man of destiny. He believed that the past 
holds the key to a glorious future but that the key has been bent by stupidity 
and veniality. He thought that if we could identify and assemble those ideas 
suited to “go into action,” if we could support the geniuses who produce 
those ideas, and if we could promulgate them to the world, we could 
probably generate a utopian future, a new age.618   
Pound praises Miller as a heroic persona in similar terms to those he uses to praise 
Mussolini – a crossover that sheds new and important light on the potentially 
fascistic overtones in Miller’s own writing. In the following section, Miller’s writing 
will be assessed in the context of this binary model of economic, social and literary 
good and evil. In what ways does Miller genuinely offer Pound an alternative to 
what he sees as the contaminated, usurious literature of his age? In what ways does 
Cancer corroborate the Social Credit ideas promoted throughout Pound’s economic 
essays of the 1930s? As we will see, Miller is fundamentally concerned with the 
individual rather than society’s potential for change. In this sense, he both correlates 
with and diverges from Pound’s beliefs about the ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ relations 
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3.3 Miller’s Inferno: A Poundian economic reading of Tropic of Cancer 
‘All this is scatological, eschatological and ecumenical. It is forbidden. Verboten. And 
so the Land of Fuck becomes ever more receding; it becomes mythological.’ Henry 
Miller, Capricorn619 
‘I was one, a single entity in the midst of the greatest jamboree of wealth and 
happiness (statistical wealth, statistical happiness) but I never met a man who was 
truly wealthy or truly happy. At least I knew I was unhappy, unwealthy, out of 
whack and out of step. That was my only solace, my only joy.’ Henry Miller, 
Capricorn620 
 
If it is surprising that Pound identified ‘a hierarchy of values’ in Miller’s work, it is 
even more surprising that he promotes him as a writer actively engaged with 
economics. There is, indeed, no mention in Cancer of ‘usura’, ‘technocracy’, 
‘economic computations’ or any of the other ‘dominant, cleaving issues’ that Pound 
accuses Joyce of ignoring.621 On the surface, it appears entirely incongruous for 
Pound to speak of Miller in this way, particularly as these economic criteria led 
Pound to excommunicate almost all the contemporaries he had previously professed 
to admire. Beyond Joyce and Lewis  - ‘put back in their proper cubby-holes’ by 
Miller’s writing - he chastised his friends and mentees Robert McAlmon and Ernest 
Hemingway, writing to McAlmon in 1934 that by ‘not recognizing the economic 
factor you …. have limited yr. work’.622 Indeed, Pound attacks McAlmon and 
Hemingway’s choices of subject matter, claiming that ‘‘people too lazy to examine 
the facts are not intelligent enough to write interesting books (reduced to bulls 
[Hemmingway] and memoirs [McAlmon] depending on personalities).’623 
It is also important to remember that Miller was aware of and bemused by Pound’s 
interest in him as an ‘economic’ writer. Before reviewing Cancer, Pound wrote Miller 
a short letter extolling the novel’s virtues but also querying why more was not made 
of ‘the money issue’: ‘Though you realize the force of money AS destiny’, Pound                                                              
619 Capricorn, p. 176 
620 Ibid., p. 12. 
621 Pound, Pound/Joyce, p. 256. 
622 Ibid., p. 256; ‘Pound to McAlmon’, in Pound/Joyce, p. 255, February 2nd 1934.   
623 Ibid., p. 255. 
 238 
wrote, ‘the one question you haven’t asked yourself is: What IS money? who makes 
it/ how does it get that way?’.624 Miller would later complain to Lawrence Durrell 
that James Laughlin, his publisher at New Directions between 1938 and 1950 and a 
sometime protégé of Pound’s, ‘had got word … that he [Pound] would promote the 
book if I would swing the bat for his crazy social credit theories.’625 Miller responded 
by producing a satirical economic treatise with Pound’s exact suggestion as its title. 
Money and How it Gets that Way is a send-up of economic jargon and of a literary 
celebrity like Pound’s attempt to involve himself in economics; the treatise is ‘a 
burlesque’ Miller puts it in a 1939 letter to his friend Gerhsam Legman, ‘on the 
pedagogical style.’626 While the book is deliberately nonsensical (Miller also called it 
‘a hilarious farce meaning absolutely nothing’), it gives a good indication of Miller’s 
irreverence for a topic Pound treated with the utmost seriousness as well as 
revealing some of his genuine ideas on money that exist beneath the surface of his 
spoofing.627 As we shall see over the following section, Miller vacillates between the 
assumption that the study of money is futile or ‘idle’- ‘Money is’, he writes in Money 
and How it Gets that Way ‘and whatever form or shape it may assume it is never more 
nor less than money. To inquire therefore how it comes about that money has become 
what it is now is as idle as to inquire what makes evolution’ – and various serious 
declarations about protestant, capitalist economic morality that suggest the need for 
radical reform.628    
Indeed, despite Miller’s misgivings and mockeries, there are ways in which Cancer 
can be read as an implicit critique of the economic system Pound despised. Not only 
does Cancer address these larger economic issues allegorically it also incorporates 
commodities, production and labor in complex ways. In this context, Georges                                                              
624 Gunther Stuhlmann (ed.), Henry Miller: Letters To Anaïs Nin (London: Shelden 
Press, 1979), p.162, December 4th 1934. 
625 The Durrell-Miller Letters, p. 69, April 5th 1937 
626 ‘Henry Miller to Gerhsam Legman’ (1939), quoted by James Decker, ‘Money and 
How it Gets that Way’, Nexus: The International Henry Miller Journal , 1 (2008). 
<http://cosmotc.blogspot.co.uk/2008/03/money-and-how-it-gets-that-way.httml> 
Accessed 13th January 2014, [para. 1 of 8]. 
627 Ibid., p.26 
628 Money and How it Gets that Way (Paris: Booster Publications, 1937), p. 14. 
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Bataille provides a philosophical bridge between Miller and Pound’s approaches to 
capitalism since he reads Miller as a writer engaged in ‘a search for moral values lost’ 
for economic reasons that contradict but also correlate with Pound’s.629 Indeed, 
Bataille’s essay ‘La Morale de Miller’ (1946) is part of a wider sociological 
comparison - between the ‘natural’ sacrificial economies of Aztec and indigenous 
North American societies and the ‘unnatural’ economic systems of modern western 
societies - that bears an incongruous but striking resemblance to Pound’s economic 
theory. Written for ‘Defense de Miller’, a special issue of the Parisian periodical 
Critique devoted to defending Miler against impending obscenity charges, Bataille’s 
essay will be read alongside some of his social anthropological and economic essays 
and longer works to illuminate Pound’s interpretation of Cancer as an economically 
engaged work of literature. The fact that Pound categorized both Miller and 
Mussolini as uncommonly ‘sane’ men opens up some pressing questions as to 
Miller’s ethical and economic approach as well as implying a certain rationale behind 
Miller’s writing that also connects him to Bataille’s economic and literary ideas.  
Pound’s identification of the ‘economic factor’ in Cancer resides, partly, in a reading 
of the narrative as an accurate reflection of the individual’s subjective experience 
under the pressures of ‘the monetary system’. ‘No one man in a thousand’ he writes 
in The ABC of Economics ‘can be aroused to an interest in economics until he definitely 
suffers from the effects of an evil system’.630 In his review of Cancer, Pound defines 
Miller as a writer of prospect because his perspective has been unclouded by his 
exposure to the fundamental economic evils of the period. As opposed to the current 
crop of writers who, he says in his letter to McAlmon, are busy ‘fussing with in’nards 
which are merely the result of economic pressure’, Miller reports truthfully on the 
direct impact of a usurious banking system, of the illogical and unjustifiable 
‘paradox between poverty and distress on the one hand and potential plenty on the 
other’.631 Moreover, Miller is presented as an antidote to what Pound calls the ‘damn 
                                                             
629 Bataille, ‘La Morale de Miller’, p. 1. 
630 ABC of Economics, p. 34. 
631  ‘Pound to McAlmon’, in Pound/Joyce, p. 255; Douglas, ‘The Use of Money’, p. 30. 
 240 
rot’ of ‘psychology’ and self-indulgent introspection.632 Here is a writer who, 
enlightened by his social and economic degeneration, is able to identify the impact 
on the individual of the malevolent governmental, economic and industrial forces 
that have corrupted the world.  
Thus Pound again posits Miller as a ‘cure’ but this time as an antidote to the 
decadent influence of psychoanalysis on literature. In a section of Jefferson And/Or 
Mussolini entitled ‘Freud’, Pound rails against literary art that follows the 
psychoanalytical path, dismissively claiming that it represents ‘the flower of a 
deliquescent society going to pot.’ ‘The average human head’, he goes on, ‘is less in 
need of having something removed from it, than of having something inserted.’633 
This is a far cry from the 1922 review of Ulysses in which Pound praises Joyce for the 
psychoanalytical complexity in his depiction of Molly Bloom: ‘her ultimate 
meditations are uncensored (bow to the psychoanalysis required at this point). The 
“censor” in the Freudian sense is removed’.634  
Indeed, Joyce, Lewis, McAlmon and Hemingway are all criticized for producing 
introspective works that deal with the trivial anxieties of the ordinary human mind, 
indulging their own and their readers’ childish desires for catharsis. Calling to mind 
his 1938 description of Joyce as a writer who ‘answered his invocation to “spew up 
some Rabellais to define the age”’, in 1922 Pound writes to American educator Felix 
Schelling that now ‘it isn’t enough to give the Rabelaisian guffaw’.635 Art should 
instead operate towards an understanding of ‘the facts’, by which he means the great 
economic pressures that cause those anxieties in the first place. This attack on 
introspective, psychoanalytical literature – made through Pound’s use of the term 
‘katharciser’ [sic] as an insult for Joyce – implies that Miller is the originator of a new 
kind of confessional prose. Lampooning Joyce, caricaturing him as ‘Jim drunk 
occupied with the crumb on his weskit’, while at roughly the same time praising 
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Miller for his enlarged ‘circle of reference’, Pound suggests that Cancer represents a 
new explorative approach to subjective experience.636 
Pound’s shift in positions on the subject of literary catharsis reveals another paradox 
inherent in his support for Miller. Indeed, we saw in Chapter Two that Miller located 
his own means of catharsis in the irreverent transgression of societal taboos; 
specifically, the uninhibited expression of sexual obscenity.  If, as Miller put it, Cancer 
represents an author ‘coming out with it cold’ in order to purge himself of harmful, 
repressive fears and anxieties,637 then Pound’s disdain for Joyce as ‘katharciser’, 
‘occupied with the crumb on his weskit’ could apply to Miller as well. Why, then, 
does Pound read Miller’s own inspection of himself as a truer, more productive form 
of catharsis?         
In Jefferson And/Or Mussolini, Pound criticizes literature that limits itself to a 
diagnosis of the individual’s suffering and stops short of seeking either cause or cure. 
If Joyce’s ‘foecal’ analysis had served a useful purpose in its time, what is now 
required of confessional literature is something altogether more constructive - ‘That 
which makes a man forget his bellyache (physical or psychic) is probably as healthy 
as concentration of his attention on the analysis of the products or educts of a 
stomach-pump.’638Thus Miller satisfies his desire for a literary figure who, in 
plumbing the depths of his everyday existence, not only proves the veniality of a 
usurious and ‘unnatural’ economy but prepares the way for a healthier life. Indeed, 
as mentioned in Section 3.1, the Miller of Pound’s review passes what Chace, in 
Political Identities in Ezra Pound, describes as Pound’s litmus test for the 1930s artist: 
[For Pound] The test of man is his ability to endure the contemporary hell 
contrived by usurers and, moreover, to so describe its shape and feel that the 
preciseness of his description will serve the struggle of all others so 
imprisoned.639 
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Miller’s ‘honesty’, according to Pound, arises from his position as a man who has ‘no 
money’ and whose ‘major preoccupation is ‘FOOD’’.640 Thus Pound not only 
categorizes Miller as virtuous for honestly representing his physical, stomachic 
suffering, he understands him as someone who reaffirms the core values and truths 
that occur at the ‘nadir’ of a personal inferno, here represented by ‘the café 
international strata’ (88). His hunger intensified at the center of the inferno, the 
lowest point of ‘the low-life’, Miller is able to identify and delineate a positive and 
instructive ‘hierarchy of values’ (88).  
Thus Miller and Pound’s shared ideas about the moral truth that is revealed by 
physical suffering and immediate instinctual desire also apply to the notion of 
hunger for food.  As this chapter progresses, we shall see that Pound’s location of 
Miller at the  ‘nadir’ in Cancer connects to both of their more expansive interests in 
values that transcend the history of intellectual ideas and unite people viscerally 
across epochs. This – we shall see in Section 3.4 - is a crucial reason for their common 
interest in the problematic culturally essentialist ideas of Leo Frobenius and Oswald 
Spengler, the stomach acting as the organ in which human beings from every period 
have been able to discern a set of virtues and truths. As importantly, hunger also 
highlights a fundamental difference between Pound and Miller’s representation of 
society and economy.641 In contrast to Pound’s situating of all literary, social and 
political evil in usury, Miller critiques economic relations in order to explore the 
metaphysical issue of what exactly constitutes humanity. In humanity’s unhealthy 
relationship with desire and the perpetual, simultaneous need and inability to 
expend energy, lies the key to Miller’s economics.                                                               
640 ‘Review of Tropic of Cancer’, p. 88. 
641 Miller’s representation of his immediate, day-to-day hunger – for food and sex – 
while he tramps the streets of Paris, was directly informed by his reading of Knut 
Hamsun. Hamsun’s most successful book, entitled simply Hunger, is talked about by 
Miller in The Books In My Life as a major influence on his work – ‘in the early stages of 
my career it was Knut Hamsun whom I idolized, whom I most desired to imitate’ 
(‘Blaise Cendrars’, in The Best of Henry Miller. ed. by Durrell, pp. 327-353, p. 327. 
Originally published in The Books of My Life (New York: New Directions, 1952)). It 
was partly through Hamsun, that Miller explored the idea – dealt with in Chapter 
Two of this thesis - of physical hunger as a means of removing false and hypocritical 
questions of conscience and moral judgment from the experience of daily living.  
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It follows that, although Pound conspicuously neglects to support his claims 
regarding Miller’s understanding of money, there is evidence in Cancer of an interest 
in modern systems of industry and commerce as ‘unnatural’ and of the desirability 
of more straightforward modes of exchange. Indeed, the ‘shape and feel’ of the ‘hell 
contrived by usurers’ in Pound’s world can be traced in both the legitimate and 
illegitimate worlds of employment in Cancer. Pound’s mission statement in ABC of 
Economics, to demystify the monetary system and return its various components to 
their basic functions, is epitomized in Miller’s veneration of prostitution at the 
expense of more socially acceptable professions. Miller was enamored, as Caroline 
Blinder points out, with the often criminal social and economic life he observed in 
working-class cafes, identifying his own quest to escape the fixed conditions of a 
repressive economic system with a system he took to represent a freer way of living:  
Miller … took great pride in [his] local working-class cafes, and saw [his] own 
ability to move from high to low culture as a sign of independence from 
traditional economic pressures.642  
It is through an analysis of his visits to these cafes, as well as Parisian working class 
bars and brothels, that Pound’s Douglasite pronouncements on the corruption of 
societal relationships  - between currency and goods, employees and their 
employment, men and women - can be traced.  
Moreover, various essays by Georges Bataille – dealing with economics, fascism and, 
most importantly, Miller’s moral code - will be used to clarify related links and 
points of departure between Pound and Miller. Pound and Bataille share an interest 
in anthropology that leads them towards curiously similar readings of Miller as a 
morally certain writer. Despite the fact that Bataille comes at these issues from a 
Marxist and social anthropological perspective and Pound, from a partly 
conservative, partly anti-ideological one, they also share a belief in the system of 
economics as a misaligned and non-operable entity in the 1930s. In his collection of 
essays Visions of Excess and his 1949 economic study The Accursed Share, Bataille 
performs a reading of Aztec and indigenous North American human sacrifice and 
the systems of expenditure that grew up around it; in particular ‘Potlach’, a North                                                              
642 Blinder, Sexual Aesthetics, p. 21. 
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American tribal custom that involved ‘the solemn giving of considerable riches, 
offered by a chief to his rival for the purpose of humiliating, challenging and 
obligating him’.643 Bataille is interested in the psychological forces that govern 
human behavior and the origins of economic activity in ‘the biosphere’ rather than 
rational analysis.644 By looking more closely at Pound and Bataille’s ideological 
differences, while pointing out areas of crossover, it is possible to place Miller in the 
wider context of radical responses to economic instability in the inter-war period and 
thus build a clearer picture of the economic, social and psychological ‘inferno’ Miller 
represents in Cancer.  
Crucially, Bataille and Pound are united by their interest in usury as a symbol of 
Protestant corruption. Where Bataille reads Miller as celebrating waste and excess, 
Pound admires his moral code for its restoration of a natural balance and health. The 
intricacies of these two interpretations will be teased out to produce a more complex 
reading of Miller’s approach to acquisition as another example of his contradictorily 
excessive and conservative drives. This also helps elucidate the tension between the 
aforementioned desire for and anxiety about expenditure – in both the sexual and 
monetary sense – most evident in his descriptions of prostitutes.  
As we saw in Chapter Two, Miller posits the underworld inhabited by the pimps and 
prostitutes in Cancer as a more honest and liberated marketplace than the one in 
which he and his colleagues at The Chicago Tribune operate. In contrast to the 
reporters and editors at his office - compared to ‘frogs dancing around like drunken 
squibs’ - the prostitute Lucienne, who dines with her pimp lover at the cafe between 
her shifts, is depicted as powerful, dangerous and splendidly transcendent - ‘a silver 
condor suspended over the sluggish tide of traffic … sailing down the boulevard 
with her wings outstretched’ (164-65). Unlike the tired, socially successful men who 
work frenetically all day, Lucienne is the mistress of her own destiny and 
transgressions. She is, Miller writes, ‘no wage slave’ (160).  
                                                             
643 Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share (Zone Books: New York, 1988 (orig. ed.: 
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644 Ibid., p.21. 
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Miller’s belief that the transgression of taboo affirms the individual’s humanity is 
rooted in a celebratory analysis of the illegal money that changes hands between the 
prostitutes, their pimps and clients on the Rue Lafayette. For Miller, this black 
market economy is representative of a fluid, positive counterforce to the stagnant 
and negative flow of legal tender from citizen to business, to bank to the stock 
market.  The sullied, crumpled notes exchanged for sex symbolize a direct 
relationship between human work and reward: 
Every bar is alive, throbbing, the dice loaded; the cashiers are perched like 
vultures on their high stools and the money they handle has a human stink to 
it. There is no equivalent in the Bank of France for the blood money that 
passes currency here, the money that glistens from human sweat, that passes 
like a forest fire from hand to hand and leaves behind it a smoke and stench. 
A man who can walk through the Fauberg Montmartre at night without 
panting or sweating, without a prayer or a curse on his lips, a man like that 
has no balls, and if he has, then he ought to be castrated. (163) 
The money is vitalized by the fact that the goods it buys are animate and bodily, 
because it fulfills the natural, human desire for satisfaction of the flesh rather than 
material acquisition. Its ‘human stink’ substantiates it whereas the clean, untainted 
bank notes in the vaults of the Bank of France are disconnected from any live 
activity. More importantly, the currency that circulates in the Fauberg Montmartre 
directly participates in the universal life process through its facilitation of sexual 
activity. 
The ‘human sweat’ that ‘glistens’ on these notes suggests sap on a leaf, a layer of 
moisture that gathers naturally and is caught tantalizingly in sunlight. By equating 
human bodily fluid with the organic excretions of the natural world, Miller creates 
an unsettling, pungent effect, calling to mind another episode in Cancer in which he 
and his wife lie together, post-coital and sated: ‘The heavy bedroom. Breathing 
regularly through the gills, sap still oozing from between her legs’ (27). The words 
‘sap’ and ‘oozing’ imply the primordial origins of the sexual act and produce an 
image that is both abundant and repellent. Added to this, the image of the notes 
passing ‘like a forest fire from hand to hand’ is reminiscent of the universal charge 
that Miller remembers from his sexual encounters with Germaine: 
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All the men she’s been with and now you, just you, and barges going by, 
masts and hulls, the whole damned current of life flowing through you, 
though her, through all the guys behind you and after you (51).  
Miller’s conception of the opposite, negative flow is illustrated in his recollection of a 
busy New York street in Tropic of Capricorn:  
To walk in money through the night crowd, protected by money, lulled by 
money, dulled by money, the crowd itself a money, the breath money, no 
least single object anywhere that is not money, money, money everywhere 
and still not enough, and then no money or a little money or less money or 
more money, but money, always money, and if you have money or you don’t 
have money it is the money that counts and money makes money, but what 
makes money make money? (108) 
In contrast to the seedy, decrepit Parisian quartier, ‘alive, throbbing with the dice 
loaded’, the clean, wealthy and modern American setting is sterile and lifeless. 
Rather than an agent for human activity, marked and stained by the humans who 
use it, money here is an independent, omnipresent and dominant force. The vitality 
of the Parisian scene is partly sourced from a sense of menace, of imminent danger 
that is entirely missing here. Swaddled or ‘lulled’ by the money in their pockets and 
on show in the new and impressive buildings and lights around them, the 
Manhattan crowd is removed from the vital current of life that electrifies and 
sustains the prostitutes’ district in Cancer. Indeed, while the experience of walking 
past the prostitutes in the Fauberg Montmartre induces perspiration and a panicked 
shortening of breath - ‘panting ... sweating’ -in New York a person’s very breath is 
‘money’, their quick and urgent emotions having been neutralized by the hyper-
commercial atmosphere of the street.  
Thus Miller shares Pound’s horror at the dehumanizing power bestowed on money.  
In this respect, they both see it as an independent commodity with an allure that 
supersedes the goods it affords. Miller’s improvisational riff, with its frenzied 
repetition of the word ‘money’, reads in part like a parody of the con artist 
salesman’s spiel, in part the madman’s soliloquy. ‘It is the money that counts’ not the 
‘object’ it buys, the actual value of each object having been subsumed by its price tag 
– there is ‘no least single object anywhere that is not money’. Again describing his job 
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at the newspaper, Miller posits the capitalist approach to money and labor as 
examples of a ‘debauchery’ of ideas:  
What is … strange is that the absence of any relationship between ideas and 
living causes us no anguish, no discomfort. We have become so adjusted that, 
if tomorrow we were ordered to walk on our hands, we would do so without 
the slightest protest. Provided, of course, that the paper came out as usual. 
And that we touched our pay regularly … We have become coolies, white-
collar coolies, silenced by a handful of rice each day. (158) 
This separation ‘between ideas and living’ is equal to Pound’s critique of the 
‘unnatural increase’ of usury. Just as Miller, we remember, points out the futility of a 
thought or theory that has ‘no sex, no vitality’, Pound sees the accumulation of 
money from money as the result of a neutered impulse. In this way, both writers are 
interested in Capitalism as a symbolic and literal threat to the positive, sexual charge 
necessary for humanity’s survival. They are in agreement that money - like ideas – 
enslaves people when it is disconnected from its first basic and natural principals, 
when it becomes a negative rather than positive force of energy.  
Though Miller does not suggest anything like the specific reforms that Pound puts 
forward as a Social Creditist, they overlap in their understanding of the perpetual, 
active use of money as a way of demystifying and disempowering it. Increased 
circulation is at the heart of the idea of ‘social credit’ as something that should be 
regularly and equally allotted to all citizens. This relates interestingly to Pound’s 
introduction to de Gourmont’s Philosophy of Love – dealt with in Chapter Two of this 
study – in which he equates the movement of creative thought with the reproductive 
activity of sperm. ‘Creative thought’, we remember him saying, ‘is an act like 
fecundation, like the male cast of the human seed’.645 Discussing this eccentric 
metaphor in his study Language, Sexuality, Ideology in Ezra Pound’s the ‘Cantos’, Jean-
Michelle Rabaté speculates that for Pound: 
money becomes positive when it is fluid, when circulation is swift and easy; a 
liquidized money loses its bad smell, it detaches itself sufficiently from the 
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anal gift in which it found its origin. The flow of magnetized money then 
figures the equivalent of sperm in its orgastic and phallic dynamic.646   
In other words, Pound sees the liquidized flow of money as representative of and 
symbiotic with a natural reproductive system of exchange and a natural 
reproductive system of thought. It is in line with this kind of thinking, then, that 
Miller perceives the micro economy of the red light district as ‘alive, throbbing’ 
because it exists independently of a vast, economic machine. As he puts it later on in 
the text, to ‘put money into circulation – that’s the principal thing’ (197).  Sex-trade 
currency, Miller claims, ‘will never be taken out of circulation because there’s 
nothing in the Banque de France to redeem it with’ (168). By its illegality, it is forced 
into a positive perpetual motion and by the ‘human sweat’ and ‘stink’ it carries (both 
figuratively and literally), it has a fair, basic and vital value, maintaining contact with 
the activity it affords. In this way, Miller creates a stripped down version of the 
monetary system in which money enables consumption rather than conservation and 
accumulation and in which ‘purchasing power’ is situated amongst human beings 
rather than ‘clogged up’ in the machinery of capitalist market economics. 
Thus, when Miller writes of Lucienne as a majestic bird ‘suspended over the sluggish 
tide of traffic’, it is in direct response to the frenzy of the established economic 
machinery. He daydreams of her, a symbol of individual liberty in a world driven 
crazy by money, while copy-editing the financial reports at the paper:  
In between the rubber and silk markets and the Winnipeg grains there oozes 
a little of the fizz and sizzle of the Faubourg Montmartre. When the bonds go 
weak and spongy and the pivotals balk and the volatiles effervesce, when the 
gain market slips and slides and the bulls commence to roar, when every 
fucking calamity, every ad, every sport item and fashion article, every boat 
arrival, every travelogue, every tug of gossip has been punctuated, checked, 
revised, pegged and wrung through the silver bracelets, when I hear the front 
page being hammered into whack and see the frogs dancing around like 
drunken squibs, I think of Lucienne sailing down the boulevard with her 
wings outstretched, a huge silver condor suspended over the sluggish tide of 
traffic. (164-5) 
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Miller’s figuration of prostitutes as symbols of protest against mainstream economics 
is, as we saw in Chapter Two, part of a more pervasive attraction to the underside of 
bourgeois life. If the pimps and prostitutes exploit each other and their clients, at 
least they make no attempt to hide the fact. Interestingly, given the common 
association of organized crime with money laundering, Miller posits criminal money 
as unlaundered, a stained symbol of the pimps’, prostitutes’ and punters’ moral 
transparency. It follows that the banking system itself can be read as an enormous, 
complex and convoluted laundering network. For Miller, criminal workers are 
liberated by their marginalisation since their transactions take place outside of the 
larger hypocrisies implicit in the international economic sphere.  
The description of Lucienne ‘suspended over the sluggish tide of traffic’ suggests – 
perversely - that it is the very commodification of her body that has freed her from 
wage-slavery. The prostitute accepts, rather than obscures, the dehumanizing project 
represented by modern capitalist society, thereby paradoxically rendering her able to 
cope with its worst excesses. This relates to a point Sarah Garland makes in Rhetoric 
and Excess: 
In writing about prostitutes and paid women Miller also shores up [his] 
tremendous feeling of immunity. Commodifying women neutralises them 
into objects of exchange with a calculable value (and for the procurer, a 
calculable degree of loss); all vulnerability is expunged.647  
Just as he presents himself as immunized against neurosis by laughter, obscenity and 
sex, he imagines that Lucienne is safeguarded from the terrible psychological 
dangers of a corrupt economic system by her acceptance that she is a dehumanized 
component within it. Of course, Garland suggests that this commodification is a way 
for Miller to expunge his own feelings of vulnerability, an idea that is also applicable 
to Miller’s canonization of Lucienne and Germaine. By imagining certain prostitutes 
as noble in their self-commodification, he is able to experience that imagined nobility 
and immunity vicariously.  
                                                             
647 Garland, Rhetoric and Excess, p. 50.  
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As with their common opposition to puritanical sexual codes, Pound and Miller’s 
ideas about the corruption of modern capitalist relations are rooted in a profound 
antipathy towards Lutheran and Calvinist utilitarian morals and skewed definitions 
of ‘wealth’. Indeed, in his Cancer review Pound suggests that Miller’s strong 
‘hierarchy of values’ is a welcome corrective to ‘the grossness of the protestant value 
scale’ (88). This attempt by Pound to ally himself with Miller on the issue of 
religious-economic evil is paradoxically echoed in Bataille, who himself reads Miller 
as an important opponent of the banal, petit bourgeois obsession with acquisition, 
conservation, and social and professional productiveness. All three writers locate the 
evil of capitalist economics in their Lutheran roots, preferring the pre-utilitarian 
moral positions of pagan and – in the cases of Bataille and Pound - Catholic societies.  
In Guide to Kulchur (1938), Pound attributes the rise of usury and the cultural, moral 
corruption outlined earlier to Martin Luther’s sixteenth-century founding of the 
Protestant Church. ‘Putting usury on a pedestal’, Pound writes in Guide to Kulchur ‘in 
order to set avarice on high, the protestant centuries twisted all morality out of 
shape.’648 By building a moral religious system based on the limited notion of the 
individual’s will towards industry, he claims, Martin Luther created the conditions 
within which the ‘semitic’ practice of usury – banned for fifteen centuries by the 
Roman Catholic Church - could flourish.  According to this scheme, Calvinism – 
which succeeded Lutheranism as the dominant branch of European Christianity in 
the 1600’s – extended Martin Luther’s legacy by legalizing usury:  
The scale and proportion of evil, as delimited in Dante’s hell (or the catholic 
hell) was obliterated by the Calvinist and Lutheran churches. I don’t mean to 
say that these heretics cut off their ideas of damnation all at once, suddenly or 
consciously, I mean that the effect of Protestantism has been semiticly to 
obliterate values, to efface grades and graduations.649 
As this shows, and various scholars have pointed out, Pound consistently couches 
Lutheran and Calvinist corruption of Catholic values – economic and otherwise – in 
terms of Jewish contamination. Chace writes that ‘just as feelings against usury …                                                              
648 Guide To Kulchur, p. 247. 
649 Ibid., p. 185. Quoted in Chace, The Political Identities of T.S. Eliot & Ezra Pound, p. 
78. 
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lead Pound immediately to feelings against Protestants, so feelings against 
Protestants lead him immediately to feelings against those who behave 
“semiticly”’.650 Similarly, in his 2005 study Ezra Pound and Confucius: Remaking 
Humanism in the Face of Modernity, Feng Lan quotes Pound as saying that John Calvin 
was ‘responsible … for reviving ‘the savage mythology of the Hebrews’.651 Indeed, 
Lan goes on, ‘Pound entertained a groundless and yet strong conviction that Judaism 
was responsible for the degradation of Christianity starting with the Reformation’.652 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Miller’s own reductive and racialist 
comments about Jewish people require address in relation to Pound’s antipathy 
towards Judaism but they appear separately to the former’s ideas of social and 
economic morality. Moreover, Pound makes no specific reference to Judaism in his 
review of Cancer. For the purpose of this Poundian economic reading of Cancer, it 
will be productive to acknowledge Pound’s racist belief in the ‘semitic’ origins of 
Protestant economic immorality but focus for now primarily on the aversion to 
inhuman utilitarianism that Pound sees reflected in the text.  
Pound believes that Protestantism’s promotion of work as an inherent virtue has 
resulted in an economic approach that excludes questions of humanity and morality. 
‘The science of economics will not get far’, he warns, ‘until it grants the existence of 
will as a component: i.e will toward … justice or fairness, desire for civilization, 
amenities etc…’653 In this sense modern capitalism is blighted, Pound claims, by 
‘overwork’ as much as ‘overproduction’, twin examples of the utilitarian loss of 
perspective on the fundamental functions of ‘money’, ‘goods’ and ‘labor’. Indeed, 
Pound advocates a move away from the incessant emphasis on labour by 
introducing a shorter working day, the provision of ‘two hours more per day to loaf, 
to think, to keep fit by exercising a different set of muscles [mental]’.654  
                                                             
650 Ibid., p. 78. 
651 Ezra Pound, Selected Prose, ed. by Cookson, p. 265. Quoted in Feng Lan, Ezra Pound 
and Confucianism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), p. 143.    
652  Lan, p. 143. 
653 The ABC of Economics, p. 35. 
654 Ibid., p. 35. 
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Miller’s own objection to the protestant work ethic is more radical. Where Pound 
promotes a healthy balance between work and leisure, Miller subverts the moral 
paradigm to advocate ‘play’ instead of industry. These ideas are fundamental to 
Bataille’s thoughts on Cancer, which are framed according to his aversion to 
protestant utilitarianism, but also to the French theorist’s very particular redefinition 
of the concept of ‘wealth’. Though not fixated on usury’s totemic evil, Bataille 
nonetheless shares Pound’s belief that it represents the limited and damaging 
bourgeois protestant value system of Martin Luther and Calvin. As he puts it in The 
Accursed Share: 
Luther upheld the Church’s traditional curse against usury and generally had 
the aversion for business that was inherent in the archaic conception of the 
economy. But Calvin advanced the doctrinal condemnation of loans at 
interest and generally recognized the morality of commerce. “What reason is 
there why income from business should not be larger than that from 
landowning? Whence do the merchant’s profits come except from his own 
diligence and industry? … from the first it was the religion of the commercial 
bourgeoisie.655  
As a result of these Protestant developments, according to Bataille,  ‘wealth was 
deprived of meaning, apart from productive value’, whereas ‘contemplative idleness, 
giving to the poor and the splendor of ceremonies and churches’ was relegated to the 
category of ‘sin’.656   
Crucially then, Bataille is another critic who seeks to establish Miller as an important 
figure against Protestantism’s reductive and damaging idea of wealth as ‘productive 
value’. He goes further than Pound, however, promoting Miller as an exemplar of 
‘contemplative idleness’ and ‘splendor’.  Throughout ‘La Morale de Miller’, Bataille 
defines Cancer’s moral raison d’étre as the resistance to external bourgeois pressures 
to enter into ‘the sphere of production, to prefer the utilitarian and profitable to 
sensual enjoyment.’657 Indeed Bataille pits Miller – ‘the child’ with a full appreciation 
of the present and an equally full disregard for the future  – against the world of 
social, domestic and economic productivity that an individual’s parents ‘are obliged                                                              
655 The Accursed Share, p. 122.  
656 Ibid., p. 122-3 
657 ‘La Morale de Miller’, p. 2. 
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to bring the child into’.658 For Bataille Miller’s position as semi-homeless vagabond 
artist symbolizes his desire for consumption and expenditure and his rejection of the 
capitalist impulse towards production and acquisition. In Miller’s writing, Bataille 
argues, ‘life’s meaning is intrinsically linked to the negation of restraint’, a 
philosophy that is ‘dangerously inconvenient’ because it refuses to comply with 
societal codes of ‘work, merit and reward’ and invariably leads to a life of poverty 
and social marginalisation.659 
Signs of Miller’s ‘negation of restraint’ and refusal of ‘work, merit and reward’ do 
indeed abound throughout his writing. As Bataille recognizes, the book that most 
clearly demonstrates his rebellion against expectations of industriousness and 
discipline is Capricorn. Because it describes Miller’s life before the decision to 
separate himself from the conventional worlds of work and family, Capricorn offers 
explicit accounts of his hatred for the restraint they impose and his longing to 
desecrate and deny it. For Miller, his German immigrant family symbolized the 
utilitarian religious code of hard work, cleanliness and frugality: 
Every wrong idea which has ever been expounded was theirs. Among them 
was the doctrine of cleanliness, to say nothing of righteousness. They were 
painfully clean. But inwardly they stank.660 
Moving back to the family home as a young adult, Miller is dismissive of his 
mother’s frustration with the fact that he sleeps all day rather than look for work. She 
would, he writes, fly into a ‘Lutheran Rage’ upon finding him in bed after noon.661 
Rather than admit to shame or self-loathing about his status as an adult subject to his 
mother’s disapproval, or indeed attempt to understand her position in hindsight, 
Miller elevates the act of lying in bed to an important preliminary stage in the artistic 
process.  His mother is rounded on for her stupid blindness to the importance of 
dreams and the imagination, her inability to understand that this act is of far greater 
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significance than the act of seeking employment: ‘Poor imbecile that she was, [she] 
thought I was lazy.’662  
Bataille makes a positive connection between this attitude and the moral impunity 
experienced by children, equating Miller’s rejection of labor as a virtuous activity not 
dissimilar to the child’s inability to comprehend the proportions of the adult’s moral 
world. Citing Miller’s anecdotal story – again from Capricorn – about a rock-fight he 
and his cousin Gene were involved in as small boys, an episode that ended with the 
death of another small boy from a rival gang, Bataille posits Miller’s lack of guilt 
about his actions as evidence of a vital moral truth understood in childhood, but 
quickly forgotten when the individual enters the corruptive sphere of work and 
responsibility:  
It is not enough for Miller to simply confirm his innocence: he aggressively 
opposes it to the moral values of the adults. “The boy whom I saw drop 
dead”, he says further on, “who lay there motionless, without making the 
slightest sound or whimper, the killing of that boy seems almost like a clean, 
healthy performance. The struggle for food, on the other hand, seems foul 
and degrading and when we stood in the presence of our parents we could 
never forgive them.663  
As in the violent textual attacks on his friends, patrons and undeserving homeless 
people, Miller’s refusal to regret or justify the boy’s murder is deliberately, 
provocatively outrageous, and intended to emphasize the intensity of his opposition 
to the utilitarian value system. By forgiving himself for his part in an apparently 
unforgivable crime, he locates a deeper, more pernicious evil in the societal 
transfixion with the labor-effort-money ratio. Indeed, he posits the basic requirement 
of working to feed one’s family - ‘the struggle for food’ - as a sinful act that taints the 
adult’s experience of life. Describing the ‘two big slices of sour rye with fresh butter 
and little sugar over it’ he and his cousin receive from his Aunt Caroline when they 
return home from the rock fight,664 he makes a distinction between the joy and, 
indeed, ‘beauty’ inherent in ‘ungrateful’ consumption and the corruption inherent in 
work and monetary exchange:                                                               
662 Ibid., p. 178. 
663 ‘La Morale de Miller’, p. 2. 
664 Capricorn, p. 115. 
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To give us that thick slice of bread each day the parents had to pay a heavy 
penalty. The worst penalty was that they became estranged from us. For, 
with each slice they fed us we became not only more indifferent to them, but 
we became more superior to them. In our ungratefulness was our strength 
and beauty. Not being devoted we were innocent of all crime.665 
In the acquirement of economic responsibility, the individual becomes complicit in a 
production, accumulation and price obsessed system, losing the ability to savor the 
act of consumption: ‘the taste goes out of the bread as it goes out of life [since] 
getting the bread becomes more important than the eating of it. Everything is 
calculated and has a price on it’ (117). 
By flagging up this scene, Bataille both highlights Miller’s interest in consumption 
over production and emphasizes the predominance of irresponsibility and excess in 
the latter’s thinking about work and money. As we shall see, Miller might share 
Pound’s exasperation at the capitalist fixation on work - ‘getting the bread becomes 
more important than the eating of it’ – but his response to it embodies both the 
Poundian drive to control circulation and a conflicting Bataillian interest in 
uncontrolled and anarchic expenditure. 
The key to this latter impulse lies in Bataille’s metaphysical interpretation of 
economics. He reads the rock fight as Miller’s revolutionary demonstration of the 
‘fatal’ schism between vital and natural human instinct and the ‘neutral … tasteless’ 
world in which we are expected to exist: 
On one side lies the seduction of the immediate and on the other effort, merit 
and reward.  It is fatal that our working world is from the very beginning so 
hostile to the young child: it tries its utmost to reduce immediate satisfaction, 
to subordinate life, make it neutral and uninteresting, tasteless.666   
This desire for the excessive and ‘the immediate’ rather than ‘effort, merit and 
reward’, Bataille claims in The Accursed Share, is the natural result of excess energy in 
the ‘biosphere’, a surplus that humans feel a constant need to expend, or ‘squander’:  
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On the surface of the globe, for living matter in general, energy is always in 
excess; the question is always posed in terms of extravagance. The choice is 
limited to how the wealth is to be squandered.667 
 An individual like Miller – motivated by the ‘romantic protest against the bourgeois 
world’ – represents for Bataille one of many heterogeneous social elements opposed 
to the homogeneous forces imposed by the collective.668 For Blinder, Bataille 
conceives of heterogeneous forces as ‘those processes that flagrantly violated the 
rational principles of a commodity and consumption driven society’.669   
This theory has its roots in Bataille’s ethnological readings of pre-capitalist, non-
western cultures, a fact that connects him to Pound in his economic critique and 
sheds light on the metaphysical implications of Miller’s sexual and economic ideas. 
As Blinder explains, designating capitalism as ‘homogeneous and therefore faulty 
[Bataille] sought to find models elsewhere in which the heterogeneous played a 
larger more active role.’ (212).  Drawing on field work carried out by early twentieth 
century anthropologist Marcel Mauss, Bataille investigates the heterogeneous drive 
towards ‘sacrifice’ as a form of ritualistic ‘consumption’ in ‘primitive’ Aztec and 
North American cultures, concluding that this drive has been neglected over the 
course of western economic history in favor of the homogeneous desire for 
‘production’.670 In Aztec societies, Bataille writes, ‘consumption loomed just as large 
in their thinking as production does in ours. They were just as concerned about 
sacrificing as we are about working.’671 He finds his evidence in the Aztec belief that 
human sacrifice was an essential function in the continuing existence of the world: 
‘wars were created “so that there would be people whose hearts and blood could be 
taken so that the sun might eat.”’672  
For Bataille the essence of ‘the social’, like the essence of every aspect of existence, 
resides in this unproductive and the glorious. He opposes the utilitarian basis of                                                              
667 The Accursed Share, p. 22. 
668 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
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modern economics with the model of Aztec human sacrifice because it suggests 
extravagant expenditure, breaking the cycle of production, sale and consumption: 
Destruction is the best means of negating a utilitarian relation between man 
and the animal or plant. The victim of the sacrifice cannot be consumed in the 
same way as a motor uses fuel. What the ritual has the virtue of rediscovering 
is the intimate participation of the sacrifice and the victim, to which a servile 
use had put an end. 673 
On these terms, Bataille suggests, payment is promoted from a means of stagnant 
exchange to a heroic and unifying spectacle – as in the case of ‘Potlach’, an ancient 
custom practiced by indigenous North Americans which involves ‘the solemn giving 
of considerable riches, offered by a chief to his rival for the purpose of humiliating, 
challenging and obligating him’. ‘Potlach’, Bataille goes on, ‘like commerce [is] a 
means of circulating wealth, but [it] excludes bargaining.’674 
Significantly, like Pound, Bataille arrives at his conclusions via the belief that modern 
conceptions of ‘wealth’ are a protestant corruption of its true meaning. 
Photosynthesis and growth, Bataille writes, are the natural processes on which pre-
Christian societies based their economies:    
The origin and essence of our wealth are given in the radiation of the sun, 
which dispenses energy – wealth – without any return. The sun gives without 
ever receiving … In former times value was given to unproductive glory, 
whereas in our day it is measured in terms of production: Precedence is given 
to energy acquisition over energy expenditure. Glory itself is justified by the 
consequences of a glorious deed in the sphere of utility. But, dominated 
though it is by practical judgment and Christian morality, the archaic 
sensibility is still alive: In particular it reappears in the romantic protest 
against the bourgeois world; only in the classical conceptions of the economy 
does it lose its rights entirely.675  
 
This has important implications for Pound’s statements on usury as a practice ‘contra 
natura’, a form of ‘increase’ at odds with the patterns and processes of growth in the 
natural world. Both theorists attack early twentieth-century capitalism for its 
absolute negation of natural and sacred metaphysical energies. Like Pound, Bataille                                                              
673 Ibid., p. 56. 
674 Ibid., p. 67-68. 
675 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
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appropriates Miller in his quest to redefine the corrupt conception of wealth 
according to pure, pre-usurious origins. For both writers, protestant theology rejects 
Pagan and Catholic ‘splendor’ in preference for a rational but wholly inhuman 
system of monetary growth and expenditure. However, they differ in their notions of 
where those origins lie and what they mean, highlighting – in the process - the 
conflicting impulses towards excess and conservation within Miller’s economic 
approach.  
Where Pound is interested in bringing order to an unnatural and insane system of 
‘growth’, Bataille disregards sanity and usefulness altogether, instead focusing on 
the metaphysical truth provided by the ‘ceaseless prodigality’ of the sun and the 
‘waste’, ‘glory’ and ‘excess’ this generates. Despite his protestations against the 
Lutheran utilitarian enslavement to work and money, Pound’s own economic ideas 
are motivated by the desire to make the monetary system useful. Indeed, his 
Douglasite beliefs lead him to demand a very controlled form of market economics 
that appears to contradict his aversion to the use-value basis of modern capitalism. 
Incongruously – given that Bataille came from a Marxist background and Pound in 
the 1930s was staunchly opposed to socialism – their economic differences can be 
usefully explained through Jean Baudrillard’s 1998 comparison of Bataillian and 
orthodox Marxist theory:  
The Marxist seeks a good use of economy. Marxism is therefore only a limited 
petit bourgeois critique, one more step in the banalization of life towards the 
‘good use’ of the social! Bataille, to the contrary, sweeps away all this slave 
dialectic from an aristocratic point of view, that of the master struggling with 
his death.676 
Pound - rather than Bataille - seeks to reform the economic system to make ‘‘good 
use’ of the social’.  Where Pound wants to sanitize a messy and manic situation 
masquerading as ordered and rational, Bataille denies the virtue in rationalizing 
monetary exchange, advocating instead a very physical and desire driven model of 
primitive economy built on the acceptance of chaotic and uncontrolled excess. If                                                              
676 Jean Baudrillard ‘When Bataille Attacked the Metaphysical Principle of Economy’, 
in Bataille: A Critical Reader, ed. by Fred Botting & Scott Wilson (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1998), pp.191-195, pp. 192-93. 
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Pound’s enemies are usury and utilitarianism, Bataille’s, according to Baudrillard, ‘is 
utility, in its root. Rather than an apparently positive principle of capital: 
accumulation, investment, deprecation, etc. … it is, on Bataille’s account, a principle 
of powerlessness, an utter inability to expend.’677 
If Pound understands the virtue in the ‘well-being’ afforded by the goods produced 
through work, Bataille sees the useful act of work itself as an impediment to man’s 
existential fulfillment: 
From the start, the introduction of labor into the world replaced intimacy, the 
depth of desire and its free outbreaks, with rational progression, where what 
matters is no longer the truth of the present moment, but rather, the 
subsequent results of operations … Once the world of things was posited, man 
himself became one of the things of this world, at least for the time in which 
he labored.678  
Thus, human beings are taken out of the present by labor, forced to behave as 
external objects of use rather than vital, active creatures animated by unproductive 
intimacy and desire. The act of work, by its incorporation of the individual in a 
useful productive system and towards a useful and productive end, prevents him or 
her from feeling and expressing their true ‘desire’ and from living in a way that is 
natural and human. 
If Miller’s interest in perpetual circulation as a way to connect money to human 
activity appears to correlate with elements of Pound’s more ‘use-value’ economics, 
his rebellion against productivity is based on a Batailllian celebration of the 
sovereignty that arises from carelessly expending a surplus - sacrificing money, 
goods and libidinous energy. In this sense, Miller’s negation of the ‘the protestant 
value scale’ can be read in his emphasis on the kind of ‘ceaseless prodigality’ alluded 
to in The Accursed Share. Indeed, as if following up on Bataille’s solar analogy, in 
Cancer Miller posits capitalist servitude to ‘the money rhythm, the love that comes 
over the radio’ as ‘joyless evidence’ of the journey ‘away from the sun’ towards ‘the 
chill idiocy of the moon’ (109). The dominance of money and the commercialization 
                                                             
677 Baudrillard, p. 192. 
678 Bataille, The Accursed Share, p. 57. 
 260 
of love represent a rhythm that is somber and cold rather than joyful and warm. If 
the sun provides endless heat to bask in, the lunar ‘incandescence’ of modern 
capitalism forces people into perpetual frenzy with no hope of genuine reward (109). 
‘The more we dance’, he writes, ‘the colder it gets’ (109).  
More importantly, Miller’s approach to individuals and their money embodies the 
extravagance of generosity and expenditure implied by ‘ceaseless prodigality’, while 
at the same time suggesting the ‘humiliating, challenging and obligating’ functions 
Bataille refers to in his discussions of the ‘potlach’.679 ‘When one spends what he has 
on himself’, Miller writes in Cancer, ‘when one has a thoroughly good time with his 
own money, people are apt to say “he does not know what to do with his money”. 
For my part I don’t see any better use to which one can put money’ (225). In this 
vein, the act of squandering money – like the act of squandering libidinous energy in 
un-reproductive sexual acts - is presented aggressively throughout Cancer as 
virtuous and necessary, a healthy demonstration of ‘wealth’ that renders the giver 
morally superior to those who would conserve or grow it. He reserves particular 
disdain, for example, for ‘misers’, from his friend Boris who ‘won’t even eat a good 
meal every now and then’ to an unnamed patron who has him to stay for a period 
and who lives in squalor despite having a good amount of cash stashed away in his 
drawer: 
A man who has two thousand francs hidden away in a dirty sock and refuses 
to wear a clean shirt or smear a little butter over his bread … such a man is 
not just … a miser he’s an imbecile. (21) 
Indeed, the impulsive and irrational expenditure of money without return is 
celebrated by Miller as a heroic and sacrificial act, a mark of the individual’s sanity – 
and, superiority - within a manic system devised by the collective.   
He makes this point via the complicated extended metaphor of an unsuccessful 
threesome he engages in with his friend Van Norden and a prostitute they meet at 
the Dome cafe. It is a confusing passage in which Van Norden and the prostitute 
refuse to ‘call it quits’ despite the former’s impotence (148); an impotence likened                                                              
679 Ibid., pp. 67-8. 
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both to the futile activity of ‘a machine whose cogs have slipped’ (148) and to the 
intransigence of two armies in ‘a state of war’ (146). ‘There’s fifteen francs 
somewhere’ Miller writes: 
which nobody gives a damn about any more and which nobody is going to 
get in the end anyhow, but the fifteen francs is like the primal cause of things 
and rather than listen to one’s own voice, rather than walk out on the primal 
cause, one surrenders to the situation, one goes on butchering and butchering 
and the more cowardly one feels the more heroically does he behave. (147) 
The only way in which the senselessness of the situation can be resolved, he 
continues, is for ‘somebody … to put his hand in the machine and let it be wrenched 
off … if the cogs are to mesh again’ (150). This act, he says has to be done selflessly 
‘without hope of reward, without concern over the fifteen francs’ (150). 
The myriad implications of Miller’s comparison between sex and mechanized 
warfare will be explored later in this chapter in the light of Pound’s anti-war ideas. 
However, in the context of Miller’s approach to wealth, the episode expresses the 
individual’s mania and desperation within an irrational and self-defeating economic 
system. The jilted cogs in the machine can only be re-meshed if the falsity of the 
‘primal cause’ is recognized and the individual human being is willing to risk his or 
her own safety to put it right. In other words, the individual must give up his or her 
fixation on the intrinsic value of money and sacrifice him or herself, in Bataille’s 
words, ‘ceaselessly’ in order to reconnect with the world. Like the threesome, a life 
led according to rational economic principals is a ‘performance’ which lacks the 
‘spark of passion’ and therefore has ‘no human significance’.  
Concentration on monetary value leads directly to the ‘inability to expend’ sexually. 
Where Pound wants to liberate the capitalist economic system by orchestrating a 
higher rate of consumption, Miller recommends the circumvention of the 
inhumanity of the system through irresponsible, uncontrolled expenditure – the 
unrestrained satisfaction of one’s appetites, sexual and otherwise. Where Pound 
believes in the possibility of achieving truth and beauty by redesigning economic 
relations so that they mirror the ‘natural increase’ of the world, Miller uses economic 
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relations to demonstrate a Bataillian perspective on existence, defined not by 
harmonious growth but by perpetual surplus.  
Accordingly, one of the principal differences between Pound and Miller’s approach 
to economics lies in their diverging opinions as to whether it is possible, even 
desirable to limit surplus energy and production – another reminder that Miller is 
less concerned with real-politic than Pound and more interested in how economics 
operate as a wider metaphor for desire. Both Pound and Miller believe that 
expenditure is by its nature more virtuous than production and accumulation, since 
it returns a positive charge to the monetary process. However, Pound wants to 
curtail production according to the real human potential for consumption, whereas 
Miller accepts overproduction and surplus as vital metaphysical facts of human 
existence. 
Nonetheless, Miller is caught between a desire to counter the negative flow of 
sexuality and economics, through acts of heroism and glorious excess, and a more 
prosaic instinct to redirect it through observation and perverse acceptance. In the 
threesome scene, there is a tension between Miller’s fascination at the passionless, 
mechanical reality of the sexual act itself and his idealistic longing for an awakening 
to the hopelessness of the proceedings. Though he emphasizes the importance of 
ceding control, of sacrificing the self without ‘hope of reward’, he is also transfixed 
by the performance in the bedroom and – by implication – the world of money and 
labor.  In this sense, both writers harbor anxieties about Baudrillard’s ‘principle of 
powerlessness …the utter inability to expend’ at the root of utilitarianism.680 Both are 
worried about the moral contamination this engenders in individuals and societies, 
even if they offer very different solutions. While Pound seeks to create a more 
natural system of economic growth, Miller suggests the restoration of relations in a 
manner that is parodical and anarchically Bataillian. As with his physical suffering – 
explored in Chapter Two – Miller’s anxiety about sexual and economic expenditure 
is relieved by his willful and complete submergence in the sexual-economic system. 
As Garland suggested about Miller’s commodification of women, Miller is                                                              
680 Baudrillard, p. 192. 
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‘expunged of vulnerability’ by his participation in a system of exchange and loss that 
fully and madly represents the economics of the time.  
Moreover, where Pound’s pronouncements on the social injustice of the economic 
system demonstrate a genuine concern about the ‘paradox between poverty and 
distress on the one hand and potential plenty on the other’ Miller’s objection to the 
capitalist frenzy reveals a fascination with this paradox that understands it as both 
outrageously unjust and ripe for aesthetic manipulation:  
Though the earth be rotting with good things, there is no time to pluck the 
fruits. The procession scrambles toward the exit sign and such a panic is 
there, such a sweat to escape, that the weak and helpless are trampled into 
the mud and their cries are unheard. (188) 
As James Decker points out, ‘an economy based on capital rather than on meeting 
basic needs seems preposterous to [Miller] ... individuals should not have to 
prostrate themselves in exchange for sustenance’ (72) but he is nonetheless inspired 
and exhilarated by the insanity of the ‘performance’.    
Like Pound, – who, as well as supporting ‘a shorter working day’, states in The ABC 
of Economics that ‘the minute I cook my own dinner or make the chair that I sit on I 
escape from the whole cycle of … economics’ – Miller advocates independence from 
the system as a means of escaping its distorted and repressive order.681 Miller’s 
solution, however, is based on the impulse to deregulate the system according to 
natural, anarchical human instincts and desires rather than regulate it on fair and 
practicable lines. Describing an encounter with a door-to-door life insurance 
salesman in Capricorn, he explains his decision to purchase a policy despite neither 
being able to afford it, nor feeling that he needs it: ‘I’m a buyer not a seller. I like to 
see people looking happy – that’s why I buy things.’682 According to Miller, the 
apparently vital and unavoidable act of ‘selling’ – either goods or one’s skills - of 
making money in order to afford food and shelter, is actually wholly avoidable: 
I said to myself I will never again go to people under false pretenses [sic] … I 
will never again sell anything, even if I have to starve. I am going home now                                                              
681 The ABC of Economics, p. 53. 
682 Capricorn, p. 148. 
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and I will sit down and really write about people.  And if anybody knocks at 
my door to sell me something I will invite him in and say “why are you doing 
this?” And if he says it is because he has to make a living I will offer him 
what money I have and beg him once again to think what he is doing. I want 
to prevent as many men as possible from pretending that they have to do this 
or that because they must earn a living. It is not true. One can starve to death – 
it is much better.683 
One form of madness – what Baudrillard calls the ‘Puritan mania of business’ 
(money earned is earned in order to be invested … having value or meaning only in 
the endless wealth it entails)’ - is replaced by another transaction that Miller posits as 
healthy, human and sane. Here, Miller offers a consciously perverse and manic 
alternative to the rationalist mania of jobs and money.684  Both Pound and Miller 
attack what Jean-Joseph Goux, in describing Bataille’s philosophy, calls ‘the 
parsimonious perspective of an ascetic bourgeoisie that only consents to spend what 
it expects in return’, but Miller finds his alternative economic model in a type of 
expenditure that echoes Bataille’s idea of “the general law of the economy”, a way of 
using time, money and libidinous energy that appears ‘nearly delirious to our 
[conventional, utilitarian] mind’.685  Miller may echo Pound’s dissatisfaction with the 
‘protestant value scale’, yet he advocates change based on Bataille’s rather than 
Pound’s model; a change based, Goux continues, on a nostalgia for pre-protestant, 
pre-utilitarian eras in which glory was to be found not in the rational and fair growth 
and distribution of resources but in splendid feats of extravagance and sacrifice: ‘the 
erection of the pyramids or the cathedrals, or of the sacrifice of thousands of herd 
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3.4 Frobenius, Spengler and the Apocalyptic ‘Process’: Cultural morphological 
intersections between Pound and Miller 
‘We do not quite know how we have come by these concepts of common decency, 
but one supposes it is our heritage from superior individuals of the past; that it is the 
treasure of tradition.”’  Ezra Pound, ‘Axiomata’ (1921)687  
 ‘Why do ideas, why do great scientific discoveries often occur in different parts of 
the world at the same time? The same is true of the elements that go to make up a 
poem or a great novel or any work of art. They are already in the air, they have not 
been given voice, that’s all. They need the man, the interpreter, to bring them forth.’ 
Henry Miller, Writers at Work (1963)688  
‘From an almost accidental occasion of beginning, there has arisen the present work, 
which is put forward as the provisional expression of a new world-picture.’ Oswald 
Spengler, The Decline of the West (1918)689 
 
Miller’s Bataillian interest in extravagant, profligate and apparently unproductive 
expenditure is starkly contradicted by his concomitant Poundian interest in the 
restoration of values that transcend historical periods. If Bataille’s reading of Miller 
correctly highlights the latter’s desire to squander rather than accumulate, to expend 
excess energy without considering utility, Miller’s work is equally permeated by 
meta-historical, eschatological language and theory that suggests the Poundian 
desire to conserve and control certain fixed moral standards. As we have seen, 
Pound believes that Miller taps into unseen, ahistorical forces that constitute 
something like the cultural inheritance he discusses in his own essays about Douglas. 
Miller’s exploration of ‘excess’, of the natural desire to expend surplus through the 
acting out of economically, sexually and artistically unacceptable urges will be seen 
in this chapter to conflict with his anxieties regarding a civilization in pre-
determined ‘decline’. 
Pound’s perception of Miller as having arrived at a sense of indisputable, ahistorical 
– even primitive – order, transcending the ‘fret and stir’ of contemporary ‘chaos’, are                                                              
687 ‘Axiomata’, p. 363.  
688 ‘Henry Miller’, Writers at Work, p. 145 
689 Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, transl. by Charles Francis Atkinson, 2 
vols (London: George Allen & Uwin Ltd., 1934 [orig. ed.: 1918]), vol. 1, p. 50. 
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strongly connected to the term ‘paideuma’, itself appropriated by Pound from 
cultural anthropologist Leo Frobenius. As mentioned earlier, Pound took 
‘Paideuma’, the title of Frobenius’ seminal 1921 study, to mean ‘the tangle or 
complex of the inrooted ideas’ that define historical civilizations, using the term to 
formulate his own vision of new a economic, social and cultural rejuvenation.690 As 
he puts it in Guide to Kulchur: ‘When I said I wanted a new civilization, I think I cd. 
have used Frobenius’ term’.691 Pound excitedly made the connection between 
Frobenius’ essentialist statements on culture and Douglas’ concept of ‘the increment 
association’, fusing their apparently unrelated ideas to arrive at his own sweeping 
historical conclusions about the ‘modality of civilizations’.692 In turn, Frobenius’ 
disciple Oswald Spengler – who helped him found the Munich Institute of Cultural 
Morphology in 1920 and espoused many of the same ethnographic and culturally 
physiognomic ideas  – was greatly admired by Miller and his text The Decline of the 
West was an important influence on Cancer’s eschatological tone and atmosphere. 
This connection between Pound and Miller’s sources is vital to an understanding of 
Pound’s notion of hierarchy and ‘prospect’ in Miller’s work. 
The initial basis of Pound’s adherence to Frobenius was the latter’s belief that by 
studying individual pieces of art it was possible to identify the ‘vital spirit’ or 
‘cultural total of achievement’ of the society in which it was produced.693 Explaining 
Frobenius’ ‘morphological’ method in Guide to Kulchur, Pound cites an anecdote or 
‘yarn’ about the archeologist - ‘[he] looked at two African pots and, observing their 
shapes and proportions, said: if you will go to a certain place and there digge, you 
will find traces of a civilization with such and such characteristics’.694 Frobenius was 
interested in artistry as reliable and intricate proof of a culture’s essence, from its 
generalities to its complexities. As he puts it in The Voice of Africa, his 1913 study of 
the ancient West African Yoruba civilization, ‘I lay utmost stress upon the fact … that                                                              
690 Guide to Kulchur, p. 57. 
691 Ibid., 58. 
692 Ibid. p. 59.   
693 Leo Frobenius, The Voice of Africa (New York: Benjamin Blom, Inc., 1968 (orig. ed.: 
1913)), p. 324. 
694 Guide to Kulchur, p. 61  
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the territorial influence of specially Yoruban civilization retrogressed during the last 
few centuries exactly as its works of art lost their vitality’.695  
The fundamental aim of Frobenius’ anthropological work was to prove that certain 
essential characteristics lie deeply embedded in human beings according not to their 
environments but to the cultures from which they originate. He was engaged, 
Suzanne Marchand writes, in a ‘quest to identify cultural differences as products of 
the soul, not of acquired refinements or skills’ (1997).696 This was, Merchand goes on, 
a search for ‘the real physiognomy of culture’,697 motivated by the desire to prove that 
the impact a culture has on its surroundings – from its use of the land through 
farming and architecture to its production of objects of utility and art - is more 
important than the impact those surroundings have on it. In The Voice of Africa, 
Frobenius describes his methodology as: 
A method of research founded on the constant examination of several 
characteristic indications of well-marked civilizations, both in their 
geographical distribution and transformation in separate provinces, rather 
than on the foreign influences to which they were subject … I [have] no 
difficulty in concluding that most of the mutual relations of culture were 
proved in their birth, extension and change.698  
Just as a human physiognomist would look at the contours of a face to discover the 
essential content of the person’s soul, Frobenius studied artifacts and ruins to 
determine what he called  ‘the soul of the culture’.699 
According to Marchand, Frobenius envisioned ‘culture’ as ‘a third sphere, 
inextricably linked with both nature and Geist [‘Soul’ or ‘spirit’]’.700  In this 
anthropological scheme, ‘autonomous cultural wholes’ were living ‘organisms’ and 
‘human beings were simply carrier objects of them’.701 In other words, Frobenius is 
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interested in the cultural essence as the elusive force that drives and defines human 
life, a true and natural entity that expresses itself through human activity. It is for 
this reason that he regards art and artifacts as symptomatic of culture and morality. 
Just as ‘Social Credit’ theory had helped Pound apply his ideas about usury to 
market economics, Frobenius’ cultural morphology provided him with the social 
anthropological basis for his belief in the ‘unnatural increase’ that spreads from 
methods of banking to the moral values of a population and then to their artwork. In 
fact, Guide to Kulchur, which – we have seen - sets out many of his ideas on the 
‘disease’ of usury, was written in direct response to Frobenius’ Paideuma. As K.K. 
Ruthven puts it, ‘from his reading of Leo Frobenius [Pound] derived the concept of 
Kultersymptome, which enabled him to see … that ‘art can be a symptom’ and not 
merely … an end in itself.’702 If Frobenius applied Kultersymptome to the non-Western 
and pre-modern tribal cultures of West Africa, Pound used it to highlight the 
difference between the ‘cultural total achievement’ of European societies in pre-
usurious and usurious periods. Quoting from a letter Pound wrote to T.S. Eliot in 
1940, Leon Surette demonstrates that Guide to Kulchur was an attempt “to get on from 
where Frobenius left off, in that his Morphology was applied to savages and my 
interest is in civilizations at their most”.703 
Via Frobenius, Ruthven points out, Pound came to the conclusion that ‘the kind of 
thought which distinguishes good from evil, down into the details of commerce rises 
into the quality of line in paintings and into the clear definition of the word 
written.’704 In other words, by thinking about art as a serious reflection of the innate 
character of its culture rather than simply the individual who made it or the message 
it is intended to transmit, a critic is able to say something serious and significant about 
the essential moral quality of that culture. In this way Frobenius was responsible, as 
Tim Redman puts it in Ezra Pound and Italian Fascism, for Pound’s arrival at the  ‘new 
understanding of the notion of taste, [the] unity of the aesthetic and the economic’,                                                              
702 Ruthven, p. 151. 
703 Pound, ‘To T.S. Eliot’, Selected Letters of Ezra Pound, ed. by Paige, p. 336, February 
1st 1940. Quoted in Surette, The Birth of Modernism, p. 63.  
704 Ruthven, p. 155.  
 269 
that we have seen throughout his essays.705  In this sense, cultural morphology 
helped Pound develop what Ruthven calls ‘usurocriticism’ - mentioned earlier in 
Section 3.2 - his method of art criticism that uses a novel, poem, painting or sculpture 
from any given age to discern not only whether usury existed in that culture, but the 
exact extent of its presence and dominance, to ‘tell the bank-rate and component of 
tolerance for usury in any epoch by the quality of line in painting’.706  
It was also through Frobenius that Pound began to think about writers like Miller as 
correctors of social and economic as well as aesthetic evils. He uses the concept of 
‘paideuma’ to consolidate and develop his own theories – suggested in his earlier 
literary essays and throughout the Cantos – of a small group of artists who 
understood ‘the process biological, social, economic now going on, enveloping you 
as an individual, in a social order’ and able to resurrect of a true ‘vital spirit’.707 
Indeed, in Guide to Kulchur Pound explicitly identifies his own hopes for the future of 
western civilization with Frobenius’ search for a superior ‘paideuma’ to take 
mankind forward: ‘When I said I wanted a new civilization, I think I could have used 
Frobenius’ term’.708 
As well as kultursymptome, Pound’s conception of a ‘new civilization’ or ‘new era’ 
depends on Frobenius’ theory of Kulterkreisn, or ‘cultural circles’ that emanate from 
certain pure civilizations and manifest themselves in civilizations from different 
epochs and continents. Frobenius explains this position in The Voice of Africa:  
I draw my courage from the constant effects observable in the swing of the 
pendulum of universal history, always responsive to the laws which govern 
the surface of the globe. I think we are entitled to select material evidence 
from analogous events in more recent periods for the desired comprehension 
of occurrences in the ages behind them.709   
An example of this, Merchand notes, is set of commonalities Frobenius identified 
between the ‘paideumae’ of Germany in the 1920s and the ancient civilization of the                                                              
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West African civilizations he studied at that time. They shared, he claimed ‘a wide 
open spaces mentality (Weitenghful)’ that was stronger and more significant than 
their many differences.710 He originally gleaned this from his examination of artifacts 
produced by the Yoruba tribe, believing the similarities between art found in West 
Africa and Ancient Europe proved that ‘the culture of Yoruba is the crystallization of 
that mighty stream of Western civilization which, in its Eur-African form, flowed 
from Europe into Africa.’711  
Pound commandeers the language of ‘cultural circles’ for his own reading of history 
and civilization, claiming in Guide to Kulchur that ‘what we know we know by 
ripples and spirals eddying out from us and from our own time’.712 According to 
William Harmon in his study Time in Ezra Pound’s Work, ‘the idea of the paideuma is 
… enlarged [by Pound] to comprehend world civilization that transcends time and 
space’.713 In line with his Douglasite notion of ‘cultural heritage’ and the ‘increment 
of association’, Pound envisions a ‘new civilization’ based on knowledge intuitively 
detected through mysterious ancestral channels, an idea that he had hinted at earlier 
in his 1921 essay ‘Axiomata’: 
We do not quite know how we have come by these concepts of common 
decency, but one supposes it is our heritage from superior individuals of the 
past; that it is the treasure of tradition.714 
This also allows Pound to rethink the course of civilizations and cultures in a manner 
that eschews standard empirical facts – ‘ideas, facts, notions that you can look up in a 
phonebook or library’ - in favor of powerful, primal ‘ideas which are in one’s 
stomach or liver’.715 According to this new approach, historical or ‘chronological’ 
knowledge can only hinder an intuited understanding of ‘the process’: 
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It does not matter whether you load up your memory with the chronological 
sequence of what has happened, or names of protagonists, or authors of 
books, or generals and leading political spouters, so long as you understand 
the process now going on.716 
In these cultural morphological terms, Miller’s descent into the economic and social 
hell of his epoch is simply another way to feel and understand ‘the process now going 
on’.  Indeed there are allusions to the ‘paideuma’ of Frobenius’ anthropological 
scheme throughout Pound’s interpretation of Miller’s Paris, in particular when 
Pound asks the reader to look beyond the false surface conception of Miller as an 
‘obscene’ writer to discover the substance of a ‘hierarchy of values’, of ‘good and 
evil’ beneath the apparent purposelessness of his bohemian expatriate existence. 
More importantly, Pound implies that Miller transmits a penetrative understanding 
of the economic problem despite his apparent ignorance of social creditist economics.  
The intuitive awareness Pound ascribes to Miller is directly reminiscent of his praise 
for Frobenius: 
The value of Leo Frobenius to civilization is not for the rightness or 
wrongness of this opinion or that opinion but for the kind of thinking he does 
… He has in especial seen and marked out a kind of knowing, the difference 
between knowledge that has to be acquired by particular effort and knowing 
that is in people, “in the air”. He has accepted the value of such a record. His 
archeology is not retrospective, it is immediate.717 
For Pound, Frobenius’ ‘kind of thinking’ demonstrates that the true cultural 
inheritance of western society resides not in the practical, learnt facts of a common 
chronological history but in an essential spirit that connects us to our ancestors. 
Moreover, the realization and celebration of these elusive connections is the only 
possible means of understanding the ‘immediate’ evils of the present and finding a 
way of moving civilization forward into the future.  
This notion of elusive, cross-epochal and physically felt knowledge is echoed 
throughout Miller’s writings. On one of the many occasions in Cancer when he 
questions the adequacy of abstract ideology, he writes that ‘ideas cannot exist alone 
                                                             
716 Ibid., pp. 51-2 
717 Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
 272 
in the vacuum of the mind. Ideas are related to living: live ideas, kidney ideas, 
intestinal ideas’ (243). Elsewhere, in Max and White Phagocytes, he recalls a 
conversation with Boris on the subject of ‘“the living word.”’ saying ‘it comes forth 
with the breath, just the simple act of opening the mouth’.718 In line with Pound’s 
instruction to move beyond the cerebral triviality of ‘the rightness or wrongness of 
this opinion or that opinion’, Miller indicates that a vital truth resides resolutely and 
essentially in our actual physical beings rather than the abstract frameworks of logic 
and argument.  
Similarly, in Capricorn Miller presents himself as attuned to certain primitive truths: 
Any primitive man would have understood me, any man of archaic epochs 
would have understood me: only those about me, that is to say, a continent of 
a hundred million people, failed to understand my language.719 
Like Pound, he expresses his desire to move away from the periphery of cold, 
rational and futureless modernity towards the positively charged and instinctively 
known values of the past. Indeed, both writers appropriate the language of cultural 
morphology in an attempt to resolve complicated relationships with their own 
‘epoch’, idealizing aspects of past civilizations to figure them as touchstones for 
ethical and aesthetical progress in the present.   
While Pound consults Frobenius for coordinates in this journey, Miller looks to 
Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West, a sprawling cultural morphological 
account of Europe’s meta-history that he discovered while he was struggling to find 
his voice in New York. Reading Spengler, Miller writes in Plexus, he was made aware 
of ‘a freshly recreated world in which one may ‘participate’ with one’s ancestors, live 
again the Spring, the Fall, the Summer, even the Winter, of man’s history’.720 
‘Spengler’s triumph’, he continues, is ‘to have made Past and Future live in the 
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Present. One is again at the center of the universe, warmed by solar fires and not at 
the periphery fighting off vertigo’.721   
Published in 1918 to enormous success and controversy, The Decline of the West 
diagnoses the terminal and inevitable decline of European civilization on the basis of 
a similar culturally determinist logic and language to Frobenius’. Like Frobenius, 
Spengler compares the essential cultural spirits of different societies in different 
epochs, arriving at his assertions about the future of the West through a reading of 
each civilization’s ‘true’ ancestral roots. He claims, like Frobenius and Pound, to 
have struck upon a method that illuminates diffuse and wide-ranging problems of 
history, culture, politics, aesthetics and economics. History functions, he proclaims, 
according to ‘great groups of morphological relations, each one of which symbolically 
represents a particular sort of mankind in the whole picture of world-history’.722 
Indeed, this process represents ‘a solution derived from one single principle that 
though discoverable had never been discovered’, the ‘provisional expression’ indeed, 
‘of a new world-picture.’723  
Following Frobenius’ lead, Spengler views the history of human life according to 
cultural wholes that are driven by essential and immutable qualities and that rise 
and fall according to pre-determined and inevitable cycles. Where Frobenius uses the 
seasons to loosely categorize these cycles and link them across civilizations, Spengler 
develops a meticulous scheme of ‘”contemporary” spiritual epochs’ with precise 
reference to the seasons, drawing up a chart that posits four major civilizations in 
history (Indian, Classical, Arabian and Western) and claims that each has undergone 
comparable periods of Spring, Summer, Autumn and Winter in their lifetimes.724 
Western civilization, the most recent civilization, experienced its ‘Spring’ in medieval 
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times, its ‘Summer’ in the Renaissance, its ‘Autumn’ in the eighteenth century and is 
currently undergoing its final ‘Winter’ phase, begun in the nineteenth century and 
defined as a period of ‘science, utility and prosperity’.725 
By the late 1910s, when Spengler was writing the book, he believed that winter 
period was entering its final stages of decline, characterized by a sense of complete 
alienation and despair among Europe and America’s predominantly urban-dwelling 
citizens, an exhaustion of artistic and philosophical possibilities and a shift in the 
direction of cultural energies from artistic and philosophical innovation toward 
technological advancement. The decline of the west, Spengler asserts, is happening 
as a result of the ineluctable natural law that ‘civilizations … are a conclusion, the 
thing-become succeeding the thing-becoming, death following life, rigidity following 
expansion, intellectual age and the stone-built, petrifying world-city following 
mother earth … They are an end, irrevocable, yet by inward necessity reached again 
and again.’726 
Beyond Miller’s testimonies to Spengler’s ‘triumph’, the narrative tone, tropes and 
imagery he uses to describe his life in Paris all bear distinct signs of his reading of 
this seasonal chart. His presentation of himself as a lone, uniquely resilient 
individual ‘alive’ within a decaying western megalopolis echoes Spengler’s vision of 
the anti-heroic ‘late city man’ who accepts and adapts to the facts of decline. 
‘‘Everything depends on our seeing our own position, our destiny, clearly’, Spengler 
writes, ‘on our realizing that though we may lie to ourselves about it we cannot 
evade it’. ‘He who does not acknowledge this in his heart,’ he goes on ‘ceases to be 
counted among the men of his generation.’727 In other words, the modern man who 
opens his eyes to the process of cultural death that is occurring throughout western 
society is able to capture the ‘the very soul of his time’.728 
Along with its consistent pronouncements about a world and society in decay, 
Cancer is permeated by Miller’s attempts to ordain himself as a man ‘of his                                                              
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generation’ who ‘does … acknowledge’ the death of civilization ‘in his heart’. ‘The 
world is rotting away, dying piecemeal’, he claims earlier on in the book, ‘and 
nobody has the nerve to put a bomb under its ass’ (33). ‘I feel the whole world 
beneath me’ he writes, picking up the theme again towards the end ‘a world 
tottering and crumbling, a world used up and polished like a leper’s skull’ (248).  In 
his most conclusive statement of self-ordination he exclaims: 
In the four hundred years since the last devouring soul appeared, the last 
man to know the meaning of ecstasy, there has been a constant and steady 
decline of man in art, in thought, in action. The world is pooped out: there 
isn’t a dry fart left. (250) 
While drawing on the Spenglerian tenet that individual self-liberation occurs 
through the acceptance of intuitive feelings about what is culturally possible, he also 
posits a particular vision of the artist as singularly equipped to embrace and record 
the decline of the west. His hyperbolic descriptions of his aims in Cancer are very 
much in line with Spengler’s mission statement in The Decline of the West to show ‘the 
coming generations … what is possible – and therefore necessary – and what is 
excluded from the inward potentialities of their time’729 Like Spengler, Miller claims 
to have arrived at a worldview that liberates others, in contrast to ordinary works of 
history and literature that have ‘incited, depressed and confounded but could not 
free’.730 Indeed, this is the premise for Miller’s definition of Cancer as ‘the last book’:   
It is to be a new Bible – The Last Book. All those who have anything to say will 
say it here – anonymously. We will exhaust the age. After us not another book 
– not for a generation, at least. Heretofore we had been digging in the dark, 
with nothing but instinct to guide us. Now we shall have a vassal in which to 
pour the vital fluid, a bomb which, when we throw it, will set off the world. 
We shall put into it enough to give the writers of tomorrow their plots, their 
dramas, their poems, their myths, their sciences. The world will be able to 
feed on it for a thousand years to come. It is colossal in its pretentiousness. 
(33) 
As we saw in Chapter Two Miller was influenced by Breton’s Surrealist manifestos 
in his antagonism towards ‘Art’. However, this paradoxical offering of his own book 
as evidence that books themselves have lost their purpose very clearly arises out of                                                              
729 Ibid., p. 40. 
730 Ibid., p. 48. 
 276 
Spengler’s consciously self-defeating and provocative model. Like Spengler, who 
consigns history to the rubbish heap while writing a historical-cultural text, Miller is 
a writer – and a writer of fiction only half-disguised as reality – who proclaims and 
celebrates the death of ‘Literature’.   
It is significant that Miller signposts Spengler’s influence by reference to his literary 
and personal relationship with Boris, the fictional pseudonym for his friend, Michael 
Fraenkel. An amateur philosopher and fellow American expatriate, Frankel inspired 
Miller to incorporate Spengler’s principal themes in his work. Although Fraenkel’s 
tone suggests an eagerness to be acknowledged that puts his reliability into question, 
his philosophical influence is evident from the opening page of Cancer onwards. 
Immediately before Miller declares himself ‘the happiest man alive’, he gives a 
‘summary’ of Boris’ philosophy:  
Boris … is a weather prophet. The weather will continue bad, he says. There 
will be more calamities, more death, more despair. Not the slightest 
indication of change anywhere. The cancer of time is eating us away. Our 
heroes have killed themselves, or are killing themselves … We must get in 
step, a lock step, toward the prison of death. There is no escape. The weather 
will not change. (3) 
Through what he and Fraenkel termed the ‘Festival of Death’, the principle of 
reveling in prophecies of natural disaster, death and despair, Miller projects himself 
not only as happy but spiritually ‘alive’. By contrast, the majority of the urban 
western population are ‘dead but don’t know it’. The inferno he envisions in Cancer 
is built on his and Fraenkel’s conception of the ‘dead multitudes’ of people who 
refuse to understand the truth expounded in The Decline of the West, who are 
spiritually and psychologically decomposing as a result of wider historical forces, yet 
unable to perceive this reality.  
As I have already noted and will examine in detail in the next section, Miller’s 
relationship with Fraenkel’s ideas is complicated by his tendency to satirize and 
mock them.  Indeed, he uses the character of Boris to portray Fraenkel as ‘nutty’, a 
comically morbid dilettante whose philosophy amounts to ‘all that palavar about life 
and death and things happening so fast’ (147).  Yet the ‘death theme’ also appears in 
 277 
earnest throughout the novel, in his essays and in his correspondence with Fraenkel. 
According to Sarah Garland in ‘The Dearest of Cemeteries’: 
Miller … found Fraenkel's identification of the outer ferment with an inner 
spiritual Armageddon compelling, and Fraenkel’s subsequent farcical 
appearance in the published version of Cancer as the neurotic and louse-
ridden Boris gives a diminished sense of the exchange of ideas.731  
In his essay ‘The Genesis of Tropic of Cancer’, Fraenkel describes the perspective he 
and Miller shared: 
We were at the end of an age, a whole culture; a way of life, an historical past, 
was coming to a close: we were caught up in a process, a cyclical or organic 
process, and a process spends itself, completes and fulfills itself, resolves. We 
simply had to face and accept The Death, squarely and resolutely, take it 
inside, as it were … live it out.732 
Crucially, for Miller, Spengler and Fraenkel’s language primarily provide a way of 
thinking about his role as an artist. As Garland puts it, Miller’s discussions with 
Fraenkel helped him find a way to connect the conception of his own ‘inner spiritual 
Armageddon’ with the ‘outer ferment’. In other words, he uses the notion of the 
world heading towards its inevitable destruction and rebirth to give gravitas to his 
own failings. Moreover, he applies Spengler’s scheme to his contemporaries. Like 
Pound, Miller not only separates the producers of ‘dead’ art from those who are 
‘alive ‘ by their willingness to embrace the extraordinarily calamitous times in which 
they live, but places Joyce amongst the former and himself amongst the latter group. 
Indeed, in his essay ‘The Universe of Death’ Miller echoes Pound’s pronouncements  
                                                             
731 Garland, ‘The Dearest of Cemeteries’, p. 208. 
732 Fraenkel, ‘The Genesis of Tropic of Cancer’, pp. 53-54.  
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on Joyce saying that he appears ‘so ridden with disease that [his] works resemble the 
disease itself’, a writer of ‘surrender’ in contrast with those writers of the future who 
effect change by a ‘vital sense of life’.733   
In this sense, Miller promotes himself in Poundian terms, as an artist whose 
approach offers resolution by confronting the decay of the society he inhabits. He 
understands the all-pervasive presence of the ‘death process’ in modern life and of 
the importance of perceiving and combatting it through one’s own sense of life: 
Death is the automaton which rules the world of activity … death from the 
roots, isolating men, making them bitter and fearful and lonely, giving them 
fruitless energy, filling them with a will which can only say No!734  
Miller’s analysis of Joyce is another example of the Poundian quest for a return to the 
‘center’. In a 1932 letter to Emil Schnellock, Miller presages certain ideas about 
artistic life and death, pitting Joyce against Spengler by claiming: 
Joyce … has lost his charm for me. I see him as a broken vomit, a precious 
sewer, a medieval stew [but] Spengler emerges biggest and best of all still … 
There is great music, great literature, great ideas.735  
Joyce becomes for Miller – as for Pound – a symbol of the ‘sickness’ of the times, a 
writer whose work accurately represents the ‘sterility, onanism, logomachy’ of the 
urban citizenry but is emphatically unable to offer the requisite ‘cure’.736 Thus 
Miller’s interest in cultural morphological ideas, in a ‘process’ that operates 
throughout the world, are remarkably similar to Pound’s ‘retrospect’ and ‘prospect’. 
For Pound and Miller, Joyce’s work runs counter to instinct, to a positive libidinous 
flow of energy (‘sterility, onanism’) and the potential for a move away from the 
disease of its age (‘logomachy’).  
Similar criticisms come up throughout Miller’s philosophical correspondence with 
Fraenkel, a series of letters compiled for a project dealing with ‘The Death Theme’ 
they called Hamlet (1933). After receiving Frankel’s reply to one of his letters – in                                                              
733 ‘The Universe of Death’, pp. 215 & 222.  
734 Capricorn, p. 264. 
735 Letters to Emil, p. 74, February 16th 1931, 
736 ‘The Universe of Death’, p. 208.  
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which he dismisses Miller’s approach as ‘a vast and horrible distortion, a horribly 
twisted and tortuous and endless gob, a nightmare born of fear and hatred and 
words, words, and more words’ - Miller scathingly accused his friend of standing 
‘eternally in the position of a diagnostician’ rather than curer.737 ‘It is your job’, he 
goes on ‘to discover everywhere traces of the disease.’738 According to Miller, like 
Joyce Fraenkel is infected with ‘the disease’ of his age and therefore will never be 
able to provide constructive solutions. Unlike Miller, Frankel is powerless to escape 
the doomed, insanely logical system in which ‘the treadmill stretches away to 
infinitude, the hatches are closed down tight, logic runs rampant, with bloody 
cleaver flashing.’739   
In this sense, the Spengler-fanatic Miller accuses his fellow-fanatic Fraenkel of 
misunderstanding a key tenet from The Decline of the West, namely Spengler’s 
promotion of ‘Culture-morale … that which a man has’ over ‘Civilization-morale … 
that which he looks for.’ While ‘the one is too deep to be exhaustible by logical 
means,’ he goes on, ‘the other is a function of logic.’740 Fraenkel might ruminate on the 
death of western civilization, on his own sense that he is emotionally dead, but he is 
powerless to effect change in himself or the outside world because he cannot break 
‘the death rhythm’ of cold, meticulous thought; he cannot detect the vital sense of life 
that will allow him to be reborn. In this way, Miller lumps Fraenkel in with the 
masses of emotionally stunted neurotics he describes so dismissively in Capricorn: 
Every one who has not fully accepted life, who is not incrementing life, is 
helping to fill the world with death. To make the simplest gesture with the 
hand can convey the utmost sense of life; a word spoken with the whole 
being can give life.741  
Miller defines this cure for the ‘death process’ through his analysis of various artists, 
but most importantly through the life and work of D.H. Lawrence. Lawrence, he                                                              
737 Henry Miller & Michael Fraenkel, Hamlet: The Michael Fraenkel – Henry Miller 
Correspondence, pp. 303, 336. 
738 Ibid., p. 336. 
739 Cancer, p. 183. 
740 Spengler, p. 354 
741 Capricorn, p. 262. 
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writes in ‘The Universe of Death’, produces work of ‘vitality’ by ‘seizing anew the 
sense of death … and reacting creatively to it’.742 As outlined in Chapter Two, 
Miller’s capacity for rebirth is paradoxically manifested in the refusal to struggle 
against the hopelessness of a desperate situation. By this, Miller means that 
Lawrence, like Spengler, is a serious artist who engages with and expresses the 
fundamental core values that originate in the ‘soul’ rather than ‘the sick reality of the 
mind’.743 Echoing Bergson, who claims that ‘we are at ease only in the discontinuous, 
the immobile, in the dead. The intellect is characterized by a natural inability to 
comprehend life’, Miller posits Lawrence as a writer who struggles to move beyond the 
comfortable, ‘dead’ bounds of logical thought.744 He is, Miller says, superior to Joyce 
- ‘blind in the pineal eye’ - or the Surrealists - ‘merely the reflection of the death 
process’ - because he produces an ecstatic vision that transcends the intellectual. 745 
Thus, like Pound, Miller’s own notion of ‘the prospect’ in the 1930s has to do with a 
shift in aesthetic as well as moral purpose, from the mere representation of the 
psychological and spiritual disease of modern Western civilization to the 
reaffirmation of core human values through a direct engagement with the ‘disease’ 
itself. In this way Miller echoes Pound’s rhetoric of the true artist as an ethically and 
aesthetically restorative figure,  ‘reacting creatively’ and rebelliously against the 
popular currents of the day in order to find some sort of resolution to an infernal and 
decaying age; an age that Miller summarized emphatically in his study of Rimbaud, 
The Time of the Assassins: 
The spell of millennium which … today is tantalizingly more imminent than 
ever before, has been replaced by the thrall of utter annihilation. In the 
whirlpool of coming darkness and chaos …. the poets of today are 
withdrawing, embalming themselves in a cryptic language which grows ever 
more and more unintelligible. And as they back out one by one, the countries 
which gave them birth plunge resolutely toward their doom.746  
 
                                                             
742 ‘The Universe of Death’, pp. 108-9. 
743 Ibid., p. 109. 
744 Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 182 
745 ‘An Open Letter to Surrealists Everywhere’ 
746 The Time of the Assassins, p. ix. 
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3.5 ‘The Last Book’: the ‘perceptual’ vs. the ‘historical’ apocalypse 
Despite shared positions on diagnosis and cure, on the role of the artist in a newly 
defined future, one of the crucial differences between Miller and Pound lies precisely 
in how they think about art as a restorative and revolutionary medium. It is 
paramount, for instance, that the forces dictating the inferno Miller creates in Cancer 
are internal and personal rather than external and cultural. Where Pound uses the 
language of impending death, destruction and renewal to express the omnipresent 
and omnipotent evils of a corrupt system, Miller employs it in the service of a 
narrower and more introspective project. His concept of Paris as hell comes from his 
intensive engagement with and delineation of his own suffering. As such, the 
economic and social misalignments Miller highlights are always posited as the wider 
consequences of individual perceptual misalignments, the result of the individual 
human being’s inability to understand the self and to recreate the world according to 
this new understanding. If Miller recognizes his inferno as representative of the 
disharmony ‘in the air’, proposing ‘live ideas, kidney ideas, intestinal ideas’ as a vital 
corrective, he also thinks about suffering and joy as states that are controlled by the 
individual, thus crucially deviating from Pound’s principal of universally felt world 
processes that the individual must contend with.747  
Miller’s notion that he was writing ‘the last book’ - at the end of one age and the 
dawn of another - works according to an idea of revolution that is starkly at odds 
with Pound’s. Miller’s use of apocalyptic language and ideology will be seen in this 
final chapter to have been motivated by what Ihab Hassan, in his study 1967 The 
Literature of Silence, calls ‘the alteration of consciousness … the constant hope of 
Miller throughout his apocalyptic harangues.’748 While Pound’s prophecies are 
grounded in his serious attempts to apply the logic of cultural morphology to the 
past, present and future, Miller’s own pronouncements celebrate the madness of the 
writers who have influenced him and the style he has adopted. It will be seen that 
the unparalleled truth Miller identifies in delirious modes of discourse was the real                                                              
747 Cancer, p. 243. 
748 Ihab Hassan The Literature of Silence (New York: Knopf, 1967), p. 7. 
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basis of his interest in Spengler and his own wild and consciously self-contradictory 
notion that he was writing a ‘last book’ for a defunct epoch. Moreover, this aspect of 
Miller’s project will identify him – again according to Hassan’s terms - as a harbinger 
of the more ‘schismatic’ modernisms that appeared after World War Two.749 In this 
way, Miller incorporates brutal and regressive elements that connect him to an early 
Poundian apocalyptic aesthetic, but in the opposite cause of self-liberation and 
progress.  
 
In a passage towards the end of Cancer where Miller looks back on his six years of 
struggle in the city, he explains his belief in the individual’s responsibility for the 
world he or she perceives: ‘I have learned what every madman in Paris discovers 
sooner or later; that there are no ready-made infernos for the tormented’ (159). 
Echoing his attack, in his study of Rimbaud, on ‘the little man’ for wanting ‘peace 
and harmony … ready-made, like a suit of manufactured clothes’, Miller dismisses 
the idea of a universally experienced hell as reductive; a myopic negation of the 
power a person has over his or her subjective experience of the world.750 
Fundamentally, the statement represents an extension of Miller’s theory of suffering 
as a means of asserting individual sovereignty. The freedom he feels as an 
economically and socially marginalized figure arises from his choice to live that way,  
his own creation of the suffering he experiences, and, crucially, his aliveness to each 
minute detail of his self-created misery. While Pound views Miller’s descent to the 
‘low-life’ as aesthetically and ethically productive because it accurately renders the 
individual’s experience in a corrupt world, Miller understands the experience 
primarily as a means of ownership over his existence and the basis of a spiritual and 
creative rebirth.   
To this end, Miller constantly struggles to fend off what he considers limiting 
external judgments on his personal experience. Describing his Paris ordeal from the 
hard-fought, relatively comfortable position of a published writer with a small 
                                                             
749 Hassan, p. 7. 
750 The Time of the Assassins, p. 31. See my p. 109. 
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income and professional reputation, he imagines and resolutely rejects standard, 
mundane responses to his time as a down-and-out: 
That was something to go through – and come out singing. Luck! Well, call it 
that if you like. Call it luck if it makes you feel any better. Only I happen to 
know differently. Happens it happened to me – and I know.751 
 
What he believes he knows ‘differently’ is that existential and artistic rejuvenation 
occurs when the urge to transcend the ‘living death’ of modern urban existence 
transforms into a genuine commitment. As he puts it in his study of Rimbaud: 
 Repeatedly we have been warned [by prophetic poets like Rimbaud] that 
unless the desire for a new life becomes a living conviction for each and every 
one of us, earthly existence will never be more than a Purgatory or a Hell.752 
The individual has a responsibility, Miller implies, to live out his or her own 
suffering and to understand it as an expression of his or her self. In this context, 
Rimbaud’s poetic exploration of his torments are, for Miller, the equivalent of the 
religious epiphanies that inspire the Christian or the Buddhist’s faith: 
Is there not something just as miraculous about Rimbaud’s appearance on this 
earth as there was in the awakening of Guatama, or in Christ’s acceptance of 
the Cross, or in Joan of Arc’s incredible mission of deliverance?753 
Miller’s appropriation of Spengler’s language and epochal scheme is useful in so far 
as it provides the palate with which to express this suffering and this personal, quasi-
religious perceptual revolution. In contrast to Frobenius’ methodological and social 
anthropological influence on Pound, Spengler (and, to a lesser extent Fraenkel) equip 
Miller with the eschatological linguistic means to communicate his ordeal and 
therefore affirm his significance as an artist and individual. Indeed, in Cancer Miller 
uses Spengler’s idea of the modern city in decline to reify his suffering in Paris: 
[This is] a Paris which has never existed except by virtue of my loneliness … 
This  Paris, to which I alone hold the key … a Paris that has to be lived, that 
has to be experienced each day in a thousand different forms of torture, a 
Paris that grows inside you like a cancer, grows and grows until you are 
eaten away by it. (187)                                                                
751 ‘Max’, p. 157. 
752 The Time of the Assassins, p. xi. 
753 Ibid., p. xi. 
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The cancer in the streets corresponds to the cancer inside him. Rather than the 
human expression of external, cultural decay – as Frobenius and Pound suggest - his 
own internal loneliness produces the external disease of the city. In this way Miller is 
able to make sense of what Garland called his ‘inner armageddeon’, using the chaotic 
mess of emotions he experiences as a rejected and dejected down-and-out to make 
sense of the physical and atmospheric urban decay of his surroundings. In ‘The 
Genesis of Tropic of Cancer’ Fraenkel describes their ‘death theme’ as having provided 
‘the meaning of a whole lifetime of drift and flux, of inchoate thoughts, feelings, 
emotions, ideas, moods … a whole world of inner chaos’.754 Indeed, like Bergson’s 
theory of the multiplicity of existence, eschatological language allows Miller to draw 
the sting out of his suffering by positing it as part of a larger sense of inevitable and 
unchangeable chaos. Similarly, Spengler allows him to mythologize his failure in 
New York and his journey across the Atlantic, an idea that is evidenced in Miller’s 
attempt to insert himself into an esteemed lineage of famously troubled expatriate 
artists in Paris: 
As I ruminated, it began to grow clear to me, the mystery of the pilgrimage, 
the flight, which the poet makes over the face of the earth and then, as if he 
had been ordained to re-enact a lost drama, the heroic descent to the very 
bowels of the earth.  (187) 
 Indeed, he uses the Dantean image of a pilgrimage into hell to legitimize and 
empower himself in the self-appointed role of revolutionary writer.  
Despite his attraction to cultural morphology and eschatology, Miller ultimately 
negates Spengler, Frobenius and Pound’s premises of a ‘world-picture’ that can be 
applied to all human beings and all history since his explicit focus is his own 
ordination, his own ‘drama’ and ‘descent’, not the historical or meta-historical forces 
that drive these. Through this, he also implicitly denies the theories he so 
enthusiastically celebrates throughout Cancer, privileging the creative will and 
actions of the individual above the mysterious epochal and cultural ‘spirit’ of 
Spengler or the ‘Paideuma’ of Pound and Frobenius’ writing.   
                                                             
754 Fraenkel, ‘The Genesis of Tropic of Cancer’, p. 59.  
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As mentioned earlier, Bruce Comens’ study, Apocalypse and After: Modern Strategy and 
Postmodern Tactics in Pound, Williams and Zukofsky sets out some useful categories for 
an understanding of the apocalyptic. According to Comens, modernist writers who 
use apocalyptic imagery fall into the post-Romantic ‘visionary tradition’ - interested 
in providing ‘a sudden, apocalyptic liberation by changing the way people perceive’ 
- or the ‘historical apocalyptic’ tradition, urgently preparing the way for an 
apocalyptic social, political or cultural revolution.755 The first camp, Comens claims, 
insist that ‘it is only our perceptual inability that condemns us to live in a “fallen” 
world, for the (visionary) real world exists now, ahistorically’ and that ‘a perceptual 
revolution’ in which ‘the ordinary world dissolves in favor of a new, visionary 
reality … can occur at any moment’; the second believe that a ‘literal’ apocalypse and 
millennial dawn will take place when certain dates, people and forces are in 
alignment.756  
Comens writes that Pound’s eschatological scheme was ‘originally based on a 
“visionary apocalyptic”’ but became ‘increasingly distorted under the urgent 
pressures of the “historical apocalyptic”.757 Miller’s belief in the individual’s control 
over his or her perceptual rebirth, however, places him firmly in the former tradition. 
Pound’s use of Frobenius’ ‘cultural circles’ to talk about physical instinctual 
‘knowledge of the process now going on’, indeed his search for artists to help usher 
in the new ‘paideuma’ very clearly emphasize ‘historical’ change, whereas Miller’s 
appropriation of Spengler’s decaying Europe is primarily aesthetic – based on the 
harnessing of imagery to transform his own emotions and perceptions and induce 
the same kind of transformation in others.758 Miller might ‘react creatively’ to ‘the 
death process’, but he does so for the purpose of furnishing his own personal Paris.  
Indeed, by framing his experience eschatologically, portentously making of it ‘a 
heroic descent to the very bowels of the earth … a bloody struggle to liberate 
himself’, by using Spengler’s language of civilization and evolution, Miller plays                                                              
755 Comens, p. 38.  
756 Ibid., p. 35. 
757 Ibid., p. 57. 
758 Guide to Kulchur, pp. 51-52. 
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around with rhetoric that Pound uses in political and historical earnest, and he does 
so to create a distinctly literary persona. Spengler and Frankel enable him to present 
himself as simultaneously destroyed and recreated, defeated and liberated as an 
expatriate artist and human being. Lifting language almost directly from The Decline 
of the West, the American Miller envisions Paris as ‘an eternal city’, one of ‘the cradles 
of civilization’, and also a ‘charnel house’, one of the ‘putrid sinks of the world’, to 
explain his rebirth as a New World writer in the Old World of Paris (186). Spengler’s 
coordinates allow Miller to contrast the fetid but historically fertile atmosphere of his 
present in Europe - ‘saturated with the past’ (317) - with the ‘cold, glittering, malign’ 
atmosphere of his past in New York (74). 
Nonetheless, Miller also displays a healthy skepticism regarding Spengler, as evident 
in his reactions to Boris (Fraenkel) in Cancer. Describing a long letter Boris sends him 
about Spengler and ‘The Death Theme’, Miller writes that ‘it sounds nutty to me, all 
this palaver about life and death and things happening so fast. Nothing is happening 
that I can see, except the usual calamaties on the front page’ (172). At another stage, 
he says of Boris’ Spenglerian theories ‘sometimes I would glance at a volume 
furtively, to check up on these wild ideas which he imputed to them – but the 
connection was frail, tenuous’ (173). Like Pound’s attempt to get him to ‘swing the 
bat’ for Social Credit, Fraenkel’s appeal for a serious philosophical alliance is 
dismissed and mocked as the product of an insane and isolated mind.   
These important differences between Pound and Miller’s apocalyptics are also 
elucidated by the non-intellectual nature of the latter’s inter-textual allusions to 
Spengler. As part of his chapter-long homage to The Decline of the West in Plexus, 
Miller claims Spengler’s language acted as an ‘elixir’ on he and his friends when they 
first discovered it in New York; it is, he says, a rare text that struck a deep chord of 
recognition in him:  
If critics and scholars were interested in the Spenglerian view of things it was 
not at all in the way we were. For them it was but another bone to gnaw at. A 
juicier bone than usual, perhaps, but a bone nevertheless. To us it was life, the 
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elixir of life. We got drunk on it every time we met. And of course we 
developed our own mutual ‘morphological’ sign language.759  
By presenting Spengler’s prose as a means of intoxication, work to be imbibed rather 
than pored over for historical or cultural truths, Miller demonstrates both his 
attraction to the non-rational, cultural theories of the period and his awareness of the 
risks they carry. Indeed, he implies an instinctive spiritual affinity with the language 
and tone of The Decline of the West rather than an intellectual connection to its ideas, a 
profound and fanatical relationship more akin to a religious experience than the 
reading of a historical, sociological or anthropological text. The ‘‘morphological’ sign 
language’ he gleans from Spengler is a means of play, then, rather than intellectual 
argument. Indeed, in the same riff, he admits: ‘passionate as I was about Spengler, 
the truth of his utterances never seemed so important to me as the wonderful play of 
his thought.’760 
As we have seen, Miller talks with a similar sense of intoxicated awe about both 
Henri Bergson and Pound. Pound’s Cantos, we remember, sounded to Miller like 
‘stuff I say to myself all day long’, a work of ‘I could swallow down like homebrew’. 
In Capricorn, he describes discovering Bergson’s Creative Evolution and feeling like ‘a 
man going through the rites of initiation’, a process that involves consumption rather 
than cerebral understanding: 
My understanding of the meaning of the book is that the book itself 
disappears from sight, that it is chewed alive, digested and incorporated into 
the system as flesh and blood which in turn creates new spirit and reshapes 
the world.761  
In her study The Secret Violence of Henry Miller, Katy Masuga argues that this 
disinterest in reading as an intellectual exercise is part of Miller’s wider  distinction 
between ‘language’ and ‘words’ and his impulse to luxuriate in rather than analyse 
what he finds on the written page: 
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Ever surrounding himself in metaphor, in language, in playful nuance, Miller 
writes, “Between the covers of the giant lexicon, amid ablatives and 
gerundives, I curled up and fell fast asleep.762 
Indeed, as he puts it The Time of the Assassins, ‘From childhood I was in love with the 
sound of words, with their magic, their power of enchantment.’763 In line with his 
interpretation of Spengler’s particular talent, the eschatological mode in Miller’s own 
work is simultaneously vital and frivolous. It functions as the thematic and rhetorical 
framework for the artist’s descent and liberation, but is never presented as a school 
of thought that he engages with intellectually. Accordingly, Miller was also keenly 
aware that Spengler’s radical historical ideas might soon probably appear dated.  
After waxing lyrically to Emil Schnellock about Spengler’s brilliance, he checks 
himself - ‘Will I be obliged to retract this two years hence?’ – before dismissing the 
relevance of contemplating his longevity - ‘Well, anyway … for the time being … big 
man!’.764 Crucially, as well as sending up Michael Fraenkel via the character ‘Boris’, 
he refuses to treat their Hamlet project as a serious philosophical exchange, telling 
Fraenkel after reading yet another long treatise on the ‘inner death’, ‘this is all 
horseshit with no holy water to redeem it’.765 
In this way Miller occupies an esoteric position within the anti-intellectualism and 
anti-humanism defined earlier in this study through Pound and Hulme. In one sense 
he is absolutely representative of the wave of readers and writers who found cultural 
morphology seductive at this time, a demographic described by Marchand in her 
study of Frobenius: 
In an era of increasingly bitter assaults on bookishness and useless (especially 
humanistic) learning, Frobenius’s intuitive approach and exotic expertise 
won him new admirers.766 
In another sense, he conspicuously locates the value of these texts, or rather his 
enjoyment of them, in the spuriousness and impossibility of the theories they 
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propagate. Just as he proudly announces that his own argument is ‘horseshit’, Miller 
appropriates Spengler and Fraenkel’s eschatological approaches precisely because 
they do not stand up under serious academic analysis.  When Miller tells Emil 
Schnellock that he ‘will be obliged to retract’ his support for Spengler ‘two years 
hence’, he does so with the purpose of complimenting Spengler. It is not clear in this 
context whether he is suggesting that the author of The Decline of the West is 
intellectually or politically suspect, but what is clear is that he sees its fallibility as 
positive. Indeed, another letter to Schnellock, reveals a similar ambivalence in regard 
to Fraenkel’s world vision: ‘he sounds crazy sometimes, and no doubt is, but it’s 
magnificent, lucid insanity – the kind that builds up new worlds’.767   
As well as emphasizing the re-creative process that Spengler and Fraenkel inspire in 
him – indeed, the delirious clarity discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis - these 
statements underline Miller’s attraction to fanaticism and zealotry. By reacting 
enthusiastically to the ‘crazy’ theories of eschatological writers, the anti-religious 
Miller adheres to Spengler, Fraenkel and Bergson’s pronouncements with the blind 
faith of a disciple. And yet, Miller makes it clear that he recognizes the excessiveness, 
irrationality and self-gratifying nature of his faith, acknowledging what Garland 
terms ‘the repercussions to the self’ that come with secular appropriations of 
prophetical language. 768  
Indeed, Miller’s quasi-religious tone is determined not to mutate into anxiety and 
contaminate his ‘incurable optimism’. Yet, mischievously, Miller also expounds some 
external philosophical, literary and anthropological texts as gospel truths. His 
conversion to Bergson’s cause, for example, is so evangelical in its nature that he 
refuses to converse with anyone who does not or can not understand Creative 
Evolution: 
You meet a friend on the street by chance, one whom you haven’t seen for 
several weeks, and he has become an absolute stranger to you. You give him 
a few signals from your new perch and if he doesn’t cotton you pass him up – 
for good. It’s exactly like mopping up a battlefield: all those who are                                                              
767 Letters to Emil, p. 104. 
768 ‘The Dearest of Cemeteries’, p. 102. 
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hopelessly disabled and agonizing you dispatch with one swift bow of your 
club … You seek out new fields of operation, new specimens of the human 
race whom you patiently instruct and equip with the new symbols … You try 
everybody and everything within range, provided they are ignorant of the 
revelation.769  
Indeed, at a later point in Capricorn Miller claims that he took to reading ‘this new 
bible’ to the workers at his father’s tailor shop ‘in the way that Paul must have talked 
to the disciples’.770 
Masuga flags up a similar dialectic between didacticism and a knowing awareness of 
absurdity in Miller’s own writing, claiming that he ‘joyfully exploits’ the ‘underlying 
dynamic of the text as a false or impossible picture of the world or of himself as a 
human being’.771 Miller, Masuga claims, draws the reader’s attention to his own 
pretensions, ‘broadcasting the seditious, minor quality of his writing’ through words 
that ‘break down (under the weight of the major language) but somehow 
simultaneously swell and spill over (in a minorization of the major language)’.772  
Citing Miller’s clumsy robbery of a passage from Joyce’s Finnegans Wake in Cancer, 
she goes on to imply that Miller deliberately marks himself out as ‘tasteless and 
contradictory’.773  Indeed, halfway through ‘Wisdom of the Heart’, his 1939 essay on 
‘the art of living’, he exclaims ‘this is the Apocalyptic Era when all things will be 
made manifest to us’ before playfully asserting ‘I am not dippy.’774 As Rod 
Rosenquist puts it in Modernism, the Market and the New:  
The man who prophesied the end of all literature hoped, by building his 
novel around an invented persona bearing his own name, to write one ‘last 
book’, and thereby position his name within an enduring, if ultimately 
degraded, literary history.775  
In other words, by his apparently total self-belief Miller demands to be taken 
seriously, but he also warns that what he is saying is implausible; a paradox that                                                              
769 Capricorn, p. 200. 
770 Ibid., p. 200. 
771 The Secret Violence of Henry Miller, p. 19.  
772 Masuga, p. 73. 
773 Ibid., 71. 
774 ‘Wisdom of the Heart’, p. 91. 
775 Rosenquist p. 114. 
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functions as a vital source of pleasure for the reader. Like the author himself in his 
readings of Spengler, Bergson and Fraenkel, Miller’s readers are invited to fall under 
the spell of a narrator who is fired up with absolute self-belief but who also admits 
that nothing he says can truly be trusted.   
Although Miller feels an attraction to Spengler’s symbols and the ‘new worlds’ built 
up by Fraenkel, it is significant that he retains a firm and practical resistance to their 
serious application as political, social or economic theory.  In contrast to Pound, who 
is heavily invested in the real anthropological implications of Frobenius’ African 
studies – and who, his friend W.B. Yeats recalls, was enchanted by ‘the idea that 
cultures (including arts and sciences) arise out of races, express those races as if they 
were fruit and leaves in a preordained order and perish with them’ Miller’s praise 
for Spengler was accompanied by a distrust of his ‘dialectic materialism … race logic, 
or quantum’, theories he dismisses as ‘crazy’ in a letter to Fraenkel.776 
According to Garland, Miller’s writings about reading suggest ‘that what's inside a 
book might matter less than the sense of having connected with … a person and a 
voice’.777 After quoting the narrator in Cancer on the eighteenth century French writer 
Papini, Garland goes on to say: 
It doesn’t matter to Miller whether Papini is ‘a chauvinist, a little Christer, or 
a nearsighted pedant’– or a fascist, we might add -- Papini, as a failure is 
'marvelous' because of the incredible mad charisma of his first person 
narration.778  
This corroborates the possibility that Miller could have been interested in Spengler’s 
cultural morphology without feeling any affiliation with his racially essentialist 
theories. Further corroboration comes from the fact that Miller dismisses ‘race logic’ 
elsewhere in Cancer – lampooning the preposterous notion that average skull size 
indicates racial evolutionary development (158). That said, Pound’s enthusiasm for 
Miller as a writer with an essentialist understanding of nationality (‘Miller’s                                                              
776 W.B Yeats, ‘Letter to Sturge Moore’, quoted in Noel Stock, The Life of Ezra Pound 
(Oxford: Routledge, 1970), p. 52; Miller, Hamlet: The Michael Fraenkel – Henry Miller 
Correspondence, p. 56. 
777 Garland, ‘The Dearest of Cemeteries’, p. 205. 
778 Garland, ‘Dearest of Cemeteries’, p. 205. 
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Americans and very American, his Russians quite so’)779 and of hierarchy, indeed as 
a man who appreciates ‘the process we are now going through’, seems to be 
confirmed by their common interest in culturally essentialist writers like Spengler 
and Frobenius.  
Beyond Yeats’ comments, Pound’s descriptions of Frobenius demonstrate that his 
interest in ‘paideuma’, ‘kultursymptome’ and ‘kulter’ was in part motivated by the 
answers the latter purported to offer on race. Contributing to Negro, an anthology 
compiled by his associate Nancy Cunnard and intended to raise awareness of 
African-American culture in the 1940s, Pound addresses ‘the Afro-American 
intelligenzia and … the Negro millionaires etc., that are rumored to flourish in 
Harlem’, telling them they should be grateful to Frobenius since he is the one man 
‘who has shown their race its true charter of nobility’.780 Through his examination of 
artifacts, weapons and ruins in West Africa, Pound claims, Frobenius has managed 
to uncover the ‘essential soul’ not only of the West African Yorubian race, but the 
entire African continent. In this sense Pound adopts what Merchand calls a wholly 
‘orientalized’ view of his contemporary Africans’.781 It is a view that is usefully 
summed up in The Voice of Africa: 
Yoruban civilization must, in its present form, be unhesitatingly declared to 
be essentially African … It is as much an integral part of, as deeply rooted in, 
the body and soul of the Yorubans themselves as the terracottas are part and 
parcel of the homogeneous soil of Yorubaland. Here is a state of culture 
which has been realized in flesh and blood, drawing the breath of life from its 
aboriginal form.782 
As we have seen, Miller’s discussions of Spengler, nationality, culture and destiny 
regularly echo Pound’s Frobenian orientalist idea about an elusive but powerful 
virtue in the ancient civilizations of non-Western nations. Through his reading of The 
Decline of the West, Miller convinced himself that, where the people of his own time 
and continent did not comprehend or appreciate his artistic voice, ‘any man of                                                              
779 ‘Review of Tropic of Cancer’, p. 88. 
780 ‘Ezra Pound, ‘Leo Frobenius’, in Negro: An Anthology, ed. and collected by Nancy 
Cunard (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1934, 1970), p. 393. 
781 Marchand, p. 16. 
782 Ibid.,322. 
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archaic epochs would have understood me.’783 Indeed, Miller’s representation of 
himself as a marginal individual depends on this connection between artistic, social 
and mental degeneration and a productive ‘primitive’ spirit, native to ‘magic’ 
practicing, non-western cultures: 
when you drive a man almost crazy and when, to his own surprise perhaps, 
he finds that he still has some resistance, some powers of his own, then you 
are apt to find such a man acting very much like a primitive being. Such a 
man is apt not only to become stubborn and dogged, but superstitious, a 
believer in magic and a practiser of magic.784    
This kind of association – between himself as a rejected, mad artist and the 
‘primitive’ and exotic cultural spirits of faraway lands – abounds throughout Miller’s 
writing.  In the Hamlet correspondence and various other essays and letters, for 
example, he identifies himself as a ‘Chinaman’, because he believes that he embodies 
essential Chinese qualities: ‘The fundamental, changeless, rock-bottom man, 
immortal, unscathed by catastrophes ’.785 He also uses Judaism and his Jewish 
characters in Cancer and Capricorn for the same self-affirmative purpose, identifying 
a capacity for suffering as a principal Jewish characteristic and believing that his own 
suffering makes him somehow Jewish in spirit. Moreover, these hunches of racial 
affinity are consolidated in Miller’s mind by his sense of Spengerian determinism. 
Western civilization is fixed on one course and he – as a rare figure who understands 
its impending doom – has freed himself to communicate with the ‘primitive’ spirits 
of past epochs. 
Clearly this appropriation of racial otherness for the purpose of self-affirmation calls 
to mind the deeply suspect Primitivist paradigm that Pound suggests in his article 
for the ‘Negro’ anthology. Miller makes use of cultural morphological imaginative 
links to think about himself as a ‘noble savage’, transcendent of corrupt, civilized 
modernity and plugged in to a certain ‘magic’ that is unavailable to the rest of his 
subservient twentieth-century race. It is the kind of anti-modern approach – also 
                                                             
783 Capricorn, p.261. 
784Ibid., p. 261. 
785 Hamlet: The Michael Fraenkel – Henry Miller Correspondence, p. 90. 
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abundantly evident in the anti-bourgeois and anti-utilitarian ideas detailed in 
Chapter 3.3 of this thesis - that connects quite easily with Frobenius. 
Miller’s perceptual revolution depends upon distinctly essentialist imagery, in terms 
not only of race but gender and sexuality too. As we have seen, he describes his 
spiritual and ethical bond with Germaine and Lucienne, the virtuous prostitutes in 
Cancer, in similarly essentialist terms: Germaine ‘functioned superbly’ in her 
‘circumscribed’ world because ‘she glows down there where a woman should’; 
Lucienne soars like a ‘condor’ above the wage slaves of Paris because she is tuned in 
to the essential frequency of her sexuality, her gender and her humanity.786 Indeed, 
both prostitutes are compared favorably to the ladylike Claude, whose primness 
goes fundamentally against the grain of her natural role as ‘whore’. In his gut, Miller 
says, he feels a sort of ‘inexpressible rebellion’ against Claude’s deviation from her 
essential self.      
In a world Pound believes is contaminated by the ‘smearing of difference’, Miller’s 
solid grasp of fixed cultural, gender and sexual distinctions marks him out above his 
contemporaries as a truth-telling artist and human being. It is also the case, however, 
that - unlike Pound - Miller abhors the use of these figurative coordinates for the 
condemnation or veneration of entire cultures or races. Pound’s address to black 
Americans, though intended to celebrate ‘their noble charter’, is based on a binary 
understanding of racial virtue and corruption that assumes his capacity, as a white 
Western man of letters, to judge the relative worth of a complete racial history. Far 
more sinisterly, his attacks on the Jewish race for its part in the bank-government-
arms dealer conspiracy resulted in the First World War - attacks which escalated 
dramatically in the 1930s and 40s and culminated in his racist condemnation of ‘the 
kikes’ and their ‘jewsocracy’  - suggest his wholesale ideological application of 
Frobenius’ cultural physiognomy.  
Miller, on the other hand, is fundamentally opposed to racial discrimination and 
persecution, particularly in their institutional forms. Although he often uses what 
was offensively racist language (words like ‘nigger’ and ‘kike’ come up frequently in                                                              
786 Cancer, p. 52. See my Section 2.3; Cancer, p. 164-65. See my p. 248. 
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his prose), he views racial inequality as another example of the pernicious collective 
subjugating the individual. Indeed, in Capricorn he describes his shock, outrage and 
sadness at witnessing the social and psychological after-effects of slavery while 
travelling across America in search of work: 
I passed the imaginary line which divides the North from the South. I wasn’t 
aware of it until a darkie came along driving a team; when he gets alongside 
of me he stands up in his seat and doffs his hat most respectfully. He had 
snow-white hair and a face of great dignity. That made me feel horrible: it 
made me realize there are still slaves. This man had to tip his hate to me – 
because I was of the white race. Whereas I should have tipped my hat to him! 
I should have saluted him as a survivor of all the vile tortures the white men 
have inflicted on the black.787  
This passage contains something of the paradox at the heart of Miller’s approach to 
race and culture. While he is instinctively opposed to the reality of slavery, and of 
one race’s sense of entitlement over another, he also envisions the black man he 
encounters as a symbol of his race, imbuing him with a ‘face of great dignity’ despite 
the ‘vile tortures’ that all black Americans have endured. Essentialist ideas of 
cultural virtue and evil are again used to assert the importance of individual 
freedom, and particularly to mark himself out as an individual who has broken away 
from the collective and therefore recognizes the full magnitude of its crime: 
I should have tipped my cap first, to let him know that I am not a part of this 
system, that I am begging forgiveness for all my white brethren who are too 
ignorant and cruel to make an honest overt gesture.788  
The language of cultural essentialism – connected to the language of eschatology – 
thus allows Miller to consolidate and reify his position on the margins of 
conventional society. It gives him the linguistic and imaginative coordinates to 
present himself as ‘sane’ and ‘healthy’ for being on the outside rather than at the                                                              
787 Capricorn, p. 281. 
788 Ibid., p. 281. Miller romanticises ancient dynasties in the cause of his anti-
imperialist message throughout his writings on America. Later in Capricorn, for 
example, he exclaims passionately that ‘No greater humiliation, it seems to me, was 
meted out to any man than to Montezuma; no race was ever more ruthlessly wiped 
out than the American Indian; no land was ever raped in the foul and bloody way 
that California was raped by the gold-diggers. I blush to think of our origins – our 
hands are steeped in blood and crime’  (Capricorn, p. 261). 
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epicenters first of American then of French civilization. Indeed, as he puts it in 
Plexus, when he first reads Spengler’s announcement that ‘THE END OF THE 
WORLD IS IN SIGHT!’ – an announcement, importantly, that he describes as 
‘imaginary’ - he experiences ‘a strange kind of peace … the peace of a man who was 
able to reconcile himself with the condition of the world in thought’.789 Thus, in stark 
contrast to the elitist authority implied by Pound’s reading of Frobenius, Miller 
presents Spengler not only as a writer who intoxicates with his use of language but a 
figure of reassurance to marginalized, alienated spirits who have lost their way in the 
divisive modernity of the twentieth century urban landscape.  Indeed, Miller’s ‘last 
book’ is imagined as a sacred sanctuary for the mentally and materially 
dispossessed, ‘a cathedral, a veritable cathedral, in the building of which everybody 
will assist who has lost his identity’ (33). 
Like El Greco and Anaïs Nin, indeed like Germaine – who, in their different ways 
Miller believed had created their ‘own worlds … inside the whale’ – Miller 
understands his ‘last book’ as a last-ditch imaginative response to the madness of 
contemporary existence. Indeed, it is akin to the process Caroline Blinder identifies 
when she analyses Miller’s discussions of Sigmund Freud: ‘Miller’s primary interest 
in Freud’, Blinder writes, was ‘as a case-study for what alternatives man constructs 
when faced with a world gone mad’.790 Blinder goes on to quote Miller on Freud in 
‘Open Letter to Surrealists Everywhere’: ‘He created a fiction ... Which helped, not to 
adjust him to the world, but to adjust the world to his own imaginings.’791   
In his brash and brazen mission statement to write the world’s ‘last book’, Miller fits 
Frank Kermode’s description of later modernist artists. As mentioned in my 
introduction to this chapter, Kermode believed that writers like Allen Ginsberg, Jack 
Kerouac and Norman Mailer lacked ‘a skepticism and a refined traditionalism [that 
had] held in check what threatened to be a bad case of literary primitivism’ amongst 
their early modernist predecessors. Ironically, however, Miller’s refusal to engage                                                              
789 Plexus, p. 455. 
790 Blinder, Sexual Aesthetics, p. 53 
791 Miller, ‘An Open Letter to Surrealists Everywhere’, pp. 168-69. Quoted in Blinder. 
Sexual Aesthetics, p. 53. 
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intellectually with eschatological influences works as its own check on his potential 
for the worst excesses of ‘literary primitivism’. Where Pound stitches diffuse and 
often highly suspect theories together to prove his own intuited hunches about the 
world, Miller feeds off the language of these writers, expressing his own essential 
ethical and aesthetical truths through the writing out of his experience. His methods 
necessitate the discovery and revelation of the ‘primitivism’ and absurdity the 
eschatological mode carries with it; indeed, his methods also require that he admit 
his own inconsistencies and hypocrisies.  
This is in part what Leslie Fielder refers to in his 1969 essay ‘Cross the Border/Close 
the Gap’:  
We have … entered quite another time, apocalyptic, anti-rational, blatantly 
romantic and sentimental; an age dedicated to misology and prophetic 
irresponsibility; one distrustful of self-protective irony and too-great self-
awareness.792 
Miller preempts the changes Fielder identifies; changes which go someway towards 
explaining the early categorizations of Cancer as a niche homage to a bygone literary 
age. Orwell, Rahv and Wilson all recognize the everyday, defeated and apocalyptic 
tropes of Joyce, Pound and Eliot’s narrative modes in Cancer, even as Orwell, we 
saw, judges Miller to be a harbinger of a new, inevitably bleak – perhaps even 
Spenglerian - future. Yet Miller represents more than both of these categories. His 
work ‘crosses the gap’ between the early modernists and the later ‘more schismatic’ 
practitioners that would come after the Second World War. In effect, he playfully 
incorporates the aesthetics of Pound’s early modernism to announce a new, 
hyperbolic and un-academic approach that effectively consigns the earlier movement 
to history. Indeed, as early as 1934, Miller uses Poundian modernist tropes and ideas 
to suggests the death of that movement; a death that was officially announced by 
Fielder – amongst others - thirty years later:  
                                                             
792 Leslie Fiedler, ‘Cross the Border – Close the Gap’, Playboy, 16 (December 1969), p. 
24. Quoted in Leon Lewis, Henry Miller- the Major Writings (New York: Schocken 
Books, 1986), p. 10. 
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The kind of literature which had arrogated to itself the name modern (with 
the presumption that it represented the ultimate advance in sensibility and 
form, that beyond it newness was not possible), and whose moment of 
triumph lasted from the point just before world war i until just after world 
war ii, is dead, i.e., belongs to history not actuality. In the field of the novel, 
this means that the age of Proust, Mann, and Joyce is over; just as in verse 
that of T.S. Eliot, Paul Valery, Montale and Seferis is done with.793 
Going back to Richard Sheppard’s comment – quoted in the introduction to this 
Chapter - about the concealed and marginalized presence of ‘complex, interrelated 
and deeply disturbing manifestations of modernity’ in certain modernist texts, we 
may then begin to rethink Miller.794 While it is possible to think about the 
eschatological, indeed the culturally morphological and culturally essentialist 
currents in Miller as expressions of a Poundian conservatism, they are dramatically 
at odds with his main moral purposes.795  If Pound’s celebration of Miller suggests 
his detection of these currents and his recognition that they were using some of the 
same coordinates, what he categorically fails to understand is Miller’s refusal to 
incorporate any influence, indeed express any feeling or thought without the implicit 
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Fiedler (New York: Stein and Day, 1971), pp. 403-516, p. 461. 
794 Sheppard, Modernism-Dada-Postmodernism, p. 7. 
795 Ibid., p. 7. 
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Conclusion 
Throughout this thesis I have attempted to define a set of radical aesthetics that are 
common to Pound and Miller and are based on complex and contradictory impulses; 
most crucially towards acknowledgement of the multiplicity of existence and the 
instinctive and often aggressive defense of particular, inarguably pure aesthetic and 
political values. As a result, works by both writers embody fundamental and 
fascinating oppositions between the socially progressive and retrogressive, the 
creative and destructive, and - in terms of the politics of art - the avant and the rear 
gardes. Pound’s triumphant championing of Miller facilitates – amongst other things 
– an understanding of the tension in the latter’s work between the desire for 
perceptual and emotional liberation and problematically essentialist attitudes 
towards what constitutes individual and group identity. These inherent 
contradictions  – easily and often misunderstood as signs of moral hypocrisy or 
intellectual deficiency – are crystalized in the context of Pound’s early twentieth 
century reaction against abstraction, propaganda and sentimentality in art and 
politics. Indeed, Miller’s articulation of these contradictions is the basis for Pound’s 
expression of moral solidarity in his review of Cancer. It is also the main reason for 
his immediately surprising and intriguing promotion of Miller, in 1935, as the future 
of Anglo-American letters.   
In the process of analyzing these crossovers, it has become equally clear that Pound 
and Miller represent two very different versions of the avant-garde. The slippage 
between a retrograde, conservative and at times fascist mode of rhetoric and its 
opposite – faith in the progressive, democratizing force of art – is a hallmark of the 
inter-war period in which their aesthetics coincide, but Miller’s alertness to that 
dialectic differentiates him from Pound in crucial ways. This, I have argued, places 
Miller in a unique intermediary position between Pound’s version of high Anglo-
American modernism in the 1910s, 20s and 30s and post-Second World War avant-
garde writing. In my attempt to make sense of Pound’s praise for Miller, I have 
shown that the two writers’ shared many of the same anxieties about the state of art 
and society in the first thirty years of the twentieth century – connected to wider 
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anxieties that permeated the artistic milieu of Europe at this time – and held a 
common belief in the capacity of literature to improve both. While they identified 
many of the same aesthetical evils, however, they understood literature’s role in very 
different ways. Where Miller focused on the writer’s responsibility to liberate him or 
her self and the reader through emotionally and perceptually truthful expression, 
Pound promoted the precise delineation of subjective experience as a way to realign 
and reaffirm essential metaphysical relations in the objective world.  
In Miller, Pound sees exactly what he wants from a writer at this time – namely, a 
sensitivity to the complex, contradictory emotions and competing aesthetic 
impressions that make up subjective experience and a willingness to use this as a 
way of countering ‘the poppy-cock … emotional slither [and] rhetorical din’ of 
Victorian and Edwardian literature.797 Consequently, they share a pluralistic and 
democratic vision of honest artistic creation that rejects aesthetic and ideological 
oversimplification. Intriguingly, their desire for a world that acknowledges what 
Pound calls the ‘full gamut of values’ and Miller the ‘multiplicity of things’ is also 
what causes both writers to veer into morally absolutist as well as nationally, racially 
and sexually essentialist territory.798 Both end up in paradoxical positions of absolute 
tolerance and intolerance because they believe in a creative and moral purity that 
arises when the individual confronts the chaos of his or her subjective experience, 
acknowledging the collapse of beautiful into ugly, right into wrong, obscene into 
appropriate.    
Crucially, Pound’s unlikely interest in Miller makes it easier to understand the 
discrepancy between the latter’s optimistic faith in the universal capacity for 
spiritual, psychological and social progress and his assertions of gender, national, 
racial and vocational polarities. As we saw in Section 2.4, ‘Attraction of the Blemish: 
sexual aesthetics in Pound and Miller’, included in his vision of a world in which 
individuals free themselves of societal restrictions is instinctive reaction against 
                                                             
797 ‘A Retrospect’, p. 3. See my p. 29.  
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Claude, the prostitute who has ‘no right to be sitting there like a lady’.799 A highly 
sensitive writer whose dedication to exploring the complexity of human experience 
led him towards suspect totalitarian beliefs, Pound illuminates a related paradox at 
the center of Miller’s moral code: that he was motivated by radically humanistic and 
universalist impulses - towards unconditional tolerance and compassion, individual 
self-autonomy and sexual and spiritual freedom – but expressed and explored these 
using deliberately brutal and ostensibly anti-humanist language. By reading between 
the lines of Pound’s apparently straightforward misappropriation, it has been 
possible to make sense of the retrograde elements in Miller’s work in relation to, 
rather than isolation from, his wider moral project.  
Through Pound and his literary ally T.E. Hulme, it has also been possible to put this 
paradox in the context of deeper political problems surrounding Henri Bergson’s 
influence on literature in the early twentieth century. Like Hulme, Miller embodied a 
Bergsonian skepticism about the effectiveness of the intellect to capture subjective 
experience while at the same time using Bergson’s philosophy to predict ‘the break 
up’ of ‘the humanist attitude’ and its replacement by a set of ‘absolute values’.800 In 
Miller, as in Hulme and Pound, fascination with the multiplicity of experience results 
in the contradictory philosophical idea that an indisputable truth exists beyond the 
limiting structures of intellectual and ideological reasoning. Pound and Miller regard 
adherence to doctrine – religious, political, social and artistic – as dangerously 
inhibitive of individual and collective life, positing instinctive taste or ‘gout’ (in 
Pound’s terminology) as a more truthful and virtuous alternative. Consequently they 
are similarly intolerant of people - and especially artists – who are unfaithful to their 
physical instincts, the principal driving force of existence.  As we have seen, for 
Pound ‘belief is a cramp, a paralysis, an atrophy of the mind in certain positions’; for 
Miller man is ‘debauched by [cerebral] ideas’ but liberated by ‘live ideas, kidney 
ideas, intestinal ideas’. 801 
                                                             
799 Cancer, p. 53. See my p. 194. 
800 Hulme, ‘Modern Art and its Philosophy’, p. 78. See my p. 127. 
801 Ezra Pound, ‘Axiomata’ 1921, p. 260; Cancer, p. 243. See my pp. 172, 282.  
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In this sense, Miller inherits Pound’s Anglo-American modernist desire to return 
from the uncertain, intellectual periphery of modernity to an ahistorical, instinctively 
felt moral center. According to both writers’ aesthetics, a person’s moral judgments 
and a writer’s creative output are purer when they originate physically rather than 
intellectually or ideologically. They disagree fundamentally, however, on the level of 
control the artist should apply to these instincts. Where Pound invokes Confucius to 
recommend fashioning ‘harmonious lines’ from ‘the inarticulate heart’s tone’, Miller 
performatively channels that inarticulacy for creative and existentially liberating 
ends.802 Pound’s faith in a unique symmetry to be rendered from conflicting thoughts 
and feelings therefore runs counter to Miller’s belief in a natural sense of order that 
arises from the acceptance and unmitigated expression of internal chaos. For Miller, 
chaos constitutes a person’s indisputable truth and is therefore the basis of honest 
work - the foundations for the ‘human document’, as he calls Cancer, rather than 
‘literature’ or ‘a book in the ordinary sense of the word’.803 Indeed, reading Bergson’s 
Creative Evolution Miller feels validated in his dismissal of the need to create order 
from chaos: ‘I have no fear or illusions about disorder … The labyrinth is my happy 
hunting ground and the deeper I burrow into the maze the more oriented I 
become’.804 
 Thus Miller uses Bergson to identify apparent inarticulacy as a hallmark of 
truthfulness – the artist’s true self expressed in the torrent of his or her thoughts 
before any attempt is made to sort through and express them with precision. He is 
categorically uninterested in what Marshall McLuhan describes as Pound’s ‘seeking 
out of those qualities and techniques in a writer which lead to the economical 
rendering of complex actualities’.805  In line with this, Miller describes and desires a 
perceptual revolution through which he is emotionally and creatively unburdened 
by confessing everything that is contradictory, ugly and therefore deemed 
unacceptable, even inexpressible. This is the philosophical grounding for Miller’s                                                              
802 ‘Ta Hsio: The Great Digest’, p. 31. 
803  ‘Un Être Étoilique’, p. 288. See my p. 141. 
804 Capricorn, p. 201 
805 Marshall McLuhan, p. 170. See my p. 31. 
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problematic and often shockingly brutal impulses – addressed in Chapter Two of 
this study - towards debasement, prejudice and cruelty. His attacks on the derelict 
Max in Max and the White Phagocytes and the cuckolded playwright Sylvester in 
Cancer are deliberate attempts to get the ‘poison out of [his] system’, cleansing 
himself of hatred, neurosis and violence so that he can achieve a state of mind that is 
‘sane’ and serves both as the material and the optimum conditions for the production 
of pure, uncontrived art.806  
Crucially, and again in line with anti-humanist, conservative interpretations of 
Bergson, this examination and acceptance of the self and the world in their ‘hideous’, 
imperfect forms, also leads Miller to oppose the positive humanist tenet that social 
and cultural systems should be organized on the basis of equality and inherent 
goodness. 807  A great deal of his confessional writing embodies a cynicism – rife in 
the works of Pound and T.E. Hulme in the interwar period - about the possibility of 
political and social progress within the restrictive parameters of the contemporary 
humanistic paradigm. This is the aggressive narcissism Miller exhibits when he tells 
Sylvester to ‘fuck your pluralistic universe’ and ‘fuck you two ways of looking at 
things’.808 Pound and Miller share an enemy, not only in sentimentality but the 
idealism of groups and ‘-isms’; established literary and political coteries they accuse 
of propagating unrealistic myths about humanity.809 Accordingly, both writers 
sanctify the role of the especial individual in opposition to the dilutive mediocrity of 
the collective. In their different ways, they dismiss social, political universalism and 
philosophical pluralism as dangerous detractions from the sovereign truth the artist 
finds in subjective experience. Just as Pound sees art as a means of asserting ‘that all 
men do not desire the same things’, Miller rails against the dilution of ‘personal, 
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151. See my p. 17. 
 305 
religious’ individual freedom by collectively imposed concepts of ‘liberty and justice 
… idle words signifying nobody knows precisely what.’810  
However, Miller and Pound’s readings of society, culture, politics and economics are 
also fundamentally affected by their disagreements over the use of the ‘chaos’ and 
disharmony of subjective experience. 811 Pound’s interpretation of Cancer’s moral 
universe as ‘eminently fair’ and constructed on a ‘hierarchy of values’ is possible 
because Miller takes up many of Pound’s early modernistic aesthetic and ethical 
positions – particularly in regard to artistic mediocrity and collective bourgeois codes 
of behavior - but it overlooks his deeper humanistic purposes and solutions.812 Miller 
might fiercely and systematically refuse the moral logic of social consciousness and 
day-to-day compassion but he strives to replace these with a utopian scheme in 
which people have ‘no feeling of class, caste, color or country … no need of 
possessions, no use for money, no archaic prejudices about the sanctity of the home 
or marriage’.813 He might couch his solutions in totalising and intolerant terms but he 
is nonetheless zealously, compassionately opposed to the political and social 
injustice wrought on the poorest and most marginalized by modern capitalist 
economics – a ‘crazy system of exploitation’ built on a ‘pitiful, ignominious spiritual 
shambles’.814 While demonstrating his faith in certain universal values, Miller 
adhered to the humanist worldview that T.E. Hulme attacked, consistently agreeing 
with the notion that ‘life is the source and measure of all values, and that man is 
fundamentally good’.815 
By confessing to chaotic, brutal feelings, to feelings of ‘inexpressible rebellion’ 
against particular individuals and groups, Miller intended to expose and – as 
Lawrence Durrell puts it – ‘do away with’ a more pernicious form of brutality that 
                                                             
810 ‘An Open Letter to Surrealists Everywhere’, p. 153. See my p. 154. 
811 Cancer, p. 10 
812 ‘Review of Tropic of Cancer’, p. 88. 
813 Henry Miller, ‘Of Art and the Future’, p. 232. See my p. 130. 
814 Ibid., p. 234. 
815 Hulme, ‘A Notebook,’ p. 444. See my p. 104, 130. 
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exists beneath the impulse towards collectively sanctioned sentiment.816 Where 
Pound is attracted to Miller’s rejection of standardized moral positions on poverty 
and sex, he fails to understand that this is part of the latter’s project to rethink 
reductive binary approaches to suffering in a way that acknowledges its true 
disorder and complexity.  
In this sense Miller succeed, where Pound fails, in his professed aim to find a purer 
aesthetic that moves literature beyond abstract and generalizing ideology. Partly in 
accordance with the radical social theories of Georges Bataille, Miller makes himself 
the narcissistic, monstrous expounder of unacceptable ideas on human misery in 
order to break through the barrier between observer and sufferer, arriving at a more 
truthful means of communion and communication. Pound’s own anti-ideological 
rhetoric, however, is contradicted by the expressly totalitarian ideological purpose 
behind his narcissism. He decrees that artists should be sensitive to the infinite array 
of internal and external ‘tonalities’ in the world, following Henry James and James 
Joyce’s examples in representing ‘variegations of dialect’ of thoughts and values.817 
Indeed, he presents this approach as a vital means of promoting understanding and 
‘communication’ between people, a way of truthfully asserting difference to repair 
the obfuscating damage caused by universalist and humanist idealism, yet his 
theories on writing inevitably collapse into partisan fascist conjecture that condemns 
difference as venal and contaminated. 818  Pound’s aesthetic aim to counter ‘the 
smearing of difference’ and produce art that accounts for intellectual, ideological, 
religious and racial nuance ultimately produces a political system of thought that 
categorizes essential characteristics as virtuous or evil.819   
                                                             
816 Cancer, p. 53. See my p. 190; Durrell quoted in Woolf, ‘Beyond Ideology: Kate 
Millet and the Case for Henry Miller’, p. 176. See my p. 125.  
817 ‘Joyce’, p. 412; ‘Ulysses’, p. 404. See my Section 1.2. 
818 ‘Henry James’, p. 298. 
819 It is worth re-stressing that these are conclusions about Pound’s non-fiction prose 
writing, not his poems. In his poetry the desire for subtle aesthetic discrimination is 
also undermined by the tendency towards totalising language but the collapse of one 
into the other is less extreme. An analysis of Pound’s creative output in relation to 
Miller’s deserves more space than a study of this nature can afford. 
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As we saw in Chapter One, this is part of a deeper, extreme and irresolvable 
contradiction that undermines Pound’s work as a literary essayist. Having begun his 
career promoting the ‘natural colors and shapes’ in poems by William Carlos 
Williams and H.D, who refused the ‘emotional slither’ and ‘rhetorical din’ of the 
status quo, he gradually developed a perspective that excluded all incompatible 
values or aesthetical nuances. He wanted art and literature to reflect the complexity 
of existence by operating from its own sacred sphere, separate from reductive 
ideological jingoism and cliché, but he also wanted it to reflect the wider political 
and social landscape in equally reductive ways. His opposition to the dangers of 
mixing ideology and art therefore had its own virulently ideological agenda built 
into it.   
Miller’s esoteric response to the turning on of ‘the brutal tap’ – as Wyndham Lewis 
described the trend towards anti-humanism in the inter-war period – and his arrival 
at a contrasting and profoundly compassionate approach to the individual and 
society, designates him a unique and elusive position in the lineage of twentieth 
century avant-garde writing.820 He is correctly identified by Blinder, Jahshan and 
Mayne as an inheritor of a mode of European avant-garde aesthetics aimed at what 
Richard Sheppard calls ‘the reintegration of art and life, with “life” understood as the 
everyday mass culture, the material world and the energies of the body’.821 As shown 
throughout this study, Miller’s hopes that Cancer should represent ‘a human 
document’ rather than a piece of ‘literature’, indeed his admiration for artists like 
Artaud Rimbaud who ‘brought art closer to life’, demonstrate his place within a 
Romantic tradition self-consciously focused on the primacy of the artist’s subjective 
experience and imagination.822 Yet the anxiety he shares with Pound about the 
abstractness of modern values in art and society and his desire for an ethically fixed 
center to remedy this situates him within a contradictorily high modernist literary 
mode. While attempting to embody ‘mass culture, the material world and the 
energies of the body’ in his art, Miller also explores an aesthetic based on the longing                                                              
820 Lewis, The Caliph’s Design, p. 268. See my p. 105. 
821 Richard Sheppard, Modernism-Dada-Postmodernism  
822 Time of the Assassins, p. 6 
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to escape the ideological and aesthetical restrictions of modern life; an aesthetic, 
Peter Bürger claims, that is common to Pound, Joyce and Eliot and that ‘separates art 
from life and beauty from sentimentality.’823  
As we have seen, Miller’s drive towards true ‘beauty’ as opposed to ‘sentimentality’, 
is motivated by his struggle to make sense of his position as an alienated individual 
and artist, but is also predicated on the instinct to marginalize ways of thinking and 
behaving that he considers undesirable. Despite the fundamental differences, 
delineated in Chapter Three, between Miller and Pound’s approaches to the 
essentialism of Oswald Spengler and Leo Frobenius’ cultural morphological projects, 
it is important to understand that the rhetoric Miller uses in his quest for self-
liberation also reveals a totalising, elitist condemnation of the ignorant, 
unenlightened majority; the masses who, unable to recognize the role of instinct and 
appetite in their lives, end up privileging intellectual and moral obedience to 
exteriorly imposed standards of behavior over their own stomachic, sexual and 
spiritual fulfillment. In this sense, there is a narrowing of the gap implied by Miller’s 
quest for his own ‘perceptual’ apocalyptic dawn and Pound’s invocation of a ‘literal’, 
‘historical’ revolution. Miller’s attack on sentimentality and repressive bourgeois 
taboos thus combines forward-thinking compassion with a deep-seated intolerance 
for the automatons who reject his path towards self-liberation. 
In this context, the hyperbole and parody that Sarah Garland recognizes in Miller’s 
infatuation with Spengler and cyclical world meta-history in fact hides a genuine, 
problematic and Poundian urge to rid humanity of veniality and ignorance. Despite 
his awareness that his and Fraenkel’s ‘Festival of Death’ is farcical, the project is also 
permeated by a very real sense of what Miller – when comparing the ‘ladylike’ 
prostitute Claude to the ‘whore from the cradle’ Germaine – calls an ‘inexpressible 
rebellion’ against false, self-denying individuals (52). Indeed, in place of the limited 
conception of sympathy critiqued in Max and the White Phagocytes, he envisions an 
improved approach to suffering that is founded on the Bergsonian premise of 
                                                             
823 Peter Bürger quoted by Richard Sheppard in Modernism-Dada-Postmodernism 
(Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1999), p. 6. 
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existence as infinitely various and interpenetrating, with contrasting elements that 
are all equally justifiable, but he presents this in terms of a fanatical religious 
conversion: 
You live there for a while, at the apex of clarity, and you see things with the 
naked eye and everything looks good, is good. It’s almost like getting religion 
– only so much better, so much more sane.824 
By reading Miller’s radical approach to subjective experience, sexuality and the role 
of the artist in the light of Pound’s transition from literary critic to social-economic 
conspiracy theorist, I have attempted to show the importance of absolutism, brutality 
and intolerance to an aesthetic and ideological project whose principal aim was 
creative and existential freedom. It is not possible to understand Miller’s works of 
the 1930s, I argue, without an appreciation of two widely neglected factors: firstly 
that his battle against the standard progressive moral thinking of his day was itself 
inspired by a profound socially conscious moral purposes; second that his own 
perceptual revolution was informed and facilitated, not simply jeopardized by 
apparently incongruous retrogressive impulses. In twentieth-century readings, 
Miller’s essentialism was too often seen as either dominant at the expense of his 
more complex purposes – in the cases of Kate Millet’s 1969 feminist attack and 
Salman Rushdie’s ‘Outside the Whale’ (1984) - or conspicuous by its convenient 
absence – in the cases of Lawrence Durrell, Karl Shapiro, Wallace Fowlie and Charles 
Glicksberg, who concentrated on his sexual and spiritual enlightenment without 
fully testing his ‘poison’.825  
In line with twenty-first-century studies by Caroline Blinder, James Decker and 
Sarah Garland I have attempted to understand the violence of Miller’s language as a 
strategic element in his metaphysical, perceptual and aesthetic revolution rather than 
a potential blight on his character and artistic reputation. Following Blinder and 
Garland’s example I have rejected the tendency to condemn or venerate Miller on 
grounds of political correctness, and analysed Miller’s course attacks on 
marginalized, vulnerable people – homeless men, female sex workers, and wage-                                                             
824 Letters to Anaïs Nin, p. 159, May 24th 1933. See my pp. 81, 176. 
825 Miller, ‘My Aims and Intentions,’ p. 155 
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slaves within a corporate news organization - in the context of suspect anti-
ideological currents in the artistic milieu of pre-Second World War Europe War. 
As Garland, Katy Masuga, Paul Jahshan and Jane Nelson recognize, this dissonance 
between progressive ideals and callous language produces paradoxically pleasurable 
and painful feelings in the reader that are vital to Miller’s project. Indeed, Miller 
designs his texts so that complicity with his positive theories on human potential is 
mingled with rapprochement for the pettiness of his prejudices. Moreover, enjoying 
the attractive elements of his narrative personality, the serious reader must confront 
his or her complicity in Miller’s unpleasant, contradictorily callous dismissals of 
people based on visceral repulsion rather than reasonable humane evaluations. As 
Anaïs Nin suggested, the dichotomy of unconditional tolerance and harsh brutality 
in Miller’s work forces the reader to confess the unacceptable and seemingly 
inexpressible impulses he or she ordinarily suppresses to make way for socially 
acceptable modes of kindness and compassion.826 In other words, Miller makes 
himself equally venerable and reproachable to force his reader to explore the same 
contradictions in him or herself.     
These deliberately induced tensions are an indication of what Ihab Hassan, in The 
Literature of Silence, calls ‘the dualism’ at the heart of Miller’s aesthetic.827 The 
marriage of ‘Prophecy and Obscenity’ Hassan writes, ‘gives [Miller’s] work its 
particular energy and tang’, again pointing to the fact that Cancer uses eschatology 
for aesthetic purposes, in contrast to Pound’s essays which incorporate it as part of a 
serious political manifesto.828 In place of the singular, forceful violence of Pound’s 
prophetic pronouncements, Miller provocatively emphasizes the sexual in ways he 
knows will be dismissed as obscene to pave the way for existential, artistic and social 
enlightenment. He believes there is a fundamental truth that we must locate in an 
embodied form in order to attain happiness, locating a means for progress in radical 
irreverence and imagining a brave new world that will come into being if people can                                                              
826 The Diary of Anaïs Nin, p. 15. Nin, we remember, writes ‘his own savage self-
confessions demand the same of others.’ See my p. 121. 
827 Hassan, p. 52. 
828 Ibid., p. 52. 
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only accept that the impulses that contemporary morality designates as taboo are in 
fact natural and vital functions of existence. 
Though Pound and Miller are equally invested in a search for alternative virtuous 
ways of living and creating art – indeed, equally opposed to the ‘stupidity’ of 
reductive moral squeamishness and panic – Miller paradoxically luxuriates in 
linguistic, behavioral and sexual impurity in order to attain and communicate a state 
of purity, whereas Pound offers a straightforward attack on ‘anti-flesh’ doctrines. 
Pound views asceticism as another poisonously dogmatic influence on the natural 
relations between thought and thing since it denies the role of physical sensation in 
the intellectual process – ‘after asceticism, that is anti-flesh’ he writes, ‘we get the 
asceticism that is anti-intelligence, that praises stupidity as ‘simplicity’, the cult of 
naivete ’.829 Pound is against ‘idiotic asceticism and a belief that the body is evil’ a 
‘masochistic and hell-breeding belief [that] is always accompanied by bad and 
niggled sculpture’.830 While both ridicule the puerility of condemning sensual 
enjoyment as naughty or wicked, Miller follows the Marquis de Sade in celebrating 
vice as an integral counterpoint to virtue, rejoicing in the liberating sensations 
induced by performing pleasurable acts that are considered sinful. Crucially, 
Pound’s own invectives against puritanical ideas about sex are couched in terms that 
suggest a return to a pure, classical model whereby physical sensation becomes a 
means of transcending earthly reality. As we saw in his poem ‘Salutation the Third’, 
where he does engage deliberately in a form of linguistic vice - through profanities 
such as ‘you slut-bellied obstructionists’ - it is for serious, aggressive and punitive 
purposes; a means of decorating the hell to which he consigns his enemies, rather 
than Miller’s playful manipulation of the reader’s desires and sensibilities.831  
Thus, for all his statements on the correspondence between beauty and disgust and 
the limited morality of the ascetics, Pound’s prophecies are grounded in a desire to 
identify and punish genuine vice, demonstrating a form of earnest dogmatism that is 
anathema to Miller. As we have seen, Pound’s is a narrative viewpoint that                                                              
829 ‘Cavalcanti’, p. 154. See my p. 186. 
830 Ibid., p. 150. See my p. 186. 
831 Ezra Pound, ‘Salutation the Third’, p. 45. See my p. 112. 
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contradicts itself but does not consciously shift ground or ‘play’ with the reader like 
Miller’s: his condemnations do not have Miller’s sharp, sour-sweet ‘tang’; his 
predictions are ‘the word’; he believes the current world process can be replaced 
with another, purer ‘Paideuma’. For Pound, the artist must use language succinctly 
to realign relations in the world according to a dogmatic notion of purity. This purity 
is both linguistic - relating to the purpose of communication itself - and political - 
having to do with economics and how the world is put together in a societal sense. 
For Miller, on the other hand, communication is invariably tainted by politics and 
internal schisms, a situation that the individual must accept rather than fight if he or 
she is to achieve any amount of personal happiness. While Miller believes – as he 
puts it in Max and the White Phagocytes - that the world is ‘terrifying but good’, Pound 
believes the terror can be made good if the right alignments are put in place.832 
As a consequence, Pound’s treatment of his enemies is loaded with clearly targeted 
hatred in a way that Miller’s is expressly not. Pound identifies specific enemies as the 
irresponsible guardians of language, idea and morality, characterizing them as 
unforgivable oppressors: Lloyd George’s cabinet members who compose ill-defined 
and ‘sloppy’ laws and policies;833 the journalists who feed the public false 
information according to the vested interests of businesses; amateurish authors who 
represent weak imitations of human emotion in their books. He presents these as the 
malignantly self-interested or stupid upholders of an infected system and condemns 
the faceless general public – who blindly and without complaint, accept distorted 
and muddled laws, policies, newspaper and literary reports – as their unwitting but 
nonetheless culpable foot soldiers. By contrast, Miller’s aggression is aimed at the 
bourgeois codes that keep the self-autonomous individual down. He is withering 
about mediocre people who adhere to harmful ideas on art, sex and suffering but 
less personal and specific in his attacks on his oppressors.  
Miller imbued high modernism’s portentous and aggressive narcissism with a self-
awareness that protected it against accusations of totalitarian excess, thus making 
                                                             
832 ‘Max’, p. 132.  
833 ‘Joyce’, p. 415. See my p. 235. 
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him acceptable to post-Second World War avant-garde critics and readers in a way 
that Pound was expressly not. If Miller was banned in the 1930s, 40s and 50s for his 
graphic language, he was treated as an important forerunner of later modernisms 
precisely because he balanced his zealotry with the obscenity and irreverence that 
Hassan flags up. As Sydney Finkelstein puts it in his 1967 study, ‘Alienation and 
Rebellion to Nowhere, ‘Miller strikes a note that would resound in the 1960s, and not 
only in literature but also in painting and music, as in the derisive joking of “pop art” 
and “indeterminate” music.’834 Indeed, writing in 1963 Kingsley Widmer places 
Miller’s apocalyptic posturing about Cancer being ‘the last book’ in the context of a 
dominant American artistic attitude after 1945: ‘the artist sacrifices his future to the 
impact of the moment, and the underlying thought is, if the world has no future, 
why worry about the future of an art work?’.835 In this way, Pound is profoundly 
hindered by his ideology because he refuses – where Miller embraces - the playful 
and parodic. His radicalized rhetoric falls behind Miller’s in the history of twentieth 
century avant-garde literature chiefly because of his programmatic anti-Semitism 
and affiliation with Mussolini’s fascism but also because of its outmodedness against 
a backdrop of a new kind of rebellion, partly exemplified by Miller. 
If Miller fits Comens’ category of a ‘visionary’ apocalyptic writer, interested in a 
‘perceptual’ revolution rather than an actual one, he also preempts what Hassan 
describes as the dominant apocalyptic aesthetic after 1944 – that of the immediate 
and simultaneous destruction and re-creation of the world that the individual 
perceives: 
Apocalypse is now! The term recovers its original sense, which is literally 
revelation; vision penetrates the perplexities of the moment to the heart of 
light. In current parlance … the alteration of consciousness …. Traces of it 
may be recognized in the psychedelic experiments of Alpert and Leary, in the 
poetry of Ginsberg, in the Reichian view of orgasm advertised by Mailer … 
The alteration of consciousness is also the constant hope of Miller throughout 
his apocalyptic harangues.836                                                               
834 Sydney Finkelstein, ‘Alienation and Rebellion to Nowhere,’ in Existentialism and 
Alienation in American Literature (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 122. 
835 Kingsley Widmer, in Three Decades of Criticism, ed. by Mitchell, pp. 113-120, p. 100. 
836 Hassan, p. 7. See my p. 282. 
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Tropic of Cancer’s relationship with the counter-cultural movements of the 1960s has 
also been suggested by various critics, including Widmer who writes that ‘in the 
post-World War Two decades, he served as somewhat of a cynosure for the 
bohemian and the marginal, an old hero for such writers as the later bohemian 
Beats.’837 Most recently James Decker and Miller’s biographer’s Jay Martin and Mary 
Dearborn have described the reverence shown him by key Beat and post-Beat figures 
like Kerouac and Kenneth Rexroth. Nonetheless, there remains room for further 
studies in this area. In particular, Miller’s influence on Norman Mailer’s 
Kierkegaardian ‘philosophy of Hip’ merits greater attention than it has so far 
received.   
Miller experimented with the high tones of eschatology not only to draw attention to 
the futility of literature in that age but of art that predicts ‘the end’. He envisions 
Spengler’s style and mission as perversely and gloriously self-defeating: ‘When I 
think of Spengler and of his terrible pronunciamentos, I thank god that style, style in 
the grand manner is done for’.838 Although he is paraphrasing Spengler’s suggestions 
about the exhaustion of artistic possibilities in early twentieth century Europe, he 
also implies that The Decline of the West gives him the absurd impression of a ‘grand 
… style’ cannibalizing itself. As Leon Lewis writes, explaining Hassan’s angle on 
Miller, the latter strives for ‘a form of negative transcendence of an absurd 
universe.’839 
Of course, Pound cannot see the possibility that ‘grand style’ might be exhausted any 
more than he can understand that the theories he sets his stall by will be proved 
disastrously incorrect by history and the evolution of ideas. Because he is completely 
submerged in his own idiosyncratic ‘grand style’, he suffers from a crucial blind spot 
to the outlandishness and irrationality of his positions. If we can, like Hassan, invoke 
‘the common parlance’ of the ‘60’s critics and writers who venerated Miller, Pound is 
not hip to the absurdities and ironies inherent in his eschatological, cultural 
morphological and economic world vision.                                                                
837 Widmer, p. 100. 
838 Cancer, p. 14. 
839 Leon Lewis, Henry Miller- The Major Writings, p. 11. 
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While Miller is aware of the delirious conditions that cultivate his eschatological 
language and ideas, acknowledging and playing on the fact that his writing presents 
him as a ‘monomaniac’, Pound occupies an altogether different ideological and 
psychological territory in this respect.840 Miller does not delude himself that his 
prophetic pronouncements are the answer to the world’s social, economic and 
political problems, lampooning Pound and Fraenkel for their self-importance and 
arrogance and admitting that he has become entangled in their web of ‘impossible 
theories’, but Pound is singularly unable to entertain the notion that his arguments 
might contain flaws.841 
Nonetheless, Miller’s willingness to admit the absurdity of his response to this 
‘absurd universe’ also turns out to be a default mode that cannot entirely mask his 
more dangerous thoughts on social, economic and political issues. Miller’s animosity 
towards bourgeois capitalist values incorporates elements of Pound’s ‘use-value’ 
desire for increased monetary circulation alongside a willfully irrational emphasis on 
excess and prodigality. The link between Miller and Bataille is therefore telling in 
more ways than one. Not only does it invoke a landscape in which the radical voice, 
rather than coming from a right wing perspective, is married to a more 
anthropological reading of the human psyche, it allows for a critique of western 
economics that surpasses partisan politics. Moreover, Miller is unexpectedly 
adamant about the need to return certain societal relations – jilted by a corrupt moral 
and monetary system – to their original and natural positions. Thus Miller’s 
metaphysical revolt questions the adequacy of notions like ‘usefulness’ and 
‘productivity’, suggesting consciously manic and excessive solutions to an insolvably 
manic situation, but at the same time engages in an ostensibly logical critique of 
utilitarianism and capitalism. 
Miller’s slippage between radically anarchic and conservative impulses is related to 
an equally significant dichotomy between the twin desires to consolidate and lose 
control. As we have seen, his progressive use of Poundian brutality to get beyond 
                                                             
840 Capricorn, p. 263. 
841 Cancer, p. 186. See my p. 196.  
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false and weak sentiment is fundamentally motivated by the desire to break away 
from controlled systems of intellect, ideology and morality, but it also protects 
certain absolute positions in all three spheres. In this way, Miller exemplifies the 
anti-humanist as well as humanist possibilities in Bergson’s philosophy, since his 
rebellion against ideology in favour of intuition is intended to advance an 
understanding of the self and an honest and inclusive approach to humanity even as 
it leads to an aggressive, totalising and dogmatic rhetoric.  
Despite Miller’s attraction to anarchy, Pound’s enthusiastic exclamation that ‘the 
sphericality of the planets presides’ in Tropic of Cancer indicates a firm belief in a 
natural and indisputable cosmological order that permeates Miller’s project. In this 
light, the use of brutality to pave the way for compassion appears partly 
disingenuous. Indeed, in Miller’s scheme of human relations, a healthy cosmological 
order is preserved when people abide by certain ‘natural’ ways of being. Though he 
is expressly parodic in his use of ‘the death theme’ and even the racial stereotypes of 
his Jewish friends, Miller’s search for a pre-modern ‘fulcrum’ also nonetheless leads 
him towards potentially ambiguous but suspect essentialist positions. Miller might 
mock Pound’s attempt to coopt him for his ‘crazy social credit theories’ but his 
presentation of himself as a truth-telling, innovative writer depends on the Poundian 
supposition that he is bravely asserting indisputable differences. Indeed, he 
envisions resilience and ‘incurable health’ as the special preserve of people who are 
able to understand their essential qualities, a theory that inevitably implies weakness 
and impurity in those who deny those qualities.842  
This anomaly returns us, finally, to the chief paradox at the heart of both their 
aesthetics; namely, that anarchic liberation serves as the starting point for Miller and 
Pound’s quests to create pure, harmonious and virtuous art. Miller’s objection to the 
application of structure to existence cannot ultimately be sustained, meaning that he 
inevitably ends up applying his own restrictive parameters to the complex disorder 
he is attempting to embrace and represent. Though he is more successful than Pound 
at getting beyond the limits of false ethical positions, he cannot resist the urge to                                                              
842 Cancer, p. 52. See my pp. 155-61. 
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seize control of that chaos for his own ideological purposes. Miller’s crucial aim, to 
embody the subjective self in a work of art – in all its chaotic, glorious and ‘hideous’ 
contradiction – is invariably compromised by the force of his feelings against 
standardized ‘beauty’, ‘ideas’ and modernity. In attempting to break the spell of 
sentimentality and ethical idealism and to express the complexities of individual 
experience unmediated by convention, he in fact falls under his own sometimes 
equally reductive spell. It is an irony that is well illustrated by Anaïs Nin’s 
recollection of the reaction Miller’s wife June had on reading the manuscript of 
Cancer: ‘He says I live in delusions, but it is he, it is he who does not see me, or 
anyone, as I am, as they are. He makes everything ugly.’843 
In line with this, the anarchic starting point has often alienated readers from both 
Pound and Miller’s aims. The quest for a truthful, uncontrived mode of literary 
expression is evident and articulated throughout their works but it is frequently 
overlooked because of the rhetorical gestures both writers succumb to. Like Miller’s 
search for a more honest approach to suffering, for redefinitions of sympathy and 
empathy, Pound’s desire for art that represents subjective experience honestly, 
naturally and ‘without moralizing’ gets lost in the aggressive fervor of his language 
and politics. By conflating aesthetics with politics and delivering his message about 
art sonorously and portentously, indeed by the frenzy and essentialism of his attacks 
on the ‘such half master slime as the weakminded’ Virginia Woolf or the slushy 
abstract writings of ‘Wells-Shaw-Bennett ersatz’, Pound distracts his readers from 
the basic search for serious and truth-telling works of literature.844   
Henry Miller - categorized for so long as amoral and apolitical or unwittingly 
counter-revolutionary - in fact produced a narrative voice that is profoundly moral 
and political. Incongruously but undeniably, the universe he creates in his semi-
autobiographical novels of the 1930s correlates with Ezra Pound’s esoteric vision of 
the world at that time, functioning within often deliriously yet distinctly defined 
aesthetic and moral boundaries. Miller’s syncretic appropriation of early modernist 
                                                             
843 The Diary of Anaïs Nin, p. 34. See my p. 192. 
844 Gottesman, ‘Introduction’, Critical Essays, ed. by Gottesman, p. ix. See my p. 52.  
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tropes and ideas demonstrates both his strong attraction and irreverent 
circumspection to them, making him fascinatingly reflective of the anxieties and 
ambiguities that permeated Anglo-American avant-garde literature in the inter-war 
period. Significantly, my study has followed Richard Sheppard’s definition of 
modernism ‘not as the “artistic emanations” of a “sensibility” but as a complex range 
of responses to a complex set of problems by a variety of people in different but 
related historical situations’. With this as my basis, ‘it [has been] possible to see deep, 
non-reductive affinities between artists and intellectuals … who have little in 
common on the surface.’845  
Pound’s affinity with Miller highlights the importance of brutalizing, retrograde 
elements to the latter’s aesthetics but it also illuminates some of the progressive 
elements of Pound’s aesthetic that are obscured by his essentialist rhetoric and fascist 
politics. While it is clear that they represent different versions of the avant-garde in 
their attitudes towards the anarchic emotional and creative forces that both believe 
drive human existence, these differences are by no means stable and it is precisely 
this instability that represents the value of Miller to present day studies of the 
twentieth-century avant-garde. In his struggle to liberate himself perceptually, to use 
writing to record and further his creative and existential resurrection, Miller is 
fascinatingly indicative of the slippage between avant-garde aesthetics and radically 
conservative language that was a hallmark of inter-war modernist writing. As 
importantly, Pound’s surprising use of Miller to demonstrate a new kind of 
modernism sheds light on the Poundian origins of elements in Miller’s writing that 
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